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In the seventeenth century a new science of motion emerged that later developed into what we 
call today classical mechanics. The epistemology of early modern mechanics was split between 
technical experimentation and mathematical formalisation. ‘Mechanicism’, Cartesianism in 
primis, was a philosophical project to both preserve the theoretical and technical efficacy of this 
science and integrate it into a new world picture. In this historical context mechanical philosophy 
therefore played a double role. On the one hand it was part of a revolutionary event opening 
new frontiers for materialist thought. On the other hand, as a world picture, it originated a new 
ideological framework for metaphysical dualism. This thesis uses this historical and 
philosophical background to radically reconsider the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. 
During the 1640s Hobbes’s scientia civilis progressively incorporated the dualistic epistemology 
of Descartes’s mechanicism into materialist philosophy by privileging one of the two structural 
features of modern science: the tendency towards ‘deduction’ rather than experimentation. This 
philosophical gesture, simultaneously epistemological and ideological, had considerable political 
consequences. For this reason Hobbes’s political theory will be read as an ideological response 
to the non-geometrical and non-mechanical functioning of ‘matter’, including ‘human matter’, 
evidenced by the threatening experimental practices carried on during the first half of the 
seventeenth century in both the Galilean science of nature and the English Civil War. 
My wider hypothesis is that this profoundly idealistic agenda still informs our understanding of 
nature and of the body politic. It reduces the open method of science to the outdated 
metaphysical picture of it provided by Descartes, and suffocates politics itself by neutralising the 
emergence of political conflict and experimentation, labelling them as not only inessential but 
also dangerous to the body politic. On the contrary, philosophical materialism invites us to 
understand the self-organising tendency of matter as an undeniable risk implicit in the 
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List of Abbreviations 
References to Galileo, Descartes and Hobbes’s works follow this list of abbreviations (details are 
provided in the Bibliography). For Hobbes’s works, when possible, citations to the Opera Latina 
(OL) or English Works (EW) follow. Translations can slightly diverge from the English versions I 
refer to, according to my interpretation and on my responsibility. The original quotation is provided 
in note. 
Galileo 
[GG] Le Opere di Galileo Galilei (20 vols.) 
Descartes 
[AT] Œuvres de Descartes (3 vols.) 
Hobbes 
[Beh] Behemoth 
[Corr] Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes 
[DC]  De cive 
[DeCo] De corpore 
[DH] De homine 
[DM] Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White 
[DP] Decameron Physiologicum 
[EL] The Elements of Law Natural and Politic 
[EO] A Minute Or First Draught of the Optiques 
[EW] English Works of Thomas Hobbes (11 vols.) 
[HS] Three Discourses 
[Lev] Leviathan 
[Lev Lat] Leviathan (Latin version) 
[LN] On Liberty and Necessity 
[LO] Latin Optical MS 
[OL] Opera Latina of Thomas Hobbes (5 vols.) 
[PrG] The Answer to D’Avenant’s Preface Before Gondibert 
[SL] Six Lessons to the Savillian Professors of the Mathematics 
[SP] Seven Philosophical Problems 






I can imagine no cause, but a reasonlesse imitation of 
costume; of a foolish custome; by which a man enabled 
to speake wisely from the principles of nature, and his 
own meditation, loves rather to be thought to speak by 
inspiration, like a Bag-pipe. 
Thomas Hobbes 
 
In the seventeenth century a new science of motion emerged that later developed into 
what we call today classical mechanics. The epistemology of early-modern mechanics 
was split between technical experimentation and mathematical formalisation. 
‘Mechanicism’, Cartesianism in primis, was a philosophical project to both preserve the 
theoretical and technical efficacy of this science and integrate it into a new world picture.1 
In this historical context mechanical philosophy therefore played a double role. On the one 
hand it was part of a revolutionary event opening new frontiers for materialist thought. On 
the other hand, as a world picture, it originated a new ideological framework for 
metaphysical dualism. This thesis uses this historical and philosophical background to 
radically reconsider the political theory of Thomas Hobbes. 
During the 1640s Hobbes’s scientia civilis progressively incorporated the dualistic 
epistemology of Descartes’s mechanicism into materialist philosophy by privileging one of 
the two structural features of modern science: the tendency towards ‘deduction’ rather 
than experimentation. This philosophical gesture, simultaneously epistemological and 
ideological, had considerable political consequences. For this reason Hobbes’s political 
theory will be read as an ideological response to the non-geometrical and non-mechanical 
functioning of ‘matter’, including ‘human matter’, evidenced by the threatening 
experimental practices carried on during the first half of the seventeenth century in both 
the Galilean science of nature and the English Civil War. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I am assuming a conceptual distinction marked by the expressions ‘mechanics’, ‘mechanicism’, ‘mechanistic 
ideology’, and ‘mechanical philosophy’. ‘Mechanics’ refers here to the new science of motion that later 
became Newton’s classical mechanics (differentiated from both ancient mechanics and modern quantum 
mechanics). ‘Mechanicism’ and ‘philosophical mechanicism’ refer to philosophies that, starting from the 
seventeenth century, intended to be systematically grounded on mechanics conceived as an ‘interdisciplinary’ 
field of research, and to explain all phenomena in terms of cause-effect relations (labelling a systems of 
thought as ‘mechanicism’ helps distancing it from the common meaning of the term ‘mechanism’, Dijksterhuis 
1961: 3, footnote). The phrase ‘mechanistic ideology’ pinpoints the ideological nature of such theories and the 
related world picture, in particular as far as they entail a deterministic ontology. Finally, by ‘mechanical 
philosophy’ I name more generally a mechanical conception of reality that can be traced back to ancient 
Greece. ‘Mechanical philosophy’ includes mechanicism but does not necessarily coincide with it, and 
therefore, depending on the context, the phrase ‘early-modern mechanical philosophy’ may relate to the 
birthplace of mechanics, mechanicism, and the mechanistic world picture. 
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My argument is developed through three chapters. In Chapter One I briefly sketch the 
early debate concerning the epistemological status of mathematics and the ontological 
status of matter in motion, in order to understand what was at stake in the philosophical 
questioning of the subject and the object of the new Galilean science, as it resulted in 
Descartes’s metaphysical synthesis. My purpose is to analyse the effects of the 
philosophical debate around mechanics and its ontology of matter in Hobbes’s political 
theory, where political power and science became closely connected for both 
epistemological and political reasons. 
Chapter Two is devoted to a close analysis of the development of Hobbes’s epistemology 
of civil science during the 1640s, and shows its ideological convergence with Descartes’s 
mechanicism. The peculiar positioning of De cive at the crossing of two ‘lines’ of research 
– epistemological and political – allows us to ‘calculate’ the impact of Hobbes’s systematic 
project on the development of his civil science. My aim is to show that an epistemological 
shift occurred in De cive which transformed Hobbes’s political theory from an ontology of 
the body politic based on the mechanics of light to an epistemology of the laws of nature 
conceived as the principles of right reason. The analysis of this transition particularly 
focuses on two connected issues: the concepts of ‘law(s) of nature’ and ‘right reason’, 
evidencing the discontinuity in the use of these concepts between The Elements of Law 
and De cive. Hence I shall enquire into Hobbes’s progressive consolidation of 
determinism during the 1640s, when he made of it an ontological postulate endowed with 
an epistemological function (the guarantee of the neutrality and objectivity of science) that 
would found the actual power of reason once it was implemented with civil power. 
As explained in Chapter Three, Hobbes’s ideological interest during the 1640s in the 
questions that the epistemological shift of De cive had left wide open was a response to 
an epistemological and political exigency of foundation. The main instrument of such an 
operation was the redefinition and disciplinary organisation of human natural motion, 
which allowed for a reformulation of the ancient Platonic project according to the new 
geometrical science of motion. As a result, civil science had to provide civil power with its 
own material means of existence, requiring it to be supplemented by cultural technologies, 
such as rhetoric, religion, and history. As a matter of fact, Hobbes’s political-pedagogical 
project eventually became perfectly consistent with the dualistic world view on which 
Descartes had founded the new mechanical science of nature, and materialism could thus 
be reduced to the political agenda of mechanicism. This agenda entailed the convergence 
of sovereignty, science, and technocracy in a theory that would plan an artificial body 
politic as the only possible solution to the political problem posed by human nature. 
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My wider hypothesis is that this profoundly idealistic agenda still informs our 
understanding of nature and of the body politic. This agenda is epistemologically wrong, 
as far as it reduces the open method of science to the outdated metaphysical picture of it 
provided by Descartes, but is also politically bad, in so far as it suffocates politics itself by 
neutralising the emergence of political conflict and experimentation, labelling them as not 
only inessential but also dangerous to the body politic. On the contrary, philosophical 
materialism invites us to understand the self-organising tendency of matter as an 
undeniable risk implicit in the functioning of all systems, the social system included. But 
the early-modern agenda cannot be abandoned without the elaboration of a new 
epistemological agenda that takes into account the development of the twentieth century’s 
natural sciences. As I will explain in the conclusion, it is my conviction that this very 
framework allows for both the demystification of the early-modern conception of the 
deterministic machine and a new materialistic understanding of the relations between 
science and political power. 
In this Introduction, I will discuss the scholarship on Hobbes’s philosophical system and in 
particular on the problematic relation between his natural philosophy and political theory. 
The gaps, oscillations and problems emerging from the analysis of Hobbes’s system will 
not be dismissed as the mark of its inconsistency; rather, they will introduce a more 
accurate study of the internal tensions that inhabited the actual development of his 
philosophy. Hence I will pinpoint some key contributions to a theory of the development of 
Hobbes’s research in the field of political philosophy that will be challenged in Chapter 
Two, through the analysis of the link between the epistemological exigencies of Hobbes’s 
materialistic mechanicism and its implicit ideological concerns. Subsequently, I will take 
into consideration different interpretations of Hobbes’s enterprise that either implicitly or 
explicitly endorse a position on the relation between science and ideology today. Some 
examples of what I call ‘epistemological’ interpretations in intellectual history, sociological 
constructivism, and Marxism will allow me to question the opposition between science and 
ideology in early-modern mechanicism and to define the ‘mixed’ approach I have adopted 
in my current analysis of the epistemological and political agenda of early-modern 
mechanical philosophy. 
The place of scientia civilis in Hobbes’s system of sciences 
Hobbes’s political philosophy was meant by its author to be a scientific and systematic 
foundation of a new political science on the ground of a geometrical theory of motion. 
More generally, the problem of providing a common foundation for his system of sciences 
was a key issue in the whole of his oeuvre, at least from the 1640s onward, when he 
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explicitly planned, developed and eventually accomplished an ambitious project inspired 
by Euclide’s Elements, which he eventually entitled Elementa philosophiae: 
I go from the varying motions to the dissimilar shapes of various things, and the 
deceptions of matter; the inner motions of men, the heart's hiding-places; and finally 
to the goods of authority and justice. I immerse myself in these studies. For the 
Body, Man, the Citizen, contain every kind of philosophising. On these three things I 
decide to compose three books and each day collect my material. (OL I, XC)2 
Nevertheless, the consistency, or even the existence of a ‘Hobbesian system’ has been a 
major subject of debate among scholars. Particularly important for my purpose is the 
debate about the relationship between Hobbes’s research in the fields of natural and 
political philosophy. 
The scholarly debate on Hobbes’s system of sciences 
The whole story starts from Hobbes’s rediscovery by Tönnies (1889). Before Tönnies, 
only Croom Robertson (1886) had recognized Hobbes’s debts towards Galileo and 
Descartes, while the traditional view still persisted of Hobbes as a ‘minor philosopher of 
the English empiricist school’ (Bobbio 1989: 201), close to Bacon and manifestly opposed 
to mathematical rationalism. But at the beginning of the century a strongly ‘polarized’ 
scholarly debate raged about the unity of Hobbes’s system and the reconstruction of its 
sources, organised around the historico-philosophical categories of Empiricism and 
Rationalism. The article of Frischeisen-Koehler (1902) was an attempt to point out 
Hobbes’s value as a political thinker, at the price of endorsing a complete devaluation of 
Hobbes’s natural philosophy. On the other hand, the theory of a ‘rationalist influence’ was 
drawn on by Brandt (1928), who (precisely against Frischeisen-Koehler) tried to show how 
Hobbes built his natural philosophy on the basis of an ‘emulative’ conflict with Descartes. 
Unfortunately, in his analysis Brandt did not consider Hobbes’s political writings, and in 
the end it was Frischeisen-Koehler who traced the main stream of scholarship on 
Hobbes’s political philosophy. 
As a matter of fact – as the interest in Hobbes’s political theory grew up connected with 
the events occurring between the two world wars – any attempt to provide a systematic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  ‘Motibus a variis feror ad rerum variorum dissimiles species, materiaeque dolos; motusque internos 
hominum, cordisque latebras: denique ad imperii iustitiaque bona. Hic ego me mersi studiis. Nam 
philosophandi Corpus, Homo, Civis continent omne genus. Tres super his rebus statuo conscribere libros’ 
(Thomae Hobbes malmesburiensis vita carmine expressa). In 1641 the first draft of De cive circulated in Paris, 
De corpore was published in 1655, and De homine in 1658. Only in 1668 the three complete sections 
appeared in their proper logical order (De corpore, De homine and De cive) under the common title Elementa 
philosophiae, within a collection of Hobbes’s Latin works which also included Leviathan, edited by the Dutch 
publisher Blaeu (Martinich 1999: 173, 324-25). 
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interpretation of Hobbes’s philosophy was blocked by Leo Strauss (1936).3 Still referring 
to Frischeisen-Koehler, he established the centrality of Hobbes’s political philosophy and 
the marginality of his natural philosophy which, according to him, had been little more than 
an obstacle to his political theory and was to be considered of no interest at all. In short, 
twentieth-century scholarship on Hobbes’s political philosophy was born out of a basic 
undervaluation of the ‘continental’ debts in Hobbes’s natural philosophy, in order to treat 
his political philosophy as a separate field of research, the integration of which into a 
system was never successful. In this sense the article of Taylor (1938) can be considered 
the prototype of all the approaches neatly dividing Hobbes’s natural science from civil 
science, particularly focusing on problems concerning the relationship between politics 
and religion, human and divine law in Hobbes’s works, and claiming the non-existence – 
or, at least, the radical inconsistency – of a Hobbesian ‘system’ of sciences.4 
In his Introduction to Leviathan, Oakeshott (1946) was perhaps the first who ventured to 
claim that Hobbes’s was a coherent ‘system’, although what he actually referred to was a 
sort of systematic critical function carried on by his philosophy despite its materialistic 
assumptions: in Hobbes, ‘civil philosophy belongs to a philosophical system, not because 
it is materialistic but because it is philosophical’ (Oakeshott 1946: 16). But during the 
1960s a couple of books appeared in which Watkins (1965) and Goldsmith (1966) tried to 
demonstrate the relation between Hobbes’s political philosophy and his system of 
sciences, without ignoring the complexity of his epistemology and particularly highlighting 
his debts towards Galileo and Descartes.5 Along the same line of thought, Spragens 
(1973) pointed out Hobbes’s attempt to provide, against Aristotle but within the ‘tacit 
framework of the Aristotelian paradigm which persists in Hobbes’s ideas’ (Spragens 1973: 
47), an alternative system based on the concept of motion, the result of which is a 
conception of political life as a part of nature and the subsequent correlation of natural 
and political sciences.6 At the same time Pacchi (1965) revived the interest in Hobbes’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A remarkable exception was Schmitt 1938 who, on the contrary, based his theological-political interpretation 
of Leviathan on Hobbes’s mechanicism. Another attempt for a systematic approach, yet from a completely 
different political point of view, was Vialatoux 1935. I will rapidly go through these crucial references – Schmitt 
in particular – in Chapter 2.4. 
4 For a wide discussion of the ‘Taylor thesis’, see Brown 1965, Chapters 2-3, where also Taylor’s article is 
reprinted. 
5 In particular, Goldsmith considers how Hobbes’s system, being strongly dependent on Galileo’s conception 
of science, inherits the same fundamental limitations: ‘Hobbes’s political science, however, exhibits the 
weakness of Galilean science in an especially noticeable way. This weakness is the absence of criteria for 
falsifying the theory by an empirical test. The theory is allowed to explain phenomena, but it is not permitted to 
be tested by them’ (Goldsmith 1966: 242). However, both accounts on Hobbes’s system are quite ‘static’, 
particularly Watkins’s, which wrongly assumes that ‘when Hobbes […] wrote the Tract he was already a full-
fledged physical determinist’ (Watkins 1965: 19) and subsequently maintains that ‘his early philosophizing split 
over into his political theorizing’ (Watkins 1965: 14). 
6 Spragens assumes Leo Strauss was right in observing that a deductive relationship between natural and 
political philosophy ‘is simply a logical impossibility’, nevertheless he claims that ‘human mind works in many 
ways other than deduction’. Spragens’s hypothesis is not of a ‘deductive derivation’ of political philosophy 
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natural philosophy, renewing an interpretative line which had remained suspended since 
Cassirer (1907) had claimed that Hobbes’s ‘hypothetical materialism’ served as a logical 
postulate for the unity of a scientific method based on an ‘epistemological 
phenomenalism’.7 
More recently, the contested but prized book of Shapin and Shaffer (1985) on Hobbes’s 
quarrel with Boyle had the undisputable merit of raising some interest in the relation 
between Hobbes’s philosophy of science and the experimental method supported by the 
Royal Society, thus providing new interest in what Sorell has named ‘the old question 
called “Hobbes’s system”’ (Sorell 1996: 45). Sorell himself (1988a) took part into the 
dispute with an article where he contrasted what he called the ‘standard interpretation’ 
(the ‘systemic’ one), trying to show the relative autonomy of De cive within the Elementa 
project. Conceding that the ‘standard interpretation’ could perhaps be reasonable if 
referred to Leviathan, Sorell claimed that it did not fit at all to De cive’s structure, which 
clearly shows its inconsistency with the basic assumptions of Hobbes’s mechanical 
philosophy. From his analysis Sorell concluded that the method of natural sciences differs 
from the method of civil philosophy not only as far as De cive is concerned, but also in 
Leviathan, where the first and second parts are actually autonomous (Sorell 1988a: 70). 
Despite criticizing some of Sorell’s arguments, Malcolm (1990) endorsed his ‘split’ thesis, 
claiming that during the development of Hobbes’s system his epistemological writings had 
become ‘more and more misleading as guides to his actual practice’ of civil science 
(Malcolm 1990: 155). In a more recent article Sorell (1996), slightly attenuating his view 
without substantially changing it, goes back to the ‘traditional’ relationship between the 
theses of the Baconian influence and of the autonomy of civil philosophy, and concludes 
that 
Hobbes is closer to Bacon than to Descartes […] but the task he undertook was not 
quite the Baconian one of making a massive report on the progress of learning up to 
his own day: it was the different one of reducing the mass of existing science to its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
from natural philosophy, but rather of a ‘considerable interaction’, the results of which is the final content of 
Hobbes’s political doctrine (Spragens 1973: 36-37). 
7 According to Pacchi (1971), before Cassirer, within the Neokantian school of Marburg, Natorp 1882 had 
already noted Hobbes’s ‘phenomenalism’. Cassirer claims that ‘from the first beginning of his philosophy it 
was [Hobbes’s (and Grotius’s)] great ambition to create a theory of the body politic equal to the Galilean 
theory of physical bodies – equal in clarity, in scientific method, and in certainty’. Hobbes’s aim would be to 
find a ‘mathematics of politic’ grounded on the assumption that ‘man’s social life is not a mere mass of 
incoherent and haphazard facts’ (Cassirer 1946: 165). Laird minimizes Bacon’s influence and rather 
underlines Descartes’s (Laird 1934: 45). Although claiming Hobbes was a ‘rationalistic materialist’ (Laird 1934: 
86) (or even a ‘naïve rationalist’, Laird 1934: 123), he believes his ‘phenomenalism’ was not ‘directly 
contradictory to his materialism. He held that the material motion called thought took its place among other 
material motions. I do not say he succeeded, but I suggest that it was not unreasonable for him to try’ (Laird 
1934: 124). 
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elements and presenting them so that they could be taken in by others. (Sorell 
1996: 60) 
If no other systematic reading of Hobbes’s system would be possible out of thinking it as 
functional to Bacon’s project of a science open to collective research, we should conclude 
with Sorell that the ‘internal tensions’ in Hobbes’s account of sciences are due to a radical 
contradiction between Hobbes’s mechanical materialism and his empiricist epistemology. 
In fact a project of re-founding science on the first elements of knowledge would rather 
connect Hobbes to the ‘intellectual context’ nourished by Bacon.8 In what follows I will 
rather endorse the hypothesis that the fundamental unity of Hobbes’s epistemological 
project and its materialistic premises also concerns his political theory. In my view, as his 
epistemology evolved, it entered in contradiction not with the ‘materialistic’ 
characterization of his mechanical ontology, but with the ‘deterministic’ characterisation of 
it, which he matured during the 1640s, alongside physical and theological reflexions, as 
an ideological exigency. Therefore, I will try to follow the problematic development of 
Hobbes’s materialistic epistemology along his three political treatises without falling into 
the trap of taking for granted a priori the unity of an alleged complete ‘system’, and yet will 
read his epistemology of civil science in the light of the postulate that all the names, 
principles and definitions it relays on, should be caused, and therefore explained, by 
anything ‘but’ the local motion of matter. 
Development of scientia civilis 
Scholars who tried to explain the development of Hobbes’s civil philosophy within the 
boundaries of his political thought, often interpreted Hobbes’s different epistemological 
claims in the three political treatises as ‘inconsistencies’ rather than as different 
methodological perspectives. And when such differences are considered ‘inconsistencies’, 
the standard view usually prescribes a progressive development for Hobbes’s civil 
philosophy, culminating in the masterpiece of Leviathan. Such a tendency is well 
characterized by the book of McNeilly (1968), which ascribes the methodological 
differences in The Elements of Law, De cive, Leviathan and De corpore to a fundamental 
inconsistency in the development of Hobbes’s views on the foundations of political theory 
(McNeilly 1968: 4). McNeilly’s grand narrative, in which both The Elements of Law and De 
cive are considered preliminary steps, results in the assumption that only an adequate 
anatomy of Leviathan can allow us to piece together a coherent picture of an Hobbesian 
methodology. McNeilly’s merit of having noticed a development in Hobbes’s political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In this direction Milanese draws on the Baconian heritage evidenced by the epistemological centrality 
assumed in De corpore by the concept of fancy (Milanese 2011: 24-25). In my analysis such an 
‘epistemological’ stance should be considered rather the result (possibly a ‘return’ to Bacon) of Hobbes’s 
epistemological development than an unvarying methodological assumption of his research. 
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thought is therefore attenuated by the univocal interpretation of its inconsistencies from 
the point of view of the work which he considers Hobbes’s final summa. McNeilly in fact 
establishes Leviathan as a kind of ‘basic’ logic (the foundation of political theory on the 
knowledge of human nature) that works as a criterion for dividing what is ‘pre-Leviathan or 
Leviathan’ in Hobbes’s production.9 
Indeed, as Brandt had earlier demonstrated in his key study on Hobbes’s natural 
philosophy, Hobbesian epistemology had always been in progress rather than fully 
accomplished, and the completion of the Elementa Philosophiae with De homine was not 
to be considered the final fulfilment of a deductive system starting from the principles of 
motion, but rather its definitive sinking (see also Pacchi 1965: 217). I am assuming here 
that it is possible to adopt a similar perspective on Hobbes’s civil philosophy, considering 
Leviathan a phase (and not necessarily the most scientifically consistent) of Hobbes’s 
philosophico-political development, rather than its ‘natural’ achievement. Although not 
challenging the undisputed primacy of Leviathan in Hobbes’s political production, this at 
least allows us to question the differences between it and the preceding political works. 
This is what a few scholars already tried to do, usually focusing on particular aspects of 
Hobbes’s doctrine. Hood (1967), for instance, points to the change in Hobbes’s definition 
of liberty from De cive to Leviathan, while Schumann (2004a), despite maintaining that 
Leviathan was mainly the rewriting of De cive, notes the important exception represented 
by the centrality assumed by the concept of persona in Chapter XVI.10 More general 
stances are assumed by other scholars who argue for a major development in Hobbes’s 
political thought. Zagorin (2009), for instance, claims that the more Hobbes’s thought 
advanced, the nearer politics came to geometry: it progressively abandoned its relation to 
mechanics and physics and became closer and closer to the – abstract – perfection of 
geometry, eventually allowing its deduction from the principles of moral philosophy.11 
Quite differently, Johnston (1986) explains that Hobbes, who aimed with his civil science 
to give a rational political stability alternative to theology and metaphysics, sought in 
Leviathan to implement this aim with rhetoric, a thesis which Skinner (1996) later revived 
and extended. For Johnston Leviathan was the turning point in Hobbes’s political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 This is what McNeilly does, for instance, in finding a passage in De cive’s preface which would exemplify the 
threshold between a conception of the state of nature based on the consideration of human motives, to the 
more ‘formalised version’ of it provided in Leviathan (McNeilly 1968: 167). On the process of formalisation of 
civil science carried on by Hobbes in Leviathan, and the ideology of neutralisation it entails, see below, in 
particular Chapters 2.5 and 3.2. 
10 Both issues were later widely developed by Skinner 2008 (on liberty) and 2007, 2002 chap. 6 (on persona). 
These important themes will be discussed in Chapter 2.4. 
11 See also Zagorin 1993: ‘If we are to posit one supreme motive or aim that drove Hobbes from the beginning 
of his career as a philosopher, it is this: that philosophy should be a science, a deductive enquiry which is akin 
to geometry in its rigorous definitions and proofs, which is centred on body and the knowledge of causes and 
effects as its fundamental subject, and which should not offer results contrary to experience’ (Zagorin 1993: 
517-18). 
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production: not only a work of science, but also of rhetoric. But the change was, according 
to him, dramatic and systemic: due to the growing awareness that reason cannot assert 
itself, rhetoric came in Hobbes’s picture with the purpose of supporting the rational 
understanding of his argument, thus making of Leviathan itself ‘a political act’ (Johnston 
1986: 91).12 
Only few scholars claim today that there was no substantial change in Hobbes’s civil 
philosophy. For instance Nauta (2002) focuses on the themes of religion and the church-
state relationship during the 1640s and concludes that there is no discontinuity in it. Tuck 
also considers Hobbes’s religious thought, and although he theorises no evident 
development in Hobbes’s political theory, he considers Leviathan a kind of utopian ‘turn’ 
of the arguments displayed in The Elements of Law and De cive. If the former treatises 
allowed for a quite partial role played by ‘ritually ordained ecclesiastics’ (DC XVII.28, OL II, 
413)13 in providing the sovereign with a correct interpretation of the Scriptures, Leviathan 
‘compromised the unity of his theory in this one respect, for he allowed (albeit in a kind of 
advisory position) a crucial role to the Church in the formation of public doctrine’ (Tuck 
1989: 85). The reason for Hobbes’s prudent opening to the Anglican Church was, 
according to Tuck, both political and philosophical: 
The reason for the shift probably lay partly in Hobbes’s enthusiasm for the anti-
Presbyterian struggle, in which he saw Independency as having the best chance of 
winning; but another part of the reason lay, I think, in Hobbes’s increasing 
awareness of the real implications of his general philosophical position. (Tuck 1989: 
86)14 
Today, the traditional interpretation which conceived Hobbes’s political theory as a smooth 
path oriented towards the accomplishment of Leviathan can no longer be sustained, pace 
those scholars who contend that in Hobbes’s political treatises there was no relevant 
change but rather a progressive clarification of ideas.15 And nevertheless, although noting 
the many differences characterising Hobbes’s political treatises, many ‘philosophical’ 
interpretations (not only in the analytic tradition), still oppose this ‘historical’ kind of 
explanation and prefer to focus with accuracy on the contradictions and ‘errors’ sparse in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This purpose would explain the very structure of Leviathan, divided into two halves corresponding to the two 
different aims: parts three and four would ‘shape the thoughts and opinions’ of the reader in order to make the 
scientific demonstration displayed in parts one and two ‘persuasive and compelling’ (Johnston 1986: 129 ff.). 
On my interpretation of the purposes of Hobbes’s civil science, see Chapter 3.1. 
13 ‘Per ecclesiasticos rite ordinatos’. 
14 The mark of this shift would be the unanimous reaction against Hobbes’s possible atheism after the 
publication of Leviathan compared to the fact that ‘there was little hostility […] towards either the Elements of 
Law and De cive’ (Tuck 1989: 86). 
15 Many of these are listed in Skinner 2008: XIV-XV, notes 23, 24, 25, 27. 
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Hobbes’s texts, in order to reconstruct a supposedly original philosophical design as not 
‘perverted’ by rationally inconsistent issues.16 
Hoekstra (2004) sketches a clear and useful ‘archetypical’ opposition between the two 
main streams of interpretation of Hobbes’s changes in political theory, the Philosophers’ 
and the Historians’: while the latter provides a political explanation of these changes in 
terms of political agenda, the former basically charges Hobbes with theoretical 
inconsistency. Against the former, I shall hold that Hobbes’s philosophy is not the building 
of a system according to a model of rationality, it is rather part of the process of 
construction of the rationality of modern science itself, and therefore its inconsistencies 
are often to be intended as oscillations, alternative paths whose interrogation can be the 
source of fundamental questions that still inhabit our mechanical world picture, and silently 
drive our way of questioning these texts. In contrast with the latter, we can certainly 
assume Hobbes’s political agenda was of central importance in changing his conception 
of the relationship between science and rhetoric, but I claim that we must not overlook 
either the sound and consistent epistemological arguments Hobbes derived from 
continuous work on De corpore during the 1640s in Paris or the ideological conclusions he 
drew from it. In short, while ‘philosophical’ interpretations consider as ideology whatever 
hinders a supposed clear rational understanding, most ‘historical’ interpretations reduce 
the problem of the influence of ideology on Hobbes’s civil science to his personal fears 
and interests. 
What all these contrasting positions share is that they all revolve around Hobbes’s political 
agenda as the supposed effective or non effective cause of ‘Hobbes’s changing 
conception of civil science’, and around Leviathan as the centre of this shift. On the 
contrary, my research is meant to add to the different accounts of the development in 
Hobbes’s civil science by highlighting the impact of the epistemological agenda of 
mechanicism on Hobbes’s epistemology of civil science, and hence to grasp the 
ideological agenda inscribed in mechanical philosophy itself, concerned as it was with 
providing secure and definitive boundaries to the domain of reason both over the natural 
and human sciences. This will consequently shift the centre of the analysis onto De cive, 
which represents the true epistemological turn in Hobbes’s research. Hence it will be 
possible to provide a consistent account of the ideological effect of Hobbes’s changing 
epistemological approach to the very contents, structure and function of his political 
theory. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 On McNeilly’s ‘logic’ of Leviathan see above, note 9. See also Gauthier 1969, who considers systematically 
Hobbes’s moral and political theory, but separately from his theory of natural science, and ‘extracting’ 
Hobbes’s method mainly from Leviathan. 
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It is in this sense that a ‘political’ interpretation, explicitly centred on questioning the very 
relation between science and ideology, still proves to be an alternative approach to the 
study of Hobbes’s philosophical research. In this direction, although he does not conclude 
for any significant change in Hobbes’s political theory, I will adopt a methodological 
suggestion from Macpherson (1962). Macpherson assumes that, despite the compelling 
exigencies of his political agenda, Hobbes actually ‘intended to be consistent’, and 
therefore the inconsistences in the theoretical structure of his political thought cannot be 
explained in terms of opportunism and must rather be explained at another level, of which 
‘the theorist could have been unconscious’. At this level, postulating consistency turns out 
to be a quite useful theoretical tool: ‘The hypothesis that a thinker was consistent within 
the limits of his vision is useful less as a way of resolving inconsistencies than as a pointer 
to the direction and limits of his vision, which may then be established by other evidence’ 
(Macpherson 1962: 7-8). In Macpherson’s account this deeper level of consistency is 
clearly ideological: he concludes that Hobbes unconsciously projected his conception of 
the early market society on his model of man in the state of nature. His argument in a way 
repeats presented that of Rousseau in an early draft of a chapter of The Social Contract 
that was later discarded: 
The error made by Hobbes, therefore, is not so much his assertion of a state of war 
between independent men in society, but his supposition that this state is natural to 
the species, and to have made it the cause of the vices by which it was produced. 
(Rousseau 1762: 175)17 
Although I can accept neither Macpherson’s ‘static’ treatment of Hobbes’s political thought 
nor his understanding of the state of nature, I shall hold to his methodological rejection of 
the easy claim of inconsistency. This will allow me to ground my interpretation on 
Hobbes’s epistemological development, thus demonstrating that the ‘inconsistencies’ 
cannot be correctly circumscribed through any ‘static’ account of Hobbes’s system. By 
abandoning a sterile charge of inconsistency, my intention is in fact to follow a 
philosophical-political path, and to explain Hobbes’s shift in both epistemological and 
ideological terms, considering all historical explanations on the basis of a ‘political agenda’ 
the very background of a philosophical explanation, and not the explanation itself. 
All these issues will be eventually brought to a head in Chapter Three, where the 
relationship between the mechanical science and the mechanistic ideology will be 
discussed through the achievements of the analysis of the epistemological and ideological 
development of Hobbes’s civil science. For this purpose in Chapter Two I shall particularly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 I shall go back to Macpherson’s book in discussing more in general the relation between mechanistic 
science and ideology in Chapter 3.4. 
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focus on the period preceding the writing of Leviathan. In fact, scholars uniformly agree 
that during the 1640s Hobbes kept collecting materials, writing and reflecting on his 
natural philosophy, mainly in antagonism with Descartes. What they seldom do, is to look 
for the effects of this continued activity on the development of his political thought.18 On 
the contrary, my research is precisely focused on the epistemological stance Hobbes 
adopted in his political treatises, a stance that profoundly changed between The Elements 
of Law, De cive and Leviathan. A historical-philosophical approach will then provide all the 
means for understanding Hobbes’s political philosophy within the context of its elaboration 
and to understand how his epistemological views influenced his political theory without 
mistakenly considering the latter as if it were elaborated in a kind of abstract and pure 
‘world of ideas’. 
In the conclusions to his Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (1996), trying 
to answer the question ‘Why did Hobbes change his mind?’, Skinner attributes some 
importance to both the different influences Hobbes underwent during the 1640s in Paris 
and the peculiar audience of his English Leviathan in 1651 (Skinner 1996: 427). But what 
he eventually claims is that Hobbes’s philosophical ‘turn’ – although not completely 
unrelated to epistemological stances – derived from his political agenda: 
If we focus on Hobbes’s account in Leviathan of the concept of civil science itself, 
what we find is not a new version of his earlier theory but a new and contrasting 
theory, evidently motivated by a desire to reappropriate much of what he had earlier 
cast aside. The Elements and De cive had been based on the conviction that civil 
science must transcend and repudiate the purely persuasive techniques associated 
with the art of rhetoric and the ‘adornment’ of truth. By contrast, Leviathan reverts to 
the humanist assumption that, if the truths of reason are to be widely believed, the 
methods of science will need to be supplemented and empowered by the moving 
force of eloquence. (Skinner 2002: 80)19 
In my view Hobbes’s ‘change of mind’ was not regressive: his conclusions in Leviathan 
were not only that reason and rhetoric must constitute an ‘alliance’ in order to produce the 
utmost pedagogico-political effects, as in the humanist tradition embodied by Cicero, to 
which Skinner refers when he says that Hobbes was ‘returning in Leviathan to the 
humanist roots from which he had cut himself off in The Elements and De cive’ (Skinner 
2002: 83-85; see also 1996: 437).20 In Leviathan Hobbes was also still trying to provide an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 On how ‘Hobbes’s political ideas have, in turn, influenced his natural philosophy’ see instead Finns 2006. 
Polin 1953 even maintains that Hobbes’s natural philosophy is built in order to justify his political philosophy. 
19 ‘To Hobbes, in short, the English revolution appears as a victory for the irrational but overwhelming power of 
neo-classical and antinomian rhetoric over the small power of science and rationality’ (Skinner 1996: 435). 
20 Viano detects a continuity between the (anti-Aristotelian) critique of rhetoric developed by Hobbes in his 
Thucydides in the name of history, and the theory of mathematical knowledge of the emotional basis of human 
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epistemological solution to the ancient question of Plato’s Republic concerning the 
relationship between government and philosophy in the light of the new epistemological 
stance he had assumed in De cive. No reference to any Platonic world of ideas, or to any 
Cartesian innate knowledge was possible within his radical materialism.21 If reason was 
ultimately based on the collective human power of instituting, diffusing and conserving 
‘names’ through education and discipline, then only power could provide the ultimate 
foundation of scientific truth against the groundless use of rhetoric. Therefore, even 
though in Leviathan reason remained the only and unique criterion for distinguishing the 
genuine use of the art of rhetoric (Skinner 2002: 78-79), it could be effective (and capable 
of using rhetoric ‘for the good’) only under the condition of a sovereign power. From this 
perspective Hobbes’s epistemology is to be considered political in its essence, as far as 
necessarily concerned with its own – material – conditions of possibility. 
In this sense I shall endorse Skinner’s assumption that ‘Hobbes’s claim to originality lies to 
a greater degree at the epistemological level’ (Skinner 2002: 307),22 along with Zarka’s 
suggestion that in Hobbes’s speculative structure, ‘it is at the political level that one has to 
look for an answer to the problem posed at the metaphysical level by the separation of 
discourse and being’ (Zarka 1999: 25). Zarka refers to a ‘metaphysical decision’ through 
which Hobbes would separate the levels of truth (logic) and of matter (ontology). This 
‘metaphysics of separation’ would provide, according to him, the horizon of both Hobbes’s 
political science and of his conception of politics. The absence of a ‘natural’ ontological 
and/or axiological order would entail the exigency of its political foundation, and it is 
therefore at the political level that, in Hobbes’s philosophy, an answer to the metaphysical 
problem of separation should be searched for. In short, politics would found what cannot 
be metaphysically founded (Zarka 1999: 24-25). Zarka’s view has the indisputable merit of 
focusing on the link between Hobbes’s (ideological) metaphysics and his political 
philosophy. A certain ‘preponderance’ of political science on the other sciences (Zarka 
1999: 175) would find its apex in the ‘new theory of authorization’ displayed in Leviathan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
nature he presents in The Elements of Law (Viano 1962: 360-61). Yet, according to him, the demystification of 
human rationality achieved by The Elements of Law eventually destroys the very foundations of the Baconian 
rationalist and anti-rhetorical project still endorsed by Hobbes at the time, thus compelling his science to recur 
to technics of ‘disciplination of imagination’ ultimately committed to state power (Viano 1962: 381-83, 391-92). 
Unfortunately, and precisely because he limits his analysis to The Elements of Law, Viano cannot grasp that 
rhetoric, on the contrary, will be taken by Hobbes as one of the major technics through which the state can 
implement the power of reason: ‘At the time, human existence appeared to him [Hobbes] as basically made of 
a texture of emotions on which it is possible to act only technically, and not rhetorically’ (Viano 1962: 392). On 
the pedagogical project entailed by Hobbes’s mechanical philosophy and the conception of the state as an 
automatic and allegedly ‘neutral’ machine devoted to the maximisation of security, see below, Chapters 3.3, 
3.4 and Conclusion. 
21 On Hobbes’s explicit reference to Plato, see below, Chapter 3.1. 
22 More precisely, according to Skinner, ‘It was in his attempt to deduce his political system from an account of 
human nature, and in his emancipation from the confines of the providentialist vocabulary, that Hobbes made 
his most original contributions to the political theory of his age’ (Skinner 2002: 307). 
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(Zarka 1999: 325), the fictive procedure that, instituting the state, would open the peculiar 
epistemological space of modern politics: 
Hobbes exits the alternative between realism [Machiavelli] and utopia [Plato, More, 
Bacon]. Posing univocally the problem of foundation, he tears politics apart both of 
nature and of history, without leaving it deprived of its own place, but rather shifting 
it. (Zarka 1999: 244) 
It is necessary to stress that in this sense Hobbes never provided a definitive solution, and 
the underlying tension of the relation between science and political power was never 
cancelled in his political theory, not even in Leviathan. The tie between the artificial world 
of politics and the natural world of matter was neither cut by Hobbes, nor solved by his 
political science, and his treatment of human nature never ceased to carry the stigma of 
that tension. In my interpretation, Hobbes’s metaphysical ‘question’ was in fact generated 
within the epistemological openness of the new mechanical science itself, while his 
metaphysical ‘decision’ was the ideological outcome of a long and dramatic confrontation 
between the emerging epistemological and political exigencies and Hobbes’s materialistic 
postulate. From a materialistic perspective this tension could not be solved within the 
boundaries of early-modern mechanicism, irremediably marked as it was by the Cartesian 
cogito. Hence the foundational aim of Hobbes’s materialistic civil science should be 
analysed not only in the light of the political agenda dictated by the English civil war, but 
also, at the same time, of the epistemological agenda dictated by Descartes’s 
metaphysical dualism to the new mechanical philosophy.23 
An epistemological-political work in progress 
In order to make my point about the ‘old question’ of Hobbes’s system, I am going to focus 
on the way the clash with Descartes’s metaphysics influenced his philosophical 
development. Hence it will be necessary to abandon any understanding of Hobbes’s 
system as the result of a successful research, the apex of which would be the completion 
of the ‘trilogy’ of the Elementa Philosophiae. If, on the contrary, one considers the whole 
of Hobbes’s oeuvre, his repeated claims that politics had to become a science such as 
‘geometrical’ sciences were becoming, can be regarded as a propitiatory ritual rather than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  Following Zarka’s interpretation, Marion draws from Hobbes’s Objections in order to show that his 
materialistic ‘decision’ relied on the hypostatisation of the provisional epistemological decision sketched in 
Descartes’s Regulae concerning the existence of ‘simple material natures’ (Marion 2005: 69-72). On this basis 
the author questions the lack of epistemological foundation in Hobbes’s peculiar ‘phenomenology’ of the body 
(Marion 2005: 75-77). This lack is precisely what, according to my interpretation, invested Hobbes’s political 
theory of an epistemological purpose. I assume that the transcendental ‘irreducible privilege of cogitatio’ to 
which Marion refers is only relative to the peculiar kind of reductionist materialism typical of a deterministic 
ontology: one of Hobbes’s (unaware) merits has been to make explicit the metaphysical dualism entailed by 
this kind of alleged materialism (see below, in particular Chapter 3.3 and Conclusion). 
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as an actual achievement. Yet, from now on, I will read the above mentioned 
‘inconsistencies’ as oscillations proper to a radically materialistic philosophical research. 
It is indubitable that Hobbes’s natural and civil philosophy are both concerned with bodies 
as the only possible object and subject of knowledge. And therefore, despite all its 
apparent theoretical inconsistencies, Hobbes’s ‘system’ leaves no chance of claiming any 
‘ontological difference’ between man and nature, reality and thought, animal and machine. 
His whole work testifies no substantial concession to Descartes’s metaphysical dualism. 
Hobbes had to challenge the problems raised by physical and mathematical research 
without resorting to Descartes’s dualistic epistemology. As a result, his epistemology was 
a strange and often contradictory mix of Baconian empiricism and Galilean geometrical 
realism which, clashing with Descartes’s philosophy, gained a twofold nature. On the one 
hand it assumed an ontological realism based on the fundamental postulate of body as 
‘matter in motion’, on the other hand an epistemological approach based on sense as the 
one and unique source for human knowledge. Keeping the two together was not only the 
main problem of Hobbes’s ‘critical materialism’ as Pacchi (1965) called it, or the mark of 
his ‘obsession with providing a unified theory of science’, as Malcolm (1990) claimed: it 
was also a crucial issue in his tormented elaboration of the epistemology of civil science. 
The different interpretations of Hobbes’s civil science open new possibilities of studying it 
as a work in progress. Such an aim can also be pursued by highlighting the internal 
theoretical interferences between epistemology and politics which of course do not 
exclude – though can be conceptually analysed independently of – the influence of 
Hobbes’s political agenda, and hence possibly transferred to a materialistic analysis of the 
ideological heritage of the relationship between the epistemology of modern science and 
political theory that I shall suggest in my conclusions. In this sense in my research I have 
considered equally insufficient an approach that would derive Hobbes’s political theory 
straight from his physics and an approach that completely overlooks the systematic 
connection between the development of Hobbes’s physics of motion and his political 
theory. Indeed, all attempts to connect the concepts of Hobbes’s political theory to the 
concepts of mechanicism pose the same important question, one which revives ‘the old 
question called “Hobbes’s system”’ and sheds more and more light on the relationship 
between Hobbes’s philosophical development and the ideology of mechanicism. In this 
sense a simple identification of the laws of (human) nature with the natural laws (of 
motion) – often assumed by those scholars who unproblematically attribute the Short 
Tract to Hobbes – is nonsense, because determinism was not openly adopted by Hobbes 
before the 1640s. This was, rather, a ‘collateral effect’ of Hobbes’s epistemological 
revolution in civil science which first appeared in the new methodological approach he 
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elaborated in De cive. As I will explain in Chapter 2, by establishing both the perfection 
and the impotence of right reason the new epistemological perspective assumed in De 
cive marked an epistemological gap in civil science that Hobbes progressively filled during 
the 1640s with a new, and even more radical, ontological determinism than the one he 
seemed to implicitly adopt in The Elements of Law. 
It is in this sense that I will assume that the shift from ontology to epistemology Hobbes 
enacted in De cive affected the whole Elementa Philosophiae project. I shall demonstrate 
that Hobbes’s quarrels about light and metaphysics with Descartes, along with his 
polemics with White and Bramhall, influenced the development of his epistemology of civil 
science, and finally made of natural science itself a political issue. My hypothesis is that, 
despite his fidelity to materialism, Hobbes could not see that the faith in ontological 
determinism was an idealistic one, driven – also in the theory of knowledge – by the aim 
of preservation of individual and ‘collective’ motion, that is life, at all costs. That is why the 
materialistic epistemology of Hobbes’s Elementa project, in which the principles of the 
natural sciences were supposed to provide the final foundation for civil science, raised a 
set of philosophical tensions which entailed the intertwining of civil science and political 
power. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the 1650s Leviathan had already made it 
clear that only civil science could provide the ‘power’ to found the whole philosophical 
system, but such power was not the power of science itself. 
Methodology 
To accomplish my research I shall therefore sketch an epistemological and ideological 
analysis of mechanical philosophy, both as a theoretical and a historical event. This 
enquiry will be guided by a few underlying philosophical questions: Does the supposed 
neutrality of ‘facts’ mean something which is only related to their ontological status or does 
it have a relevant ideological function? What is ‘ideological’ then? Anything but facts? Did 
the world picture provided by mechanicism fit the purpose of providing a neutral science of 
nature, of human nature and of the body politic? In short, was modern science the 
discovery of a method for truth, or should we rather consider it an ideological expression 
of the desires and hopes of some individuals, of the spirit of an epoch, or of a class? 
These questions will push my research out of the boundaries of Hobbes’s philosophy to a 
wider interrogation of the political agenda of mechanicism. For this purpose I will draw on 
three different interpretations concerning the role played by ideology in early-modern 
mechanicism, based on quite different approaches: constructivist epistemology, based on 
sociology of science; what I shall call ‘historical epistemology’, based on intellectual 
history; and Marxism, based on historical materialism. Each of these approaches entails a 
theory of the emergence of modern science and of its political stakes on the one hand, 
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and a theory of truth on the other. Yet in order to keep my research focused on the case-
studies I have chosen, the following analysis is only based on scholarship that directly 
refers to Hobbes and Descartes, and hence more or less explicitly deals with a general 
theory of modern science. 
Constructivist epistemology 
In their exemplary attempt to directly challenge the political implications of Hobbes’s 
epistemological project, Shapin and Schaffer (1985) assume a quite original point of view. 
As Lupoli (1976) had already done, they take the Dialogus physicus de natura aeris as an 
example of how much Hobbes’s project openly contrasted the purely experimental 
approach Robert Boyle and other scientists were carrying on in a research group that later 
resulted in the foundation of the Royal Society in 1660.24 But they address the same 
problem from the perspective of a sociology of science focused on the connections 
between science and politics: 
We argue that the problem of generating and protecting knowledge is a problem in 
politics, and, conversely, that the problem of political order always involves solutions 
to the problem of knowledge. (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 21) 
According to the two scholars, Hobbes and Boyle pursued the same aim of constructing 
and granting a new order, challenging in fact a unique twofold problem concerning both 
social peace and the foundation of mechanical science. But their projects took divergent 
paths. On the one hand Boyle intended to define the boundaries of natural philosophy in 
relation to the ‘contentious’ field of civil philosophy. On the other hand, Hobbes aimed at 
grounding civil philosophy itself on the same geometry on which he was grounding natural 
philosophy. The epistemological value of geometry on the one hand and of experiment on 
the other was therefore the central issue. For Hobbes geometry could be the solid base of 
any scientific knowledge and science could be extended to all the domains of being, 
because the whole of being was matter in motion. For Boyle only empirical evidence of 
‘matter of facts’ could appropriately ground scientific knowledge of nature without mixing it 
with non-scientific (and dangerous) speculations on metaphysics and politics. 
In order to develop their argument, Shapin and Schaffer borrow from Wittgenstein the 
concept of ‘form of life’ and focus on the different conceptions of experiment 
characterising the two forms of life represented by Hobbes and Boyle. In short, Boyle’s 
‘language game’ consisted in constructing a new, completely ‘neutral’ and non-theoretical 
science empirically based on ‘matter of facts’: a conventional ‘pattern of activities’ which 
included collective participation in experiments and discursive practices was aimed at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Lupoli had already dedicated a brief essay to the The Dialogue (Lupoli 1976), which Shapin and Schaffer 
actually quote, although they received it after completing their manuscript (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 10, 
n.17). 
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establishing the distinction between causal explanation and factual evidence in order to 
‘justify’ the convention itself. According to Boyle this codification of ‘experimental life’ 
would led to the formation of a safe ‘intellectual space’ where the community of scientists 
could contribute to a development of science and technology, thus being useful for society 
without undermining the public authority which materially sustained it. This approach 
inaugurated the legitimation of the existence of a class of scientists-technicians who were 
not concerned with politics, but only with establishing a truth independent from any 
political power, precisely because dependent on truths deposited by God in nature itself, 
and therefore accessible through observation and experimentation (Shapin and Schaffer 
1985: 298). 
This program was harshly contrasted by Hobbes, who considered it neither possible nor 
effective (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 80-81), or rather either impossible and dangerous. 
According to him, Boyle’s projected community was another kind of heretic group, not so 
different from those congregations of enthusiasts that in his view usually menaced public 
order. Experimentalists were in fact a new kind of clergy that built its own truth and 
falsehood (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 310), thus possibly helping churchmen with 
weapons which could eventually be used (once again) against the recently restored 
monarchy. In fact, the lack of foundation for experiments would make scientific knowledge 
independent of civil power and – what was more dangerous to Hobbes – the production of 
consent would be committed to the free exercise of rhetoric by specialised groups. On the 
contrary, it was urgent that science be provided with a well-founded systematic unity in 
order to prevent it from fomenting dissent: only geometry – and the force civil philosophy 
derived from it – could grant a true assent-producing efficacy.25 
Hence the political reasons for Hobbes’s refusal of Boyle’s experimental ‘form of life’ are 
clear and sound. But what ‘form of life’ was his own? The authors provide three possible 
explanations of Hobbes’s stance: a couple of personal reasons (to defend the theoretical 
scheme which sustained his supposed primacy as a natural philosopher; to pursue his 
personal aim to secure order26) and a generic ‘historico-sociological’ one: ‘the heightened 
sensibility to the practical problem of dissension that was displayed by all English 
intellectuals during the making of the Restoration settlement’ (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 
81). In this sense the Hobbes-Boyle quarrel would be a struggle for finding out the more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Yet as far as Hobbes’s political agenda is concerned, Shapin and Shaffer did not analyse the way Hobbes 
thought developed, shifting from an epistemological solution to the problem of (deterministic) order to a purely 
ontological one methodologically unsustainable but politically necessary, namely ideological (see below, 
Chapter 2). 
26 While the first hypothesis appears to generally correspond to Hobbes’s views on human nature, the second 
could also find adequate biographical support in Hobbes’s own reference to his mother’s fear at the moment 
he was prematurely born in April 1588 while voices were spreading concerning the coming of the Armada 
Invencible: ‘And at that point my mother was filled with such fear that she bore twins, me and together with me 
fear’ (Vitae Hobbianae; OL I, XXII). 
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effective (scientific) method for the production of certainty in order to establish public 
belief. As I have explained, Hobbes’s political pedagogy was precisely aimed at producing 
public opinion as a secure foundation of social stability. And Shapin and Shaffer conclude 
that, quite similarly, the ‘experimentalist clergy’ aimed at instituting rational belief through 
‘the production of matters of fact within the community of reliable believers’ (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985: 317). 
But when in Chapter VII they explicitly enquire about the different interests pertaining to 
the different ‘forms of life’, Shapin and Schaffer show the sense in which Boyle’s project 
was spiritualist, because the experimental form of life confined spirits in their own realm, 
thus implicitly confirming their existence. In effect, referring to ‘matters of facts’ marked the 
limits of experimental knowledge and implicitly pushed the knowledge of ‘extended spirits’ 
out of the boundaries of science. In this sense experimentalist spiritualism was against 
both sectarian enthusiasts who saw spirits everywhere and materialist atheists who 
denied their existence (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 298). Now, this was evidently a claim 
that Hobbes’s materialism could not accept either as true or as safe. On the contrary, this 
collectively built experimental knowledge was precisely what was to be challenged by a 
philosophical reflection on science, whether or not we call it metaphysics. These premises 
rather helped push his intransigent materialism further – up to the explicit negation of any 
possible existence for spirits, phantasms etc. In this sense materialism was both an 
epistemological and a political weapon. For Hobbes witches and ghosts were to be a ‘real’ 
problem in the eyes of legal and civil powers as long as a ‘double sight’ still infected civil 
life. The phantasms of imagination and the practices associated with them – the results of 
bodily motions in the brain and in the organ of sight – were to be prosecuted, but only 
geometrical materialism could be a definitive solution to a problem his dualist antagonists 
could not defeat: 
This ‘seeing double’ could be remedied by collapsing the hierarchical division 
between matter and spirit; and the triumph of the civil sovereign could be assured by 
collapsing that hierarchy in favour of matter. (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 98) 
Shapin and Schaffer’s constructivist approach is grounded on the assumption that 
scientific truth was the result of intellectual and political practices that ultimately define the 
form of life characterising Western modernity. From this perspective political modernity 
and modern science are inscribed in the same political field, because they represent the 
process of emergence of the same form of life – namely ‘European’ modernity – 
eventually institutionalised in the modern state, as explicitly theorised by Latour (1993).27 
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27 This usage of Wittgensten’s concept of ‘form of life’ is made explicit by Latour’s rely on Shapin and Shaffer’s 
book in order to criticise the ideological status of modern science as such. 
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Intellectual historians, in particular when the history of epistemology is concerned, adopt a 
completely different approach, whose presuppositions are probably less evident, but not 
at all a-political. 
Intellectual history 
Partially relying on Shapin and Shaffer’s work, Malcolm paints his picture of the 
‘ideological’ struggle between Hobbes and the Royal Society with the much more soft 
pastel colours of intellectual history. In his convincing picture the attack on Hobbes’s 
mechanistic atheism was part of the defensive ideological strategy carried on by the Royal 
Society through to the rhetorical pattern of a via media between scepticism and 
(Hobbesian) dogmatism, which would allow for the mechanistic views of its members a 
safe research ground, independent from any risky metaphysical commitment (Malcolm 
2002: 330-34). According to Malcolm this argumentative pattern was inspired by 
Latitudinarian theology, a sort of deism ante-litteram, the main argument of which was 
‘turned to the defence of the new science’, or at least of its public ‘image’. In the end, it 
was precisely the profound similarity between the mechanical assumptions of Hobbes and 
the Royal Society that made of Hobbes the designed polemic target of this ideological 
operation of differentiation (Malcolm 2002: 332, 334). This explanation of the whole 
sequence of events in the apparently neutral terms of intellectual influence cannot avoid 
revealing in the end its presupposed framework: a non professed theory of human nature. 
Although admitting the ‘misleading’ character of ‘unifying explanations’, Malcolm 
concludes with a quick reference to what appears to be taken as a trans-historical 
category defining human nature, in order to give ‘one possible reason for doing science in 
this period’: ‘curiosity’ (Malcolm 2002: 335). Of course, curiosity cannot explain any 
political conflict unless it is conceived as profoundly connected to individual interest and to 
a conception of politics as ultimately based on individual interests and their composition. 
The problem is that intellectual history is usually grounded on the implicit belief that 
individuals are the ultimate source of philosophical thought. And, correspondingly, a rather 
‘spontaneous’ psychology becomes the ultimate tool for explaining the philosopher’s 
‘ideology’, namely her or his perseverance in trying to maintain theses that do not comply 
with what was accepted as a matter of fact in his epoch. Indeed, the psychology usually 
adopted is a quite Hobbesian one that points to the individual striving for power. On this 
implicit ground, those who are dealing with intellectual history display a common need to 
distance themselves from – when not explicitly criticising – Shapin and Shaffer’s 
approach, concerned as it is with a collective construction of truth. 
By shifting the focus of his analysis onto Hobbes’s polemics against Wallis on the topic of 
the squaring of the circle, Jesseph (1999) makes the criticism against social 
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constructivism even more explicit. This approach – he states – after Shapin and Schaffer 
‘has become quite commonplace in Hobbes scholarship’ (Jesseph 1999: 343). Trying to 
explain why Hobbes was so resolutely wrong in defending his geometry, Jesseph rejects 
any reference to collective ‘forms of life’, and claims that Hobbes’s stubborn insistence 
depended on an epistemological issue: the ‘empirical’ conception of geometry and the 
fundamental status assigned to geometry within Hobbes’s system of sciences. Jesseph 
concludes that, since geometry was considered by Hobbes the methodological basis of 
any possible scientific knowledge, this failure would cast doubt on the whole system, and 
in particular on the very ‘science of the commonwealth (itself an ‘artificial body’ 
constructed by human agreement)’ (Jesseph 1999: 341-42). Rather than providing a 
radical alternative to Shapin and Shaffer’s approach, Jesseph appears to expand it by 
adding an epistemological argument (‘mathematical factors’) to their ‘seriously wrong’ 
interpretation of the controversy ‘as driven purely by social factors’ (Jesseph 1999: 343, 
italics added). But when he comes to the question of where this necessity of a grounded 
and unassailable system comes from, he is at a dead end. It is clear that such a question 
relies on biography, psychology, sociology, politics and other things, but without one field 
of the analysis excluding the other; in short, it requires a philosophical enquiry. However, 
among so many possible interpretive tools, when he grounds the explanation of Hobbes’s 
unreasonable insistence, Jesseph eventually seems to choose Hobbes’s own 
‘competitive’ psychology:28 
Convinced that he had delivered principles that could make short work of any 
mathematical problem, blinded by his passionate desire to defeat Wallis and reap 
his share of mathematical glory, and ultimately embedded by his failures, Hobbes 
himself betrayed his want of right reason by his claim to it. (Jesseph 1999: 356) 
A similar presupposition can be detected in Lupoli’s study of the metaphysical 
presupposition of Hobbes’s physics of motion. Lupoli displays a detailed analysis of the 
inconsistencies implied by Hobbes’s epistemological intersection between physics and 
theology under the conceptual umbrella of the ‘material god’.29 Although he claims that, for 
Hobbes, abandoning this ‘intersection’ ‘would be disadvantageous both at the ideological 
and at the philosophical level’ (Lupoli 2006: 571), he only dedicates three pages of his 
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28 Emblematically pictured by Hobbes’s metaphor of the race between individuals in EL IX.21 and Lev XV; EW 
3, 122. 
29 Lupoli seems to adopt the same model used by Garber in reading Descartes’s metaphysical ‘choice’ as the 
ground of his deductive physics. Garber grounds his explanation on the assumption that experiments are 
‘theory-neutral means of choosing between independently constructed theories’ (Garber 2001: 110, n. 26). 
Hence, according to him, Descartes’s refusal of self-evidence to ‘a-theoretical facts’ was essentially non 
scientific, because in his deductive project, on the contrary, ‘experiment plays a carefully regimented role’ 
(Garber 2001: 109-110; see also Garber 1992a 307-308). Unfortunately, although he pictures ‘the context of 
the larger intellectual trends’, Garber’s ultimate explanation refers to ‘Descartes as a living, breathing human 
being, who learns (and forgets) things, whose views develop and change over time, even if he himself is not 
always aware of that dimension of his thought’ (Garber 2001: 3-4). 
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book to explaining the reasons for Hobbes’s stubborn insistence on this theologically 
dangerous and epistemologically inconsistent topic. In fact, the whole book rather points 
at the epistemological level, explaining how, by expelling the inconsistences of his physics 
into the realm of theology, Hobbes ultimately aimed at preserving the internal coherence 
of the former. The ‘ideological’ level of explanation, instead, is rapidly liquidated in a single 
paragraph, where ‘ideology’ simply refers to Hobbes’s necessity of providing a justification 
of the compatibility of his philosophy with the bible and avoiding the charge of atheism. 
Again, a ‘historical epistemological’ approach tends to conceive ideological explanations 
in terms of personal interests, deviations from the consistent thinking required by rational 
thought, which would determine the undeserved intromission of individual passions in the 
path of rational scientific research. In a word, a ‘historical epistemological’ explanation 
tends to conceive truth as the (historically situated) scientific knowledge of matters of fact, 
and ideology as a deviation from it, without questioning the material basis of either 
science or ideology, and in fact implicitly assuming the individual mind, or brain or soul – 
in a word, reason – as their ultimate source. 
In general, most historical approaches share the apparently genuine purpose of 
explaining the philosopher’s individual ‘agenda’ on the background of the unquestioned 
assumption of the interference between scientific truths concerning ‘matters of fact’ and 
individual ‘intentions’. Yet if it is definitely a crucial task of the history of philosophy to read 
texts with the purpose of understanding ‘what their authors were doing in writing them’, it 
is also the basic task of philosophy to question the concept of authorship itself. And for 
this philosophical task ‘getting inside the heads of long-dead thinkers’ (Skinner 2004: X) 
may not be the best strategy, unless we assume that inside the head is where thought 
takes place. From this point of view, I pointed out that constructivist approaches have the 
indisputable merit of questioning the individualistic premises of a historical approach by 
analysing the social processes underlying the invention of truth at a wider, collective order 
of magnitude, that they characterise as ‘form of life’. That human body (and especially the 
brain) is a privileged place for philosophical thought to take place is a basic assumption of 
Marxist philosophers too, yet what Marxism, along with evolutionism, has made quite clear 
is that although brain is a main biological condition for thought, its source is society. 
In this sense The Leviathan and the Air Pump is to be taken as a necessary complement 
to this intellectual history, because it carries the merit of questioning the often unstated 
presupposition that science is the knowledge of matters of fact, by thematising the 
relationship between science and ideology rather than their sharp opposition, and 
considering this relationship a collective rather than an individual outcome. Yet this 
sociological approach, if pushed at its limits, might look like a degeneration of the Marxist 
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approach, entailing the presupposition of a meta-language concerning the ultimately 
apolitical struggle between different ‘forms of life’ instead of the dialectic of class 
struggles. In this sense, the undisputable merit of what I have called ‘historical 
epistemological’ approach is to have recalled, against ‘constructivist’ approaches, the 
impossible reduction of the epistemological struggles concerning ‘matters of fact’ to a 
supposed sociologically ‘concrete’ last instance, whether it be the Wittgensteinian ‘form of 
life’ or the Marxist ‘class’. But the quite individualistic psychology usually adopted by this 
approach does not go farther than the sociology of knowledge in making of some alleged 
invariant characteristics of the individual psyche a kind of entirely determinant ‘basis’. This 
individual is much more abstract than the concepts of ‘form of life’ or ‘class’. 
In fact, the problem is still alive, and requires further interpretations of the historical (socio-
political) forces traversing what in The Holy Family Marx and Engels once defined as 
Hobbes’s ‘one-sided’ ‘Baconian’ materialism (MEW 2: 136). But for this purpose it is of the 
utmost importance to move the horizon of this research out of Hobbes’s own ‘supposed’ 
mind, by transforming the question itself. It is worth openly declare that the problem 
Hobbes was facing, differently raised by the former analyses, ultimately concerned the 
historical status of rationality and the ‘resistance’ of natural motion to the social and 
scientific construction of mechanicism as truth, also in civil science. This enquiry 
necessarily entails a more profound attempt to question mechanicism as both an 
epistemological and a political attempt to cope with the overturning of the natural and 
(therefore) human universe operated by the scientific revolution. 
Marxism and science 
Marxist accounts of the historical emergence of mechanicism provide, of course, a wide 
range of interpretations, which are nevertheless based on some shared assumptions. 
Firstly, they refuse any Enlightened or Positivistic linear account of Renaissance and 
early-modernity as the first steps of a progressive liberation of man from his theological 
chains through modern science – because they refuse the assumption that liberation is an 
automatic effect of scientific and technological progress. Secondly, following Marx’s 
narration of the development of capitalism from the ‘subjective organization’ in 
manufacture to the ‘objective organization’ in great industry (see in particular Capital I, XII-
XII; or XIV-XV in the English edition) they understand the emergence and consolidation of 
the mechanistic world picture as an ideological issue related to class struggle. In this view, 
the principles on which early-modern scientific knowledge was based – laws of nature, 
efficient causality, mathematical regularity – can be considered as neither ontological 
features of Nature nor epistemological invariants of human knowledge, mind or any 
transcendental subject. Mechanical science was not only a revolutionary achievement of 
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man freed from theological binds: the Wissenschaftliche Denkweise (scientific way of 
thinking) was also the philosophical and ideological expression of the bourgeoisie. 
Therefore scientific method, objectivity of facts and the mechanistic world picture, need to 
be explained through a socio-historical analysis of the relations of production in which the 
emerging class, bourgeoisie, in its attempt to challenge the Medieval world picture, 
elaborated its own. 
This approach gained particular importance after the mechanistic picture of Nature had 
crashed under the developments in physics at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Discoveries such as the theory of relativity and quantum physics troubled the undisputed 
faith in the mechanistic account of ‘reality’ as the objective and definitive one, both in the 
epistemological sense – whether transcendental (e.g. in Neokantism) or conventionalist 
(e.g. in Empiriocriticism) – and in the ontological sense. Mechanicism was in different 
ways studied as the superstructural effect of infrastructural variations at the socio-
economical level, and modern science turned to be (in a way as much as both 
metaphysics and ontology) strictly linked to – and even dependent on, or in some extreme 
cases reduced to – the ideological effects of the capitalistic mode of production. Not only 
did these great historical narrations try to resist any ingenuous Positivistic faith into ‘pure 
facts’, they also questioned the progressive account of sciences (and civilisation) which is 
usually given particular evidence by considering the development of technology. 
Nevertheless they often incurred the opposite mistake of overlooking that technics 
provides human beings with direct relation to a reality that precedes any effort of 
symbolisation and crucially shapes scientific symbolisation. Human techniques (and thus 
science itself) face matter, the specific ‘resistance’ of which to human efforts of 
transformation and symbolisation, if not properly a-temporal, develops at an order of 
magnitude which is incommensurable to human species’ social and even biological 
developmental speed, and notably to any political project. For this reason, as I will explain 
in Chapter 3.4, the status of technics has always been a problematic issue for historical 
materialism where, usually concealed by an almost exclusive concern for labour, it was 
rarely challenged in itself.30 
In this sense the ‘spontaneous philosophy’ of scientism31 that often underpins intellectual 
history represents a serious critical challenge for both a constructivist approach to the 
sciences of nature which would consider them a merely ‘cultural’ phenomenon and for any 
Marxist attempt to explain the superstructural emergence of mechanicism (and even of 
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30 For a critique of Marx’s failed differentiation of technics and labour, see Simondon 2012, in particular part II. 
On the way in which, consequently, Marxism failed to clearly locate natural science, as far as it also depends 
on technics, either in the ideological superstructure or in the social base, see below, Chapter 3.4. 
31 With this expression I am deliberately referring to Althusser 1967. 
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modern science and technology) exclusively in terms of class composition. In fact, the 
faith in a-theoretical facts compels to ask an epistemological question about what is ‘real’ 
and actually resists any reduction to historical and sociological coordinates, and brings to 
question mechanicism at a double level: as a world picture emerging from a historically 
determinate society and as the result of a long term development linked to the technical 
relationship of the human species with its natural milieu. Thus my research has inherited 
from Marxism and constructivism the exigency of considering science – both on its 
theoretical and experimental sides – as the result of historical collective processes of 
invention, but it has also gained from what I have named the ‘historical epistemology’ of 
sciences the exigency of taking the existence of ‘a-theoretical facts’ seriously. I have 
therefore tried to maintain these approaches together: firstly, considering rational 
theoretical choices – modern science included – as themselves historical and political 
products, and not neutral elaborations of some immaterial and ahistorical ‘reason’; and 
secondly, assigning to modern science a specific relation to reality because its efforts of 
symbolisation are, at least in part, bound to the actual resistance of matter experienced by 
technics. Adopting these complementary perspectives, the present thesis offers a study of 





Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes's Political Epistemology 
 
 
Newton’s treatise on the Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica [Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy] (1687) begins with the definition of the terms of his 
discourse. They are ‘mathematical’ quantities: first matter, motion, forces, and then – in 
the Scholium – time, space, place, and again motion; immediately thereafter the laws of 
motion follow as ‘axioms’. Newton conjointly provides the elements for mathematical 
description and the principles for physical explanation of the motion of matter. It is evident 
that in the third book, which he entitled De mundi systemate [Of the System of the World], 
natural philosophy seemed to have finally achieved the mathematisation and 
mechanisation of nature, presented in an orderly and ‘popular method, that it might be 
read by many’ (Newton 1687: 401).1 The purpose of a complete mathematical description 
of the fundamental laws governing the physical universe was Newton’s legacy for the 
following centuries, a dream that lasted as long as classical mechanics. Yet the possibility 
of such a synthesis had not always been taken for granted during the elaboration of 
mechanical philosophy. In fact, the convergence of mathematical description and 
mechanical explanation was achieved neither by a common progression towards a clear 
goal nor by any coup de théâtre: it was the outcome of a slow and variegated process 
through which the two fields of research eventually converged in what we call today 
‘classical physics’. Furthermore, early-modern mechanics was not, as we clearly know 
today, the final achievement of physics, neither on the side of mathematical formalisation 
nor of the explanation of its object, matter in motion. 
At the time of the scientific revolution a long-lasting world picture was to be challenged, 
which originated with the Greeks and had been adapted during the centuries first to the 
Muslim and then to the Christian religious exigencies, and was based mainly on Aristotle’s 
qualitative physics, where mathematics did not play a crucial structuring role. The method 
of the new science, which would soon thereafter be called mechanics, was mathematical 
modelling plus experimentation, and its object was nature conceived as matter made of 
measurable quantities and motion depending on exclusively efficient causes. If seen 
through the lens of the history of science, the two sides of the ‘scientific method’ are little 
more than names that keep together quite different sets of practices, theoretical modelling 
and technical experimentation, that preceded and followed the Newtonian synthesis. This 
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1 ‘Methodo populari, ut a pluribus legeretur’. 
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twofold nature, that Newton’s provisional synthesis makes so clear to appear 
paradigmatic, can be traced back to a double chain of research practices mixing scientific 
and ideological issues,2 along whose development metaphysics played a crucial role. 
Philosophical systems accompanied scientific research by both influencing and displaying 
its results, providing its framework and justification or criticising its implications, notably 
theological, ethical, and political: in general, we can assume that philosophical thought 
has always mediated the outcomes of scientific research with the different exigencies and 
resistances of culture, where by mediation we do not necessarily mean conciliation. 
During the seventeenth century philosophical thought tried to enhance, analyse, explain, 
and frame this method, and at the same time to discuss, circumscribe, and finally provide 
a systematic foundation for it. From this perspective, Newton’s mechanical universe – like 
any other philosophical world view – was at the same time a techno-scientific and an 
ideological outcome. 
The huge epistemological and ontological debate on mechanicism is part of what we call 
today the scientific revolution,3 which during the seventeenth century expanded into the 
fields of metaphysics, theology, ethics, and politics, and contributed to completely 
changing the European world view of a human-centred cosmos. I aim to show that this 
debate had ideological consequences that cannot be measured within the boundaries of 
scientific research. Mathematisation and mechanical explanation were not only the pillars 
of a new method of knowledge and of an action on the environment so powerful that it 
would completely change the ‘natural’ history of our planet and of its inhabitants, humans 
included; they were also the theoretical counterpart of an emerging new mode of 
production (capitalism) and of an emerging new form of political organisation (the state). 
But the effects of the scientific revolution on the collective imaginary was as powerful as 
the undeniable technological progress it offered. And yet, while science and technology 
have moved quite far from their original early-modern conceptual and material 
frameworks, on the contrary the philosophical changes entailed by the scientific revolution 
still frame our epistemological, ontological, moral, and political discussions. In fact, along 
with the very method of science, what was elaborated in seventeenth century 
mechanicism was an ideological equipment that lasted much longer than the scientific 
image of the world with which it was associated at the moment of its emergence.4 
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2 I am deliberately leaving aside whether this twofold nature is rooted in the peculiar sociological structure of 
Western civilisation. According to Zilsel the difference in the social origins of the two components of Galileo’s 
method is evident in the way in his Discourses Galileo ‘gives the mathematical deductions in Latin and 
discusses the experiments in Italian’ (Zilsel 1942a: 943). This topic will be debated in Chapter 3.4. 
3 For general studies of the scientific revolution through mechanicism, see the classics by Dijksterhuis 1961, 
Westfall 1978. 
4 I will develop this argument in my Conclusion. 
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In this chapter I shall briefly sketch the early debate concerning the epistemological status 
of mathematics and the ontological status of matter in motion – the cores of the method 
and the object of the new Galilean science – in order to understand what was at stake in 
the philosophical questioning of the subject and the object of such a science, as it resulted 
in Descartes’s metaphysical synthesis. My purpose is to analyse the ideological effects of 
this debate out of the field of natural philosophy, and in particular to enquire into the 
ideological implications of this process of ‘mechanisation of the world picture’ in Hobbes’s 
political theory. 
 
1.1 On Mathematical Certainty and the Relativity of Motion 
The Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum 
During the second half of the 16th century a huge debate took place concerning the 
ancient problem of the knowledge and nature of mathematical objects, and the quite new 
problem of their relation to the method and object of mechanical philosophy. Arguing 
against Platonic mathematical realism (which attributed to mathematical objects the 
highest ontological existence, as separated ‘ideas’) the Aristotelian tradition had 
traditionally attributed to mathematical sciences a floating epistemological status, 
according to the intermediate ontological status Aristotle had attributed to its objects in 
Metaphysics XIII: 
Geometry will not be about perceptible objects just because its objects happen to be 
perceptible, because it does not study them as perceptible; the mathematical 
sciences will not for that reason be sciences of perceptible objects, nor will they be 
about other things separate from the perceptible ones. (Aristotle, Metaphysica XIII.3, 
1078a 2-5) 
In fact mathematics was considered by Aristotle a quite useful tool for physics, which he at 
times adopted when dealing with optics, harmonics, and astronomy – domains in which 
mathematics functions as a ‘composite science’.5 But he considered it unfit to provide a 
dynamic explanation of all the causes of natural change, local motion included. Because 
true scientific explanation depended on the knowledge of causes, the explanation of 
natural change was something that only what he called ‘physics’ could actually offer. In 
the Aristotelian tradition informing Averroes any ‘absolute demonstration’ (as the ones 
provided in geometry) was considered quite problematic in natural philosophy because of 
the hidden causes which might differentiate knowledge ‘for us’ from knowledge ‘for 
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5 Composite sciences were optics, harmonics, and astronomy, concerned with ‘mathematical lines not qua 
mathematical, but qua physical’ (Aristotle, Physics, II.2, 194a 8-12). ‘Composite science’ was first named 
‘mixed mathematics’ by Bacon (Brown 1991). 
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nature’, while it was generally held that in pure mathematics the two visions would 
coincide (Jardine 1998: 693). In short, the price paid by mathematics for being considered 
such a perfect science was that of being methodologically dependent on Aristotle’s logic 
on the one hand, and to be precluded from providing perfect knowledge of physical nature 
in itself on the other.  
In the 16th century a Quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum arose within the 
Aristotelian framework, that openly posed the problem of the actual scientific value of 
mathematics. The Questio soon came to directly question the status of mathematics as a 
science of causes and to indirectly question the nature of its objects: numbers, figures, 
relations. The scholarship sees in Piccolomini’s Commentarium de certitude 
mathematicarum (1547) the key text to accessing the origin of the whole Quaestio.6 
Piccolomini contrasted the shared view inherited from Averroes, according to which the 
inductive knowledge of effects and the deductive knowledge of causation were both 
present in mathematical ‘potissima demonstratio’. In short, Piccolomini maintained that no 
‘potissima demonstratio’, as required by Aristotelian logic (that is in Posterior Analytics), 
was possible in mathematics (that is in Euclidian geometry), because the latter could not 
access the physical cause-effect relations.7 Mathematical demonstration was perfectly 
certain, and in effect the very model of abstract perfect clarity, and yet all knowledge of 
physical causes remained open and undetermined. Mathematics could not provide an 
adequate and univocal account of natural causes; it just provided different demonstrations 
for the same effect, and not its actual explanation. 
The ultimate reason for the limits of mathematics was the fact that it depended on human 
imagination rather than on any physical or metaphysical forms of causation. The irregular 
motion of the imperfect and decaying matter constituting the sublunary world was 
apparently the farthest from the abstract perfection of mathematics and made the latter 
appear a quite beautiful masterpiece of human imagination with no use at all in the 
knowledge of physical causes.8 From this perspective, what made of the Questio a crucial 
turning-point is that it helped detach the two fields of research: a mathematics of relations 
could be developed independently from any concern for actual physical causes, as a pure 
science of quantity which, on the long term, would become the ‘materia communis’ of the 
different fields of natural philosophy. Along this path Renaissance Platonism progressively 
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6 Mancosu 1992 and 1996, Jardine 1998, Sergio 2006. 
7 Aristotle attributed to mathematical demonstrations the first degree of certainty, but no relevance for natural 
science: ‘Mathematical accuracy is not to be demanded in everything, but only in things which do not contain 
matter. Hence its method is not that of natural science; because presumably all nature is concerned with 
matter’ (Metaphysics II.3, 995a 14-18). 
8 In fact, the epistemological problem exploded when mathematics was to be extended and applied to the 
whole of the universe, of its physical motion and of its causes, not only to the regular and eternal (or believed 
so) motion of the skies. 
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gained its place in the history of science.9 But in the meantime, Aristotelianism kept 
dominating the scene of natural philosophy for a quite long time. A strong continuity with 
Aristotelianism was maintained by the epistemologies of Bacon and Harvey, where the 
role of mathematics as a technical tool was perhaps not underestimated, but any form of 
centrality was certainly denied to it. On the contrary, the Aristotelian primacy of physics 
soon became strongly problematic in Galileo’s research, and it was definitely abandoned 
by Descartes’s epistemology (Jardine 1998: 710), where the apparently insurmountable 
gap between mathematical knowledge and the natural world investigated by natural 
philosophy became an explicitly metaphysical problem. 
Galileo 
According to a standard interpretation in the history of science, after Francis Bacon’s 
‘sterile attempt’ at the origins of early-modern mechanics there was Galileo’s return to 
Plato’s mathematics and Archimedes’s statics. 10  Galileo’s primary goal in renewing 
ancient statics was to abandon the qualitative approach typical of Aristotelian dynamics.11 
For this aim, a science was necessary to study bodily motion without explaining the 
causes of motions, which – in the Aristotelian framework – would mean to provide 
qualitative explanations. The solution was a ‘purely kinetic’ account of motion which did 
not refer to any causal explanation, but was perfectly suitable for mathematical 
formalisation. Galileo limited himself to a plain description of quantitative relations in 
mathematical terms, thus becoming the initiator (although not at all the accomplisher) of a 
new, entirely quantitative account of nature which would later find its mature formulation in 
Newton’s dynamics. Thus, although in his research Galileo was not concerned with 
grounding a ‘true science’ of natural causes, he paved the way for an integrally 
mechanical approach to the study of nature: the very existence of his mathematical 
science of local motion can be said in this sense to have posed a problem at the same 
time ontological and epistemological, which could not be solved without further 
philosophical effort. 
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9 In fact Platonism and Pythagoreanism continued to develop throughout the Middle Ages, Humanism, and the 
Renaissance, partially crossing and merging with Aristotelianism and Averroism. In any case, seventeenth 
century mechanical philosophers used ‘Aristotelianism’ as a label for the ‘old fashioned’ philosophy taught in 
the universities that they were challenging. 
10 Particularly crude if not dismissive towards Bacon were Koyré 1935-39, Lenoble 1943 and Dijksterhuis 
1961. I am far from endorsing such a monolithic and outdated stance, although for my purposes I will 
particularly focus on Hobbes’s continental debts. On Bacon’s matter theory, see Gaukroger 2001: 166 ff. No 
matter how pre-modern it is to be considered, the independency of Bacon’s matter theory from mechanics is 
in fact a quite complex subject that indirectly questions the reductionist tendency of early-modern mechanics. 
11  For Koyré 1935-39 Galileo’s mechanism was not even merely Archimedean but also still partially 
compatible with Aristotle. And this is what, according to Garber, made it acceptable to Mersenne (Garber 
2004: 157). More recently, Machamer underlines the crucial role played by Archimedean statics in giving rise 
to ‘to the mathematical and experimental structure of the mechanical world picture (though not to all aspects 
of its widespread power of intelligibility)’ (Machamer 1998b: 57-58). Without a doubt, though, when the 
mathematisation or, better, geometrisation of reality had to abandon the Aristotelian framework, it proceeded 
through mechanical models. 
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In effect, two crucial aspects of the same problem emerge from Galileo’s scientific 
research – one strictly ontological, the other epistemological – that can be easily related to 
the twofold nature of the scientific method. The two aspects concern respectively the 
object and the subject of the new science. Galileo’s overall project was to read the ‘book 
of nature’ written in ‘mathematical language’ (GG VI, 232).12 The image of the book of 
nature was not Galileo’s invention, of course, and it was rather a quite common topos of 
Humanistic polemics against Scholasticism through the reference to Plato’s Timaeus. It is 
possible to grasp the exact meaning of Galileo’s version of the metaphor by crossing this 
passage with another of his most famous sentences, included in the Dialogue Concerning 
the Two Chief World Systems (1632), where he clearly establishes the absolute and 
universal ‘intensive’ value of geometrical knowledge as paradigmatic for the new science: 
Understanding can be taken in two modes, intensive or extensive. Extensively, that 
is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, which are infinite, the human 
understanding is as nothing […]. But taking man's understanding intensively, in so 
far as this term denotes understanding some proposition perfectly, I say that the 
human intellect does understand some of them perfectly, and thus in these it has as 
much absolute certainty as Nature itself has. Of such are the mathematical sciences 
alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in which the Divine intellect indeed knows 
infinitely more propositions, since it knows all. But with regard to those few which 
the human intellect does understand, I believe that its knowledge equals the Divine 
in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which 
there can be no greater sureness. (GG VII, 128-129)13 
In short, Galileo claimed that mathematical language was the code for the understanding 
of nature precisely because nature itself was created geometrical by God, and the equal 
certainty characterising the humans’ and the creator’s knowledge granted that nature was, 
at least in principle, perfectly transparent to those who mastered the new geometrical 
science. But the project thus displayed remained in Galileo’s works scarcely more than a 
metaphor: although it was a kind of postulate, or at least the horizon of Galileo’s research, 
it was not at all its achievement. For many reasons Galileo’s texts lack any metaphysical 
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12 ‘Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes, that is the universe; but it cannot be 
understood unless one first learns to understand the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. It 
is written in mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, 
without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it, and one wanders in vain through a dark 
labyrinth’ (Galileo, Il Saggiatore 1623). 
13 ‘L'intendere si può pigliare in due modi, cioè intensive o vero extensive: […] extensive, cioè quanto alla 
moltitudine degli intelligibili, che sono infiniti, l'intender umano è come nullo […] ma pigliando l'intendere 
intensive, in quanto cotal termine importa intensivamente, cioè perfettamente, alcuna proposizione, dico che 
l'intelletto umano ne intende alcune così perfettamente, e ne ha così assoluta certezza, quanto se n'abbia 
l'istessa natura; e tali sono le scienze matematiche pure, cioè la geometria e l'aritmetica, delle quali l'intelletto 
divino ne sa bene infinite proposizioni di più, perchè le sa tutte, ma di quelle poche intese dall'intelletto umano 
credo che la cognizione agguagli la divina nella certezza obiettiva, poichè arriva a comprenderne la necessità, 
sopra la quale non par che possa esser sicurezza maggiore’. 
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systematisation of the actual achievements of his mechanics, and yet his research was 
the starting point for seventeenth-century mechanical philosophy: the systematic analysis 
of the metaphysical, epistemological, ontological, and, as I will try to demonstrate, political 
implications of the new world picture. In fact, Galileo’s distinction between mathematical 
certainty and physical explanation never led to a philosophical solution to the problem 
posed by the Quaestio.14 Thus, precisely because he did not provide a philosophical 
synthesis of the duality inscribed in the very method of science itself, Galileo had to 
challenge here and there the two horns of the problem under a concealed form. He had to 
cope with both the actual resistance of matter to geometrical account, and the theoretical 
relativity of any measurement of motion. In short, as I am going to explain, he faced a 
twofold problem concerning the object and the subject of the science he was inventing. 
On the one hand, in Galileo’s method the role of experimentation was quite marginal, or at 
least strictly purposed to the control of hypotheses rather than to observation,15 and the 
role of matter was in a way that of an obstacle, which marked the boundaries of scientific 
knowledge, and implicitly represented an actual risk for its certainty. According to Galileo 
the very nature of matter in motion resisted measurement, and therefore it was not easily 
reducible to geometrical account, that is to science. In the Dialogue Galileo openly 
opposed Simplicio’s Aristotelian-fashioned claim that a sphere does not touch a surface 
just in one point (GG VII, 229-30).16 But in his Postille di Galileo Galilei al libro intitolato 
Esercitazioni filosofiche d’Antonio Rocco filosofo peripatetico, also recalling the 
Aristotelian ‘sphaera aenea non tangit planum in puncto’, Galileo made of the paradoxical 
tension between mathematics and mechanical practice (and, therefore, experimental 
evidence) an explicitly aporetical issue: ‘Claiming that the continuous is made of ever 
divisible parts, and claiming that the continuous is made of indivisibles, is the same thing’ 
(GG VII, 745). And in fact, as far as the material sphere is concerned, 
Mr Rocco should be aware that Mathematicians, when they want to build a sphere, 
do not resort to the indivisibles, but they rather go to the wood turner [torniajo], if 
they want it made of wood, to the smelter, if they want it made of metal. (GG VII, 
749) 
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14 Sergio 2006: 61, n. 18, expanding Jardine 1991. 
15 According to Dijksterhuis it was just functional to the verification of hypotheses, or even superfluous if the 
theory could be assumed as sufficiently persuasive (Dijksterhuis 1961: 333-359). Although less categorically, 
scholars generally agree on the dominance of ‘theoretical’ experimentation in Galileo’s work. 
16 Simplicio states: ‘These mathematical subtleties are true in the abstract, but they do not comply […] as one 
comes to matter, things go the other way round’ (GG VII, 229). Galileo-Salviati’s ‘poor discussion’ of the 
argument might display the very ‘split’ between mechanics as a mixed science and mathematics: ‘to cover up 
the gap between his physical causal discourse and his mathematical analysis, Galileo attempted to deny any 
boundary between mathematics and physics in the Dialogue and to erase the traditional discourse on 
mathematical entities’ (Feldhay 1998: 127-128, 132-33). 
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As a matter of fact, the very object of the new science, matter in motion, represented a 
problem that could hardly be solved within the boundaries of mechanical knowledge. And 
in effect, since his earlier speculation, Galileo had lamented that mathematical ‘reality’ had 
to cope with a reluctant, contingent matter which constantly menaced the – intensive 
divine – status of geometrical science. In a letter of 1602 he had posed the problem, as 
usual, in a quite ‘practical’ way, as a problem of measurement: 
As far as matter is concerned, its contingency affects the abstract propositions of 
the geometer; and being these [propositions] so distorted that no perfect science is 
thus possible, therefore the mathematician is relieved from considering them. (GG 
X, 100)17 
On the other hand, a further complication emerged from the astronomical discoveries of 
Copernicus concerning the point of view of the subject of the new science. After 
Copernicus’ discovery, the starting point of Galileo’s new physics of motion was 
necessarily that the earth was moving, and yet from this (quite unstable) ground some 
universal rules for the measurement of motion had to be settled, and an answer provided 
to the question: How can one measure motion while moving? Hence a new conception – 
scientifically grounded – of the relativity of motion was growing, which would soon deprive 
the universe of a definitive reference frame. 
From a mathematical point of view the problem of the measurement of motion can be 
solved through a quite simple transformation (now called the ‘Galilean transformation’, 
even though it was not even Galileo’s invention).18 From a physical point of view, when no 
absolute reference frame can be taken to be at rest or in motion, the measurement of 
motion is always relative to the established reference frame, which can be indifferently 
supposed to be at rest or in uniform motion. Galileo makes an example of a group of 
friends carrying on different experiments on a moving ship, and observing that their 
measurements do not diverge from the ones they used to make on land. In short, a 
reference system in uniformly accelerated motion perfectly corresponds to a still system 
for perception as well as for objective measurement. As a result, the relativity of all 
measurements of motion to the respective reference frames can be mathematically 
calculated, assuming a consistent picture of the universe as an ontologically unitary 
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17 ‘Quando cominciamo a concernere la materia, per la sua contingenza si cominciano ad alterare le 
proposizioni in astratto dal geometra considerate; delle quali così perturbate siccome non si può assegnare 
certa scienza, così dalla loro speculazione è assoluto il matematico’ (Galileo Galilei, Lettera a Guidobaldo Del 
Monte, Padua 29 November 1602). 
18 The scientific concept of ‘Galilean relativity’ does not match Galileo’s conception of the relativity of motion, 
which cannot be considered a ‘principle’ of his physics, in fact still earth-centred and linked to a quasi-
Aristotelian conception of free-fall and the ‘nature’ of heavy bodies (Chalmers 1993: 200-1). Today, ‘Galilean 
relativity’, or ‘invariance’, also named ‘Newtonian relativity’, refers to a three-dimensional ‘Cartesian’ 
coordinate system (not Descartes’s invention either) which allows the calculation of speed in relation to the 
chosen reference frame. 
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system. And nevertheless, the mathematical simplicity of this solution, if we consider the 
physical implications, appears to completely invalidate the former Aristotelian framework. 
Aristotle’s system had for centuries won a battle against the relativism of atomists, thanks 
to a plainly physical argument, by anchoring space coordinates to an absolute point of 
view and cancelling chance from motion: 
Such directions (up, down, right, left, etc.) do not exist only relative to us; for to us a 
thing is not always the same in direction but changes according as we change our 
position […] By nature, on the other hand, each of these is distinct and exists apart 
from the others; for the up-direction is not any chance direction, but where fire or a 
light object travels, and likewise the down-direction is not any chance direction but 
where heavy or earthy bodies are carried, as if these directions differed not only in 
position but also in power. (Aristotle, Physics IV.1, 208b 14-16, 18-22) 
On the contrary, Galileo’s mathematical account of the relativity of local motion required 
neither any physical centre of the universe nor any ontological distinction between quiet 
and motion. From this perspective the diffusion of Galileo’s discoveries concerning motion 
was a really devastating event for the Aristotelian-Christian world picture, because it 
cancelled the possibility of conceiving motion as ‘naturally’ relative not only to the centre 
of the earth but to any possible centre of the universe at all. In this sense it is clear that 
Galileo’s concept of inertial motion, although still quite qualitative,19 de facto reintroduced 
relativity in the Aristotelian-Christian world in a way much more dangerous than the (more 
or less explicit) adoption of Copernicanism in the Dialogue, which made him run the actual 
risk of being sent to the stake. In fact the attack on the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian earth-
centred worldview does not appear to have been the most challenging novelty carried on 
by the new astronomy. The Copernican revolution, in itself, did not revive the spectre of 
relativity that had been exorcised for centuries by Christian philosophy: it certainly 
deprived humans of their narcissistic primacy in the centre of the universe (on earth), but it 
still allowed the sun-god to be another sufficiently glorious centre. More seriously, it was 
the new Galilean concept of the relativity of motion that ruined the keystone of the entire 
monument represented by the Aristotelian physics of motion, where an absolute high and 
low existed along with the natural tendency of the four elements to spontaneously reach 
their natural places. 
As a matter of fact, Galileo’s purely mathematical description of the relativity of local 
motion completely invalidated Aristotelian physics without providing any alternative 
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19 In fact Galileo’s mechanics was not fully inertial. Such notions as ‘impressed force’, ‘intrinsic motions’, and 
notably ‘impetus’ still inhabited his texts and his world view. The unaccountability of gravitation, in particular, 
did not allow him to provide the causes of inertial motion. And yet it was Galileo who first connected 
systematically all the issues concerning motion in a kinetic picture that was incompatible with Aristotle’s 
(Hooper 1998: 157 ff.). 
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physical explanation of motion. In this sense Galileo’s mechanics was a threshold that, 
once crossed, cancelled the ancient universal order without being capable of producing a 
new one, and, furthermore, it called into question the very idea of a universal order, a 
cosmos, with all its theological and political counterparts. More threatening than ever, the 
spectre of relativity was therefore reappearing with new physical evidence through 
Galileo’s mathematical evocation. This process was about to bring to a new picture of the 
universe as lacking any centre at all (a quite dangerous picture indeed – as Bruno had 
personally experienced just a few years before), while on the other hand, by contrast, the 
revolutionary ideas of Galileo – as the term ‘revolution’ implies – elicited in many of his 
admirers the exigency of a return to some new metaphysical foundation. 
Mathematics, mechanics, and mechanicism 
The main points of Galileo’s mechanics were the pervasive uniformity of local motion and 
the objectivity of primary qualities: both issues provided the undisputed basis for early-
modern mechanical philosophy. The first one (the local motion of matter as the postulate 
of any possible explanation of natural phenomena) was completed by the second one (the 
foundation of qualities on purely quantitative differences). And from this distinction the 
typically modern version of the sceptical problem of the relationship between 
epistemology (the theory of knowledge and of science) and ontology (the theory of being) 
derived its framework. In effect this approach posed the problem of a structural gap 
between subjective representation and objective reality, which drove scientific discourse 
towards the quest for a metaphysical solution. In the previous pages, a separate 
consideration of mathematical formalisation and physical explanation allowed for the mise 
en scène of ‘the conflict between the demands of mathematical mechanics and 
mechanical philosophy’ (Westfall 1971: 47). It is now time to understand how a new 
mechanical philosophy progressively grew up during the seventeenth century from a 
concern limited to natural philosophy to the elaboration of complete systems of sciences. 
This was achieved through a process of convergence of the epistemological and 
ontological demands of the new physics into metaphysical systems to which the label of 
‘mechanicism’ can be applied.20 
The lack of adequate physical explanation of the causes of motion, along with the attested 
resistance of matter to geometrical formalisation, constituted a complex set of problems 
that required a new philosophical conception of the subject, method, and object of science 
which, in effect, paved the way for a completely new world picture. In short, to be seriously 
taken as a metaphysically grounded world picture, Galileo’s physics of ‘local motion’ 
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20 By ‘mechanicism’ I mean the mechanical philosophy that, during the seventeenth century, assumed the task 
of discussing, developing and finally founding, the theoretical achievements of the new mechanical physics 
(see above, Introduction, note 1). 
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required a more subtle philosophy. Hence it was for seventeenth-century mechanical 
philosophers the source of two different but connected aims, which today we might 
distinguish as respectively philosophical and scientific: 1) to provide an epistemological 
and ontological (and actually metaphysical) foundation of a neutral point of view on the 
causes of motion; 2) to provide a complete mathematical account of the deterministic 
invariance of the cause-effect relations determining the motion of matter. As I am going to 
explain, mechanicism progressively emerged as the attempt to provide the ultimate 
synthesis of all these issues by superposition of the universal power of mathematical 
science over the mechanical characterisation of matter in motion. 
For many reasons Galileo did not intend to offer such a philosophical claim. No attempt to 
destroy the Aristotelian-Christian world picture was accomplished nor even explicitly 
carried on by him, – he always worked as a ‘pure’ mathematician. But as soon as the new 
science of matter in motion became a shared ‘reference frame’ in Europe, all the problems 
it comprised were received by those who intended to build a philosophical system out of 
Galileo’s mechanics, and in particular – what I am particularly concerned with – by those 
who gravitated around the man who was the true epicentre of the spreading of Galileo’s 
ideas in Europe, the Minim friar Marin Mersenne.21 
Mersenne 
After an initial wavering over the innovative aspects of Galileo’s work, Galileo’s account of 
free-fall became the most important source of inspiration for Mersenne’s work at the 
middle of the 1630s, and strongly influenced his understanding of mechanics as a theory 
of motion.22 But Mersenne probably took Galileo as a ‘mixed mathematician’ rather than a 
natural philosopher, and this allowed him to accept mechanics as a development ‘internal’ 
to Aristotelian science (Malet and Cozzoli 2010). At the same time, Mersenne’s ‘mitigated’ 
scepticism allowed him to leave untouched the hidden contradiction between a harmony 
of appearances and the actual order of the real cosmos, of which mathematical harmony 
could only be considered a reflection. Mathematical demonstrations were for Mersenne 
certain, causal, and scientific, but they did not concern physics (Dear 1988: 72). Thus, as 
a ‘mathematician’ and not a ‘physicist’ himself, Mersenne can be said to have been 
working for the reinforcement of Aristotelianism, but in fact injecting into the Parisian 
intellectual milieu the mathematical germs of mechanicism.23 In this sense he is certainly a 
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21 Mersenne’s crucial role in making of mechanics a not-only-Italian affair during the 1630s is certainly beyond 
doubt (see for instance Roux 2004: 36). A still valid pioneering study of Mersenne’s merits was Lenoble 1943. 
22 According to Palmerino, the problems related to Galileo’s theory of acceleration through infinite degrees of 
speed eventually increased Mersenne’s scepticism towards mechanistic models (Palmerino 1999: 324-28). 
23 ‘Mersenne’s mechanism, his world machine, was not set forth as the true picture of the real world […] but as 
a hypothesis for organizing and utilizing our knowledge’ (Popkin 1960: 142). On the way in which 
seventeenth-century ‘mixed mathematics’ contributed to exiting the Aristotelian framework and establishing 
ontological determinism, see Daston 1992: 30-38. 
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noteworthy ‘case study’ for the transition from the Aristotelian to the mechanical world 
picture (Garber 2004), and his case also demonstrates that the separation of the fields of 
mathematics and physics was a key epistemological tool for this turn. Once the germ of 
mathematics was injected into the ancient world picture, the latter could not survive: at the 
logical level because of the rational force of mathematics; at the ideological level because 
of the powerful efficacy displayed by the mathematically built machines. 
Perhaps Mersenne could hardly see the ‘incompatibility’ between the new mechanical 
view of nature and the Aristotelian cosmos. And in fact, there was no way to assume 
Galileo’s Archimedean new science of motion without abandoning the Aristotelian 
framework: this is a radical consequence that only those concerned with the enterprise of 
building a philosophical system could assume. Thus it was Descartes, Gassendi, and 
Hobbes who drew from Galileo’s research its philosophical, epistemological, and political 
consequences.24 On the basis of Galileo’s science of local motion, Descartes, Gassendi, 
and Hobbes aimed at building complete philosophical systems. And elaborating the 
epistemological and metaphysical foundations for the new physics, they also transposed 
in their philosophies the problems they inherited from Galileo’s methodology. 
Descartes and mechanics 
In Le mecaniche Galileo was quite dismissive towards the dreams of the ‘poorly talented 
engineers’ (GG II, 158).25 Indeed, for him ‘mechanical philosophy’ in the strict sense was 
impossible, because the adjective ‘mechanical’ denoted the qualitative world of the 
Aristotelian four elements rather than the actual quantitative world made of shapes, 
numbers, and motions (Gabbey 2004: 15). Quite consistently, the twofold nature of the 
new hypothetical-experimental method was in fact strongly bent towards geometrical 
formalisation by the traditional attitude of ancient science, deeply rooted in a strong 
prevalence of the theoretical moment over the practical one. This was quite evident in the 
opposition between ‘geometrical’ and ‘mechanical’ knowledge, and the devaluation of the 
latter as far as it depended on empirical experience. This classical heritage Leonardo had 
already tried to contrast: 
They call mechanical the knowledge which is born from experience, and scientific 
the one which is born and ends in mind, and semi-mechanical the one which is born 
form science and ends being operated by hand. But I hold to be vain and full of 
errors all those sciences which are not born from experience, the mother of 
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24 ‘In this sense one can say that a truly new philosophy begins not with Mersenne, but with Descartes and 
others in his generation, such as Hobbes and Gassendi, who attempted philosophical systems. Mersenne, like 
Galileo, I think (and this is somewhat controversial) is doing something somewhat different’ (Garber 2004: 
157). 
25 ‘Poco intendenti ingegneri’. 
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certainty, and which do not end in a well-known experience (Leonardo Treatise on 
Painting, 19r).26 
It was precisely under the premise of a re-evaluation of experience as ‘the mother of 
certainty’ that Leonardo could conclude for a strong connection between mechanical 
praxis and mathematical achievements: ‘Mechanics is the Paradise of mathematical 
sciences, because here we come to the fruit of mathematics’ (Leonardo The Notebooks, 
1155).27 
Although Descartes apparently welcomed this kind of conceptual innovation, he partially 
maintained Aristotle’s terminological distinction between mathematics and mechanics, and 
the related theoretical approach. An emblematic example of the resulting ambivalence 
can be found in the Discourse on the Method (1637), his first published work, which 
contained an introduction to his method (commonly named Discourse on the Method) and 
three scientific essays he had previously written, concerning Dioptrics, Meteorology, and 
Geometry. 28  In Geometry Descartes expressed open disagreement with the current, 
depreciative use of the term ‘mechanical’, but nevertheless he accepted and used it to 
sketch a distinction between ‘mechanical’ (= rough) and ‘geometrical’ (= exact) knowledge 
(AT VI, 411-412). Furthermore, within the very realm of geometry Descartes distinguished 
pure ‘geometrical’ from ‘mechanical’ curves (‘the spiral, the quadratric and similar ones’), 
the construction of which was to be operated through non a priori calculable relations (AT 
VI, 389-390).29 In the Discourse itself he conserved this ambiguity: he first despised a 
merely ‘mechanical’ use of mathematics (AT VI, 7), while in what followed he supported 
‘the strength of mathematical demonstrations’ with a direct reference to the mechanical 
necessity of blood circulation and clock functioning (AT VI, 50). This problematic 
connection between mathematics and mechanics was not at all clarified by his sharp 
remark: ‘the rules of mechanics […] are the same as the rules of nature’ (AT VI, 54).30 
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26 ‘Dicono quella cognitione essere meccanicha la quale è partorita dall’esperientia, e quella essere scientifica 
che nasce et finisce nella mente, e quella essere semimeccanicha che nasce dalla scientia et finisce 
nell’operatione manuale ma a me pare che quelle scientie sieno vane et piene d’errori le quali non sonno nate 
dall’esperientia, madre d’ogni certezza et che non terminano in nota esperientia’. Leonardo is following a quite 
common issue in the treatises on painting: ‘The social antithesis of mechanical and liberal arts, of hands and 
tongue, influenced all intellectual and professional activity in the Renaissance […]. This fact appears rather 
distinctly in the writings of contemporary artists who over and over again discussed the question as to whether 
painting and sculpture belong with liberal or mechanical arts. In these discussions the painters usually 
stressed their relations to learning (painting needs perspective and geometry) in order to gain social esteem’ 
(Zilsel 1942a: 940). On the innovative interpretation of the relation between art and science contained in 
Leonardo’s theory of painting, see Luporini 1953: 148-54. 
27 ‘La meccanica è il paradiso delle scienze matematiche, poiché con quella si viene al frutto matematico’. 
28 The full title was Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire la raison et chercher la vérité dans les 
sciences. Plus la dioptrique, les météores et la géométrie, qui sont des essais de cette méthode [Discourse on 
the Method of rightly conducting one's reason and seeking the truth in the sciences, and in addition the Optics, 
the Meteorology and the Geometry, which are essays in this Method]. 
29 On Descartes’s exclusion of the ‘mechanical curves’ from the realm of geometry, see Mancosu 1996: 72 ff. 
and Jesseph 2004: 204. 
30 ‘Les règles de la Mécaniques […] sont les mêmes que celles de la nature’. 
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Was Descartes identifying mechanics and physics (and thereby machines and nature), by 
differentiating the (rough) functioning of both from the pure exactness of geometry, or did 
he use the word ‘mechanics’ in a way (mechanical = natural = exact) which evidently 
differed from the way he had used the adjective ‘mechanical’ in Geometry, that is before 
eventually writing the introductory Discourse to the three essays in 1637? 
Since his early work with Beeckman, Descartes practiced ‘mixed mathematics’ – also 
named ‘mathematico-physics’ in the early seventeenth century – with no evident 
ontological purpose. It was only after the long elaboration, in the Regulae ad directionem 
ingenii [Rules for the Direction of the Mind] (1619-29), of his project for a universal 
knowledge based on intuitive evidence that Descartes transformed the previous approach 
into a double-sided purpose that drove his effort during the following decade: to provide a 
unified theory of the objects of physics and mathematics, and to provide their 
metaphysical foundation in divine legislation (Roux 2004: 29-31). This is the period in 
which Descartes conceived and wrote also Le monde ou traité de la lumière [The World or 
Treatise on Light] and L’homme [Treatise on Man] – two works he avoided publishing to 
avoid running the risk of inquisition more than for reasons to do with the provisional nature 
of his work. There he already set the complete framework and planned the future path of 
his research.31 Koyré suggests that in his Cogitationes privatae [Private Thoughts] (1619) 
the young mathematician Descartes was still working on the concept of movement, 
wavering between a physical and a purely mathematical conception of space,32 and his 
hesitations disappeared only when the two coincided in Principia Philosophiae [Principles 
of Philosophy] (1644).33 What seems quite clear is that, although at the beginning of the 
1630s the identification of physics and mechanics was yet to come, Descartes had 
already set the agenda of making natural philosophy as certain as geometry, and in this 
agenda mechanics had a crucial role to play. 
The structural ambiguity of Descartes’s mechanistic project was emphatically displayed by 
his reply to the criticism of Fromondus, who had noticed a ‘rude’ Epicurean blend in his 
physics (AT I, 402-3).34 It is quite problematical to establish what Descartes precisely 
meant by using the expression ‘mechanica philosophia mea’ (‘my mechanical philosophy’) 
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31 They eventually informed two more systematic works he published during the 1640s: Principia Philosophiae 
(1644) and Les Passions de l’âme (1649), respectively. 
32 ‘Motion is a paradoxical entity: it is a state of the moving body which nevertheless passes from a moving 
body to another; it represents change and, at the same time, remains identical to itself. It appears to 
Descartes as a hybrid entity, and he deliberately as instinctively substitutes for this notion the more concrete, 
clear, and more easily imaginable notion of motive force on the one hand, and of trajectory on the other’ 
(Koyré 1935-39: 119, italics added; cf. also Koyré 1962). 
33 In fact Descartes never completed his program, often contenting himself with analogical mechanical 
explanations. In this sense, as Koyré notes, the process of mathematisation of physics reached a standstill in 
Principia Philosophiae (Koyré 1935-39: 128). 
34 ‘Non raro in physicam Epicuri nesciens, credo, recidit, rudem at pinguisusculam, nec satis elimatam, ut 
plerique credunt, ad limae extactae veritatis’ (Letter of Fromondus to Plempius, 13 September 1637). 
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in two letters dated 3 October 1637 (Descartes AT I, 420-21, AT I, 430). Gabbey (2004) 
and Roux (2004) strongly disagree about that. Both recognise that geometry and physics 
together constitute for Descartes the science of a nature which is, at least theoretically, 
entirely reducible to geometry, but they disagree about the epistemological role Descartes 
attributed to mechanics. Despite his admiration for mechanics, as for medicine and all the 
useful techniques, according to Gabbey Descartes scarcely attributed to it any theoretical 
value: in fact he used the expression ‘mechanica philosophia mea’ with a hint of ‘ironic 
self-deprecation’ (Gabbey 2004: 20). Roux, instead, thinks that the letter marks the turning 
point after which for Descartes the adjective ‘mechanical’ eventually equalled 
‘geometrical’. In this sense Roux concludes that with the expression ‘mechanica 
philosophia mea’ Descartes was in fact announcing his new natural philosophy (Roux 
2004: 32-35). 
As Roux notes in passing, ‘some weaker senses of “mechanical” would [later] emerge’ in 
Descartes’s agenda (Roux 2004: 35). Perhaps Descartes’s oscillations about the 
epistemological significance of the term ‘mechanics’ are not entirely translatable in the 
terms of a ‘progression’ of his thought along the lines of a project of mathematisation of 
nature. They rather seem to derive from a deeper ambiguity which can be detected in the 
whole of his production, and – as I will try to demonstrate in this thesis – to the theoretical 
structure of deterministic mechanicism itself. However, one can appreciate Descartes’s 
constant oscillation between two different conceptual operations: 1) theorising all cause-
effect relations in the nature-machine as functioning in an entirely deterministic way 
according to few simple laws of motion; 2) building a method – analytical geometry – 
which would allow us to fully deduce from the first principles (and thus to describe 
mathematically) all kinds of possible motions.35 The first was the ontological assumption of 
nature as a deterministic system of cause-effect relations, the second was the 
epistemological assumption of a deductive method. While the first hypothesis was patently 
in contrast with his theory of rational will conceived as the incidence of the res cogitans on 
the res extensa, the second, on the contrary, was grounded on that same distinction, 
because the universal knowledge of the laws of motion could be thus subtracted to motion 
itself. The inner tension deriving form this structural contradiction crosses the whole of 
Descartes’s production. 
In his earlier work, Descartes’s mechanistic conception of nature was already established, 
but a plain identification of natural motion with the rules of geometry was still problematic. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Of course, the method in itself would not allow an actual complete deduction of the complex phenomena of 
local motion one can observe through experiments from the first principles of geometry, but it would allow 
postulating, in principle, the complete subsumption of all the causal series one can actually observe in nature 
under the general laws of motion. 
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Natural science was the exact description, thanks to geometry, of a nature-machine the 
ontological status of which was still considered problematical in light of the ideal (and 
divine) perfection of geometry. The result was the well known ‘fable’ of Le monde: 
But, even if all that our senses have ever experienced in the true World seemed 
manifestly contrary to what is contained in these two Rules, the reasoning that has 
taught them to me seems so strong that I cannot help believing myself obliged to 
suppose them in the new World I am describing to you. For what more firm and solid 
foundation could one find for establishing a truth, even if one wished to choose it at 
will, than the very firmness and immutability which is in God? (AT XI, 43. Cf. also 63, 
80, 82-83, 98)36 
When Descartes opposed the world deriving from the appearances of senses to the one 
which reason theoretically builds on the basis of God’s immutability he was not childishly 
defending himself from the charge of atheism with a ‘theological’ trick. Rather, he was also 
grounding his metaphysical solution of the problem posed by Galileo on a dualist 
epistemology, which would later result in a dualistic metaphysics. 
In fact, Descartes’s solution was much more complicated than it might appear from this 
brief account, because it followed many years of work on optics, geometry, and various 
kinds of physical and physiological phenomena, not to mention all the ruminating around 
the legitimation of this work through what is better known today as Descartes’s philosophy 
(namely the Discourse and the Meditations).37 However, the structure of Descartes’s 
solution to the problem posed by Galileo was quite simple. He grounded the science of 
matter in motion on metaphysical dualism: on the one hand the res extensa, that is 
moving bodies with measurable primary qualities; on the other hand the res cogitans, that 
is eternal non-moving ideas matching the primary qualities of bodies, and directly 
accessible by reason. The second founded the knowledge of the first. In this sense 
Descartes’s metaphysical dualism cannot be conceived as a simple theological 
escamotage; it was rather part of a project of progressive clarification of the central 
notions of mechanics. In fact, not only it was ‘theologically correct’, it also allowed for a 
redefinition of the epistemological status of the subject of science on the one hand, and of 
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36 ‘Mais encore que tout ce que nos sens ont jamais expérimenté dans le vrai Monde, semblât manifestement 
être contraire à ce qui est contenu dans ces deux Règles, la raison qui me les a enseignées me semble si 
forte, que je ne lasserais pas de croire être obligé de les supposer dans le nouveau que je vous décris. Car 
quel fondement plus ferme et plus solide pourrait-on trouver pour établir une vérité, encore qu'on le voulût 
choisir à souhait, que de prendre la fermeté même et l'immutabilité qui est en Dieu ?’ (Descartes, The World 
or Treatise on Light, Chapter VII, On the Laws of Nature of this New World). 
37 This was only a small part of Descartes’s ‘philosophy’ if we give the term the comprehensive meaning it had 
at the time. In fact, most of what he conceived as his truly philosophical enterprise, his natural philosophy, 
might now simply appear to be some odd old science, while his reflection concerning the grounds of it is often 
considered the apex of his philosophy. This is probably an ideological effect he highly contributed to 
generating: through the metaphysical separation of the domains of human thought and matter, or liberty and 
necessity. 
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the concepts of matter and motion, on the other. The subject of science was reduced to a 
purely neutralised gaze, the object of science to a purely passive body. 
The neutral subject of science, the passive object of science, and the divine laws of 
motion 
Garber’s ground-breaking studies on Descartes attribute a central function to metaphysics 
as a foundational framework for his physics: according to Garber, in Descartes’s 
systematic attempt of providing an alternative to scholastic philosophy only the reference 
to immaterial causes could adequately replace the abandoned Aristotelian ‘substantial 
forms’ with an equally efficient explanatory framework for bodily motion.38  Following 
Descartes’s claim that the ‘six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics’ (AT 
III, 298), Garber concludes that ‘the Cartesian doctrine of the distinction between mind 
and body is intended not only to clarify the notion of mind, but also that of the body’ 
(Garber 1992b: 302). Thus, in a larger sense, Descartes’s metaphysical dualism had an 
epistemological purpose, and the argument of the existence of an external world would 
serve not only to deflect charges of scepticism, but also to – epistemologically – ‘replace 
the sensual world of colours, tastes and sounds with the spare geometrical world of 
Cartesian physics’ (Garber 1992b: 294-95). Thanks to this metaphysical assumption, on 
the one hand bodies had only properties related to the res extensa and, on the other 
hand, all the primary qualities matched eternal ideas fully accessible within the res 
cogitans.39 
From this perspective one can consider the above mentioned oscillations in Descartes’s 
statements concerning ‘mechanics’ as evidence of a structural problem in his philosophy, 
which derives from the difficulty of managing one of the main philosophical problems of 
modernity, the anti-Aristotelian breakthrough in the relation between epistemology and 
ontology. Descartes’s problem can be summed up in a quite simple question: How can we 
have a science based on fixed and eternal truths if all in nature is matter in motion? The 
same problem recurs – although with different relative weights – from Le monde (where a 
physics of light still links physics and the theory of knowledge) to the Principia (where it is 
instead metaphysics that provides the framework of both the theory of knowledge and 
physics). Descartes’s final solution was metaphysical: eternal truths (of geometry) are 
neither matter nor motion, they are not natural but divine, they are res cogitans, and 
therefore subtracted from any possible motion (exception made for God’s inscrutable will, 
of course). This solution was both epistemological and metaphysical: it consisted in 
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38 See also Garber 1992b: 321-322, where he eventually concludes that in Descartes’s system the true 
causes of motion can only be God and the created substances (finite minds) but not bodies that bear no 
‘active force’. 
39 In this sense la fable concerning Le monde could be read as the response to an epistemological exigency to 
prevent a premature identification of the scientific model with physical reality. 
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geometrically building an external point of view on moving matter and making of it the 
unique, absolute, and disincarnated subject of modern science. 
For this metaphysical choice there was, however, an epistemological price to pay: the gap 
between the Cartesian dynamics and statics widened, leading to the separation of the 
basic magnitudes governed by the (mechanical) laws of motion – extension and motion, 
or size and speed – and those depending on the (geometrical) principles of statics – 
heaviness and displacement. 40  As a result, Descartes had to cope with a double 
abstraction: the laws of motion were valid only in the void (where there is no heaviness), 
while heaviness only concerned force, that is statics and purely geometrical 
demonstration: ‘the idea of extending statics to the analysis of motion’, so fruitful for 
Galileo, ‘was not considered by Descartes’ (Roux 2004: 65).41 This epistemological split 
not only was coupled with a new metaphysics, but also had a considerable impact on the 
ontology of matter in motion: 
The change-over from a developmental to a static conception of matter was as 
profound as the change from a geocentric to a heliocentric astronomy, and its 
effects were as far-reaching. Moreover, it was a step that could never have been 
justified by appeal to logical principles and experimental evidence alone. (Toulmin 
1965: 166) 
In fact, because Galileo’s inertial framework had introduced a fundamental indistinction 
between rest and motion, the path towards Newton’s identification of the ‘Innate Force of 
Matter’ with the essentially passive nature of matter was opened. The vis inertiae was 
eventually reduced by Newton to a ‘force of inactivity’ characterising a matter whose main 
feature was in fact the ‘inactivity of the Mass’ (Newton 1687: 2-3). 42  Drawing on 
Beckham’s ‘principle of perseverance’, Descartes played an important role along this 
process of reduction of matter to extension, the passive support of the Galilean 
conception of the relativity of motion. Along this path Descartes worked at reducing matter 
to a unique, liquid-like, and passive body, independent of motion and presenting no trace 
of physical void. Thus he eventually separated motion from bodily extension, and 
considered motion ‘a mode of the matter which is moved’, different from the general and 
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40 According to Koyré Descartes excluded speed from his system because it was scarcely suitable for 
mathematical intelligibility and geometrical representation (Roux 2004: 58). 
41 Why? Roux’s final explanation binds Descartes to ‘a more general feature of French mechanics’: ‘French 
mechanicians […,] these new Archimedeans [Fermat included…,] were indeed good mathematicians, but they 
did not consider mathematics as a method for understanding physical things. Mathematical constructions 
were only abstractions for them, with which it was fun to play, but which were not to be confused with what 
really happened in nature. Moreover, with the exception of Mersenne, they were not interested in the ways in 
which motion intervened in natural processes. At best, motion was for them a way of generating curves’ (Roux 
2004: 66). 
42 See Hooper 1998: 170-71. 
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perpetual ‘cause’ of their existence which was situated out of matter and motion, in God’s 
immaterial eternity, in which human reason was allowed to participate (AT VIII, 61-62).43 
In effect, according to Descartes every single part of the universe participates in many 
different sequences of motion, and the total amount of motion remains unvaried. Motion is 
transmitted from a body to another through reciprocal transference. Thus one part of 
matter can be said to be in motion only when its motion differs from another motion, that is 
local motion does not consist in a ‘change of place’ (absolute motion) but in ‘separation’ 
(relative motion). In this sense Descartes defines rest as unity, but motion as ‘detachment’ 
between the object and the system of reference for measurement. The whole operation 
apparently entails the arbitrary assumption of one point of view to determine what is 
reciprocally moving or at rest. In fact, because motion was a basic explanatory notion in 
Descartes’s physics, it had to obey laws which had to be invariant, thus overcoming the 
lack of ‘foundation’ in the researches of Galileo, who, ‘not considering the first causes of 
nature, has only sought to the reasons of some particular effects, and thus he has built 
without foundation’ (AT II, 380).44 Hence the ‘absolute’ conception of the relation between 
motion and rest, conceived as a geometrical ‘change of place’ that Descartes implicitly 
assumed even though he kept defining motion as ‘relative separation’ (Garber 1992b: 
310).45 But this absolute measurement of motion was possible only by referring to an 
external point of view, and this possibility was granted by the existence of an immaterial 
and therefore non-moving substance, the res cogitans. 
In conclusion, it was only after Descartes had eventually identified matter with ‘extension’, 
that is the metaphysical object of mechanics, that he was allowed to commit motion, 
completely purified from matter, to god’s ruling power and the gaze of res cogitans, that is 
to the metaphysical subject of mechanics. In effect, it was far before his Discourse – when 
he was still working on Le monde – that Descartes had explicitly identified God’s 
‘mathematical truths’ and the laws of nature: 
In my treatise on physics I shall not avoid discussing a number of metaphysical 
topics, and especially the following: the mathematical truths which you call eternal 
have been laid down by God and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his 
creatures […]. Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that it is 
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43 ‘Motus nihil aliud sit in materia mota quam eius modus’. 
44 ‘Sans avoir considéré les premières causes de la nature, il a seulement cherché les raisons de quelques 
effets particuliers, et ainsi [qu’]il a bâti sans fondement’ (Descartes, Letter to Mersenne 11 October 1638). And 
again: ‘Everything he says about the speeds of bodies descending in the void, etc., is built without foundation 
[est bâti sans fondement]’ (AT II, 385). 
45 Descartes eventually claimed that each body has only one motion proper to it and wanted to ‘eliminate the 
arbitrariness in the distinction between rest and motion’ (Garber 1992b: 307). 
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God who has laid down these laws [mathematical truths] in nature just as a King 
lays down laws in his Kingdom. (AT I, 145)46 
In fact, this was not Descartes’s invention. In The Advancement of Learning (1605) 
Francis Bacon, to whom Hobbes was for a long time the secretary, referring to James I, 
wrote: 
Kings ruled by their laws as God did by the laws of nature, and ought as rarely to 
put in use their supreme prerogative as God doth his power of working miracles. 
(Bacon 1605: I, 175)47 
This passage makes it quite clear that the origin of the concept of ‘laws of nature’ was 
rather theological-juridical than physical, as most scholars agree.48 Referring to the divine 
‘laws of nature’ and endorsing the disembodied look of a God-like reason, Descartes was 
able to explain the motion of matter independently of any moving and relative point of 
view. In his philosophical system the perfect correspondence between the principles of 
geometry and the laws of nature could be clearly and distinctly assumed by the intuitive 
faculty of a self-transparent subject of science, and the mechanical motion of matter (once 
the latter was reduced to body as extension) was perfectly ready for a complete account 
made through the formalised language of geometry.49 The paradigmatic (and historical) 
importance of Cartesianism makes possible a shortcut: it was through Descartes’s 
metaphysical foundation that Galilean mechanics was systematically integrated into the 
new world picture.50 
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46 ‘Mais je ne lasserai pas de toucher en ma Physique plusieurs questions métaphysiques, et particulièrement 
celle-ci : que les vérités mathématiques, lesquelles vous nommez éternelles, ont été établies de Dieux et en 
dépendent entièrement, aussi que tout le reste des créatures […] Ne craignez point, je vous prie, d’assurer et 
de publier partout, que c’est Dieu qui a établi ces lois en la nature, ainsi qu’un Roi établit des lois en son 
Royaume’ (Descartes, Letter to Mersenne 15 April 1630). 
47 This passage is also quoted by Milton, who adds that ‘by the beginning of the seventeenth century the idea 
of nature being governed by laws had become widely acceptable’ (Milton 1998: 684). 
48 See the pioneering works of Kelsen 1941 and Zilsel 1942b. As Roux admits, ‘the term “law” had been used 
in science without direct reference to a God legislator also before the seventeenth century, and nevertheless it 
was only this reference that allowed for a wider generalisation’ (Roux 2001: 569). According to Oakley a 
‘theologically driven shift’ occurred in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries - through the legal metaphor – 
from the natural laws of (human) nature to the laws of (physical) nature arbitrarily instituted by God, later 
popularised by Boyle and the Royal Society from the 1660s onward, which later become a cliché (Oakley 
2005: 60-61). The most wide-ranging collection of essays on the subject is probably Daston and Stolleis 2008. 
On the remarkable absence of this expression in Hobbes’s natural philosophy, see below, Chapter 2.2. 
49 So in the Principia Philosophiae mathematical measurement could be assumed to – at least in principle – 
explain the whole set of the arbitrarily complex cause-effect relations of any physical phenomenon on the 
ground of a geometrical method based on the laws of nature and, accordingly, to empirical data. 
50 ‘La grande Mécanique n’étant autre chose que l’ordre que Dieu a imprimé sur la face de son ouvrage, que 
nous appelons communément la Nature’ (Letter to Villebressieu, Summer 1631). In fact, this oft-quoted 
passage is not Descartes’s: it is part of Baillet’s comment to an incomplete text (AT I, 213-14). One could say, 
however, that it corresponds closely to Descartes’s spirit if not to the letter. 
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1.2 For a Materialistic Science of Matter in Motion: Hobbes after 
Descartes 
Like all the philosophers connected to Mersenne, Hobbes was deeply involved in 
contributing to the foundation of the new mechanical philosophy. But from the beginning 
he wanted mechanical philosophy to ‘unlock the secrets of matter and motion’ without 
referring to any transcendental principle, and radically opposed Descartes’s dualism. It is 
interesting to note that Hobbes’s account of the journey in Europe on which he 
accompanied the young Sir Cavendish in his grand tour (1634), starts precisely with the 
‘Galilean’ metaphor of the book: 
But we did not spend all this time with books, unless you could say the world was 
like a book. Many cities of Italy we saw, many French cities; we saw the sweet 
recesses of Savoy. But I, I forever pondered the Nature of things, as I travelled by 
ship, or by coach, or on horseback. And in the whole world only one thing seemed 
to me true, even though it’s falsified in many ways: an only truth, but one that’s the 
basis of those things that we falsely say are ‘something’: such fleeting things as 
sleep has, or as by glass I am able to multiply at will: phantasms, offspring of our 
brain, nothing more; in their inner parts is nothing but motion. So that whoever 
wishes to learn Physics should first learn well what a power motion has. I therefore 
unlock the secrets of matter and of motion, and thus cheat my free time all through 
Italy. I write nothing, I make no polemics; a mistress who taught me was always with 
me. We leave Italy and come again to the high walls and magnificent roofs of Paris. 
Here I know Mersenne, and to him communicate what I had worked out about the 
motion of things. He approves and much commends; from that time I too was 
numbered among the philosophers. (OL I, LXXXIX, vv. 105-130)51 
In Paris Hobbes also met Gassendi. Gassendi was part of Mersenne’s circle from the 
1630s and his importance in the development of mechanicism, adding to it some 
Epicurean features, in particular atomism, cannot be overlooked. Mersenne succeeded in 
building a productive relationship between Hobbes and Gassendi, after having failed to do 
the same for Hobbes and Descartes. If we hold with Sorbière’s account, Hobbes’s De 
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51 ‘Nec tamen hoc tempus libris consumpsimus omne, Ni mundum libri dixeris esse loco. Italiae multas, 
Gallorum et vidimus urbes ; Secessus dulces vidimus Allobrogum. Ast ego perpetuo naturam cogito rerum, 
Seu rate, seu curru, sive ferebar equo. Et mihi visa quidem est toto res unica mundo Vera, licet multis 
falsificata modis: Unica vera quidem, sed quae sit basis earum Rerum, quas falso dicimus esse aliquid; Qualia 
somnus habet fugitiva, et qualia vitris Arbitrio possum multiplicare meo; Phantasiae, nostri soboles cerebri, 
nihil extra; Partibus internis nil nisi motus inest. Hinc est quod, physicam quisquis vult discere, motus Quid 
possit, debet perdidicisse prius. Ergo materiae motusque arcana recludo ; Sic tempus vacuum fallo per 
Italiam. Scribo nihil, facio adversaria nulla, magistra Quae docuit, praesens nam mihi semper erat. Linquimus 
Italiam, rursusque redimus ad alta Moenia Lutetiae tectaque magnifica. Hic ego Mersennum novi, communico 
et illi De rerum motu quae meditatus eram. Is probat, et multis commendat; tempore ab illo Inter philosophos 
et numerabar ego’ (Thomae Hobbes malmesburiensis vita carmine expressa, 1673). 
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corpore was received by a dying Gassendi with a kiss (Corr II, 836). This can be 
symbolically taken as the apex of a friendship that lasted from Hobbes’s Parisian years, 
when the two shared their common adoption of Galileo’s conception of inertial motion as 
the keystone of natural philosophy and as a paradigm to expand to other fields of 
philosophy.52 Gassendi’s mechanicism was a natural philosophy and not a mathematical 
science, as for him the certainty and evidence of mathematics was in no way related to 
the genuine causes of things (Mancosu 1996: 13; 23-24).53 In this sense his philosophy 
was not at all in the mainstream of the scientific revolution, because it maintained the 
separation of mathematical speculation and the physical explanation of motion. And 
although it presented a possible mechanical alternative to Cartesianism, Gassendi’s 
philosophy did not directly challenge the metaphysical assumptions of Descartes. 
Furthermore, his sceptical stance allowed him to avoid endorsing a clearly anti-
metaphysical attitude, and to instead adopt a ‘theologically correct’ Epicureanism which 
even admitted the immateriality of the soul (Lolordo 2006: 227 ff.).54 In contrast, the clash 
with Descartes’s metaphysics was crucial to Hobbes’s research. The encounter posed to 
Hobbes’s philosophy an epistemological problem concerning the stability of science: a 
problem that, from a radically materialistic perspective, could not be solved by referring to 
the transcendence of reason. 
When, at the moment of fleeing to France (November 1640), Hobbes joined the scientific 
community of the mechanical philosophers in Paris, he decided to do it through an 
incredibly harsh debate with Descartes, on two fronts: the science of optics and 
metaphysics. The first took place mainly in a letter exchange with Descartes through the 
mediation of Mersenne; the second, again thanks to Mersenne, who asked Hobbes to 
provide his comments on Descartes’s Meditations, which were later published as part of 
an appendix to the text made of five sets of Objections followed by the author’s 
responses. The two debates were strictly connected. At the time Hobbes was still trying to 
found his theory of knowledge on the Galilean principle of local motion, and he conceived 
epistemology as part of a physics of motion. In effect, once it was assumed that all human 
motion was a result of the original impact of external bodies on the senses and the further 
propagation of motion within the body, then it was plain that the principles of local motion 
had to explain any kind of motion and therefore also the internal motions of the brain 
which we call knowledge. The geometrical-mechanical ontology of light was in this sense 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Gassendi’s Epistulae de motu strongly influenced Hobbes’s De Motu (Leijenhorst 2004). 
53 Highlighting that Gassendi understood Galileo’s theory of motion as a physical one, Palmerino considerably 
attenuates Koyré’s dismissive devaluation of Gassendi’s mathematical talent as the cause of his failure to 
connect Galileo’s law of free fall to a physical explanation (Palmerino 2004: 164). 
54 ‘While Hobbes used inertial motion to substantiate the scientific validity of his social theories, Gassendi 
used it as one of the means to restore Christian orthodoxy to his materialistic natural philosophy’ (Sarasohn 
1985: 364-65). 
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taken by Hobbes as paradigmatic: it seemed to be the model for the epistemology of any 
kind of knowledge, science included, assuming that only sense could be corrected by 
sense.55 For this reason a physics of light conceived in terms of local motion entailed a 
whole epistemology, which was supposed to ground even the peculiar kind of motion we 
call science. In this sense, one can maintain that Hobbes was trying to ‘deduce’ an entire 
epistemology from the laws of optics. 
This could not be without consequences for Hobbes’s attitude towards Descartes’s 
dualistic metaphysics, precisely because of the completely different conception of 
rationality it allowed, on the one hand, and the opposed conception of matter, motion (and 
light) it entailed, on the other. The contrast between the two philosophers on the subject, 
the object and the method of science could not be more radical, although, as I will try to 
explain in Chapter 2, Hobbes’s epistemology eventually followed an ideological path. 
A clash between theories of light: a (meta)physical quarrel 
Hobbes’s interest in Descartes’s optics dates back to his earlier reading of La dioptrique 
(1637).56 The two began their quarrel, however, in November 1640, when Hobbes sent to 
Mersenne a fifty-six-page manuscript criticising Descartes’s Discourse and particularly the 
Dioptrics (Martinich 1999: 163). Their epistolary exchange via Mersenne lasted a few 
months at the beginning of 1641, when Hobbes was already in Paris, writing the third 
Objections to Descartes’s Meditations (Schuhmann 1998: 67),57 and probably De cive.58 If 
one considers Hobbes’s concern with optics when he was not yet known as a political 
philosopher and his natural philosophy was not complete, ‘Hobbes’s philosophy gives the 
impression of having been developed as the next move in a game where Descartes was 
the previous player’ (Tuck 1988: 28). In effect, although the philosophical system 
Descartes eventually presented in his Principia Philosophiae was centred on metaphysics, 
quite differently, at the beginning, Descartes’s research was still focused on the problems 
of light and perception. Around 1629-33, between the Regulae and Le monde, Descartes 
was still trying to attribute to the physics of light the central role of linking the ontological 
and the epistemological fields by explaining knowledge as dependent on sensible 
experience, and therefore functioning according to the mechanism of propagation of light 
he was studying in his Dioptrique (about 1630-35). On the contrary, as previously 
explained, at the accomplishment of his research Descartes turned to a metaphysical 
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55 ‘The great deception of sense […] also is by sense to be corrected’ (EL II.10). 
56 The reading of Descartes possibly inspired Hobbes’s dealing with optics when he had not yet left England 
(see Digby’s letter of 1637, in Corr I, 52). On Hobbes’s attacks to Descartes in his optical treatises, see below. 
57 Letters 29-34, 36 of Jan-Apr 1641, in Corr I, 54-120. Hobbes’s objections were published in August of the 
same year. 
58 Although in the Molesworth edition of Hobbes’s complete works (OL) the Epistola dedicatoria is dated 1 
November 1646 (DC Ep; OL II, 140), the original manuscript copy dedicated to William Cavendish is dated 1 
November 1641 (Schuhmann 1998: 73). 
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solution, and this is why in the Principia Philosophiae light completely ‘lacks its central 
organizing role’ (Garber 1992b: 292). It is from this perspective that the optical quarrel 
between Hobbes and Descartes displays epistemological implications which are worth 
discussing in detail. 
Frithiof Brandt – the first to tackle in depth the Hobbes-Descartes debate as a key issue in 
Thomas Hobbes’ Mechanical Conception of Nature (1928) – saw evidence of a strong 
change from the still partially Aristotelian Short Tract (1630-31) to what Hobbes wrote 
after reading Descartes’s Dioptrics. Almost one century after Brandt, scholars have no 
definitive solution to the problem of the attribution of the Short Tract. Although we have 
eventually learned from Malcolm (2002) that the manuscript was written by Robert Payne, 
a close friend of Hobbes’s, it is not clear who actually conceived it, and the discussion is 
also open as to whether it is to be considered ‘Hobbesian’ or not (Malcolm 2002: 80-
145).59 This scholarly debate on the attribution of the Short Tract indirectly crosses the 
relationship between Hobbes and Descartes with the crucial question on the general 
characterisation of Hobbes’s research as mainly ontological or epistemological. Tuck 
denies the attribution of the Short Tract to Hobbes in order to maintain the emergence of 
his epistemological project from its confrontation with Descartes’s struggle against 
scepticism, namely around the problematic relationship between what is ‘really in the 
external world’ and what is perceived, which constituted the ‘crucial issue in the new 
philosophy’ (Tuck 1988: 17-18). On the other hand, arguing against Tuck, Zagorin inclines 
towards the hypothesis that the Short Tract was in fact a Hobbesian work, in order to point 
out that Hobbes’s ontological project – already shaped in 1636, before his disputes with 
Descartes on optics – was strictly ontological and independent from Descartes’s 
profoundly epistemological concern against scepticism (Zagorin 1993: 214-15).60 I shall 
not try here to solve the ‘Short Tract attribution’ problem, not only because it goes beyond 
my philological expertise, but also because it is not important to my explanation of 
Hobbes’s philosophical development. 
Thus I will follow Zagorin’s suggestion to leave aside the Short Tract, and focus on the 
theoretical problem implicitly posed through this philological dispute, which I resume as 
follows: in the light of his philosophical relationship with Descartes, was Hobbes’s 
philosophy a mechanical ontology or an epistemology of mechanicism? My answer will 
take this apparent alternative as a marker of a development in Hobbes’s philosophy in 
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59 Malcolm’s hypothesis is that the Short Tract was almost certainly written but probably not conceived by 
Robert Payne. A quite authoritative voice for the party of attribution to Hobbes is Schuhmann 2004b. 
60 According to Zagorin, Hobbes’s project was, consistently from the outset, to produce a deductive science 
akin to geometry, with definitions and proofs, centred on body and the knowledge of causes and effects, which 
should not offer results contrary to experience (Zagorin 1993: 517-18). In fact, I assume Hobbes intended to 
be consistent with these major assumptions, but had to – as much consistently – change the shape of his 
project after encountering Descartes’s. 
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which the clash with Descartes’s philosophy played a crucial role. I will assume that, when 
Hobbes fled to Paris at the beginning of the 1640s, the problem of light as motion was still 
a key issue in his mechanistic conception of nature and the strategic core of his 
mechanical theory of knowledge. The field of optics implicitly presented problems the 
solution to which would supposedly allow Hobbes to swallow the epistemological problem 
into the ontological one, by entirely explaining knowledge – and science itself – in terms of 
local motion. Therefore I strongly disagree with Zagorin’s hypothesis that Hobbes’s 
philosophy was basically independent of the Mersenne circle’s anti-sceptical struggle and 
not even dependent on Descartes’s influence (Zagorin 1993: 514),61 and endorse the 
hypothesis that Hobbes’s early philosophical work ‘was developed very largely in 
response to the issues raised by Descartes in 1637, and that Hobbes’s criticisms of 
Descartes in 1640-41 were fundamental to his own philosophy’ (Tuck 1988: 16). This 
response was not a change in the basic assumption of materialism and of the universality 
of motion, but it explains how – at the moment when Descartes’s physics was already 
metaphysically founded – Hobbes’s attempt to ‘transform the categories of traditional 
metaphysics into categories of physics’ (Zarka 1996: 73) was soon transformed into a 
harsh metaphysical and epistemological struggle against Descartes’s dualism. Hobbes’s 
main concern became the creation of a system of sciences through which he was 
determined to banish all references to immaterial causes, that is to the non-scientific 
‘offspring of our brain’. And the original battlefield for this epistemological war was optics. 
The letters and optical treatises: a clash between theories of matter (passive/active) 
Hobbes wrote three optical treatises in a quite short time span in comparison to the 
considerable length of his life. The first two, in Latin, were probably conceived between 
the end of the 1630s and the beginning of the 1640s. The Latin Optical MS contains 
explicit polemic references to Descartes’s optical theories.62 The Tractatus opticus has a 
clear geometrical structure and contains no direct references to Descartes, possibly 
because of Mersenne’s ‘censorship’. 63  A third treatise in English, A Minute or First 
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61 Zagorin intends to demonstrate Hobbes’s indifference to the sceptical position about sense, taking on 
Popkin 1982 and Sorell 1988b (Zagorin 1993: 508, 512-15). Zagorin claims that around 1636 (letter 19, in 
Corr I, 33-36) Hobbes already had established the principles of his metaphysics, that is ‘body as the sole 
reality, the motion of bodies as the universal cause of change, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities’. Such 
a ‘combination’ of empiricism and logical rigor in geometrical deduction would be the ‘supreme motive’ driving 
Hobbes philosophical research from the beginning (Zagorin 1993: 515-18). What really matters to Zagorin is 
to point out that Hobbes’s project was ontological and metaphysical, but not at all epistemological, because 
not concerned with scepticism about sensible knowledge (and Descartes’s influence) (Zagorin 1993: 517). 
62 The manuscript MS Harley 6796, (fos. 193-266) of the British Library, was published by Alessio 1963. The 
problem of dating the Latin Optical MS is very complicated indeed. Some scholars suppose that it was written 
in the period 1637-40 (or even earlier, e.g. Tuck 1988: 37). Malcolm initially hypothesised that the manuscript 
was transcribed by Sir Charles Cavendish at the end of 1640 (Malcolm 1994: LIV), but he later concluded that 
Hobbes ‘completed’ it during the ‘early years of his Parisian stay’, that is around 1641-42 (Malcolm 2012: 3). 
63 When Mersenne published the Tractatus Opticus as a part of his Universae Geometriae Synopsis (1644), 
he probably suppressed Hobbes’s remarks against Descartes to avoid further quarrelling between them 
(Brandt 1928: 390). The Tractatus Opticus was eventually included in Hobbes’s OL V. 
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Draught on the Optics, accomplished between 1645 and 1646,64 later became part of De 
homine (1658), namely chapters II-IX, but only after being translated into Latin and 
depurated of all direct polemic references to Descartes (Alessio 1962: 401 ff.). In the 
original English version the very ‘foundations’ of Descartes’s theory as it was displayed in 
the Discourse, still appeared to Hobbes a main object of controversy, if not of counter-
metaphorical scorn: 
To conclude, I shall doe like those that build a new house where an old one stood 
before, that is to say, carry away the rubbish. (EO; EW VII, 469)65 
Following this harsh premise, Hobbes concluded his treatise accurately enumerating nine 
‘rubbish’ theories on optics, three of which can be easily ascribed to Descartes. While the 
first (the sixth in Hobbes’s list) refers to a quite technical matter,66 the second (the 
seventh) dismisses ‘the opinion that light is a bodie, or any other such thing than such 
light as wee have in dreams’, and introduces, last but not the least, the conclusive 
materialistic attack to the supposed concurrence of the soul to the explanation of vision, 
which Hobbes had already criticised in the Latin Optical MS (LO IV.14, 207-208): 
Lastly, is to be cast away the conceipt of millions of strings in ye optique nerve, by 
which the object playes upon the braine, and makes ye soule listen unto it, and other 
innumerable such trash. (EO; EW VII, 469) 
Although it is impossible to suppose that Hobbes contributed towards Descartes ‘leaving’ 
light and ‘keeping’ res cogitans (that is clarifying his absolute refusal of the hypothesis of 
any ‘materialistic’ foundation of knowledge in vision), it seems quite evident that the 
epistolary debate on optics was a key moment for Hobbes to rethink his physics of 
knowledge in terms of an epistemology of the ‘principles’ of knowledge. In this sense it is 
still possible to follow Brandt when he assumes that, thanks to the theory of light as an 
‘ideal-case’ of rebound movement, Hobbes was trying to reduce psychology and 
epistemology to a part of his mechanistic ontology (Brandt 1928: 118, 121). If during the 
1630s Hobbes had been mainly interested in finding out how local motion could explain 
perception, by the time he reached Paris he was – at least in part – still attempting to 
‘reduce the static into the kinetic’ (Brandt 1928: 121), and to make of sense perception 
and knowledge (as movements of the human body) a part of his physics.67 Yet it is still to 
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64 It was only partially published as A Minute or First Draught on the Optics in the Molesworth edition (EW VII, 
467-471). A critical edition of the entire manuscript MS Harley 3360 of the British Library was made by Stroud 
1983 (see EO in bibliography). 
65 It is worth recalling how Descartes in the Discourse introduced his method precisely with an architectonic 
metaphor (AT VI, 11). 
66 ‘Sixthly, the opinion that perspective glasses and amplifying glasses are best made of hyperbolicall figures’ 
(EO; EW VII, 469). 
67 It is quite interesting to note that, when Brandt tries to show how in Hobbes’s mechanicism matter was from 
the beginning conceived as in motion, although he pinpoints 1641 as the key date (Brandt 1928: 113, 115, 
121), he later adds that ‘in the year 1641 neither of them [Descartes and Hobbes] had framed their ultimate 
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be enquired how much the encounter with Descartes affected Hobbes’s subsequent 
philosophical research, in which an epistemology is largely – although quite 
problematically – displayed. What is clear, their quarrel made a fundamental difference 
between Hobbes’s and Descartes’s conceptions of matter emerge: for the ‘dualist’ 
Descartes matter was essentially static while for the ‘materialist’ Hobbes it was intrinsically 
dynamical. 
Descartes and Hobbes on the static/dynamic characterisation of matter 
In general Hobbes’s picture of the universe might appear not far from Descartes’s, 
because in it ‘when one part is changed a different part will take its place and another part 
will replace the last-named part, and in this way will be affected in succession, according 
to the cohesion of the parts, a disturbance – though a slight one – throughout the 
separate parts’ (DM XII.9, 115v-116).68 Yet there are some apparently minor differences 
which are not without consequences: many physical issues mark the distance between 
Descartes and Hobbes on the crucial issue of the activity/passivity of matter, and of the 
latter’s radical identification of matter and motion. And all these differences in fact point 
towards a basic metaphysical opposition, as I am going to explain. 
Particular attention is to be devoted to the different conceptions of what ‘natural motion’ is, 
which are made evident by some closely related physical issues. First of all, for Descartes 
‘by nature’ motion is rectilinear, and only a determinate ‘quantity’ of motion can 
momentarily pertain to matter as such, while direction (even if only a ‘tendency’) depends 
on deviation by contact between bodies and is not directly related to one body’s quantity 
of motion. In fact, light itself is only a ‘tendency [inclination]’ to move: ‘And note here that it 
is necessary to distinguish between motion and the action or tendency to move. […] the 
action or tendency to move (which, I have said, should be taken for light) must in this 
respect obey the same laws as motion itself’ (AT VI, 88-89).69 On the contrary, for Hobbes 
‘by nature’ there exist only revolving motions (Mintz 1952)70 and the motion of a body also 
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philosophy of mechanism’ (Brandt 1928: 128). Brandt speaks of Hobbes’s theory as a ‘pure kinetics’. Before 
him Lasswitz claimed that ‘Hobbes’s theory of matter is definitely a kinetics’ (Lasswitz 1890: II, 219). More 
recently, Hobbes’s philosophy has been defined a ‘kinematist theory of power’ (Pietarinen 2009: 184). Even 
more radical is Lupoli: ‘matter – as the object of science […] is dissolved into motion; on the other hand, local 
motion, which is the only object of science […], has no existence out of matter in motion: there is a body only 
as far as there is an actually moved body. The absolute epistemological preeminence of actual motion as the 
only explicative principle is counterweighted by its de-ontologisation’ (Lupoli 2006: 531). 
68 ‘Si omnem cuiuslibet partis motum localem mutationem vocet, verus est, mota enim parte una succedet alia 
pars in ipsius locum et in huius locum alia, et hoc modo fiet successive propter partium cohaesionem 
perturbatio saltem levis per partes singulas’. 
69 ‘Et remarquez ici qu’il faut distinguer entre le mouvement, et l’action ou inclination à se mouvoir […] l’action 
ou inclination à se mouvoir, que j’ai dit devoir être prise pour la lumière, doit suivre en ceci les mêmes lois que 
le mouvement’ (Descartes, Discours). 
70 Hobbes’s ‘bias’ comes from Galileo’s Discourse. In this sense Mintz is wrong when he claims that ‘Hobbes 
introduces the principle of inertia, which he adopted with no significant variation from Gassendi and 
Descartes’; while he rightly states that ‘under the impact of mechanistic science and infinity theories, belief in 
the Circle of Perfection finally broke down. Hobbes’ thought contributed generously to the decline of the idea, 
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has a determinate direction. Therefore, because matter is itself in motion, it has also a 
‘natural’ tendency to preserve not only the quantity of motion, but also its direction, that is 
the ‘kind’ of motion with which it is endowed – and ultimately differentiated and defined by. 
Consistently with his theory on the propagation of light by ‘pressure’, Descartes also 
rejected the existence of an ontological void, because it entailed the possibility of a 
discontinuity in the medium that contrasted the mechanistic world picture of a universal 
mechanical causality by contact governed by the laws of motion: 
The action, or inclination to move, [which] is transmitted from one place to another 
by means of several bodies which touch each other, and which fill all the spaces 
which is between the two without interruption, follows exactly the same path through 
which this same action would move the first of these bodies, if the others were not in 
its path. (AT XI 102-3)71 
On the contrary, Hobbes hesitated for a long time on this topic and on the connected one 
of the transmission of light as local motion through an elastic and ‘mobile’ medium (TO 
Hypotheses; LW 217-18), and he only endorsed his enemy’s plenist thesis when he finally 
adopted ontological determinism, but this choice was not due to exclusively physical 
issues, as I will explain in Chapter 2. 
This contrasting conception of matter is also evidenced by their different explanations of 
the phenomenon of reflection as a rebound effect. Around this problem of rebound, the 
hardness and/or the elasticity of bodies also became an argument between the two. All 
these problems evidently concerned motions so small that they could never be expected 
to be detected by the senses, and therefore their knowledge was to be accessible only by 
suppositio. Yet to the same problem Descartes and Hobbes provided diametrically 
opposed solutions, quite consistent with the respective views on matter: for Descartes the 
cause of hardness was ‘static’, while for Hobbes ‘dynamical’. Descartes explained bodily 
coherence in terms of the relative rest of particles, while Hobbes explained all kind of 
static phenomena by the speed of corpuscles: the quicker they rotate, the more relative 
coherence a body has.72 Again, for Hobbes the cause was to be found in the natural 
(circular) internal motion of matter: ‘For the cause thereof of hardness, I suppose the 
reciprocation of motion in those things which are hard, to be very swift, and in very small 
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but he himself persisted uncritically in the old belief’ (Mintz 1952: 99-100). About Gassendi’s version of circular 
natural motion, see Palmerino 2004. 
71 ‘L’action, ou l’inclination à se mouvoir, qui est transmise d’un lieu à l’autre, par le moye de plusieurs corps 
qui s’entretouchent, et qui se trouvent sans interruption en tout l’espace qui est entre deux, suit exactement la 
même voie, par où cette même action pourrait faire mouvoir le premier de ces corps, si les autres n’étaient 
point en son chemin’ (Descartes, The World). 
72 See Leijenhorst 2004: 174. On the same ground Descartes refused Hobbes's explanation of gravity 
because he conceived the ‘rest’ of the internal particles. 
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circles’ (SP V; EW VII, 32).73 In general, Descartes’s and Hobbes’s different determination 
of the causes of phenomena out of the grasp of human senses and therefore explained 
only by suppositio – such as all the phenomena depending on a materia subtilis – strongly 
resembled their opposite views on the inherence of motion to matter. Emblematic of 
Hobbes’s conception of materia subtilis as itself in motion was his solution to the problem 
of the ‘individuality’ of bodies, which he makes depend on motion only: ‘for bodies, as 
bodies, have no difference; but only from some special cause, that is, from some internal 
motion, or motions of their smallest parts’ (DeCo XXI.5; EW I, 323). 
The idea of an external and internal incessant motion of bodies was also present in 
Hobbes’s Tractatus Opticus, where it is explicitly identified with heat, which was directly 
connected to the concept of ‘conatus’ since De mundo: 
If someone said, ‘The principle of motion is the potential to motion without the act’, it 
will follow that conatus is not an action and does not achieve anything, whether the 
conatus be inward or outward. Conatus is therefore motion in actuality, even though 
the motion be very small and indistinguishable by the eye [...] So conatus is nothing 
but an actual motion, either of the whole body that tends [corporis conantis], or of its 
inner and invisible parts. (DM XIII.2, 118v-119v)74 
The distance between Hobbes’ and Descartes’s conception of matter is in effect evident 
also in the different elaborations of the concept of ‘conatus’, when treating the connected 
problem of free-fall. The problem of free-fall was a particularly dividing issue concerning 
the problem of inertial motion, because it is an example of a natural (and apparently 
rectilinear) motion caused by no actual clash, and in this sense it seems to contradict the 
idea that each body’s motion is exclusively caused by the clash with another body’s 
motion. Hobbes was soon part of the conjoint efforts carried on by the Mersenne circle to 
find a mechanical cause for free-fall that could be squared with Galileo’s odd-number 
law.75 When providing his final solution, however, he used the scholastic term ‘conatus’ 
(‘endeavour’ in the English translation), which originally referred to an internal force driven 
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73 This determines the different coherence of the parts of a body and therefore hardness and softness ‘are not 
different kinds, but different degrees of quality’ (DeCo XXII.2; EW I, 334). 
74 ‘Vel si quis dixerit principium motus esse potentiam ad motu sine actu, sequetur conatum non esse 
actionem, neque quicquam efficere sive ille introrsum sit, sive extrorsum. Est itaque conatus motus actualiter, 
licet exiguus, nec oculis manifestus […] Omnino igitur conatus est motus actualis, vel totius corporis conantis 
vel partium eius internarum, & invisibilium’. 
75 Hobbes and Gassendi took it as an indubitable starting point. Other causal explanations of the same law 
were provided within the Mersenne circle. Because of the impossibility a mechanical-causal explanation of the 
Galilean law, Huygens, Descartes, and also Mersenne eventually abandoned it (Leijenhorst 2004: 184, 166). 
On the contrary Hobbes’s study of the Galilean formula of free fall goes from De Motu (Ballistica) to its final 
account in De corpore XVI and XXX (Leijenhorst 2004: 175). In the Decameron Physiologicum (1678) Hobbes 
explicitly provided his final solution to the problem of gravity in opposition to both the scholastic explanation 
via vis impellens and to the ‘attractionist’ one remounting to Kepler (Leijenhorst 2004: 178): if an ‘attractive’ 
action exists, it is due to the downward-pushing force of the ambient air (pockets of air) caused in turn by the 
Earth’s rotation. 
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by a final causation. Yet, because Hobbes’s mechanical causation is by definition 
exclusively due to actual local motion, therefore conatus as a physical phenomenon 
cannot be other than motion. More precisely, it is the ‘insensible’ ‘first beginning’ of all 
actual motion.76 Thus Hobbes’s final definition of ‘conatus’ is inspired by Galileo’s notion 
of momentum: 
I define ENDEAVOUR [conatus] a motion made in less space and time than can be 
given: that is, less than can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; 
that is: by a point. (DeCo XV.2; OL I, 177)77 
This definition evidently depends on Hobbes’s ‘physical’ geometry. Because the science 
of motion itself resulted from the movement of those parts of human bodies which produce 
signs in order to construct the geometrical laws that describe the ideal movements of 
bodies, all objects must be physical – figures, planes, lines, and even points included: 
‘Hobbes did not see some kind of conceptual gulf between mathematical and physical 
objects, or between what we would call pure and applied mathematics. Mathematical 
objects are produced by the motion of bodies’ (Jesseph 2004a: 207).78 Thus Hobbes 
assumed divisibility of matter as always possible, and in principle if not in practice infinite, 
so that the geometrical point was in fact for him a quantity as small as possible. It is also 
clear that in this framework the conatus could only be ‘considered as’ non-extended and 
discontinuous, while it actually was extended, although ‘smaller than any given’, and 
continuous. In this sense the concept of conatus can be said to well represent a main 
internal problem in Hobbes’s research, the tendency ‘to differentiate the philosophy of 
motion from simple geometry’, because it helped make Hobbes’s dynamics more and 
more continuous, while his geometry remained ‘Euclidian’, that is discontinuous (Pacchi 
1965: 211).79 Hobbes’s conception of the geometrical representation of motion moved in 
this sense ‘closer to the modern infinitesimal account of motion than did Galileo’ 
(Leijenhorst 2004: 183),80 and – one might add – than Descartes’s algebra. In fact, 
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76 Which Descartes does not fail to explicitly attack: ‘[He claims inclination to be motion] “for”, he says, “the 
beginning of motion is motion”. But who has conceded to him that inclination [inclinationem] is the beginning 
or a part of motion?’ (AT III 316; Letter to Mersenne 18 February 1641). 
77 ‘Definiemus conatus esse motum per spatium et tempus minus quam quod datur, id est determinatur, sive 
expositione vel numero assignatur, id est, per punctum’. Hobbes’s own English translation is quite longer, as if 
it aimed to provide further explanation concerning the reference to the geometrical ‘point’: ‘I define conatus a 
motion made in less space and time than can be given: that is, less than can be determined or assigned by 
exposition or number; that is: motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or point of time’ 
(EW I, 206). 
78 On Hobbes’s physicalist (kynematic) conception of geometrical constructivism, see also Gargani 1971: 233. 
In this sense, according to Hobbes geometry can be said to be concerned with both sense and reason: ‘Two 
lines are equal if the difference cannot be discovered by senses or reason’ (Corr II, 609). 
79 The matter concerning the concept of conatus is so complex as to require by itself an independent analysis. 
For a general overview on Hobbes’s use of the term, see Barnouw (1992). For some hints on Hobbes’s use of 
the term across physics, ethics, and politics see below, Chapter 2.3. 
80 Although Hobbes opposed the beginnings of modern calculus because of his essentially Aristotelian 
understanding of mathematics and his personal animosity against Wallis (Leijenhorst 2004: 183). 
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Descartes refused the Galilean law of free-fall precisely because he refused the 
ontological discontinuity it seemed to entail, while he was progressively attempting to 
identify matter and continuous quantity with mathematical description by, on the one 
hand, postulating the ultimate existence of a materia subtilis made of atoms filling any 
possible ontological void, and, on the other hand, introducing an ontological feature in his 
notion of mathesis universalis that would tend to ‘identify mathematical and physical 
demonstrations’ (Sergio 2006: 201).81 
The perspective opened by the analysis of their different (and in many aspects opposed) 
theories of motion and the opposite theories of matter they entail, allows us to reconsider 
the claim that the implicit or explicit attacks on Descartes contained in Hobbes’s works 
and letters always raised issues pointing far beyond that field. It is quite clear that, since 
the beginning, the opposition between Hobbes and Descartes on optics was not merely a 
technical one, and what Descartes roughly dismissed was not – or at least, not only – 
Hobbes’s optics, but rather its implications concerning matter, motion and, notably, God 
and the soul.82 From the assumption, in optics, that perception is possible as a kind of 
‘reaction’ of the internal motion of the organs of sense to an external motion and clash, it 
was a short step to conceive the matter compounding the human body as capable of all 
kinds of motions, and hence to conclude that the entire spectrum of human activities, 
included the ‘highest’ ones Descartes would attribute to the soul, could be conceived as 
an ‘internal motion’ of human matter (see in particular DeCo XXV). In effect, the 
theoretical point of divergence had been touched at the outset by Hobbes when – 
precisely against Descartes’s Dioptrics – he had claimed that 
here we disagree: for what he calls tendency, I call motion, and what he 
distinguishes from motion […] I understand as motion. (LO I.10: 151)83 
On the other hand, against the first and fundamental hypothesis of Hobbes’s Tractatus 
opticus – namely that ‘every action is local motion in that which acts, such as any passion 
is local motion in that which is acted upon’ (TO I; OL V, 217)84 – Descartes did not fail to 
provide a harshly clear and distinct confutation: 
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81 The negation of void, a necessary requirement of the Cartesian synthesis of geometry and physics, is a 
question around which the discussion on the relation between geometry and physics evolves, and tends to 
become – as Macherey and Morfino explained in relation to Spinoza and Pascal – a political question 
concerning the ontology of the social (Macherey 1985, Morfino 2008). On the political relevance of the topic of 
void in connection with ontological determinism, see below, Chapter 2.3. 
82 See Descartes’s quick dismissal of Hobbes’s arguments concerning a ‘corporeal soul and God’ in his Letter 
to Mersenne 21 January 1641 (AT III 287). 
83 ‘Hic iam dissentimus; nam quos ille conari, ego moveri voco, et actionem, quam ille a motu distinguit, ego 
[…] motum esse volo’. Here Hobbes also explicitly argues against the ‘vulgar’ evidence of a ‘conatus without 
motion’ [‘facilius recipitur a vulgo posse esse conatum sine motu’] (LO I.10: 151). Stoffel 1987 provides a good 
account of the implications of the Descartes-Hobbes debate concerning optics on Hobbes’s concept of 
conatus, which is not invalidated by his wrong dating of the Latin Optical MS to 1644-46. 
84 ‘Omnis actio est motus localis in agente, sicut et omins passio est motus localis in patiente’. 
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In his first hypothesis he wrongly assumes that ‘all action is local motion’. (AT III, 
315)85 
It is true that Hobbes’s initial project of reducing epistemology to an ontology of sense 
perception required the previous solution of a remarkable series of problems about light 
that were closely related to mechanical issues concerning motion: the optical problems of 
the relation between velocity and direction of light, the modality of its transmission through 
a medium and the velocity of its propagation, were directly connected with other more 
general physical issues, such as inertia and the relation between movement and direction 
of bodies, the existence of void and/or of a materia subtilis, and the hardness and/or 
elasticity of bodies.86 Yet it is clear that a genuinely metaphysical opposition inhabited the 
clash of their physical optical theories, which made Hobbes aware that he could not 
maintain his materialistic premises without elaborating an epistemology capable of taking 
into account the problematic relation between the geometrical representation of nature 
entailed by mechanical science and the actual nature of matter in motion. Therefore I 
cannot agree with Brandt’s opinion that the core of their struggle lay in the claim for a 
priority in the elaboration of two different mechanical conceptions of nature which in fact 
arose simultaneously. In fact, the opposition between a dynamical and a static conception 
of matter implicitly concerned the subsequent metaphysical quarrel about the existence of 
the res cogitans. 
Against Brandt, who claims that Hobbes’s Objections ‘present practically nothing of 
interest in respect to the mechanical conception of nature’ (Brandt 1928: 127), a reading 
of both Hobbes’s Objections and Descartes’s replies in the Meditations makes it clear that 
what is primarily at stake in the ‘optics debate’ is a kinematic versus a static 
characterisation of matter and hence a materialist versus a dualist metaphysics of 
mechanicism. As explained, Descartes’s static, passive account of matter allowed for a 
separation of motion from matter and its direct connection with God’s will as a cause, 
which justified the necessity of the laws of nature. The regularity of motion was thus not 
only guaranteed, but also its overall quantity and conservation actively maintained by 
God: 
It is therefore completely consistent with reason for us to think that, solely because 
God moved the parts of matter in diverse ways when He first created them, and still 
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85 ‘In prima sua hypothesi falsum assumit, quod nempe omnis action sit motus localis’ (Descartes, Letter to 
Mersenne 18 February 1641). In his letter Descartes declares he is replying to ‘octo folia’, the last part of 
which, according to Malcolm, corresponded closely to the Tractatus Opticus (which Malcolm calls ‘Optica’; cf. 
Corr I, 92-93, n. 2) On Hobbes’s lost letter in ‘octo folia’, see Schuhmann 1998: 70-71. Against Hobbes 
Descartes recalls the abovementioned hypothesis of the transmission of motion through inclination, on which 
he founded his theory of the propagation of light. 
86 On these topics see especially Shapiro 1973: 143 ff., who refers to Hobbes and Descartes, and, more in 
general, Sabra 1967. 
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maintains all this matter exactly as it was at its creation, and subject to the same law 
as at that time; He also always maintains in it an equal quantity of motion. (AT VIII, 
61-62)87 
This was not a late outcome of Descartes’s research; it was his project from the outset to 
found the new physics on the immutability of God’s will (AT I, 145-46),88 and for this 
purpose he had to purify matter of any hints of autonomous activity. In effect Descartes’s 
matter is basically geometrical and static, so that physical motion entirely follows its 
‘divine’ principles independently of the actual characteristics of matter. The Cartesian 
body, whose essence is extension, ‘lacks the power to set itself in motion’ because it is 
initially set in motion by the immaterial substance of God and, on a smaller scale, by the 
immaterial substance of human soul. On the contrary, Hobbes’s world is in continual 
motion because matter is, as such, in motion: bodies are in motion by definition, since 
they cannot be set in motion by anything but other bodies (Jesseph 2004b: 133). To make 
it quite simple, for Hobbes existence and motion de facto coincide. 
As Hobbes clearly resumes through the famous ‘joke’ comparing Descartes’s ‘cogito ergo 
sum’ to the evidently false demonstration that ‘I am walking, therefore I am a walk’ (AT VII, 
172),89 what is mainly at stake in their quarrel is the idea that for Hobbes matter in motion 
is itself the essence of all things, and all the ‘spiritual’ faculties – reason included – are in 
fact the hidden motion of some materia subtilis and/or internal parts of the body: 
Reasoning [depends] on names, names [depend] on the imagination, and 
imagination [depends] (as I believe it does) merely on the motions of our bodily 
organs; and so the mind will be nothing more than motion occurring in various parts 
of an organic body. (AT VII, 178)90 
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87 ‘Unde sequitur quam maxime rationi esse consentaneum, ut putemus ex hoc solo, quod Deus diversimode 
moverit partes materiae, cum primum illas creavit, jamque totam istam materiam conservet eodem plane 
modo eademque ratione qua prius creavit, eum etiam tantundem motus in ipsa semper conservare’ 
(Descartes, Principia Philosophiae). And of course God’s will not only provided the ontological foundation, but 
epistemological too: ‘From God’s immutability we can also know certain rules or laws of nature [Ex hac eadem 
immutabilitate Dei, regulae quaedam sive leges naturae cognosci possunt]’ (AT VIII, 62). 
88 ‘It will be said that if God had established these truths he could change them as a king changes his laws. To 
this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can change. “But I understand them to be eternal and unchangeable.” 
– I make the same judgement about God. “But his will is free.” – Yes, but his power is beyond our grasp. In 
general we can assert that God can do everything that is within our grasp but not that he cannot do what is 
beyond our grasp. It would be rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as his power’ (Descartes, 
Letter to Mersenne 15 April 1630). 
89 ‘Nam eodem modo possem dicere: sum ambulans, ergo sum ambulatio.’ See also Hobbes’s objection to 
the third meditation: ‘My thought, though not separate from me, is distinct from me in the same way in which 
(as I have said above) jumping is distinct from the jumper. If M. Descartes is suggesting that he who 
understands is the same as the understanding, we shall be going back to the scholastic way of talking: the 
understanding understands, the sight sees, the will wills, and, by a very close analogy, the walking (or at least 
the faculty of walking) walks. All these expressions are obscure, improper, and quite unworthy of M. 
Descartes’s usual clarity’ (AT VII, 177). 
90 ‘Si hoc sit, sicut esse potest, ratiocinatio dependebit a nominibus, nomina ab imaginatione, et imaginatio 
forte, sicut sentio, ab organorum corporeum motu, et sic mens nihil aliud erit paeterquam motus in partibus 
quibusdam corporis organici.’ This is not only something on which Descartes contests Hobbes, it is something 
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Thus as Hobbes’s objections progressively move to the topics of the spiritual substance 
and to God, Descartes’s answers become more and more sharp and their tone more and 
more dismissive.91 Finally, he completely misses Hobbes’s peculiar distinction between 
actual ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ (‘a linking of names by the word is’), which, without 
existence, is ‘our invention’ (AT VII, 194).92 In fact their debate on optics, along with their 
different physics of matter, were part of a struggle between a materialist and a dualist 
metaphysical foundation of mechanicism, and notably of the relation between physical 
motion on the one hand and, on the other, the phenomena of perception, knowledge, 
imagination, reason: in a word, with epistemology. 
 
1.3 Geometry and Physics: The Problem of Method 
Once it is clarified that Hobbes’s matter is ‘in motion’ by definition, it is worth following this 
claim’s epistemological implications. I shall therefore try to elucidate the basic 
epistemology of the different sciences entailed by Hobbes’s theory of motion, provisionally 
taking for granted the unity of his philosophical system in order to analyse the composite 
methods featuring the different scientific fields. This (fictive) assumption of a 
methodological unity in Hobbes’s oeuvre will guide a brief analysis of De corpore, the first 
part of the Elementa philosophiae, Hobbes’s ‘official’ system of sciences which included 
De corpore (1655), De homine (1658), and De cive (1642). On the basis of such 
premises, in Chapter 1.4 I will be able to formulate my hypothesis about Hobbes’s 
strategy concerning the relationship between science and political power, thus grounding 
the analysis of the development of Hobbes’s epistemology of civil science I will display in 
Chapter 2. 
Two methods for one science (analytical and synthetical) 
In perfect Aristotelian orthodoxy, Hobbes defines science as the knowledge of causes.93 
Two methods must be adopted for the scientific knowledge of causes, synthetical and 
analytical, that are both necessary to explain the existence of an effect. The synthetical 
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that he cannot even accept as an argument: ‘When he concludes that the mind is a motion he might just as 
well conclude that the earth is the sky, or anything else he likes’ (AT VII, 179). 
91 ‘I think I did give a full enough explanation of the idea of God to satisfy those who are prepared to attend my 
meaning; I cannot possibly satisfy those who prefer to attribute a different sense to my words than the one I 
intended. As for the comment at the end regarding the creation of the world, this is quite irrelevant’ (AT VII, 
181); ‘I see nothing here that needs answering’ (AT VII, 183); ‘All this is completely self-evident’ (AT VII, 185). 
‘As for how we can have an idea of God, I have gone over this ad nauseam. There is absolutely nothing in this 
objection to invalidate my demonstrations’ (AT VII, 189). 
92  ‘Unde constat essentiam, quatenus distinguitur ab existentia, nihil aliud esse praetor nominum 
copulationem per verbum, est. Ideoque essentia absque existentia est commentum nostrum.’ Descartes does 
not even consider Hobbes’s peculiar kind of nominalism as worth an answer: ‘The distinction between 
essence and existence is known to everyone. And this talk about eternal names, as opposed to concepts or 
ideas of eternal truths, has already been amply refuted’ (AT VII, 194). 
93 For a quite complete account of Hobbes’s debts towards Aristotle, see Leijenhorst 2002. 
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method moves from causes to effects while the analytical one moves from effects to 
causes. Now, in the exposition and teaching of science only the synthetical method must 
be used. But in scientific research the two methods actually concur for the discovery 
(inventio) of causes: 
It is manifest, that in searching out of causes, there is need partly of the analytical, 
and partly of the synthetical method; of the analytical, to conceive how 
circumstances conduce severally to the production of effects; and of the synthetical, 
for the adding together and compounding of what they can effect singly by 
themselves. And thus much may serve for the method of inventio. (DeCo VI.10; EW 
I, 79, italics added) 
The same ‘mixed’ method can be applied to any domain of knowledge with different 
restrictions, depending on the characteristics of the domain. In this sense Hobbes 
describes the way human reason can move up and down a chain of related elements by 
adding or subtracting: ‘following’ backwards the necessity of their connections or ‘building’ 
such a necessity. 
Through this same mixed method, in De corpore Hobbes links the ‘causes or generations’ 
to the ‘appearances or phenomena’, which are ‘internal’ movements of mind resulting from 
the clash of the movements of ‘external’ bodies against senses (DeCo XXV.2; EW I, 389-
91). The movements of external bodies cause the internal movements of human bodies 
called ‘phantasms of sense’ or ‘imagination’ (DeCo VI.1; EW I, 66). Consequently we have 
a complex system of bodily motions producing different kinds of effects, corresponding to 
4 different genres of ‘things’: bodies, accidents, phantasms, and names (DeCo V.2; EW I, 
57-58). Thus physics is concerned with bodily motions as causes and effects of other 
bodily motions, but a great part of scientific research consists in discriminating – by 
contrasting these phantasms to geometric models describing ‘pure’ motion – the 
accidents, phantasms, and names depending on human senses from the real bodies 
moving independently of them (DeCo VI.8; EW I, 75-76). This is precisely the repetition, at 
the epistemological level, of the same task previously carried out by optics at the 
ontological level, which, according to Hobbes, would permit separating the wheat of the 
object from the chaff of senses.94 In fact, both the direct sensation (the internal motion 
produced by the external moving body clashing against senses) and the subsequent 
internal image of an external motion continuing after the first sensation, are part of the 
same understanding of the relation between a cause and an effect, that is two 
phenomena of local motion. Now, in order to allow the same method to work for both the 
domains of the ‘external’ motion of bodies and the internal motion of human bodies that 
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94 Cf. also DeCo VI.10; EW I, 79. 
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produces knowledge, the equivocal use of the terms ‘causes’ and ‘principles’ needs to be 
clarified. 
Principles and causes: different epistemologies, same ontology 
In De corpore Hobbes focuses on the equivocal use of the word ‘principle’ – putting the 
blame for it, it goes without saying, on Aristotle: 
The fallacy lies in the equivocation of the world principle; for whereas Aristotle in the 
beginning of his Metaphysics, says, that the treating of principles belongs to primary 
science, he understands by principles, causes of things, and certain existences 
which he calls primary; but where he says a primary proposition is a principle, by 
principle, there, he means the beginning and cause of knowledge, that is, the 
understanding of words, which, if any man want, he is incapable of learning. (DeCo 
V.12; EW I, 63) 
Following Aristotle, philosophers would run the risk, then, of using the same term, 
‘principle’, to indicate both some eminent causes of things and the first causes of 
knowledge, confusing the epistemological value of the ‘first principles’ of knowledge with 
the ontological reference to the physical causes of motions. According to Hobbes, 
although they must have – as any other existing effect – ‘all but one universal cause, 
which is motion’ (DeCo VI.5; EW I, 69), we cannot connect the ‘names’ that refer to these 
different kinds of ‘things’ [sic] (the domains of theoretical principles and physical causes) 
in the same discourse without producing false propositions (DeCo V.2; EW I, 57-58). 
Hence it is evident that Hobbes’s stance entails in physics what Gargani called an 
‘epistemological indeterminacy’ (indecidibilità epistemologica), which was quite in line with 
Galileo’s physics and Descartes epistemology (Gargani 1971: 22, 24), and yet does not 
entail any ontological separation of the two domains, but just a methodological 
complication. It is precisely on the basis of this fundamental ontological monism that the 
same synthetical and analytical methods can be applied both to causes and effects, and 
to principles and consequences. And yet the very relation between the two domains is – 
strictly speaking – beyond the grasp of science: it is impossible to have a true and 
universal knowledge, that is science, of the determinate empirical relationship between a 
singular physical body and the universal principles of physical science (DeCo V.2; EW I, 
58). It is clear that, once the Cartesian epistemological gap entered Hobbes’s materialist 
theory of knowledge, it entailed the assumption of an epistemological dualism de facto.95 
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95 In a couple of pages that probably represent the most remarkable synthesis of the epistemologies of 
Descartes and Hobbes in relation to the underlying opposite metaphysical projects, Leijenhorst notes that in 
his first philosophy ‘Hobbes shifts, without explicitly stating it, from the appearance of change 
(phenomenological perspective) to the physical change of our body as the effect of an external body (realist 
perspective)’ (Leijenhorst 2005b: 117-19). In my interpretation I would like to explain that this epistemological 
dualism is connaturated to mechanical philosophy precisely because of its passive conception of matter, 
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In fact, if only local motion can be properly a ‘cause’ of any phenomenon, we must not 
underestimate the fact that the principles of knowledge must be themselves effects 
(phantasms) deriving from ‘trains of thought’ (imagination), and ultimately relying on 
movements of ‘external’ bodies clashing on senses. Therefore Hobbes tries to 
differentiate the use of the terms ‘principle’ and ‘cause’ by referring the first to the bodily 
movement which produces a phenomenon, and the second to the phantasms of sense 
and of imagination which are ‘principles of science’, that is a special kind of effects of the 
same kind of cause: bodily motions. Yet we must follow Malcolm (1990) in admitting that 
Hobbes is not immune from using the term ‘cause’ in an equivocal manner.96 And this is 
particularly evidenced by the difficulty he experienced in crossing the domains. A few 
pages after arguing for their radical distinction, Hobbes is obliged to give a causal 
explanation of the principles of knowledge, whose existence cannot have its origins 
anywhere else but in motion: 
The first beginnings, therefore, of knowledge, are the phantasms of sense and 
imagination. (DeCo VI.1; EW I, 66) 
Nevertheless, Hobbes’s choice appears here epistemologically sound. He states that, 
though in logic it is not proper to express the relation between premises and conclusions 
as ‘cause’, nevertheless it is admitted (‘may pass, though it be not properly spoken’), if it is 
clearly established that ‘speech is not the cause of speech’, but rather that ‘understanding 
[i.e. a motion in human body] is the cause of understanding’ (DeCo III.20; EW I, 43). 
In short, although depending on the same ontological ‘universal principle’ of motion, the 
principles of knowledge (mathematical or not) and the causes of motion pertain to different 
epistemological levels, the ontological connection of which is postulated, but not possible 
to be scientifically known in detail. Therefore the ‘internal’ principles of the knowledge of 
motion – although they ontologically must be homogeneous with any other kind of motion 
– cannot be epistemologically considered the same as the causes of the ‘external’ 
motions, which physics is expected to explain. So in the end the two methods of 
philosophy do not provide the same kind of knowledge, precisely because they rely on 
two different kinds of theoretical tools. The synthetical method, proceeding ‘from the 
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independently of what metaphysical project one assumes. In this sense, Hobbes’s conception of matter as 
inherently active can be said to undermine the secure boundaries of the same mechanistic ideology it is part 
of. See below, Chapters 3.3 and 3.4. 
96 From the consideration that ‘Hobbes was sliding […] into an equivocal use of the word “cause”’, Malcolm 
concludes that ‘the idea of uniting the knowledge of necessary truths with the knowledge of causes was in the 
end a snare and a delusion, and this accounts for much of the floundering in Hobbes’s later writings on the 
subject […], not only the chapter on method in De corpore [i.e. Chapter 6, which I am discussing here], but 
also Leviathan, where the definition of “science” compromises awkwardly between knowledge of the 
consequences of names and knowledge of the consequences of facts’ (Malcolm 1990: 155). It is worth 
recalling that Malcolm, who is making his point against the idea of a common foundation of natural and civil 
science in Hobbes, excludes any possible epistemological explanation of Hobbes’s ‘equivocal use of the word 
cause’, which is, on the contrary, what I am trying to do here. 
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generation of things to their possible effects’, relies on the ‘truth of the first principles of 
our ratiocination’ collectively constituted by the imposition of names,97  and therefore 
provides universal knowledge. The analytical method, proceeding ‘from their effects or 
appearances to some possible generation of the same’, relies on principles ‘placed in the 
things themselves by the Author of Nature’ and ‘by us observed in them’, it relies on 
phenomena, phantasms which provide the particular knowledge of natural causes (DeCo 
XXV.1). The assumption of this twofold methodology eventually allowed Hobbes to define 
the epistemological distinction of geometry and physics (and all sciences) without 
rejecting the postulate of the underlying homogeneity of their object: matter in motion. 
Overlapping geometry and physics 
In fact, for the abovementioned reasons, although the object of all sciences is the same, 
the different sciences provide a different knowledge of it, according to the varying 
epistemological relationship between the subject of science and the different phenomena 
resulting from matter in motion. Thus, although within Hobbes’s system of sciences we 
cannot differentiate geometry and physics claiming that only the second is concerned with 
bodies, in fact we must consider the different kinds of bodies with which they are 
concerned, and the consequences this entails for the kind of knowledge of which they are 
capable. On the one hand geometry starts from principles and abstract bodies ‘built’ by 
reason and imagination, while on the other hand physics is a mixed knowledge of causal 
chains based on hypotheses chosen thanks to phenomenal observation, by referring to 
the principles established within the preceding fundamental science. For that reason 
physics depends on geometry: ‘the principles of the science of motion help to frame the 
hypotheses that the science of the sensible world requires’ (Zarka 1996: 73; see also 
Gartgani 1971: 197). 
Such a hierarchical differentiation depends on geometry being a science of abstract 
bodies entirely depending on the human body (mind), but physics being a science of 
natural bodies which are instead independent of the human body (mind). In geometry, an 
exclusively internal movement of mind simply causes another internal movement, such as 
‘understanding being the cause of understanding’: therefore geometrical knowledge is not 
just related to, but also – at the same time – made of bodies.98 In it, principles and 
consequences are also the causes and effects of those phantasms whose construction ‘is 
in the power of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does no more than deduce 
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97 ‘Made and constituted by ourselves, whilst we consent and agree about the appellations of things’ (DeCo 
XXV.1; EW, 388). Names and definitions, of course, can be well or badly chosen according to the motions 
they are supposed to describe (Jesseph 1996: 100). 
98 ‘Because his ontology recognizes only bodies as real, Hobbes concluded that the traditional geometrical 
definitions of Euclid must be scrapped and replaced by ones defining the objects of mathematical investigation 
as bodies; points, for example, are bodies whose magnitudes are sufficiently small that they can be neglected, 
lines are produced by the motion of points, surfaces by the motion of lines, etc’ (Jesseph 2004a: 202). 
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the consequences of his own operation’ (SL; EW VII, 183-184). From the point of view of 
the ‘artist’, production and demonstration constitute here an identical and unique 
sequence; therefore ‘principles’ and ‘causes’ coincide in providing the same kind of 
explication of consequences and/or effects, because ‘the lines and figures from which we 
reason are drawn and described by ourselves’ (SL; EW VII, 184). 
Thus, geometry is a certain knowledge of abstract principles generated by human mind 
and of their consequences. It is a synthetical science because its principles are produced 
by man, but it does not describe phenomenal reality except from those images produced 
by the human body (as mind) according to the same principles, while physics is a 
hypothetical knowledge of universal relations between causes and effects, but always 
observing singular causes and effects. It is synthetical only ‘in general’, because it is 
related to bodies whose existence is not dependent on man, moved by causes which are 
not produced by man: therefore physics must refer to geometry for its principles of 
explanation, analytically choosing – among all the possible hypothetical causes – those 
that must ‘be such as are conceivable’ (DeCo XXX.15; EW I, 531), that is more ‘rationally’ 
related to the studied effects (phenomena). As any other science concerning natural 
bodies, then, physics is itself internally ‘divided’ into an abstract knowledge of principles 
derived from geometry and a concrete knowledge of a reality which is understandable in 
the terms of those principles, but not functioning according to that ideal ‘perfection’, at 
least at the eyes of our limited knowledge: 
The science, which is here taught, hath its principles in the appearances of nature, 
and endeth in the attaining of some knowledge of natural causes. I have given to 
this part the title of PHYSICS, or Phenomena of Nature. (DeCo XXV.1; EW I, 388)99 
In short, geometric construction and physical explanation do not provide the same kind of 
knowledge. Although the first is the ground of the second, as in fact any actual science is 
modelled on geometry, the two kinds of knowledge they refer to cannot, at least in 
principle, overlap. Yet this quite balanced view does not fully account for the complexity 
either of Hobbes’s system of sciences or of his conception of the relation between 
geometry and physics. Before enquiring the place of civil science in his system of 
sciences, it is worth explaining in what sense this quite problematic relation in fact hides a 
more profound adherence to mechanicism. 
In effect Hobbes’s peculiar overlapping of geometry and physics did not take place 
through the reference to a God-legislator as happened in Descartes’s case. In a certain 
sense Hobbes’s solution appears closer to the early Descartes’s hesitation in Le monde: 
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99 At the end of his work, Hobbes is even more explicit about the different epistemological status of 
geometrical demonstrative and physical hypothetical knowledge (DeCo XXX.15; EW I, 531). 
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no warranty of a unifying divinity, but rather a certain independence of the ontological and 
epistemological level, as witnessed by his assumption of both the existence of atoms and 
the in principle infinite indivisibility of matter. But his postulate of materialistic monism 
compelled Hobbes to assume also a kind of epistemological continuity between the two 
fields which required a ‘physicisation’ of geometry. It is clear that, if local motion causes 
both movements of external bodies and movements in man’s body, called phantasms of 
sense or imagination, there should be no ontological difference between the objects of 
geometry and physics. It is therefore worth concluding with Jesseph that in Hobbes’s 
philosophy ‘the book of nature may be written in the language of mathematics, but the 
alphabet in which this language is written is nature itself, namely material bodies in 
motion’ (Jesseph 2004a: 208).100 Yet the alphabet of this ‘physicisation’ of geometry 
Hobbes was adopting posed a quite serious foundational problem to his materialistic 
version of mechanicism, which did not allow for a straight ‘geometrisation’ of physics, that 
is a reduction of physical motion to the rules of geometry. On the contrary his purpose 
arose a whole series of problems which a materialistic metaphysics was not allowed to 
solve with a simple claim to an immaterial God or Reason. All of which takes us to the 
strange case of Hobbes’s political epistemology. 
 
1.4 The Strange Case of Thomas Hobbes’s Political Epistemology 
As previously explained, when Galileo attacked Aristotle’s qualitative dynamics by means 
of the ancient Archimedean statics, his geometrisation of local motion was intended to 
found neither an epistemology nor an ontology of the physical world. His conception of 
local motion, however, if taken for an ontological principle, entailed an epistemology of 
relativity that both Descartes and Hobbes tried to exorcize with their metaphysics, by 
providing a) an epistemological foundation of the scientific point of view consistent with b) 
the geometrisation of primary qualities required by the Galilean physics of local motion. 
And, despite the apparent irrelevance for scientific research, the way mechanical 
philosophers challenged these issues irreversibly shaped the new science which, to the 
fundamental properties of nature traditionally celebrated by Solomon, had irreversibly 
added ‘motion’.101 
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100 According to Jesseph ‘the centrepiece of Hobbes’s new analysis by the method of motion is Chapter 16 of 
De corpore’, a chapter that ‘was lifted almost straight out of Galileo’s Two New Sciences’ (Jesseph 2004a: 
205). 
101 Mechanical philosophers were ‘fond of quoting the phrase from The Wisdom of Solomon (11:20) that God 
“has disposed all things by measure and number and weight”, but this traditional ground had to be expanded 
in order to cover also the unstable and problematical new object of science which motion actually was’ (Mayr 
1986: 56). 
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Both Descartes and Hobbes assumed that every single part of matter participates in many 
motions, transmitted through reciprocal transference. As explained, this creates the 
problem of which point of view should the subject of science endorse, in order to produce 
a universal and steady knowledge of its object, matter in motion. Compared to 
Descartes’s solution, Hobbes’s difficulties were quite clear: with no res cogitans the 
subject of science is by definition in motion, therefore no absolute point of view on matter 
in motion can be assumed. Furthermore, the problem of the resistance of matter to a 
geometrical account cannot be easily solved through a straightforward reference to some 
kind of divine legislation. And, just to complicate the whole thing, Hobbes was determined 
to extend mechanicism to the political field where, on the contrary, as in morality, 
Descartes’s metaphysics explicitly denied any possible application of mechanical science, 
because res cogitans introduced an unpredictable element of liberty in the bodily motion 
characterising the mechanical-physiological functioning of human passions, which made 
the political field unsuitable for a science of causes. 
Hobbes’s solution to this set of problems touched, of course, both the subject and the 
object of his materialistic version of the new mechanical philosophy. And this also in the 
field of civil science, where he pursued two goals, strictly connected to the epistemological 
problem inherited by Galileo: a) to build a point of view internal to matter in motion, but – 
as far as possible – immune from motion; and b) to provide an account of local motion that 
would reduce the resistance of matter and the threatening unpredictability of motion to 
geometrical order. On the basis of the previous account of Hobbes’s attempt to challenge 
this problem at the ontological and epistemological level, it is now possible to provide a 
first glance at the political implications entailed by Hobbes’s implementation of 
Descartes’s epistemological approach within a materialistic framework. 
Hobbes’s civil science in the system of sciences 
As should be clear from Chapter 1.3, according to Hobbes a science can be defined by its 
method (synthetical or analytical), by its theoretical object (principles-consequences or 
causes-effects), and by the kind of bodies it is concerned with (natural or artificial). The 
epistemological status of the different sciences, and their relation to their objects, radically 
change depending on all these factors. This consideration prevents taking Hobbes’s 
Elementa philosophiae as the actual achievement of a monolithic, deductive system of 
sciences. Firstly, because there is no undivided connection between the synthetical and 
analytical parts of the method. Secondly, because the physical chains of causes and 
effects, and the logical chains of principles and consequences concern different domains: 
respectively the motion of different bodies as objects of knowledge, and the a priori 
structure of scientific (or ‘philosophical’) deductive discourse. Thirdly, because the variety 
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of bodies and their relation to human body definitely affects the kind of knowledge one 
can actually have of them. 
After analysing the crucial and paradigmatic relationship between geometry and physics, I 
shall now enquire after the epistemological status of political philosophy, which Hobbes 
called scientia civilis, through the lens of the larger picture of his epistemology. In effect 
Hobbes’s epistemology was continuously reworked during the quite fast development of 
his political thought in the 1640s. This development entailed the reconfiguration of the 
problem of the epistemological status of civil science at each step of its elaboration, The 
Elements of Law Natural and Politic (accomplished in 1640), two editions of De cive (1642 
and 1647), and the English Leviathan (1651). In 1668 Hobbes also published a new 
version of Leviathan in Latin, and wrote an account of the English Civil War he called 
Behemoth, which was not precisely a political treatise: it rather concerned history, a 
matter the scientific status of which had always been quite problematical for him. The 
articulated development of Hobbes’s civil science will be the object of my analysis in 
Chapter 2. Here, to cut a long story short, I will provide a synchronic picture of the 
structure and implication of Hobbes’s epistemology of scientia civilis, by taking geometry 
as the starting point, as Hobbes himself did once he had decided – with De cive – to 
govern the domain of moral philosophy as successfully as ‘the geometers’ had made with 
their ‘province’ (DC Ep.; OL II, 137). 
As said, Hobbes elaborated a materialist and constructivist conception of geometry, which 
postulated a continuity between the names and principles of geometry, and the physical 
elements and causes of motion. His peculiar obstinacy to keep this radically materialistic 
point imposed a price. Not only did this draw the scorn of part of the community of 
mathematicians, it also conveyed the methodological problems of his geometrical 
constructivism into the epistemology of scientia civilis. In Hobbes’s peculiar geometry, 
points, lines, and surfaces are physical entities, in the same way in which imagination, 
speech, and all the ‘phantasms of mind’ are physical effects of bodily motion (of light and 
sound). In short, the objects of geometry are as physical as any other phenomenon, with 
the difference that they are entirely under human control. It is precisely starting from the 
assumption that the possibility to construct an object entails the possibility of knowing and 
controlling it, that Hobbes’s epistemological innovation in civil science emerged. He 
moved from the claim that both geometrical figures and the body politic are artificial, that 
is a human product: 
Geometry therefore is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason 
are drawn and described by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable 
because we make the commonwealth ourselves. (SL; EW VIII, 184) 
 71 
And yet the parallel has a clear limitation due to the different ontological nature of the 
bodies the two sciences are concerned with. This entails crucial methodological 
consequences which cannot be overcome by a straight identification of civil science and 
geometry. While geometry is entirely artificial, civil science concerns an artificial product, 
the body politic, whose original components are natural bodies, the bodies of men. And 
these bodies, insofar as they are not built by man himself, are the object of physics, not of 
geometry. In this sense, it is because of the double nature of its object, natural and 
artificial, that civil science had to integrate the methods of physics and geometry. And the 
model of such an integration was of course mechanics.  
Civil science and mechanics: same mixed object 
Mechanics is quite close to geometry as far as it concerns artificial bodies built by men, 
and yet the functioning of these bodies is far from the ideal perfection described by 
geometry. In this sense mechanics can be said to be situated between geometry and 
physics: it concerns artificial bodies made up of natural raw materials the original structure 
and functioning of which is independent of men’s wills, while their assemblage follows the 
principles of geometry and can therefore be clearly understood. Now, suppose the raw 
materials of such artificial bodies are the natural bodies of men, and mechanics becomes 
a perfectly suitable model for civil science: the artificial bodies it produces are made up of 
natural components, in principle entirely dependent on – but actually independent of – the 
producer’s control. Only in this sense was mechanics, in the well-known analogy of the 
‘automatic Clock’ Hobbes presented in the preface to De cive, the model inspiring a 
method for a completely new civil science: 
As in an automatic Clock or other fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the 
function of each part and wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately 
the material, shape and motion of the parts, so in investigating the right of the 
commonwealth and the duties of the citizens, there is a need, not indeed to take the 
commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to understand correctly what 
human nature is like. (DC Praef.; OL II, 145-46)102 
Such a privileged relation between mechanics and civil science provided the latter with a 
quite anomalous methodology. The mixed nature of the bodies with which civil science is 
concerned gave rise to dramatic questions about its method and theoretical object: was 
civil science a synthetical deductive knowledge proceeding from first principles (as 
geometry) or was it an analytical science entailing the observation of facts and the 
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102 ‘Sicut enim in horologio automato aliave machina paulo implicatiore quos sit cujusque partis rotaeque 
officium, nisi dissolvatur, partiumque materia, figura, motus seorsim inspiciatur, sciri non potest: ita in iure 
civitatis civiumque officiis investigandis, opus est, non quidem ut dissolvatur civitas, sed tamen ut tanquam 
dissoluta consideretur, id est, ut qualis sit natura humana’. 
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suppositio of hypotheses (as physics)? Civil science was clearly assumed by Hobbes to 
be a synthetic science, at least in principle, which was to be inscribed into the project of a 
complete system of science. Thus his De cive was supposed to follow De corpore and De 
homine along a strictly deductive chain moving from the first principles of philosophy, to 
natural philosophy, to anthropology and, finally, to the body politic. But Hobbes’s decision 
to publish at the outset De cive, before developing the other parts of his system, posed a 
problem both pedagogical and epistemological, which pushed him to find a possible 
methodological alternative for civil science. He displayed a possible ‘analytical’ knowledge 
for civil science as a partial remedy to the ignorance of those who are not capable of 
understanding it ‘synthetically’ starting from the first principles of geometry (DC Praef.; OL 
II, 151), and, I would add, to remedy the impossibility of actually ‘taking it apart’ into its 
components, as it would be possible with machines. In fact, this attempt posed further 
consideration concerning the peculiar epistemological relation between the principles of 
human nature on which civil science is based and man as the subject of their knowledge. 
This is something that links civil science to moral philosophy insofar as both primarily 
concern the knowledge of the principles of human nature immediately evident to all men, 
through an internal evidence which is not far from the one allowed to geometry. 
Civil science and moral philosophy: same internal subject 
Moral philosophy is in fact concerned, like physics, with the motion of a natural body 
(man) whose internal motions are impossible for any external observer to grasp. But in 
this case the natural body object of science is also the subject of the science itself. And 
this offers to moral philosophy a quite peculiar advantage over physics: moral philosophy 
can also rely on an ‘internal’ point of view on the natural mechanisms of the human body, 
which provides a synthetical ‘surplus’ beyond the analytical knowledge typical of physics. 
The privileged internal point of view of the human body studied by moral philosophy 
allows for a direct knowledge of the genesis of the effects from the internal causes, even if 
in this case the causes, that is human passions, are not properly ‘built’ as in geometry, but 
only followed along the process of their natural explication. Furthermore, through the 
understanding of the natural law, moral philosophy can recognize the principles from 
which right actions can be synthetically derived and, under certain external conditions, 
produce consequent effects. In short, moral philosophy is a science of natural bodies with 
some privileges: although by definition not as certain as geometry, it is more certain than 
physics. It can provide the direct knowledge ‘from within’ of the principles and causes of 
motions in man’s natural body. And, what is more important, among all natural sciences, 
moral philosophy appears to be the only one the functioning of whose object is possibly 
dependent on the science we have of it, as it happens in geometry. 
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The dual relationship to mechanics and moral philosophy, to the mixed bodies of the first 
and to the double epistemological perspective allowed by the second, provided the 
peculiar epistemological shape of the twofold method of civil science. It is thus that the 
analytical and synthetical methodologies could become in Hobbes’s civil science the 
opposition of two different and independent methods for the knowledge of the same 
object. 
Civil science as analytical and synthetical 
It is precisely in Chapter VI of De corpore, devoted to method [De methodo], that Hobbes 
speaks of two possible methods for those who want to build civil science. Firstly, 
they that have attained the knowledge of the passions and perturbations of the 
mind, by the synthetical method, and from the very first principles of philosophy, 
may by proceeding in the same way, come to the causes and necessity of 
constituting commonwealths, and to get the knowledge of what is natural right, and 
what are civil duties. (DeCo VI.7; EW I, 73-74) 
This kind of knowledge is based on the ‘principles’ of human nature, the motions of human 
bodies and in particular the internal motions of mind (passions and perturbations) and the 
laws of human reason, that is the ‘laws of nature’. Starting from the self evident first 
principles of motion it proceeds deducing synthetically their consequences and thus 
achieving ‘all other knowledge appertaining to civil philosophy’ (DeCo VI.5; EW I, 73-74). 
The problem of this ideally perfect method is that ‘universal principles’ as such ‘cannot be 
demonstrated’: they can only be known ‘by nature’ (cf. DeCo VI.12; EW I, 80), i.e. ‘by 
themselves’ (cf. DeCo VI.15; EW I, 84). Therefore another method is necessary not only 
as an alternative to the properly scientific synthetical one, but as a precondition for it. In 
fact, on the other hand, 
they also that have not learned the first part of philosophy, namely geometry and 
physics, may, notwithstanding, attain the principles of civil philosophy, by the 
analytical method. (DeCo VI.7; EW I, 74) 
This second kind of knowledge starts from the idea of justice and discovers analytically 
the principles compounding it, ‘by subtraction’ from the idea of justice, and can eventually 
be discovered to coincide with those directly experienced by any man observing the 
functioning of ‘his own mind’: 
For if a question be propounded, as, whether such an action be just or unjust; if that 
unjust be resolved into fact against law, and that notion law into the command of 
him or them that have coercive power […] which may be known to be so by any 
man's experience, that will but examine his own mind. And, therefore, from hence 
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he may proceed, by compounding, to the determination of the justice or injustice of 
any propounded action. (DeCo VI.7; EW I, 74) 
It is clear that the second way eventually turns to a new synthetic operation, which starts 
this time from a principle extracted from a direct ‘internal’ experience, thanks to a previous 
analytical operation. Therefore we must conclude that the first path also had to be at least 
partially analytical, because it started from principles whose ‘inventio’ – by definition non-
demonstrable – could proceed only from sense. In fact, this problem of the evidence of 
the first principles, which Descartes had solved through the self-reflexivity of cogito, 
expands on the whole of Hobbes’s philosophical research, so that a kind of circularity 
concerns the method of philosophy as such: 
So that it is manifest, by what has been said, that the method of philosophy, to such 
as seek science simply, without propounding to themselves the solution of any 
particular question, is partly analytical, and partly synthetical; namely, that which 
proceeds from sense to the invention of principles, analytical; and the rest 
synthetical. (DeCo VI.7; EW I, 74-5) 
In fact, the principles of any science cannot be ‘demonstrated’, because the odos towards 
their evidence is strictly individual, as it is, in general, a late result of the action of bodies 
on the senses. And this indemonstrability makes them depend on pedagogy and 
ultimately on the power that historically institutes names and definitions. Because there is 
no rule for choosing the starting point of an analysis, no first principle can be granted by 
any definitive methodology, not even geometry, the new queen of sciences: 
Because there are many means by which the same thing may be generated, or the 
same problem be constructed, therefore neither do all geometricians, nor doth the 
same geometrician always, use one and the same method […]. If the question be 
much complicated, there cannot by any of these ways be constituted a certain rule 
[…] but the success will depend upon dexterity, upon formerly acquired science, and 
many times upon fortune. (DeCo XX.6; EW I, 312-314) 
One might guess that on this point Hobbes incredibly anticipates non-Euclidean 
geometries, which do not take into account the ‘normal’ (related to human perception) 
conception of three-dimensional space, nevertheless allowing the construction of models 
that are perfectly functional in understanding and operating on different sectors or scales 
of physical reality. According to Hobbes the ‘axioms of Euclid’ can be entirely 
demonstrated by the internal logic of the artificial bodies which they permit to be built, 
without any reference to experience, because they are not ‘principles of demonstration’ 
but ‘petitions’, that nevertheless have ‘by the consent of all men gotten the authority of 
principles’, that is power: 
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Those petitions, or postulata (as they call them) though they be principles, yet they 
are not principles of demonstration, but of construction only; that is not, of science 
but of power. (DeCo VI.13; EW I, 82) 
As a result, geometry was related to power both in its principles and in its effects: its 
principles depended on the power capable of imposing a common consent upon men 
through teaching, its effects on a power capable of imposing them upon matter through 
mechanics. 
Civil science as geometry (through mechanics and ethics) 
The right way to understand Hobbes’s prospected equivalence of geometry and politics in 
his philosophy, therefore, lies in the fact that they are both constructive sciences based on 
the ‘linguistic’ power over definitions and names, that is, entirely dependent on the power 
which (im)poses their ‘principles’. In De homine, Chapter X, entitled De Sermone et 
scientiis, after recalling that the use of language ‘did not get man better, but improved his 
power’ (DH X.4; OL II, 92),103 Hobbes goes back to epistemology, explaining how the only 
sciences demonstrable a priori are those ‘the generation of which depends on the free will 
[arbitrio] of men themselves’ (DH X.5; OL II, 92).104 These include geometry; exclude 
physics, which is nothing more than a ‘mixed mathematics’ based both on a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge; and – not at all surprisingly – include ethics [ethica] and politics 
[politica], because 
those principles thanks to which we know what are just and fair, unjust and unfair, 
i.e. the causes of justice, and precisely the pacts and covenants, are made by men 
(DH X.5; OL II, 94)105 
Neither geometry nor civil science represent the reality of the bodies they are concerned 
with as it actually is, they just provide a priori the formulas of their ideal functioning, 
starting from which it is possible to plan an intervention on them. Both of them are 
sciences of abstract motions depending on principles derived from senses, posed by 
means of power, and demonstrating their strong, practical effectuality if applied to existing 
bodies. But the analogy with geometry stops here, because the artificial body of civil 
science is made of natural bodies, as is the case with mechanics, and because the 
knowledge of these natural components is possible from within, as with ethics. In 
conclusion, while geometry is a pure and perfect science of a special kind of artificial 
bodies, civil science is in fact a science of ‘mixed’ bodies (artificial bodies made of peculiar 
natural ones) that constitute at the same time its object and subject. As a consequence, it 
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103 ‘Homo non melior fit, sed potentior’. 
104 ‘Quarum generatio dependet ab ipsorum hominum arbitrio’. 
105 ‘Propterea quod principia, quibus justum et aequum et contra, injustum et iniquum, quid sint, cognoscitur, 
id est, justitiae causas, nimirum leges et pacta, ipsi fecimus’. 
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has to be double-sided, as its twofold connection with mechanics and ethics 
demonstrates. 
Like mechanics, civil science is synthetical, or a priori, inasmuch as its principles are 
produced by ‘geometrical’ reason and the reality it is concerned with partially depends on 
their position. Machines are artificial and made up of natural ‘parts’, and they can be 
geometrically known and produced by men. And that also goes for the body politic. But 
there are crucial limitations for the ‘mechanical’ analogy: since we cannot actually 
disassemble the body politic, we are not in a position to control its process of production. 
And in effect, the analogy between civil science and mechanics is not widespread in 
Hobbes’s writings in a way consistent with his assumption of mechanistic materialism. 
Because of the patent impossibility of assuming an internal point of view on the causal 
chains that actually produce the body politic, which presents itself as a ready-made 
artificial body, a complementary analytical approach was required. And in effect, like 
ethics, Hobbes’s civil science can actually gain the advantages of a knowledge from 
within. This is achieved by building an artificial point of view, internal to the body politic, or 
at least assumed as such. This point of view marks the epistemological place Hobbes 
reserves to the sovereign in his civil science. In this sense one could claim that Hobbes’s 
civil science, conceived as an ‘ethical science’ of the body politic, based on geometry and 
close to mechanics, is ‘synthetically’ accessible only from the sovereign’s point of view. 
To the epistemological limitations of a ‘mechanical’ civil science an unexpected efficacy is 
therefore offered by the epistemological insight of ethics. As a matter of fact, the natural 
bodies of men are for civil science the medium to enter the causal chains that materially 
constitute the body politic both at the epistemological and at the ontological level. 
Although it is not possible for any man to acquire an ‘internal’ point of view on the body 
politic in order to build a purely synthetical science, yet by empowering ethics civil science 
can produce considerable effects on the body politic: under the condition of the exercise 
of civil power the construction of covenants can produce real effects on men’s wills. In this 
sense Hobbes’s civil science, a mix of mechanics and moral philosophy, is not to be 
considered merely descriptive, but rather strongly prescriptive and in fact – at least in 
principle – productive of its own object, according to the model of geometry.106 
And here comes the big problem, because both geometry and civil science require their 
principles, the definitions, and the names on which they are based to be steady and, in a 
certain sense, immune from motion. In Hobbes we have no metaphysical hook for this. As 
we learn from him, there is no more stable body in his philosophy than a well built and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 The problematic epistemological status of a mechanistic civil science will be the core of my argument 
concerning the epistemological agenda of mechanicism in Chapter 3.3. 
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ordered commonwealth. In effect, in order to exist, science needed not only a long term 
existence out of the state of nature, but also a particular enforcement by the state: in 
short, a politics of science was needed. Hence for conjoint epistemological and political 
purposes Hobbes planned an artificial body, the state, a great living machine which would 
be long-lasting (although not eternal, because Leviathan is still a ‘mortal god’), producing 
perpetual-like effects, and in particular a foundation of science by means of an artificial 
soul, the sovereign, which – securing the Commonwealth – would politically institute the 
‘principles and names’ on which peace and science (that is philosophy) are ultimately 
grounded.107 Within a materialistic framework, only the functioning of such a machine 
could embody (that is make exist) Descartes’s metaphysical subject of science, thus 
fulfilling the purpose to ground scientific research, on the one hand, and also political 
praxis, on the other, without recurring to the acrobatic performances of Descartes’s 
provisional moral. This point of view, which civil science could produce in theory, only 
sovereign power could actually endorse and make last. Thus Hobbes increasingly 
conceived the relation between civil science and power as a circular relation, in which 
politics had primacy. And the primacy of politics was soon extended to all the domains of 
philosophy, as it was politics that provided the material conditions for the possibility of 
science itself. Indeed, according to Hobbes’s own doctrine, also geometry was in danger: 
For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any man’s right of dominion, or 
to the interest of men that have dominion, that the three angles of a triangle, should 
be equal to two angles of a square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, 
yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it 
concerned was able. (Lev XI; EW III, 91) 
Consistently with the purpose to save science from the arbitrary powers which would 
adhere to custom rather than to reason, Hobbes’s research eventually generated a 
subject of science that was entirely dependent on the very power that could grant its own 
existence. According to the ‘genealogy’ he presented in Leviathan, 
Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth, the mother of peace and 
leisure. Where first were great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of 
philosophy. (Lev XLVI; EW III, 666)108 
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107 As Lebrun 1983 explains, Hobbes’s sovereign does not create truth, it rather institutes it by setting the 
code for interpretation against the moving background of individual passions. Yet what Lebrun interprets as 
Hobbes’s solution to the Platonic problem of stabilising ‘significations’ is in fact the mark of an aporia: the 
‘impossibility of keeping Platonic essentialism by maintaining the political and epistemological imperative of 
fixing sense’ (Balibar 1992: 7). See below, Chapter 3.1. 
108 Thus the Commonwealth is the ‘grandmother’ of philosophy, and the lineage can be further extended, 
since fear of death is certainly for Hobbes the mother of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, it is worth 
highlighting (as it has been pointed out by Foisneau 1990: 185) that the study of philosophy derives from the 
desire of knowledge, that in turn determines – in the moderate ones, at least – a tendency towards the 
submission to a common law. Thus in Leviathan: ‘Desire of knowledge, and arts of peace, inclineth men to 
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The shifting subject of civil science 
In the next chapter I will study the epistemological development of Hobbes’s civil science 
during the 1640s, on the ground of the assumption that, from De cive onwards, Hobbes 
had to abandon the goal of deducing the principles of civil science from the general 
principles of motion. During his French self-exile in the 1640s, after his problematic 
encounter with Descartes and the entering into Mersenne’s entourage, his approach 
became strictly epistemological, and the problem of the access to the first principles of 
motion, due to his radical materialistic assumption, became central to his epistemology. 
Thus his main epistemological concern soon became the construction of a point of view 
internal to matter but in some way immune from motion, whose steadiness and clearness 
would equal Descartes’s res extensa: a point of view which could grant the basis of 
science, giving to ‘names’ the solidity of the principles characterizing scientific knowledge. 
Hobbes, who undoubtedly was a metaphysical materialist, rejected any incorporeal 
foundation for the abstract and universal subject required by Descartes’s mechanical 
science. And yet the necessity to ground the principles of science compelled him to look 
for a technical-political solution to his epistemological problem. For this purpose he 
projected a paradoxically transcendental-immanent subject of science, a point of view 
which science could produce in theory, but only sovereign power could actually endorse 
and make last. 
The strategic role played by the subjects of science and of power is in fact part of a story 
that goes far beyond the boundaries of Hobbes’s enterprise, a story that can be briefly 
pictured through the permutations of the same simple structure occurring in the works of 
Machiavelli, Descartes, and Hobbes. When Machiavelli dedicated The Prince, the summa 
of his political science, to De’ Medici (the grandson of the Magnificent), he was in a way – 
one might say – anticipating Galilean relativity, and situating the subject of science in the 
interplay of powers of the different points of view: 
For just as those who draw landscapes place themselves down in the plain to 
consider the nature of mountains and high places and to consider the nature of low 
places place themselves high atop mountains, similarly, to know well the nature of 
peoples one needs to be prince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs 
to be of the people. (Machiavelli 1532: 4)109 
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obey a common power: for such desire, containeth a desire of leisure; and consequently protection from some 
other power than their own’ (LEV XI; EW III, 87). Once outside the state of nature, the ‘proclivitas’ present but 
frail in human nature would be more and more empowered in the commonwealth, where it might become part 
of the political organisation itself, according to the fact that not only human nature, but the laws of nature are 
clear evident and, last but not least, still. 
109 ‘Né voglio sia riputata presunzione, se uno uomo di basso ed infimo stato ardisce discorrere e regolare i 
governi de’ Principi [Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and humble 
condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes]; perché così come coloro che disegnano i paesi, 
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In Descartes’s and Hobbes’s times this multiplication of the points of view was not at all a 
consolidated value in natural philosophy, neither could it be in political philosophy, of 
course.110 As already explained, with his metaphysical move – the separation of res 
cogitans and res extensa – Descartes had saved the subject of science from motion. He 
had separated the neutral, external, and universal point of view of the subject of natural 
science from the spectacle of God’s clocklike artwork. The price to pay was an ontological 
gap between the deterministic functioning of nature and the metaphysical liberty 
characterising human agency. On the one hand Reason was the disembodied external, 
clear, and distinct look of the subject of science on ‘natural motion’, and on the other hand 
Reason was also one of the causes – among others, that is passions – of ‘human motion’. 
But in this case Reason was only partially accessible from the contingent point of view 
Descartes assigned, in his Discourse, to a provisional moral, and in fact no geometrical 
science of morality was possible for Descartes precisely because Reason was – by 
definition – not accountable for in terms of mechanical motion.111 And consequently, there 
was no universal place for the subject of political science either. This is evidenced by 
Descartes’s own variation of the same structure formerly displayed in Machiavelli. It recurs 
in the advice Descartes offered in 1646 – to the Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia112 – 
concerning precisely Machiavelli’s dedication [‘préface’ sic] to The Prince. In his letter 
Descartes claimed he did not share Machiavelli’s theory, and in particular the way political 
knowledge was to be drawn according to the latter: 
The pencil only represents things which are seen from afar, but the main reasons for 
the actions of Princes are circumstances so particular that, if one is not Prince 
himself […], he cannot imagine. (AT IV 492)113 
This was like saying that political knowledge cannot be a science precisely because the 
subject of political science cannot be situated outside of particular political circumstances, 
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si pongono bassi nel piano a considerare la natura de’ monti e de’ luoghi alti, e per considerare quella de’ 
bassi si pongono alti sopra i monti; similmente, a cognoscer bene la natura de’ popoli bisogna esser Principe, 
ed a cognoscer bene quella de’ Principi conviene essere popolare’ (Machiavelli, Il Principe). This Lorenzo De’ 
Medici was the grandson of the better-known Lorenzo the Magnificent, who died in 1492, long before the first 
draft of The Prince around 1513. 
110 See the convincing picture offered by Toulmin 1992. 
111 Descartes sharply separated not only the object, but also the subjects of natural and of human philosophy, 
and made of moral and political science – forcedly concerned (also) with the transcendent liberty of res 
cogitans – a non-geometrical one. And for long time he made of man an empirical-transcendental monster, 
and of matter a perfectly passive support on which motion had been firstly imposed by God through the laws 
of nature, and could be imitatively imposed by his partial and quite imperfect image through technological 
effort. I am not adopting this basic ideological view of technology as simply the ‘application’ of science, that 
allowed to make of Descartes the easy target of all the criticisms concerning a techno-scientific male-
domination of the female-nature. Although Descartes’s philosophy can partially authorise this view, it is also 
traversed by different kinds of tensions which problematise this too simple picture. 
112 In fact former princess: at the time in exile in The Hague. 
113 ‘Car le crayon ne représente que les choses qui se voient de loin ; mais les principaux motifs des actions 
des Princes sont souvent des circonstances si particulières, que, si ce n’est qu’on soit Prince soi-même, ou 
bien qu’on ait été fort longtemps participant de leurs secrets, on ne les saurait imaginer’ (Descartes, Letter to 
Elizabeth of Bohemia, September 1646). 
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in order to look at them ‘from afar’. As a result, Descartes had separated the neutral 
external universal point of view of the subject of natural science from the internal and 
contingent point of view of the politically effective subject of political science. It is clear that 
from Descartes’s perspective science and power could not reside in the same subject. 
This allows us to frame the problem as follows: as long as the subject of knowledge is in 
motion (as it happens in Machiavelli), the subject of science is not absolute and steady, 
but it actually can produce political effects in the conjuncture; if the subject of science is 
grounded on a still point of view external to the situation (as it happens in Descartes), 
scientific knowledge is absolute and secured, but it is also neutralised and no longer 
effective. 
On this basis, it is possible to appreciate Hobbes’s own variation on the same structure. 
We can find it at the outset of Behemoth, where the Cyclopic and sovereign gaze of the 
subject of mechanical science lurks over both the realms of nature [‘place’] and history 
[‘time’], conveying them into the unified horizon of objectivity: 
A. If in time, as in place, there were degrees of high and low, I verily believe that the 
highest of time would be that which passed between 1640 and 1660. For he that 
thence, as from the Devil’s Mountain, should have looked upon the world and 
observed the actions of men, especially in England, might have had a prospect of all 
kinds of injustice. 
Although the historical moment might be passed, history – conceived as ‘the relation’ of 
actions, causes, etc. – appears here the lever that can artificially raise the subject at the 
height of that past conjuncture, allowing for a sufficiently detached, scientific, ‘panoramic’ 
view on human actions: 
B. I should be glad to behold that prospect […]. I pray you set me, that could not see 
so well, upon the same mountain, by the relation of the actions you then saw, and of 
their causes, pretensions, justice, order, artifice, and event. (Beh; EW VI, 165) 
In order to contrast with Descartes’s metaphysical dualism, Hobbes was not only 
betraying Galileo’s principle of the relativity of natural motion, he was also radically 
contrasting Machiavelli’s ‘political epistemology’ of human motion. Through a kind of 
demoniac pact, Hobbes eventually exchanged the conjunctural efficacy of a subject of 
knowledge in motion within history, for the universality of a subject of knowledge quite 
steady and – as far as possible – safe at the margins of historical and natural motion, on 
the devil’s mountain. But for this pact there was, of course, a price to pay. And in fact this 
epistemological move eventually made the subject of science entirely dependent on 
political power. 
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Where was this move originated, and what did it entail? I think this can be explained at 
different levels: a) at the level of the political agenda, and this is a work the synthesis of 
which was Skinner’s outstanding achievement; 114  b) at the level of Hobbes’s 
epistemological agenda, and this is a work yet to be done. Both perspectives concur to 
give shape to Hobbes’s ideological choices, motivated as much by the urgencies of his 
times, and by the opportunities for the theoretical understanding and the actual 
organisation of the body politic offered by the new philosophy of nature. When Hobbes 
injected mechanics into the inherited framework of political philosophy, the new science 
was carrying a whole set of epistemological and metaphysical problems. During the 1640s 
Hobbes progressively incorporated Descartes’s solutions to these problems into his 
materialistic philosophy. This led him to privilege – also in the new civil science – one of 
the two structural features of modern science: the tendency towards geometrical 
formalisation, in a word, ‘deduction’ rather than experimentation.115 In this sense I believe 
Hobbes’s political philosophy must be read as an ideological response to the non-
geometrical and non-mechanical functioning of ‘matter’ and of ‘human matter’ evidenced 
by the threatening experimental practices carried on during the first half of the 
seventeenth century both in the new Galilean science of nature and in the English Civil 
War. 
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114 It is worth pointing out that Hobbes’s ‘political’ agenda as it is understood in Skinner’s research – i.e. as the 
way an individual’s interests are influenced by her/his environment – will not be taken as exhaustive of 
Hobbes’s ‘ideological’ agenda. On the other hand, I will not assume a superstructural determination of 
Hobbes’s thought by class or group interests. From the perspective I am adopting here, an ideological agenda 
is the intersection of complex processes of which neither the individual nor the social system, however 
conceived, are the sources, but rather their relation. And in structuring this relation, collective (historical, 
political, epistemological) and individual processes and exigencies overlap, from which also individual or 
collective ‘interests’ emerge. 
115 Whether actual or imaginary, the emerging mechanistic world picture would affect the development of 
political theories and practices during the following centuries. And – as I would like to suggest with my work – 
the basic features of the early-modern mechanistic world picture, although attacked and destroyed at the level 




The Development of Hobbes’s scientia civilis 
 
 
Hobbes lived in Paris in self-exile for about 11 years, from 1640 to 1652. When he fled 
from England in November 1640, he had already written (but not yet published1) his first 
political treatise, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. The manuscript had circulated 
since May 1640 (Corr I, 115), which remarkably added to Hobbes’s reasons for leaving 
immediately after the establishment of the Long Parliament. Once in Paris he wrote 
Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia de cive. Per me reges regnant, et legum 
conditores justa decernunt, a first manuscript draft which circulated among friends in 1641 
and, thanks to Marin Mersenne, was later printed in a few copies in 16422 (only in 1947 
the much more diffused definitive edition appeared in Amsterdam as Elementa 
philosophica de cive3). A few months before going back again to England in February 
1652, he published Leviathan (1651).4 During the whole period he had been working 
consistently on Elementa philosophiae, the lifetime project of a philosophical system he 
accomplished in 1658 with the publication of De homine. 
In the preceding chapter I examined Hobbes’s philosophy, picturing it as a systematic 
whole by methodologically leaving alone many of the inconsistencies scholars have 
focused their criticisms on. My aim was to analyse the theoretical connections between 
the different fields of his research, and hence to grasp the peculiar epistemological 
perspective he intended to adopt in civil science. In contrast, I am presenting here the 
hypothesis of a strong change in Hobbes’s approach to the problem of knowledge at the 
beginning of the 1640s, when he was shifting from an ontology based on the theory of 
light to an epistemology based on the first principles of science. In this shift the 
relationship with Descartes’s research certainly had an important role to play. In Chapter 
1.2 I followed Brandt in introducing the relationship between Hobbes and Descartes 
through their debate on optics, because it was crucial in order to understand the 
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1 And in fact he never did. It was Tönnies who discovered that the 1650 edition of Human Nature; or the 
Fundamental Elements of Policy and of De Corpore Politico; or the Elements of Law Moral and Politic, was in 
fact the unauthorized disjunction of one unitary manuscript Hobbes never intended to publish (Tönnies 1889: 
v-vii). This editorial trick determined for many commentators the equivocal identification of the two parts of The 
Elements of Law as two parts of Hobbes’s philosophical system (De homine and De cive respectively). 
2 ‘Printed’ rather than published, since ‘these copies were not put on sale at any bookseller’ (Tuck 1998: XIII; 
see also Warrender 1980: 40). 
3 A French version appeared in 1649 by Hobbes’s friend Samuel Sorbière. An English version, called 
Philosophicall Rudiments concerning Government and [Civill] Society, appeared only in 1651. The translation 
was signed C.C., whom Malcolm identifies as the young poet Charles Cotton (Malcolm 2002: 241 ff.).  
4 Only in 1668 a quite re-managed Latin version of Leviathan appeared, when Hobbes was also writing 
Behemoth, a historical treatise on the English Civil War. With these texts I will mainly deal in Chapters 3.2 and 
3.3. 
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emergence of a new problem in Hobbes’s theory of knowledge at the beginning of the 
1640s. The encounter with Descartes injected into Hobbes’s research the anti-sceptical 
exigency that led him to adopt a new epistemological approach which prolonged for more 
than ten years the gestation of De corpore, the starting piece of his whole philosophical 
system, and resulted in the premature birth of the third piece of the system, De cive, which 
was presented in complete epistemological autonomy. Hence – going farther than Brandt 
– I am now enquiring what in this change was at stake for Hobbes’s political theory. As a 
matter of fact, it was precisely while his political thought underwent its major development 
that Hobbes had crucial philosophical disputes: not only with Descartes, but also with 
Thomas White and with John Bramhall on topics such as materialism, optics, human 
nature, liberty, and determinism. Along this path, Hobbes’s radical materialism could not 
avoid challenging the Cartesian solution concerning the epistemological foundation of 
mechanics, and reviving the ancient problem of the relation between science and power. 
These conjoint issues eventually made epistemology and politics the two sides of the 
same research project. 
On these grounds I shall consider the eleven years that run from The Elements of Law to 
Leviathan, in order to articulate Hobbes’s philosophical project with the main shifts in his 
epistemology of civil science. To this end, the peculiar positioning of De cive at the 
crossing of two ‘lines’ of research – epistemological and political – will allow us to 
‘calculate’ the impact of Hobbes’s systematic project on the development of his political 
theory. Firstly, I shall display the ontology of the body politic contained in The Elements of 
Law, trying to show its connection with Hobbes’s early researches on natural philosophy 
through the lens of his physics of light. Secondly, I shall explain how in De cive Hobbes 
abandoned a merely ontological level of the discourse in order to found civil science on its 
own principles, yet firmly refusing Descartes’s metaphysical assumptions. My aim is to 
show that the ‘epistemological shift’ of De cive transformed Hobbes’s political theory from 
an ontology of the body politic based on the mechanics of light to an epistemology of the 
laws of nature conceived as the principles of right reason. The analysis of this transition 
will pinpoint two connected issues, the concepts of ‘law(s) of nature’ and ‘right reason’, 
evidencing the discontinuity in the use of these concepts between The Elements of Law 
and De cive. 
Hence I shall enquire into Hobbes’s progressive consolidation of determinism during the 
1640s, when he made of it an ontological postulate (the guarantee of the neutrality and 
objectivity of science) that would grant the actual power of reason once it was 
implemented with civil power. This ideological development I shall sketch by enquiring into 
the state of the art of Hobbes’s research in natural philosophy at the middle of the 1640s 
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(particularly as it results from the pages of De motu and the Treatise of Liberty and 
Necessity), in connection to the conceptual framework he was adopting in civil science. 
This research was strictly intertwined with Hobbes’s subsequent reformulation of his views 
concerning the themes of liberty and power, and progressively brought him to adopt 
ontological determinism as a postulate of his mechanical philosophy and to endorse its 
consequences in political theory. 
Although Hobbes’s purpose of establishing an equilibrium between science and civil 
power remained relatively unvaried throughout his political research, the epistemological 
shift of De cive raised in his civil science apparently insurmountable problems of 
consistency about the political power of reason. As I am going to explain, the new 
approach compelled Hobbes to intensify rather than to abandon the reference to a 
geometrical foundation of civil science, thus determining a fatal tension in his philosophy 
between the perfection of the epistemological model and his ontology of physical motion. 
This entailed a definitive commitment of civil science to the incarnation of right reason in 
the representative function of the state through a deliberate fiction, the sovereign as a 
‘persona’, who would be an adequate cause of social order in substitution for the 
powerless perfection of science. 
From this perspective Leviathan will appear an ‘ideological synthesis’ of the questions that 
the epistemological shift of De cive had left wide open. This ideological synthesis Hobbes 
achieved with a twofold move. On the one hand he made of ‘determinism’ a 
methodological postulate (the guarantee of the neutrality and objectivity of science) and 
the ontological foundation of the effective power of the laws of nature and of the existing 
political state of things. On the other hand, and at the same time, he emptied the concept 
of ‘right reason’, by postulating the absolute absence of (divine) justice and its coincidence 
with the exercise of power de facto. These conjoint assumptions reduced Hobbes’s civil 
science to both an ideological neutralisation of scientific knowledge and an unconditional 
apology for state power. On these grounds, I shall explain in Chapter 3 that Hobbes’s 
ideological synthesis entailed an entire political pedagogy perfectly consistent with 
Descartes’s mechanistic metaphysics. 
 
2.1 From the Ontology of The Elements of Law to De cive’s 
Epistemology 
Motion-optics-knowledge in The Elements of Law 
The letters on optics, along with the metaphysical dispute portrayed by the Objections to 
the Meditations, constituted a battlefield in which Descartes and Hobbes debated the 
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relation between ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics, both being aware of not 
having found a theory of light which could be a consistent solution to their physical and 
epistemological problems. To both of them the theory of light, because of its clearly 
geometrical structure, offered the perfect model for a possible explanation of vision in 
entirely mechanical terms. And, because vision was a matter of local motion and pressure 
by contact between particles, the model was in principle fit for all processes of knowledge 
depending on sense perception. Nevertheless, the model did not easily allow them to 
explain the highest activities of mind, like memory, imagination, and reason. Most of these 
processes were largely explored in mechanical terms by both Descartes and Hobbes, and 
the latter never gave up to the postulate that all of them had to be in principle reducible to 
a mechanistic account. In fact it was only for ‘Reason’ that Descartes had an alternative 
solution which, although clear since the Meditations (1641), was fully displayed a few 
years later in Principia Philosophiae (1644). His metaphysical solution definitively 
cancelled the hypothesis that a theory of light could be the model for a possible 
foundation of rational knowledge, and providing his epistemology with a sound 
metaphysical foundation on res cogitans. Hobbes followed a quite different path, which 
was in fact double sided. On the one hand he kept seeking in optics the key concepts for 
a materialistic explanation of knowledge through the mechanisms of human perception. 
On the other hand he shifted towards the study of civil science, which he progressively 
trusted to be also the epistemological domain where he could find a solution to the 
problem of a more general foundation of scientific knowledge. 
Thus The Elements of Law Natural and Politic was intended to be a scientific treatise on 
the local motion of bodies, both in the first section devoted to the functioning of human 
nature5 and in the second about the body politic. In this sense it should be read as an 
attempt to provide a mechanical ontology of the matters concerned, human body and the 
body politic, which also contains an ontology of knowledge, as part of the internal motions 
characterising the human body. In effect, the possibility of a physical explanation of 
knowledge itself, as a motion which exclusively starts from sense and arises, through 
memory and imagination, to reason and science, was postulated by Hobbes’s radical 
materialism. If the local motion of matter explains the constitution of any kind of body, it 
will explain all motions, included the ‘mental’ movements of human bodies we call 
‘knowledge’. Consequently, Hobbes analyses sense, imagination, memory, passions, and 
reason itself, as man’s ‘powers’, that is movements in the internal parts of human bodies 
which, by means of sense, react to movements taking place in the outside world, thus 
producing images, concepts, passions, etc. Conversely, the effects of these internal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In fact, as I will note, the expression ‘human nature’ is totally absent from the text, and referring to man’s 
‘motions’ Hobbes does not use the word ‘law’, but speaks only of ‘powers’. 
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motions are the external motions of human bodies (actions and speeches), which impact 
on the motions of the external bodies. That is why physics, logic, and civil science can be 
all conceived as relying ‘in the last instance’ on the same fundamental mechanisms of 
local motion, an assumption Hobbes carried on in different terms within all his different 
works. 
At the moment Hobbes was writing The Elements of Law his physics was still a plain 
ontology which was supposed to entail a complete epistemology. The science of optics 
provided the model which displayed the possibility for a scientific correction of sense by 
sense itself, a kind of entirely mechanical ‘transformation’ of sense into reason: ‘the great 
deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected’ (EL II.10). Although one 
cannot concede to Brandt that in his first political treatise Hobbes succeeded in marking 
‘the foundation of modern empirical psychology’ (Brandt 1928: 151), it is possible to 
assume that – even if it was not directly concerned with the mathematical and physical 
topics that fifteen years later would finally constitute De corpore – The Elements of Law 
already conveyed a systematic project, part of which was certainly Hobbes’s attempt to 
solve the epistemological problem of the relationship between reason and sense through 
optics.6 What is more interesting for the current research, in the same work this problem 
was inextricably linked to the consideration of motion and knowledge as political 
problems. 
Natural/artificial motion in politics and logic 
It is clear that, in Hobbes’s philosophy, there can be no qualitative distinctions among 
bodies, but only differences in motion: all bodies constitute a homogeneous whole divided 
into different parts exclusively depending on different kinds of ‘motions’ taking place 
according to the Galilean principle of inertial movement and impact. In this sense each 
‘individual’ body – whether natural or artificial – exists as a coherent compound of matter 
whose existence depends on the combined motions of its ‘internal’ parts and of the 
‘external’ bodies it collides with. We have thus in The Elements of Law a whole set of 
bodies whose motion is – at least in principle – perfectly suitable for a mechanistic 
description. Yet, although human bodies constitute no ontological exception, it is their 
regular kind of natural motion that produces the artificial kind of motion characterising the 
body politic. This fact makes the artificial motion of the body politic depend on the natural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Tuck clearly recognises the closeness of The Elements of Law to Hobbes’s optical ontology, but because of 
his static conception of Hobbes’s philosophy, he does not analyse the epistemological consequences of 
Hobbes’s declining faith in the possibility that optics could be a definitive alternative to Descartes’s solution 
(Tuck 1988: 37-39). In general, scholars claiming that Hobbes was already building his Elementa philosophiae 
system within the text of The Elements of Law still have to counter Tönnies’s discovery that the 1650 edition of 
Human Nature and De Corpore Politico was not Hobbes’s, and that the complete text of The Elements of Law 
‘had been drawn up independently, from and without any regard to the systematic plan, which probably did not 
yet occupy the philosopher’s mind at the time when he wrote it’ (Tönnies 1889: VII). 
 88 
motion of the human body, and hence civil philosophy depend on a physical theory of 
human nature. This fact entails considerable epistemological and political consequences. 
To the general question about what keeps a body in existence (that is its parts moving as 
one), Hobbes’s answer is clear: the continuity of motion. Yet, while the continuity of 
natural motion does not depend on human will, art, or technics, the continuity of an 
artificial motion does. A further distinction should be made between simple machines, 
which could be considered (at least in Hobbes’s times) the product of a single human 
individual, and complex machines which, like the body politic, have their collective origin in 
a covenant between men. In particular, as far as the body politic is concerned, Hobbes’s 
answer to the question ‘What keeps them in motion?’ is quite clear: the respect of 
covenants. If the covenant is broken the body politic dissolves, such as natural bodies die 
and machines break down. The breaking of covenants is what breaks down the artificial 
body itself. To this political evidence a further ‘epistemological’ consequence can be 
drawn. 
In Hobbes’s world entirely made of matter in motion, bodies ‘political’ and ‘of knowledge’ 
are both artificial bodies whose coming into existence and preservation depends on men’s 
collective wills, discourses, and actions, the coherence and continuity of which is 
ultimately granted by covenants. Thus we witness in politics the rising phantom of the 
state of nature just as, in logic, the unsolvable conflict of opinions. And therefore the 
problem posed by the very existence of the artificial bodies is in both fields the same: the 
problem of the collective preservation of their artificial motion. This assumption would 
explain why in The Elements of Law political bodies and sciences are so strictly 
connected in their origin and nature. Both in logic and in politics a covenant produces a 
single artificial consistent motion out of many different natural motions. Such ‘technical’ 
operations are performed by fixing a normativity which structures, respectively, a system 
of names, principles, and deductions, and a system of individuals and corporations. This 
explains why, like any other artificial body, the body politic has a ‘logical’ consistence both 
on the side of the subjects, who contradict themselves if they desire liberty,7 and on the 
side of the sovereign, who cannot even actually contradict itself.8 In conclusion, what 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 ‘He therefore that desireth to live in such an estate, as it is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, 
contradicteth himself’ (EL XIV.12, italics added). 
8 ‘When he or they that have the sovereign power, give such exemption or privilege to a subject, as is not 
separable from the sovereignty, and nevertheless directly retain the sovereign power, not knowing the 
consequence of the privilege they grant, the person or persons exempted or privileged are not thereby 
released’ (EL XXI.13). This is a less immediate argument, because we are confronted here with a kind of 
‘performative’ contradiction. In the case of a sovereign exempting citizens from subjection, such an act – 
whether of course in the rights of the one who owns the sovereign power – is in fact contradictory with the 
exercise of sovereignty. From such premises the conclusion could be easily drawn that the sovereign cannot 
actually contradict himself, as Hobbes recalls in a previous statement according to which when a man 
‘signifieth two contradictory opinions’ the derived one is to be considered invalid, because it could proceed 
‘from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy’ (EL XIII.9). 
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menaces the persistence of a body politic is equated to what menaces the existence of a 
coherent discourse, and therefore injustice and contradiction are the same: 
There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and 
conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments 
and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion 
by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through 
passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not to do, or 
not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a 
contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the 
time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of 
the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a 
covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; 
which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as 
absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation. (EL XVI.2)9 
The parallel foundation of logical and moral error on (the lack of respect for) covenants 
confirms not only that all artificial bodies are the product of covenants among many 
different human wills, but also that the respect of such covenants is the condition of 
possibility for the continuation of their existence. Now, because what has been said works 
for both political and logical artificial ‘bodies’, then natural philosophy itself – with its whole 
set of concepts for a causal explanation of the mechanical functioning of nature – cannot 
be considered but a kind of artificial body, in fact a ‘power cognitive’ the existence of 
which is the product of men’s covenants on names, principles, and definitions and which 
can continue only under the condition of their respect. And because also civil science is a 
product of men’s powers and covenants, the regularities it is supposed to ‘discover’ in 
nature depend in fact on men’s nature in a double sense: the bodies of men are both the 
natural cause of the ‘tools’ for scientific knowledge (geometrical representation, deduction, 
etc.) and the natural bodies whose motion and functioning such tools should describe. 
Thus the ‘laws of nature’ are both part of human nature and the object of one of 
humanity’s highest forms of knowledge, civil science. According to their nature men have 
the ‘natural right’ to continue their lives, conceived as a way of enacting the powers of 
their bodies. These powers clash, determining a situation of conflict or, rather, a situation 
in which men experience the permanent threat of the conflict Hobbes calls the ‘estate of 
nature’. Among such powers there is also the scientific knowledge of the ‘laws of nature’, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Absurditas and injuria, in the matching passage of De cive (III.3; OL II, 182-83). Hobbes did not repeat the 
same remark in Leviathan. In De Corpore, however, he stated again that ‘names have their constitution […] 
from the will and consent of men. And hence […] men pronounce falsely, by their own negligence, in departing 
from such appellations of things as are agreed upon’ (DeCo V.1; EW I, 56). 
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that is civil science. Following the laws of nature some men can understand that it is better 
to abandon their power to all things (their ‘natural right’), in order to preserve the individual 
bodily motion called life (which is the material condition of all other powers); the majority of 
them do not understand and nevertheless – willing or not – they do adapt: in the end all of 
them make covenants in order to acquire peace, and so on and so forth until the well-
known establishment of the commonwealth through civil laws. 
The consistency of the whole argument of Hobbes’s first political treatise was based on 
both the assumption that men’s ‘powers’ actually are naturally independent motions, and 
that these motions can and must be artificially made converge into a peaceful, physically 
consistent collective motion which is a perfect model of logical coherence. 
The stability of science and politics depends on the power of covenants 
Hobbes actually intended to adopt a purely ontological perspective. He presupposed a 
fundamental homogeneity of the object and therefore of the method of all sciences, 
treating political bodies as a particular kind of artificial body, still suitable for the 
geometrical and mechanical knowledge he reserved to natural bodies. It is clear that – as 
far as The Elements of Law was concerned – all processes can be explained, at least in 
principle, through an exclusively physical account of motion. Yet this does not mean that 
he actually succeeded in providing complete ‘physical deduction’ of the body politic from 
the knowledge of matter in motion. On the contrary, he experienced there the 
problematical limitations of his ontological approach for such an enterprise. 
As it was evident when he mocked ‘this device therefore of them that will make civil laws 
first, and then a civil body afterwards, (as if policy made a body politic, and not a body 
politic made policy)’ (EL XX.14), in The Elements of Law Hobbes was postulating not only 
an ontological continuity from nature to artifice (which he never abandoned), but also an 
epistemological continuity between the natural and human sciences. In Chapter VI – 
where he explains his own anti-Cartesian theory concerning the link between evidence 
and truth, and introduces for the first time his own anti-Cartesian ‘method’ (the four steps 
of science) – Hobbes clearly differentiates science and history, 10  but mentions no 
separation at all between natural and civil philosophy (Skinner 1996: 5, n. 22). This 
assumption of a basic epistemological continuity becomes even more evident when we 
look at Chapter XIII, where Hobbes marks the distance between mathematical and 
dogmatic knowledge (EL XIII.4), thus indirectly confirming the presupposition of an 
homogeneity of all sciences as such. This initial stance allowed Hobbes to maintain in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Both are ‘remembrance’ of experience registered in books, but experience can be differently conceived: as 
experience of ‘nothing else but sense’ (history) or ‘experience of the proper use of names and language’ 
(science) (EL VI.1). Which is like saying that science concerns the established ‘universals’ of experience, 
history the particular experiences, accordingly to Aristotle. 
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these ‘epistemological’ chapters of The Elements of Law a fundamental faith in the 
physical power of reason, referring to ‘powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive and 
motive’ (EL XIII.1) and in particular to the powers of speech. With perfect circularity, from 
the motion determining sense evidence starts the path towards any ‘experience’, including 
the perfect ‘evidence of truth’ Hobbes calls ‘wisdom’ (EL VI.3-4), and to the external 
motion the internal motions of the human body return, thanks to the effective power of the 
mind on body: 
That power of the mind which we call motive, differeth from the power motive of the 
body; for the power motive of the body is that by which it moveth other bodies, 
which we call strength: but the power motive of the mind, is that by which the mind 
giveth animal motion to that body wherein it existeth. (EL VI.9) 
It seems therefore possible to argue that in The Elements of Law the attribution of a 
‘motive power’ to reason (that is what makes us ‘differ from the wildest of the Indians’ EL 
XIII.3), depends on the ontological perspective Hobbes was assuming, and was therefore 
strictly related to the postulate of ontological uniformity of the objects of civil and natural 
philosophy, a stance Hobbes still believed he was able to ground on the unifying power of 
the model of optics. 
This ontological homogeneity of the objects of all sciences does not mean that civil 
philosophy had no peculiar methodological characterisation. In fact it was, for Hobbes, the 
only science really concerned with effective ‘laws’. While the abstract propositions of 
natural science are not proper ‘laws’, because they are not capable of producing any 
effects in their objects (that is natural bodies), the propositions of civil philosophy, on the 
contrary – by prescribing laws to the natural minds-bodies of men – can actually influence 
their motions and, in the end, they can actually influence the artificial motion of the body 
politic, thanks to the obedience to the civil laws that civil philosophy prescribes. In this 
sense the natural laws civil science relies on can exercise their rational power on human 
natural motion and, through it, onto the artificial motion of the body politic. As a matter of 
fact, through the study of The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, men could attain the 
knowledge of the means suitable to arrange the concurrent persistence of their own 
natural body motion (that is life) and of the political bodies that allow it. A coherent logic 
prescribes there the means of preservation of the ‘natural’ motion of the individual body by 
linking it to the preservation of the ‘artificial’ motion of the collective body politic, and 
therefore logically connects natural and civil laws. This logic is inscribed in human ‘nature’, 
and therefore Hobbes calls it ‘law of nature’: its existence is eternal, but its knowledge is 
not. In fact, because any kind of knowledge, science included, is naturally in motion and 
dependent on men’s wills and passions, Hobbes is forced to conclude that a sort of 
 92 
artificial counterpart of it is needed, the coherent motion of which should not depend on 
men’s changing wills, submitted to the natural variability of passions. This stable 
counterpart is civil power: as a result of his first political treatise, Hobbes had thus 
irreversibly intertwined the epistemological issue of the stability of scientific knowledge 
with politics. 
By linking science to civil power he was indirectly bypassing a whole set of 
epistemological problems that haunted his project of providing a mechanistic political 
theory: How is it possible for reason to scientifically grasp the ‘laws of nature’? How can 
the ‘dictates’ of reason be founded, given that reason is a motion of the human body? 
This structural lack of foundation was probably what gave such an importance to 
Hobbes’s encounter with Descartes’s fable of Le monde as a set of ‘phenomena’. Thanks 
to his confrontation with Descartes – who had directly challenged (and was metaphysically 
solving) the problem of founding precisely the scientific knowledge of mechanical motion 
which Hobbes seemed to have left unquestioned – the structural limits of the ‘physical’ 
epistemology contained in The Elements of Law (little more than a ‘fancied’ realistic 
ontology) became soon evident to its author. From this perspective, his writing of De cive 
can be read as a first attempt to solve the epistemological problem by providing a new 
kind of foundation for the entire system, precisely starting from what he considered – from 
a properly scientific point of view – a completely untouched field of research: scientia 
civilis. In his words ten years later: 
Natural Philosophy is therefore but young; but Civil Philosophy yet much younger, 
as being no older […] than my own book De Cive. (DeCo Ep.; EW I, IX) 
De cive: an epistemology of the law of nature 
After one year in Paris Hobbes had quarrelled with Descartes on optics, written the fourth 
set of Objections to the Meditations, and mostly composed De cive. Within little more than 
one year he abandoned the naïve ontological approach he had adopted in The Elements 
of Law. His De cive was no longer intended to be a straight ontology of human and 
political bodies: it was the third part of a philosophical system (that is a system of 
sciences) aiming to provide a complete set of Elementa philosophiae, in which every 
science had to be founded on the general principles, definitions, and names established 
by first philosophy according to the model of geometry. Epistemology had now gained 
primacy over ontology, and all sciences required the pre-establishment of a solid 
epistemological ground. 
This move accentuated the internal tensions of Hobbes’s philosophy, generating a new 
set of problems. Although in his Elementa philosophiae he kept the postulate that 
everything was ‘but’ matter in motion, Hobbes was well aware of the necessity and 
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difficulty of founding sciences on a geometry of motion based on the ‘names’ established 
by first philosophy. In fact, although relying on the general principles of motion, civil 
philosophy needed further principles, specific for the peculiar kind of bodies it was 
concerned with, and consistent with the particular point of view one could gain on them. 
As a result, De cive was much more a foundation of civil philosophy on its own principles 
than on the general principles of matter in motion. But it was, in Hobbes’s intentions, a 
strong and definitive one. In effect, at the moment of writing De cive Hobbes’s faith in the 
power of reason was probably at its apex, and the limitations proper to civil science were 
therein attributed only to its ‘youth’, and inscribed in the optimistic stance that 
characterised the whole Epistola dedicatoria (1641).11 This faith was grounded on the 
assumption of Geometry as the undisputed model for all sciences on the basis of a 
presupposed methodological continuity between all the different domains accessible to 
human reason.12 It was on the same ground as physics – yet along a different but parallel 
path – that new optimistic perspectives of development were opening for civil science by 
mirroring the model of geometry: 
The Geometers have managed their province outstandingly [….] What we owe to 
Physics, Physics owes to Geometry. If the moral Philosophers had done their job 
with equal success, I do not know what greater contribution human industry could 
have made to human happiness. For if the patterns of human action were known 
with the same certainty as the relations of magnitude in figures […] the human race 
would enjoy such a secure peace that it seems unlikely that it would ever have to 
fight again. (DC Ep.; OL II, 137-38)13 
Carrying on these hopes, during the short period between The Elements of Law and the 
first edition of De cive Hobbes’s civil philosophy steadily went through a methodological 
shift. From a physics of the body politic based on ‘human nature’ conceived as a set of 
clashing powers, Hobbes moved towards a foundation of civil philosophy on ‘lex naturalis 
[natural law]’, conceived as a set of principles the scientific knowledge of which would 
definitively allow men to exit the fearful conditions characterizing their life ‘in statu mere 
naturali’ (DC I.10; OL II, 164). In The Elements of Law human nature was redefined, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See above, Chapter 1 note 58. 
12 ‘Philosophy is divided into as many branches as there are areas where human reason has a place, and 
takes the different names which the difference of subject matter requires. In treating of figures it is called 
Geometry, of motion Physics, of natural law, Morals, but it is all Philosophy; just as the sea is here called 
British, there Atlantic, elsewhere Indian, so called from its particular shores, but it is all Ocean’ (DC Ep.; OL II, 
136-37). 
13 ‘Et geometrae quidem provinciam suam egregie administraverunt […] Nam quod physicae debemus, id 
debet physica eidem geometriae. Si philosophi morales munere suo pari felicitate functi essent, non video ad 
felicitatem suam in hac vita quid amplius contribuere humana industria posset. Cognita enim, pari certitudine, 
ratione actionum humanarum, qua cognoscitur ratio magnitudinum in figuris […] fruretur gens humana pace 
adeo constante, ut non videatur, nisi de loco, crescente scilicet hominum multitudine, unquam pugnandum 
esse’. 
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against Aristotle, as a jumble of ‘faculties and powers’, postulated as mechanical: 
Man’s nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers, as the faculties of 
nutrition, motion, generation, sense, reason, &c. For these powers we do 
unanimously call natural, and are contained in the definition of man, under these 
words, animal and rational. (EL I.4) 
This identification of what the tradition called ‘facultates’ and mechanical ‘power’ is also 
explicitly stated by Hobbes: ‘By this power I mean the same with the faculties of body and 
mind, mentioned in the first chapter, that is to say, of the body, nutritive, generative, 
motive; and of the mind, knowledge’ (EL VIII.4).14 And again, it recurs in the fourteenth 
chapter as a brief summary of what previously displayed, where the reference to ‘faculties’ 
completely disappears: 
In the precedent chapters hath been set forth the whole nature of man, consisting in 
the powers natural of his body and mind, and may all be comprehended in these 
four: strength of body, experience, reason, and passion. (EL XIV.1) 
On the contrary, in the matching chapter of De cive (the crucial, introductive one), Hobbes 
turns back to the Latin term ‘facultates’: ‘the faculties of human nature can be reduced to 
four kinds: Physical force, Experience, Reason, Passion’.15 Since the outset of De cive it 
is clear that Hobbes had abandoned a straight ontological approach, and adopted an 
entirely epistemological one. In De cive Hobbes was not primarily referring to physical 
powers, but rather to logical conditions of possibility as the adequate starting point for a 
theoretical construction of the body politic through the logic of covenants, according to ‘the 
fundamental laws of nature’. For these reason, it was not only a question of human nature 
as a set of ontological powers, but primarily of human nature as a model from which to 
draw a doctrine providing ‘the conditions of society and peace among men’ (DC I.1; OL II, 
158).16 
In effect, De cive was intended to be the complete deduction of civil science – the science 
of the body politic – from the principles of human nature – which Hobbes called laws of 
nature.17 Because deduction was now unmistakably its aim, civil science could even be 
considered superior to natural philosophy, as far as it was immune from the 
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14 In Hobbes the body/mind distinction is never ontological, of course, because he always refers to effective 
‘powers of the mind’ cognitive and motive (e.g. EL XX.7-8). This distinction he will completely abandon in 
Leviathan, where the term ‘faculty’ serves only the differentiation between ‘natural’ and ‘acquired’ powers. 
(Marquer 2005: 30). 
15 ‘Naturae humanae facultates ad quatuor genera reduci possunt, vim corpoream, experientiam, rationem, 
affectum’. 
16 ‘Societatis sive pacis humanae conditiones’. 
17 Pacchi correctly observes that in The Elements of Law there is no explicit reference to a ‘unique explicative 
principle or to a unique deductive chain’ (Pacchi 1965: 220). And this is due to the fact that with the word 
‘deduction’ he is referring to a logical operation, which is not what the ontological approach of The Elements is 
specifically concerned with. 
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epistemological limitations characterising physics, tied to the necessity to recur to 
hypothesis or ‘suppositio’. From what he explicitly states in his Latin Optical MS, in 
Hobbes’s intentions civil science clearly stands on the ‘safe’ side of geometry: 
The treatment of natural sciences differs greatly from the treatment of the others. In 
the latter nothing is needed nor admitted, other than definitions of terms by which 
ambiguity is excluded, as foundations and as first principles of demonstration. […] 
While in the explanation of natural causes another kind of principles must be 
adopted, called Hypothesis or Suppositio. (LO I.1: 147)18 
In contrast with Tönnies (1969) and Tuck (1988), who adduced philological evidence for 
an earlier date, Skinner (1996) dates the Latin Optical MS after The Elements of Law, 
precisely on the basis of this hierarchical distinction between the natural sciences and the 
others (civil science included), still absent in the sixth Chapter of Hobbes’s first political 
treatise, and therefore presumably not assumed by Hobbes when he started writing it.19 In 
this sense the Latin Optical MS would prelude to how civil science was eventually 
transformed in De cive, according to this programmatic statement, in a deductive science 
quite far from natural science. 
From the ontological to the epistemological perspective: oscillations 
Perhaps, as I am trying to point out, it is neither necessary nor possible to assume a 
strictly linear development in Hobbes’s epistemology, and it would be more convincing to 
consider it a work in progress open to different and even contradictory hypotheses. In this 
perspective The Elements of Law should be considered a text in which a physical-
ontological stance, as far as we approach the end of the draft, steadily mixes to an 
emerging epistemological one, which eventually appears dominant when, once he 
completed the book, Hobbes wrote The Epistle Dedicatory in May 1640, no more than a 
few months before starting De cive. This brief text is, as a matter of fact, crossed by 
contradictory tensions. More than a shadow spreads there on the postulate of the actual 
efficacy of civil science. It is sufficient to note, for instance, how Hobbes pictured it as 
epistemologically far away from the perfection of geometry (‘to reduce this doctrine to the 
principles and infallibility of reason there is no way’, EL Ep. XV), and seemingly defended 
it only for its edifying value (‘it would be an incomparable benefit to commonwealth, if 
every man held the opinions concerning law and policy here delivered’, EL Ep. XVI). And 
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18  ‘Rerum naturalium tractatio a caeterarum scientiarum tractatione plurimum differt. In caeteris enim 
fundamenta sive principia prima demonstrandi alia neque requiruntur, neque admittuntur, quam definitiones 
vocabulorum, quibus excludatur Amphibologia […] Sed in explicatione Causarum naturalium, aliud genus 
principiorum necessario adhibendum est, quod vocatur Hypothesis sive Suppositio’. 
19 ‘If we assume that Hobbes completed the manuscript before writing Chapter 6 of The Elements, it seems 
strange that The Elements makes no use of the important distinction drawn in the manuscript between two 
different types of science, and instead treats the so called steps of science in an undifferentiated way’ 
(Skinner 1996: 5, n. 22). 
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nevertheless, despite such limitations, Hobbes still claimed he intended to ‘put such 
principles down for a foundation’ in order to make civil science ‘inexpugnable’ (EL Ep. 
XV). 
In the light of the contradictory tensions inhabiting the epistle dedicatory of The Elements 
of Law, it is possible to figure out Hobbes’s approach when, a quite short time after 
closing his first political treatise, he was going to provide a new start to his political theory 
with De cive, and moving from an ontology of the body politic to an epistemology of civil 
science. By this I do not mean that in De cive Hobbes abandoned his project to integrate 
political theory into a physics of motion: he clearly intended to pursue this project, as it 
seems confirmed by some newly added physical analogies he presented in the text in 
order to explain human behaviour.20 But, as a matter of fact, he had bracketed the 
problem. Because his urgency was to secure the new civil science on an epistemological 
ground alternative to the transcendent one Descartes was exploring, Hobbes was 
abandoning the attempt to reduce all epistemological questions to a physics of sensation 
and, ultimately, to the optical model of a theory of light. He was rather definitively 
embracing the powerful model of geometry. This shift and its consequences I am going to 
trace by focusing on a couple of classical concepts that play a key role in the problematic 
connection between the fields of natural and civil philosophy: ‘laws of nature’ and ‘right 
reason’. 
 
2.2 ‘Laws of Nature’ and ‘Right Reason’ 
The concepts of ‘laws of nature’ and ‘right reason’ carry a heavy load of equivocal 
connotations that they have inherited from their articulated history. Their meaning crosses 
a complex set of different functions they played in classical philosophy, in Medieval 
theology, and in modern philosophy, often moving between the different fields of 
philosophical research. A brief clarification of Hobbes’s use of these concepts will allow 
me to track the shift of Hobbes’s research from the ontological to the epistemological 
level. Firstly, I shall enquire into the variations in Hobbes’s key concept of ‘laws of nature’, 
clarifying its epistemological implications in the light of the epistemological shift 
represented by De cive. Secondly, I will adopt the concept of ‘right reason’ as a ‘marker’, 
in order to show how Hobbes in De cive consolidated its usage as a reference for 
scientific modelling in civil science, thus opening an epistemological gap between the 
issue of the neutrality of science and the need for its actual foundation. The two issues will 
allow me to picture the fatal tension that arose with De cive in Hobbes’s epistemology of 
civil science: a tension structural to a perfect science endowed with no physical (or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See below, Chapter 2.2. 
 97 
political) power at all. As I will explain in Chapter 2.3, this tension later resulted in an 
ideological solution in which the development of determinism plays a major role, by 
mirroring at the ontological level the epistemological perfection of right reason. 
Laws of nature 
Because of the commonly accepted opposition between nomos and physis, the idea itself 
of a law (nomos) governing nature (as physis [from phyo]) was completely nonsense for 
the Greeks, and such it remained as long as the Aristotelian framework resisted – except 
for the reference to a moral ‘law of human nature’ which, on the contrary, hailed from the 
Stoics and was widely re-elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. In Francis Bacon the physical 
meaning of ‘law’ was superposed, although often inconsistently, to the concept of ‘form’ or 
formal cause, that is a concept still permeated with Aristotelianism (Milton 1998: 680-81, 
685-86). In general, during the first part of the seventeenth century the use of the word 
‘law’ referring to natural regularities was still quite rare. Even Galileo and Mersenne did 
not speak of laws about the regularities they discovered in nature (Roux 2001: 55 ff.), and 
it was only Hobbes’s main philosophical enemy, Descartes, who officially started a 
‘technical’ use of the term by referring in Principia Philosophiae (1644) to the fundamental 
principles of motion as ‘rules, i.e. laws of nature’, whose knowledge was founded on 
God’s immutability (AT VIII, 62).21 As a matter of fact, Descartes was a kind of exception. 
His research had already been for a long time oriented towards attributing a foundational 
role to God. The above displayed quotation from the letter to Mersenne of 15 April 1630 
(AT I, 145; see above, Chapter 1.2), clearly demonstrates that Descartes was aware that 
the centrality of the word ‘law’ would grant both the triumph of his mechanistic view of 
nature and the metaphysical foundation of its principles, well settled in man’s mind by God 
himself and therefore very close to being eternal. 
As explained in Chapter 1, it was the metaphysical reference to a God legislator as the 
founder of nature conceived as a created machine that allowed for a generalisation of the 
expression ‘laws of nature’ and its extension – through the legal metaphor – over the 
domain of the new physics. And apparently, once accepted that for Hobbes there is 
nothing else but moving bodies made up of ‘matter in motion’, the title of The Elements of 
Law Natural and Politic would leave no doubt about ‘law’ being the key concept linking 
together the motions of natural and political bodies: 
The true and perspicuous explication of elements of laws, natural and politic 
[depends on] the knowledge of what is human nature, what is a body politic, and 
what it is we call a law. (EL I.1) 
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21 ‘Ex hac eadem immutabilitate Dei, regulae quaedam sive leges naturae cognosci possunt’. Cf. also Le 
monde (where yet the ‘rules’ are confined in the phenomenal horizon of the fable): ‘The rules [règles] by which 
these changes take place I call “laws of nature”’ (AT II, 37). 
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But if we abandon the incipit of the book and go through the whole text, we discover that 
the word ‘law’ is hardly used at all by Hobbes to describe any movement of natural bodies, 
even the human ones. And only in the last chapter of the book the promised explication ‘of 
the nature and sorts of law’, finally appears: 
All laws are declarations of the mind, concerning some action future to be done, or 
omitted. And all declarations and expressions of the mind concerning future actions 
and omissions, are either promissive, as I will do, or not do; or provisive, as for 
example, If this be done or not done, this will follow; or imperative, as Do this, or do 
it not. In the first sort of these expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in 
the second, consisteth counsel; in the third, command. (EL XIX.1)22 
The definition of law as a ‘declaration of mind’ discharges the term of any straight 
relevance for natural philosophy, and eventually allows Hobbes to use it to refer to two 
different kinds of laws: the ‘law of nature’, that is reason,23 and the ‘civil law’ of the 
sovereign. The first, depending on God’s will, is ‘unalterable’ (EL XVIII.4), the second, 
instead, changes depending on the changing will of the sovereign. However, both of them 
have the same effect of compelling a body to act according to a certain pattern of motion 
(natural, that is individual, or artificial, that is collective), and both can be disobeyed: which 
clearly renders nonsense any attempt to think about the ‘law’ in the title as non-
problematically related to some supposed eternal ‘laws of motion’. Following this 
argument, it is not consistent with the theoretical premises of The Elements of Law to 
think of nature ‘in itself’ as a Cartesian machine depending on ‘laws’. On the contrary, 
what Hobbes calls ‘laws of nature’ are in fact laws of human nature. In short, it is possible 
to assume that it was perfectly consistent with Hobbes’s historical context and 
philosophical references – not to mention his opposition to Descartes – to banish the word 
‘law’ from the philosophy of nature he was elaborating during the 1640s. And in effect, in 
the whole of his work the use of the word ‘law’ was always linked to the formula ‘law(s) of 
nature’ or ‘natural law’, which can be considered laws only as ‘commands’ of God, eternal 
but nevertheless – as commands – always breakable by men. 
Therefore, if we limit our considerations to The Elements of Law, the whole book cannot 
be said to establish any deterministic conception of nature, at least if this idea should rest 
on the concept of ‘law of nature’. However, this does not mean that the hypothesis of a 
natural determinism was completely out of Hobbes’s horizon. On the contrary, the idea of 
a natural necessity was probably part of Hobbes’s key convictions, substantiating the 
mechanistic conception of science as a science of causes. And nevertheless, a general 
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22 In general, the concept of law indicates – as Hobbes defines it in EL XIII.6 – a command ‘sufficient to move 
us to action’, whether it derives from civil laws or from the natural law. 
23 ‘There can therefore be no other law of nature than reason’ (EL XV.1). 
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theory of determinism was not yet the object of Hobbes’s speculation: it was neither a 
basic assumption in his physics nor a principle for his civil science. In effect in The 
Elements of Law he never referred to any kind of regularity or even principle of motion 
through the expression ‘law’, exception made for the only sentence one can find in the 
whole text, in which the word ‘law’ concerns a natural phenomenon and, quite notably, an 
optical one: ‘the laws of refraction’ (EL II.8). The claim that refraction is subject to ‘law’ 
fully corresponds to his epistemological program, inspired by ontology of light, of 
‘geometrically’ correcting sensations, in order to know ‘the things that really are in the 
world without us, […] those motions by which these seemings are caused’ (EL II.10). 
The approach Hobbes adopted in De cive, instead, entailed a disjunction of epistemology 
and ontology. The resulting ‘double sight’ is evidenced by his conjoint adoption of the 
geometrical method of deduction from the first principles on the one hand, and the more 
and more frequent reference to physical motion as a paradigm for the explanation of 
human behaviour on the other. In De cive’s Chapter III, On the Other Laws of Nature, 
Hobbes repeatedly returns to a definition of the laws of nature, inclining more and more 
towards a clear assumption of their superiority in relation to any civil law: ‘the laws of 
nature are immutable and eternal’ and yet accessible by human reason independently of 
any civil law (DC III.29; OL II, 195).24 At the same time, as he abandons a straight 
identification of the perfect science of human nature with a physics of the natural motion of 
men’s bodies, Hobbes’s reference to natural analogies becomes more and more diffused. 
The whole set of new physical metaphors Hobbes displays in De cive seems in this sense 
to compensate the geometrical immutability and perfection connecting the laws of nature 
to reason by recalling the underlying postulate that there must be no ontological distance 
between natural and human motion. 
These metaphors recur precisely where Hobbes aims to show the analogy between the 
compelling power necessitating human behaviour, that is liberty, and physical 
phenomena. Here and there in the text Hobbes equates the human power to move to the 
natural tendency of a stone to fall or of water to expand, once the impediments are 
removed, and hence he defines human liberty as ‘the absence of impediments to motion’ 
(DC IX.9; OL II, 259).25 All these similitudes concur in De cive to reassert the relation 
between human motion or the ‘collective’ motion of the body politic, and the more general 
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24 ‘Leges naturae immmutabiles et aeternae sunt’, also restated by referring to the ‘law of nature’ (in the 
singular) in DC IV.20. To this claim of ‘eternity’ he will later add a bend of unavoidability: ‘There are some 
things in these [civil] laws whose omission […] seems rather to be a fulfilment than a violation of natural law’ 
(DC III.27; OL II, 195). 
25 ‘Absentia impedimentorum motus’. 
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‘motion of natural bodies’ (DC XII.1; OL II, 284).26 But it is in the opening chapter of the 
first section (on Liberty) that Hobbes uses the ‘law’ of free fall as more than a metaphor for 
describing man’s natural strive for self preservation: ‘this happens by a real necessity of 
nature as powerful as that by which a stone falls downward’ (DC I.7; OL II, 163).27 It is 
worth noting that, beyond the metaphor, the ‘necessity’ dictated to men by their nature, to 
avoid death at all costs, carries the same ontological characterisation of the mechanical 
conatus of any natural body, and this ‘natural’ necessity is not at all a ‘law of nature’. This 
shows again – if needed – that there is no unproblematic connection between the 
Hobbesian law of nature as the fundamental principle of civil science and the Cartesian 
‘laws of nature’ regulating the natural motion of bodies. 
Thus Hobbes can go back to what he had earlier clarified in The Elements of Law, namely 
that ‘properly speaking, the natural laws are not laws, in so far as they proceed from 
nature. But in so far as the same laws have been legislated by God in the holy scripture 
[…] they are properly called by the name of laws’ (DC III.33; OL II, 198; see EL XVII.12).28 
Within the boundaries of civil science what is taken as eternal are in fact the laws of 
human nature and, consequently, what reason can scientifically conclude from such 
principles: ‘what we call the laws of nature are nothing other than certain conclusions, 
understood by reason, on what is to be done and not to be done’ (DC III.33; OL II, 198).29 
In fact, laws are completely indifferent to the rest of nature, since they only pertain to man: 
‘law as a species is coeval in nature and time with the human species’ (DC XIV.14; OL II, 
322).30 And in De cive this is carried on so far as to transform nature itself into something 
outside the very boundaries of the reign of God, to which only human beings (and not 
even all of them) would belong, thanks to their faculty of understanding: 
God so rules all men through power that no man can do anything which He does not 
want done; yet this is not Reigning in the precise and proper sense. Reigning is said 
to those who rule through speech rather than action, i.e. if they rule by precepts and 
threats. In the kingdom of God therefore we do not count inanimate bodies or things 
without reason as subjects (though they are subject to divine power), because they 
do not understand God’s precepts and threats. (DC XV.2; OL II, 332)31 
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26 ‘Motu corporium naturalium’. The analogies of the stone and of water recur once again in DC III.9 and DC 
XIII.15 referring to the artificial collective motion of the body politic. For my discussion of Hobbes’s conception 
on liberty, see below, Chapter 2.3. 
27 ‘Idque necessitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapsis deorsum’. 
28 ‘Non sunt illae proprie loquendo leges, quatenus a natura procedunt. Quatenus tamen eadem a Deo in 
Scripturis sacris latae sunt […] legum nomine propiissime appellantur’. 
29 ‘Naturae autem quas vocamus leges, cum nihil aliud sint quam conclusiones quaedam ratione intellectae, 
de agendis et omittendis’. And this knowledge corresponds to what was legislated by God ‘in the holy 
scriptures’, of course. 
30 ‘Legum enim genus omne et natura et tempore coaevum est generi humano’. 
31 ‘Quamquam autem Deus homines ita per potentiam regat, ut nemo possit quidquam facere quod ille factum 
nolit, non est tamen hoc, proprie et accurate loquendo, regnare. Regnare enim dicitur, non qui agendo, sed 
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In effect, despite their eternity and necessity, the laws of nature ‘are not obligatory’. More 
properly, it is only their knowledge, which entails such a difficult deduction, that makes of 
the laws of nature actual ‘laws’: ‘for laws do not oblige unless they are known, and are not 
in fact laws’ (DC III.26; OL II, 194).32 
This patently makes of the laws of nature some kind of fundamental principles the power 
and efficacy of which are not grounded on any natural tendency, nor can be 
incontrovertibly grounded on any civil law. The physical power exerted by the body politic 
depends on human nature as much as the intellectual power of reason does, and yet the 
two powers do not match anymore. Literally, in De cive they are not situated at the same 
level: reason as a physical power of the human body is part of the physical motions of the 
human matter that concur to the actual functioning of the body politic, while reason as the 
principle of true knowledge perfectly fits the exigency of founding a deductive system of 
sciences. Human nature (and reason itself) is consequently split between its actual 
physical tendency and the rational laws it also depends on, and the new civil science is 
born crossed and dramatically tense because of the exigency to keep the two instances 
together. This shift of Hobbes’s civil science from the analysis of reason as a physical 
power to reason as also a theoretical model is clearly marked by the way the very 
foundation of the laws of nature, the ‘dictates of natural reason’ (EL XVIII.1), become 
throughout De cive the ‘dictates of right reason’ (italics added). 33  This conceptual 
‘translation’ responded to a foundational purpose that was hardly compatible with 
Hobbes’s materialistic ontology of motion. 
Right reason 
The Greek concept of ‘right reason’ (orthos logos), a Stoic concept, indicated a sort of 
ethically ‘purified’ reason working at the same time in the fields of theoretical and practical 
philosophy. In Cicero, being associated to ‘natural right’, the concept of recta ratio 
assumed a more clearly juridical blend without abandoning its constitutive relation of 
foundation with the divine mind, and its privileged accessibility by the mind of the Wise: 
‘just as the divine mind is the highest law […] so too it is fully developed [perfecta] in the 
mind of the wise man’ (Cicero, De legibus II.9).34 The progressive absorption of the 
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qui loquendo, id est, praeceptis et minis regit. In regno igitur Dei, pro subditis habemus, non corpora 
inanimata, neque irrationalia, licet potentiae divinae subjiciantur; quia praecepta et minas Dei non intelligunt’. 
Hobbes is here commenting on the Psalm 96.1, 98.1. On this passage as representative of the political 
agenda of mechanicism, see below, Chapter 3.4. 
32 ‘Etenim leges, nisi cognitae, non obligant, imo non sunt leges’. 
33 ‘Dictatae rectae rationis’ is a recurrent expression in De cive that never appears in the English of the The 
Elements of Law. In EL XVIII.2 Hobbes refers to the laws of nature as ‘descriptions of natural reason’, while in 
the matching paragraph of De cive he speaks of ‘descriptions of right reason’ (‘descriptionis rectae rationis’) 
adding that ‘it has been shown before that the natural laws are its dictates’ (‘cujus dictamina leges esse 
naturales ante ostensum est’) (DC IV.2; OL II, 200). 
34 ‘Divina mens summa lex est, item quom in homine est perfecta in mente sapientis’. In effect ‘Reason 
existed, derived from nature, directing people to good conduct and away fro crime; it did not begin to be a law 
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concept in Christian philosophy (accomplished by Thomas Aquinas) explicitly made of it a 
theological issue related to God’s perfection, while the possibility of connecting it to 
human reason was always highly disputed and particularly criticized within the Ockhamist 
tradition. The reference to recta ratio eventually became of general usage in political 
theory as a rhetorical tool and, as such, during the seventeenth century it was also 
extended to the field of mechanical philosophy, e.g. by Boyle.35 The structure of the 
argument is not far from the one still displayed in the Eikon Basilike – the autobiography 
purportedly written by Charles I before his execution. It was from the very link between 
right reason and God’s Word that the condemned king Charles I – or whoever wrote in his 
behalf – still deduced the necessity to obey his own command: 
No man can be more forward than My self to carry on all due Reformations, with 
mature judgement, and a good Conscience, in what things I shall (after impartiall 
advise) bee, by God’s Word, and right reason, convinced to be amisse, I have 
offered more than ever the fullest, free’st, and wisest Parliaments did desire. (Eikon 
Basilike XIV, 116)36 
In this sense one can argue that the path covered by Descartes when founding the clarity 
and distinctiveness of reason on the substantial homogeneity of human reason as res 
cogitans and God’s immateriality was a quite traditional one. Completely different was 
Hobbes’s conceptual and rhetorical path, although it did not provide completely different 
results. In his original project – at the epoch of The Elements of Law – Hobbes rather put 
the emphasis on human natural reason and on wisdom as ‘evidence of truth’. In fact, at 
the very beginning of the 1640s Hobbes was assuming ‘wisdom’ as a knowledge entirely 
accessible to man by his own strength, thanks to the principles of modern science, and 
possibly compatible with the sacred texts.37 Yet in The Elements of Law the expression 
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only at that moment when it was written down, but when it came into being; and it came into being at the same 
time as the divine mind. And therefore that true and original law, suitable for commands and prohibitions, is 
the right reason of Jupiter, the supreme god’ (Cicero, De legibus II.10, italics added). 
35 Cf. Hoopes 1962 and Mulligan 1994. 
36 A few chapters later ‘right reason’ reappears in order to state the necessity to obey the king’s ‘divine’ word: 
‘And not onely in Religion, of which, Scripture is the best rule, and the Churches Universall practise the best 
commentary, but also in right reason, and the true nature of Government, it cannot be thought that an orderly 
Subordination among Presbyters, or Ministers, should be any more against Christianity, then it is in all secular 
and civill Governments, where parity breeds Confusion and Faction’ (Eikon Basilike XVII, 152-53). Referring to 
this book Mulligan explains that ‘Charles invoked “Right Reason” – inspired by God and confirmed by 
conscience and inner experience to justify his own rationality. Equating God with eternal “Reason” was exactly 
how Gerrard Winstanley, writing, probably at exactly the same time, early in 1649, expressed his basic beliefs: 
“In the beginning of Time, the Great Creator Reason ... did make and preserve all things.” He described 
“Reason” as “that spiritual power, that guides all men’s reasoning in right order and to a right end” and 
referred to it also as the “King of Righteousness and Prince of Peace.” In both these usages “Right Reason” 
was inspired from above and entailed Christian moral ends as the outcome of its action’ (Mulligan 1994: 237). 
It is not clear to me why Mulligan takes for granted the identification of ‘right reason’ and ‘reason’ tout court 
without providing any justification for this choice. 
37 According to Larmore, when referring to right reason Hobbes provides no direct reference to divine will, 
although the text of Leviathan (namely Lev XIV and the last paragraph of Chapter XV), ‘misled some 
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‘right reason’ occurs only twice. In the fifth chapter it appears almost as a rhetorical issue, 
representing the model of a perfect act of ratiocination with the function of negatively 
defining contradiction and absurdity as a patent diversion from it.38 But when it appears for 
the second and last time in the concluding chapter, it is finally declared a ‘common 
measure’ not existent ‘in rerum natura’, the function of which has therefore to be supplied 
by sovereign power: 
In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other 
concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise 
quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a common 
measure of all things that might fall in controversy […]. This common measure, 
some say, is right reason: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing 
to be found or known in rerum natura. But commonly they that call for right reason to 
decide any controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing right reason is 
not existent, the reason of some man, or men, must supply the place thereof; and 
that man, or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power, as hath been 
already proved. (EL XXIX.8) 
This almost sarcastic ‘call into inexistence’ of right reason and its pragmatic commitment 
to the artificial will of the sovereign concluded The Elements of Law. And nevertheless, 
once he had assumed the epistemological approach of De cive, Hobbes needed 
principles of human nature as much evident as the principles of motion were for natural 
philosophy. And since the complexity of human nature could not be easily deduced from 
the first principles of motion – or at least Hobbes believed he was not able to do this 
before completing De corpore – he pursued a shortcut towards a different kind of 
foundation: ‘the natural law [lex naturae]’ was now, quite plainly (hoc est), ‘the dictate of 
right reason [rectae rationis dictamen]’ (DC I.15, II.1; OL II, 167, 169). Thus, no more than 
one year after having explicitly expelled right reason from nature in The Elements of Law, 
Hobbes openly reincorporated it into man’s powers, namely in philosophy itself. In the 
Epistola dedicatoria to De cive he could thus ground the science of truth on right reason, 
with no appeal to any transcendent guarantee: 
True Wisdom [sapientia] is simply the science [scientia] of truth in every subject. 
Since it derives from the remembrance of things, which is prompted by their fixed 
and definite names, it is not a matter of momentary flashes of penetrating insight, 
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commentators’ (Larmore 1998: 1186-87, n. 100). In my reading this does not depend on ‘confusion’, but rather 
on the actual transformation of Hobbes’s approach. 
38 ‘Now when a man reasoneth from principles that are found indubitable by experience, all deceptions of 
sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be according to right reason; 
but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is contradictory to any 
evident truth whatsoever, then is he said to have concluded against reason: and such a conclusion is called 
absurdity’ (EL V.12). 
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but of right reason, i.e. of Philosophy. (DC Ep.; OL II, 136) 
This might explain why, along with the concept of Wisdom – which, opposed to 
eloquence, conjugates theoretical (truth) and practical (deliberation) knowledge39 – the 
expression ‘recta ratio’ becomes surprisingly diffused in De cive, where it counts 28 
occurrences. 40  Although it sometimes functions as a rhetorical device, right reason 
appears to correspond here to the ideal of a perfect science of the natural law accessible 
to men independently of the civil law. In De cive Hobbes was still endorsing the ‘ideal’ 
anteriority of science to political power, and the assumption that in scientia civilis one 
could find the neutral theoretical power of ‘right reason’ itself. This divine perfection of the 
law of nature posed the problem of the relation between the natural law ‘of 
commonwealths [civitatum]’ and the only properly ‘natural’ law ‘of men [hominum]’ (DC 
XIV.4; OL II, 316). The second was, at least in principle, anterior to the first and accessible 
by human reason: ‘the natural law did give rise to obligation in the natural state […]. 
Therefore the obligation to observe those laws is older than the promulgation of the laws 
themselves’ (DC XIV.9-10; OL II, 319).41 
The contradictory status of right reason in De cive 
Although the new perspective had increased the epistemological power of reason, in 
practice ‘reason’ could not be more powerful than any other of men’s ‘powers’, because – 
just as in The Elements of Law it was part of human powers – in De cive ‘right reason’ 
never ceased to be ‘a part of human nature as any other faculty or passion of the mind’ 
(DC II.1; OL II, 169).42 And, indeed, a quite fragile one, also at the epistemological level 
because, as a matter of fact, the laws of nature displayed in the philosophers’ books (such 
as the jurists’ laws) cannot be properly considered written ‘laws’ outside of the consent of 
the sovereign (DC XIV.15; OL II, 323). As a matter of fact, in De cive the concept of law 
was doubled, or better, split: on the one hand it was the perfect model of true science, and 
on the other hand it was the truth actually instituted by civil power.43 This derived from the 
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39 ‘The art of the one [Wisdom] is Logic, of the other [Eloquence] Rhetoric; the end of the one is truth, of the 
other victory. Both have their uses, the one in deliberation, the other in exhortation. For one is never 
separated from wisdom, the other almost always is’ (DC XII.12; OL II, 294-95). 
40 I have counted 28 occurrences, summing the phrases ‘recta ratione’ (2), ‘rationis rectae’ (1), ‘recta rationis’ 
(1), ‘recta rationem’ (10) and ‘rectae rationis’ (12). Yet of course the expression ‘dictamina (humanae) rationis’ 
covers the same meaning. 
41 ‘Lex naturalis obligabat in statu naturali […] Cum ergo obligatio ad leges illas observanda antiquior sit quam 
ipsarum legum promulgatio’. 
42 ‘Non minus sit pars naturae humanae, quam quaelibet alia facultas vel affectus animi’. ‘While Hobbes 
preserves this familiar terminology, however, he is far from viewing recta ratio in traditional terms as an 
unerring intuition or faculty’ (Skinner 1996: 294). 
43 When he comes to the classification of laws in De cive, Hobbes goes back to the identification of the divine 
and natural laws displayed in The Elements of Law (‘As for the division of law into divine, natural, and civil, the 
first two branches are one and the same law’ EL XIX.7), along with their explicit imputation to God as the 
author of nature and of human nature. But in De cive Hobbes feels the need to specify the division of the 
divine and human laws as respectively depending on the scripture and the ‘divine’ natural reason (DC XIV.4; 
OL II, 315-16). This evidently allows for a more neat and safe separation of theology and philosophy, but also 
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epistemological ambiguity of ‘right reason’. Right reason outside of the identification with 
civil laws existed, but as a purely formal model deprived of any power in itself; yet right 
reason also existed and was effective in the body politic, but quite far from the promising 
perfection it aimed at as a scientific model. In short, although the theoretical purity of right 
reason was, in Hobbes’s intentions, a major force towards political pacification, yet it 
posed a huge problem to the newborn civil science: the problem of implementing science 
with political practice. It is therefore not a surprise that it took a quite short time for 
Hobbes’s concept of ‘right reason’ to precipitate, from this precarious equilibrium, along 
with the events of the English civil war during the 1640s. 
In the manuscript called De motu,44 which Hobbes completed soon after De cive, we can 
find a more accurate terminological definition, that probably allows for a more plain 
solution to the problem of understanding the concept of ‘right reason’ in relation to 
‘reason’, ‘right reasoning’, and the ‘civil laws’. In De motu ‘reason’ is merely a human 
faculty, a power at the service of each individual’s striving for preservation, and there is no 
evident connection between the ‘critical faculties’ of human nature (that is intellect and 
reason) and what is true and right in itself. Yet there is ‘right reasoning’, an actual capacity 
of some men in determinate occasions to produce a ‘true’ chain of propositions: 
Again, reason is nothing but the faculty of syllogising, reasoning being merely a 
continuous linking of propositions, or their gathering under one head, or (to put it 
more briefly) the calculating of names […]. It must also be understood that there is 
right reasoning. Right reasoning is that reasoning which, commencing with an 
accurate explanation of names, proceeds by means of the syllogism, or through an 
unbroken linking of propositions that are true. (DM XXX.22, 348r-v, italics added)45 
And only ‘right reason’ is the ideal model and the actual ground of a continuative and 
correct exercise of right reasoning, independent of the existing civil laws: 
Right reason (if such exist) is the potential [potentia] to do, or the faculty of doing, 
this as often as we please: and herein lies the infallibility of reasoning. (DM XXX.22, 
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complicates the relation between the law of nature (divine and human) and the civil laws, since ‘all human law 
is civil law’ and yet ‘there are no laws beyond the dictates of right reason, which is divine law’ (DC XIV.5; OL 
II, 316). 
44 The MS 6656A (Fonds latin of the BNF) was an analytic critique to Thomas White’s De mundo, where 
Hobbes displayed most of the physical doctrine he later poured in the text of De corpore. The manuscript was 
found during the 1970s and first published in the original Latin as Critique du De Mundo de Thomas White 
(1973). The English translation appeared in 1976 with the title Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined. I will 
mainly follow this translation, although, as usual, modifying it on the basis of the Latin original, when needed. 
45 ‘Ratio iam nihil aliud est quam facultas sillogisandi, ratiocinatio enim nihil aliud est quam continua connexio 
sive collectio propositionum in unam summam, vel – ut brevius dicam – calculus nominum […] Subaudiendum 
autem est ratiocinationem esse rectam. Est autem recta ratiocinatio quae, initium sumens ab accurata 
nominum explicatione, procedit per syllogismum seu ab accurata nominum explicatione, procedit per 
syllogismum seu connexionem continuam propositionum verarum’. 
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348v)46 
Because ‘civil laws’ are separated by an epistemological gap from the ‘ideal’ perfection of 
‘right reason’ (‘if such exists’), the importance of ‘right reasoning’ consists precisely in 
providing the only possible connection between natural reason and right reason in the 
light of the latter, a connection Hobbes’s own civil science in De cive was intended to 
provide through deduction from the laws of human nature: 
Certainly those who live in a body-politic and are placed under its laws, by virtue of 
right reason must, in the interests of peace and the public good, consider the civil 
laws as concurrent with right reason. (DM XXX.22, 348v, italics added)47 
In fact, ‘right reason’ still embodied here as in De cive the ideal of autonomous existence 
and accessibility of the natural law outside of the domain of the civil law. But this 
theoretical superiority, once revealed materially ineffective, had to progressively redefine 
its material conditions of possibility. 
At the beginning of 1646 Hobbes made some important revisions to the text of De cive,48 
adding a Praefatio ad lectores and a few explanatory notes, among which one he 
expressly devoted to the concept of ‘right reason’. This appears his only methodological 
attempt to clearly define ‘right reason’ as existing ‘in men’s natural state’, outside the safe 
boundaries of civil law: ‘outside of a Commonwealth, where no one can distinguish right 
reason from false except by making comparison with his own’. And what Hobbes does 
here is to identify right reason with the ‘act of reasoning’ [ratiocinandi actum]. In this 
sense, as an ‘act of reasoning’, right reason cannot be a mere faculty among the others, 
simple ‘reason’, and yet it is ‘not [even] an infallible faculty’. The ‘act of reasoning’ is a real 
process, which deserves to be called ‘true’: ‘the act of reasoning, that is, a man’s own true 
Reasoning’ about the effects of his actions (DC II.1; OL II, 169).49 
This attempt to find in a ‘true’ and ‘right’ act of reasoning a mediation between ‘right 
reason’ as a model and ‘reason’ as a material faculty inscribed in human nature, was later 
absorbed in Leviathan in the more famous definition of human ‘reason’ as an operation of 
‘addition and subtraction’, or better an act of ‘reckoning’ which clearly recalls the definition 
of reason as ‘the calculating of names’ provided in De motu. In fact in Leviathan the 
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46 ‘Recta ratio (si qua talis existit) est potentia vel facultas ita faciendi quoties volumus; quae est ratiocinandi 
infallibilitas’. 
47 ‘Iis certe qui sub legibus, et in civitate vivunt, pro recta ratione pacis & utilitatis publicae causa leges civiles 
pro recta ratione habendae sunt’. 
48 In spring of 1646 he allowed Sorbière to use this version as a basis for the Amsterdam edition of 1647. This 
means that ‘by early 1646 Hobbes had made all the substantive changes that he thought necessary’ (Malcolm 
2012: 2; see also Skinner 1996: 330). 
49 ‘Ratiocinandi actum, id est, ratiocinationem uniuscujusque propriam et veram circa actiones suas, quae in 
utilitate, vel damnum caeterorum hominum redundare possint’. Hobbes does not abandon here also a more 
‘formal’ definition of ‘true seasoning’ as the correct deduction of conclusions ‘from true principles correctly 
stated’ (DC II.1; OL, 170) 
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expression ‘right reason’ becomes quite rare and confined, with only 9 occurrences, 6 of 
them concentrated in Chapter V, ‘Of Reason and Science’, in a book more twice as large 
as De cive. Although the expression is used in a way which partially recalls Chapter 
XIX.22 of The Elements of Law, the existence of right reason is not denied here. On the 
contrary, after explaining that the possibility of error is always there, Hobbes clarifies that 
‘reason itself is always right reason, as well as arithmetic is a certain and infallible art’. In 
short, (right) reason actually exists as a perfect model (as in De cive), and nevertheless 
the perfection of this existing model is now assumed as definitely far from human 
cognitive powers, which cannot go beyond a neutral operation of ‘reckoning’. 
As a matter of fact, in Leviathan there is no more actual ‘empty space’ that human reason 
can approach in order to achieve (even if from time to time) perfection: right reason is fully 
existent as a divine command and also completely absent as a possibility for individual 
men. Because of its intrinsic perfection, it cannot ever coincide with any ‘one mans 
reason’, thus compelling, in case of controversy, the need ‘to set up for right reason, the 
reason of some arbitrator’ (Lev V; EW III, 31). This passage evidently repeats the one in 
The Elements of Law XIX.22, yet now in the light of the saturation of the empty space of 
right reason with God’s command, the divine ‘dictate of right reason’, that is one of the 
ways through which God declares his laws and ‘governeth as many of mankind as 
acknowledge his providence’ by commanding obedience (Lev XXXI; EW III, 345). In fact 
this dictate appears to human reason as a purely negative criterion, through which right 
reason finally assumes the only possible form it can assume as a universal truth: the 
paradoxical acknowledgment of its own elusiveness.50 
Powerless superiority of right reason over civil power 
Skinner interprets Hobbes’s use of the expression recta ratio in the light of a supposedly 
unvarying methodological path for his civil science, eventually implemented, notably in 
Leviathan, by an ars rhetorica systematically employed to ‘supplement and enforce’, to 
‘amplify and underline the findings of reason and science’, once the method of recta ratio 
alone had revealed its pedagogical inefficacy (Skinner 1996: 3-4). Skinner’s account is 
driven by the desire to demonstrate a strong anti-humanist continuity between The 
Elements of Law and De cive, in order to explain the rationalist and resolutely anti-
rhetorical epistemological stance assumed by Hobbes in civil science at the outset, and 
the subsequent withdrawal to the complementarity of rhetoric to science in Leviathan. This 
pushes him to overlook the epistemological gap that separates The Elements of Law and 
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50 This ‘pure’ function of right reason is perfectly exemplified by its only other recurrence in Leviathan as a 
negative criterion for the ‘wise man’ to discern reports on reality from fancies: ‘it is the part of a wise man, to 
believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible’ (Lev II; EW III, 10). On 
the ideology of neutrality of science entailed by this conception of right reason, see below, Chapter 3. 
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De cive. Recta ratio therefore appears, from his perspective, the unproblematic ‘addition’, 
in De cive, of a certain Baconian blend to the scientific method earlier displayed in The 
Elements of Law, a kind of alternative label for the same path (meth-odòs) made of 
‘footsteps’ or vestigia to be followed (Skinner 1996: 294, referring to EL VI and DC Ep.). 
On the contrary, the theme of recta ratio marks, in my view, a decisive epistemological 
turn that is taking place in De cive. 
Both in The Elements of Law and De cive it was as if Reason could actually produce the 
body politic through the king. But De cive was not conceived as an ontology of the body 
politic: it was primarily a treatise on the first principles of the new civil science. In the 
epistemological perspective Hobbes adopted in De cive, the structure and functioning of 
the body politic was therefore to be understood from the point of view of ‘right reason’, 
which was in fact the perfect view on civil science precisely because it entailed the 
possibility of theoretically producing the geometrical model of a civil body, with no relation 
to political practice. In fact De cive assumed the same mechanistic connection between 
the ‘power cognitive’ of the mind and its ‘power motive’, and therefore between the 
principles of civil science and political practice, and yet it could not grant this connection 
on the basis of the ontological continuity assumed in the former treatise between the laws 
of nature as ‘principles’ and the same laws of nature as ‘causes’. In effect, it appears that 
Hobbes initially adopted the same equivocal identification of the ‘principles’ of knowledge 
and the ‘causes of things’ he later imputed to Aristotle (DeCo V.12; EW I, 63).51 Yet once 
he had shaped De cive according to the model of geometry, it was evident that civil 
science could not provide the actual causes of a body politic, but only the universal 
principles of its knowledge, in which neither ‘the Justice of particular actions’, nor the 
‘particular laws’, nor the classical decision on the form of government was due (DC Praef.; 
OL II, 152). 
Following the Cartesian dualist solution to the problem of providing a foundation for the 
new mechanical science, Hobbes had separated the realm of civil science with its 
principles, definitions, and names from the realm of the actual causes of the object of that 
science, the body politic. Civil science was thus born as a kind of non-prescriptive, neutral 
form of knowledge, according to the Cartesian model. What mechanical philosophy 
allowed for was a separation of the epistemological domain of principles and the 
ontological domain of causes. De cive was the transposition of this theoretical structure 
into the domain of political philosophy, which marked the origin of political science and, as 
I will explain in Chapter 3, of its ideology of ‘neutrality’. With this move right reason gained 
a larger, and in principle complete, autonomy, and hence it became more powerful (in the 
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51 See above, Chapter 1.3. 
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theoretical domain), but less effective in the practical one. It was the touchstone of any 
true reasoning and the actual model of perfect science. Perfectly mirroring the Cartesian 
res cogitans, it had scarcely any practical efficacy. As long as the rational laws of nature 
were directly embodied in the complex amount of the human ‘powers of the mind’ 
cognitive and motive, they could be easily conceived as actual causes of motion, but 
since they were assumed as principles of knowledge, the problem of granting their 
efficacy became crucial. In effect, once the dictates of right reason had become principles 
of knowledge and knowledge had lost any peculiar power as a physical cause, the 
problem first raised by The Elements of Law and therein solved by the intertwining of civil 
power and rational power came back with further complication. 
From the perspective adopted in De cive, more than ever, in order to become science, 
knowledge needed to gain stability. But, if ‘power’ is a motion of matter, there is no 
evident physical compatibility between ontological power and epistemological stability. 
The concept of power indicates in Hobbes’s mechanics the local motion of a body as far 
as it can be transferred to another body by contact. This assumption drove Hobbes’s 
political research and strongly conflicted with the new epistemological approach he 
adopted in De cive. Although he never called into question the ontological unity of his 
object, matter in motion, he maintained the separation of the method of civil science 
based – as geometry – on the dictates of right reason, from the actual ontological account 
of physical and political motion. Thus Hobbes was compelled to move civil science closer 
to the efficacy of mechanics rather than confining it in the universal but hardly effective 
perfection of geometry: the material conditions of possibility of civil science had to be at 
the same time theorised and practically provided through actual power, as the sword and 
the crosier of Leviathan later prescribed. Thus from De cive onwards a new task for 
Hobbes’s philosophy was set: the recruitment of new theoretical and practical means of 
production and conservation of the power of civil science over the body politic. In order to 
fill the gap between the theoretical perfection of science as ‘right reason’ and the actually 
‘small power’ Hobbes eventually acknowledged to sciences in Leviathan,52 a specific 
conceptual apparatus was needed. 
In fact, the new mechanical philosophy was not intended to have local, limited effects: it 
was born fit for treating the entirety of Nature and, similarly, all political issues, on the 
ground of the universality of human nature. The new science was expected to be effective 
at the order of magnitude of mankind, also at the political level. A political treatise could 
thus not grant the all-encompassing objective efficacy mechanical philosophers were 
dreaming of by merely being a speculum principis: ‘right reason’ had to be systematically 
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52 ‘The sciences are small power’ (Lev X; EW III, 75). 
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re-connected to civil power as a universal and effective cause. In the previously recalled 
note of De cive concerning ‘right reason’, we must notice that Hobbes was opposing there 
science to false reasoning, ‘stupidity’, and ‘ignorance’ of the laws of nature as the same 
kind of departure from the ‘principles of right reasoning laid down in chapter I, articles 2-7’ 
(DC II.1; OL II, 170).53 If we go back to the concluding paragraph of the set Hobbes was 
there referring to, we can find that ‘right reason’ can be the measure of ‘right’ precisely on 
the ground of the knowledge of the ‘desire’ (appetitum) that draws men towards what is 
good and away from what is bad as ‘a real necessity of nature as powerful as that by 
which a stone falls downward’ (DC I.7; OL, 163).54 It was as if right reason could find an 
adequate and effective counterpart of its perfection only in the ontological connection of 
causes stated by a ‘lawful’, deterministic account of nature, human nature included. 
Hobbes’s materialistic epistemology was not so easily reducible to such an account as the 
one elaborated by Cartesian mechanicism, yet this reduction actually took place in 
Hobbes’s philosophy during the 1640s as a conjoint physical, political, and theological 
enterprise. 
 
2.3 On Vacuum and Conatus: The Consolidation of Ontological 
Determinism 
Around 1642-43, soon after De cive, Hobbes went back to natural philosophy and wrote 
De motu, a critique to Thomas White’s De mundo.55 In the spring or summer of 1645, at 
the house of the exiled William Cavendish, Marquess of Newcastle, he started a long-term 
dispute with his new acquaintance Archbishop Bramhall.56 This debate brought him to 
provide a ‘Treatise’ Of Liberty and Necessity in response to Bramhall’s ‘Discourse’ on the 
same subject.57 At the same time Hobbes was also writing A Minute or First Draft on 
Optics (1646) and took part in the discussions about the nature of void that – following 
Torricelli’s and Pascal’s experiments – were carried on also within Mersenne’s circle in 
those years. All these variously stimulating inputs brought Hobbes to define his thesis on 
the nature of void during the period 1646-48, in close connection with the explicit 
formulation of a theory of necessity in the Treatise, and the ‘return to Civil Science’ 
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53 ‘Principia autem rectae ratiocinationis circa ejusmodi officia, ea sunt quae capitis primi articulis 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
et 7 explicata sunt’. 
54 ‘Idque necessitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapis deorsum’. 
55 On De motu, see above, note 44. 
56 For the dating of this ‘live debate’, see Jackson 2007, chap. 3. 
57 In fact the title of Bramhall’s paper composed in 1645 was A Treatise of Liberty and Necessity upon 
Occasion of some Opinions of Thomas Hobbes about these. I adopt the commonly accepted nomenclature 
employed by Chappell 1999: ‘Discourse’ for Bramhall’s treatise and ‘Treatise’ for Hobbes’s Of Liberty and 
Necessity, composed as a letter to Newcastle in August 1645 and published in 1654. Its publication was 
immediately followed by Bramhall’s A defence of true Liberty (1655) and, again, by Hobbes’s The Questions 
concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (1956). 
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through the additional notes and the new Praefatio ad lectores he wrote for the second 
edition of De cive.58 This complex set of issues scattered across different writings testifies 
to the wide range of interests involved in Hobbes’s systematic project. In taking them on, 
my analysis aims at highlighting once again the close connection between metaphysics 
and politics animating Hobbes’s philosophy. This time I will show how the conjoint 
exigencies emerged in both spheres induced an ideological development: the adoption of 
what I shall call ‘ontological determinism’. 
Before I can proceed, it is worth clarifying the sense in which I use the expressions 
‘ontological determinism’ and ‘epistemological determinism’, referring the first to a 
mechanistic metaphysics of nature and the second to a methodological issue that 
constitutes the innovative core of mechanics. This will lead to an explanation of Hobbes’s 
entanglement of the ontological issue of determinism with the political need of an 
adequate cause that would grant the continuous and regular functioning of the body 
politic. 
Ontological and epistemological determinism 
Ontological determinism is the fundamental belief in a global causal net connecting all 
existing phenomena, and thus making of the universe a machine-like totality in which the 
motion of each part directly or indirectly causes effects in all the other parts. This 
fundamental belief in determinism is perforce accompanied by the admission of the 
limitation of human understanding, and of scientific knowledge itself, to some parts of the 
whole causal net, and the asymptotical projection of absolute knowledge in an infinite 
intellect representing absolute knowledge, capable of foreseeing any future event on the 
basis of the perfect knowledge of the present state of the universe. It can be 
emblematically grasped through Laplace’s formula: 
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that 
set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if 
this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would 
embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and 
the future just like the past would be present before its eyes. (Laplace 1814: I, 3)59 
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58 This second edition was published in the Netherlands in 1647. According to Skinner its accomplishment 
probably also contributed to nourish Hobbes’s decision to write a new political treatise, that is, Leviathan 
(Skinner 1996: 330-31). 
59 ‘Nous devons donc envisager l’état présent de l’univers, comme l’effet de son état antérieure, et comme la 
cause de celui qui va suivre. Une intelligence qui, pour un instant donné, connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la 
nature est animée, et la situation respective des êtres qui la composent, si d’ailleurs elle était assez vaste 
pour soumettre ces données à l’analyse, embrasserait dans la même formule les mouvements des plus 
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In short, reality is deterministically conceived and – at least in principle – fully knowable, 
although such a knowledge is never actually complete. This definition I assume as the 
ideal-type of modern mechanical philosophies, as far as they refute any ontological 
meaning to the concept of chance, and assume it only as the limit-case indicating the 
shortage of the ideally complete knowledge of causes which is the essential postulate of 
the scientific method. 
On the other hand I name ‘epistemological determinism’60 the adoption of the postulate of 
determinism to ground both the methodology and the ethics of scientific research – based 
on the refusal of all non-causal (in the sense of the efficient cause) hypotheses of 
explanation of phenomena – without directly concerning the ontological status of reality in 
itself. In short, reality has to be deterministically understood in order to be accessible to 
science, but, at the same time, the difference between real processes and their scientific 
representation is never cancelled, and therefore the complexity of reality must not be a 
priori reduced to any deterministic representation. This approach would entail the use of 
statements concerning a purely ‘local’ determinism, in contrast to the ontological 
assumption of reality as deterministic in itself. Early-modern mechanicism was precisely 
the reduction of reality to some quite simplistic tools of geometrical representation, which 
provided a representation of matter in motion sufficiently universal and appearing 
sufficiently impersonal to be taken for reality itself. The effort to provide a metaphysical 
foundation to determinism – a theoretical tool neatly differentiating the method of the new 
science from the Aristotelian one – was precisely what led to the adoption of the 
ideological representation of the universe as a perfectly ‘geometrical’ – that is imagined – 
machine. My working hypothesis is that mechanicism played a major role in producing this 
ideological shift, and Hobbes was – willing or not – an active part of this enterprise.61 
Does vacuum exist? Hobbes’s epistemological stance 
It was only in the middle of the 1640s that Hobbes achieved a complete and theoretically 
detailed justification of ontological determinism. Once again, the analysis of an apparently 
marginal issue will allow me to track this change: Hobbes’s change of mind on the 
question of void will lead to the understanding of how the issue of natural determinism 
surpassed the actual exigencies of Hobbes’s materialistic physics of motion, and had a 
striking relevance for Hobbes’s political theory. 
The concept of void was a traditional battle-horse of the Epicurean tradition, and the 
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grands corps de l’univers, et ceux du plus léger atome: rien ne serait incertain pour elle, et l’avenir comme le 
passé, seraient présents à ses yeux’. 
60 Indeed, I am adopting the expression ‘epistemological determinism’ following Bachelard’s suggestion of 
taking it in a sense deprived of any metaphysical presumptions (Bachelard 1951: 223). 
61 All these points will be reworked in my Conclusion, where I will argue that in fact ontological determinism 
still nourishes the ‘spontaneous ‘ideology’ of scientism also in political theory. 
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declared enemy of Descartes’s mechanics. The existence of void had to be rejected by 
Descartes, because it entailed the possibility of a discontinuity in the causal chains and 
revived the Epicurean ‘monstrosity’ of chance events, with potentially devastating effects 
on his deterministic theory of the ‘laws’ of motion. Hobbes long hesitated on the subject of 
void, which he debated in his optical and physical writings, particularly during the 1640s, 
at times adopting the Epicurean distinction between sparse microscopical void (vacuum 
disseminatum) and localised macroscopical void (vacuum coacervatum) in order to accept 
the first and deny the existence of the second (Shapin and Shaffer 1985: 83). The 
possible and ‘imaginable’ existence of void was asserted by Hobbes since the early Latin 
Optical MS in order to explain the multidirectional propagation of light from a ‘pulsating’ 
luminous source (by systole and diastole) through an elastic medium (LO I.4: 148).62 And 
around 1646, in his last optical treatise, Hobbes still explicitly stated that he could ‘find no 
impossibility, nor absurdity, nor so much an improbability in admitting vacuity’ (EO II.2.2: 
96). 
The De motu clearly displays Hobbes’s persisting ambivalence about void in the first half 
of the 1640s, along with his ‘epistemological’ stance concerning the hypothesis of natural 
determinism, and the growing awareness of some of its political implications. According to 
Hobbes there is one way out of the difficulties entailed by the doubt about whether nature 
admits vacuum or not, by assuming that ‘the quantity of vacuum in the whole world is fixed 
and limited’ (DM II.9, 24).63 This is clearly just an hypothesis (‘suppositio’) that works for 
many different purposes, such as ‘to admit [the existence of] vacuum in the way I have 
suggested can despatch the difficulty of [explaining] the compression of the air in the guns 
newly invented’ (DM II.11, 24v).64 Yet it is a consistent hypothesis, while the opposite one, 
i.e. ‘that a vacuum cannot exist [non posse esse vacuum]’, is, according to Hobbes, 
simply and openly ‘wrong’ [falsam] (DM V.4, 30). In general, although this open stance 
could in principle authorise any kind of monstrous hypotheses produced by human 
imagination, de facto it only authorises hypotheses that comply with the geometrical 
theory of motion: hypotheses that do not comply with it must be plainly and simply 
declared ‘wrong’. Non-decidability is in fact a circumscribed scientific achievement, and 
not at all an undifferentiated label applying to any unknown matter. Claims that cannot 
comply with the geometrical theory of motion are simply rejected as ‘wrong’, while claims 
that are compatible and yet by definition out of reach of human experience are 
scientifically proclaimed non-decidable. At the same time, this epistemological stance 
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62 ‘Id quod neque fieri potest neque concipi, nisi concedatur posse dari vacuum, saltem per vim; dari autem 
vacuum facile est imaginari neque non posse dari hucusque a quoquam demonstratum est’. On this point see 
Gargani 1971: 221-223. 
63 ‘Video […] quantitatem vacui quod in toto mundo est, esse certam et determinatam’. 
64 ‘Eadem vacui suppositione expediri potest difficultas de compressione aeris in sclopetis nuper inventis’. 
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entails a kind of analytic depuration of scientific language from the terms, mainly inherited 
from Aristotelian Scholasticism, that are in fact nonsense, precisely because they do not 
comply with a mechanical representation of reality. 
The same ‘epistemological’ stance he adopted concerning void can be easily detected in 
Hobbes’s discussion in De motu of other topics as well as connected with the problem of 
determinism. In effect, there are several concepts that he provisionally adopts in De motu 
and he will never accept elsewhere as scientifically founded. All these concepts can be 
admitted there as hypotheses as far as they comply with the geometrical representation 
and imagination of matter, as if in De motu Hobbes, precisely because of the 
epistemological status attributed to this concepts, could more freely adopt them as 
working hypotheses. This is what he does with the concept of the ‘infinity’ of the universe 
(DM XXVII.6, 297v), and the attribution of a possible scientific status to astrology, 
depending on the fact that ‘the sum total of all the causes within the stars is the sum total 
of all the causes within the universe’ (DM XXXVI.4, 400v).65 Quite ambiguously, in De 
motu astrology is neither excluded from the domain of philosophy nor included in it. It 
rather appears a plausible hypothesis ‘at the margins of scientific knowledge, projecting it 
in the dimension (de facto unreachable) of the totality of the physical system of the 
universe’ (Paganini 2010: 41). In this sense it is legitimate to conclude with Leijenhorst 
that Hobbes maintains in De motu an ‘epistemological autonomy’ of the secondary 
causes, although he cannot conclude for their ‘ontological autonomy’ from a supposed 
first cause (Leijenhorst 2005b: 116). In fact, it seems he cannot ‘conclude’ at all, since he 
cannot discharge any of two contradictory hypotheses if both are imaginable in the terms 
of the geometry of motion. And coherently, no conclusive scientific statement is possible 
on void such as on any topic by definition out of the horizon of scientific knowledge, as the 
knowledge of the totality of the causes is. And in effect, explicit claims against the 
existence of void and other issues directly or indirectly concerning the hypothesis of an 
‘ontological’ determinism can be hardly detected in Hobbes’s writings in the first half of the 
1640s – a stance perfectly consistent with the epistemological stance he had explicitly 
adopted at the beginning of the decade in De cive.66 
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65 ‘Collectionem omnium causarum quae sunt in astris esse collectionem omnium causarum quae sunt in 
universo’. According to Foisneau, this passage exemplifies the contrast between Hobbes’s explicit assertion of 
the epistemological independency of the different causal chains from global causality, and his assumption of 
an ontological systematic interconnection of causes in De motu. He names this the ‘paradox of the integral 
cause’ (Foisneau 2000: 110 ff.). The same argument could be applied on Hobbes’s Treatise of Liberty and 
Necessity, where Hobbes explains that ‘the influence of stars is but small part of the whole cause, consisting 
of the concourse of all agents’ and then hooks everything on ‘the first link God Almighty’ (LN II.11: 20). On the 
theological presuppositions entailed by Hobbes’s ontological determinism, see below. 
66 This epistemological stance was indeed never completely abandoned by Hobbes. In De corpore, that is in 
Hobbes’s physical summa, we can still find the assumption of both the existence of atoms and the infinite 
indivisibility of matter. In this sense one might extend to the whole of Hobbes’s physics (as a science of 
phenomena) what he says about Sidereal Philosophy: ‘though the causes I have here supposed be not the 
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In effect the hypothetical status of void as of all the connected issues really became 
‘dangerous’ for Hobbes when determinism was definitively assumed as one of the articles 
of faith of his theological-political orthodoxy. As a matter of fact, a solution to the problem 
of void was not perceived by Hobbes as crucial before 1646-48, when he openly 
proceeded in the direction of Descartes’s plenism. Two subsequent letters to Mersenne 
concerning Etienne Noel’s Le plein du vuide, an account of Torricelli’s experiment with 
mercury, appear to perfectly display Hobbes ‘plenist turn’. 67  In the first letter of 17 
February 1648 Hobbes sums up his opinion about vacuum as follows: 
I still think what I told you before: that there are certain minimal spaces here and 
there, in which there is no body, and that these spaces occur because of the nature, 
or natural actions, of the sun, fire, and other heat-producing bodies […]. Certain 
small empty spaces are necessarily formed by this action. (Corr I, 167)68 
A few months later, on 25 May, still to Mersenne and concerning precisely the same topic, 
he argues: 
All the experiments which you and others have made with mercury do not conclude 
that vacuum exists. (Corr I, 173)69 
This sequence quite emblematically represents the end of most of Hobbes’s 
epistemological oscillations. In fact, physics never acquired in Hobbes’s system the actual 
status of a perfect knowledge as geometry was, and, given the premises, it could not: 
there was no full access to the internal motions of bodies, and therefore to the internal 
causes of bodily motion, as was the case with the objects of geometry. This level of 
knowledge – the one concerning what was not accessible to human senses – had 
forcedly to remain hypothetical. On this ground there was no scientific reason for Hobbes 
to so suddenly and conclusively reject the hypothesis of void. And nevertheless this is 
what he eventually did. In De corpore the arguments ‘partly made by the followers of the 
doctrine of Epicurus’ and ‘delivered by Lucretius’ concerning the existence of void are 
conclusively rejected (DeCo XXVI.2-5, EW I, 414-27). And in Hobbes’s subsequent works 
the hypothesis of void will not surface as a plausible hypothesis any more. 
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true causes of these phenomena, yet I have demonstrated that they are sufficient to produce them, according 
to what I at first propounded’ (DeCo XXVI.11). In effect, also when in Chapter XXVII he speaks about 
‘intersidereal bodies’, the different explanations are always provided in term of ‘possible causes’. 
67 On the whole affair, see Sergio 2001: 227-43. On the basis of the two letters Sergio establishes the ‘turn’ 
around February-April 1648. He explains that ‘it was neither from a fully convicted Mersenne, nor from a 
perfectly Mersennian compact group that Hobbes draw the reasons for his “conversion”’, and concludes 
suggesting the existence of a connection between Hobbes’s and Roberval’s ‘conversions’ (Sergio 2001: 239, 
243). 
68 ‘Summatim idem quod ante censui, esse nimirum loca quaedam, nunc haec nunc ilia, in quibus corpus 
nullum inest, et [haec] contingere ex natura siue actione naturali solis, ignis, aliorumque, si qua sunt, 
corporum calefacientum […] [ex] qua actione vacua quaedam spatiola necessario oriuntur’ (Corr I, 165). 
69 ‘Toutes les expériences faites par vous et d’autres, auec l’argent vif, ne concluent pas qu’il y a du vuide’ 
(Corr I, 172). 
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Interpreters adduce some good physical and epistemological reasons for Hobbes’s 
‘turn’.70 But they generally add to their explanations a note concerning a general tendency 
of Hobbes’s thought towards – as it was posed by Shapin and Shaffer in their Leviathan 
and the Air Pump – ‘protecting’ knowledge. Paganini, for instance, claims that prudential 
reasons brought Hobbes to close the ‘openings’ he presented in the ‘audacious stance’ of 
De motu (Paganini 2010: 42). Since it is not clear what theoretical reasons would bring 
Hobbes to this defensive stance, it appears quite reasonable to conclude that it was 
prudence (both theological and political) or even fear that inspired Hobbes’s more 
conformist choices. Other scholars suggest a more profound connection between the two 
agendas, epistemological and political, such as Sergio, who concludes that Hobbes’s 
epistemological strategy was to reduce all phenomena to a ‘general mechanical 
lawfulness’ of a Cartesian kind (Sergio 2001: 263-64; 270). Quite explicitly, Shapin and 
Shaffer claim that Hobbes’s epistemological turn towards ‘plenism’ was connected to a 
wider project to solve the political problem of closing the public space of debate opened 
by epistemological dissent, as perfectly exemplified by his quarrel with Boyle around the 
experiments with the air-pump carried on within the Royal Society during the 1660s.71 In 
effect, the idea that inspires my whole research is that the analyses of the two agendas 
have to be kept together in order to provide a satisfactory understanding of the shifts 
occurring in Hobbes’s political theory during the 1640s. And, precisely for the same 
reason, the connections and tensions between Hobbes’s two agendas have to be 
searched out precisely in that period.72 
In my view Hobbes’s ‘turn’ concerning the issue of void can be clearly understood only if 
we connect it with the wider theme of determinism he had been challenging during the 
1640s. In my reconstruction Hobbes’s exigency to unconditionally adopt the ‘plenist’ 
hypothesis was closely connected to his necessity of adopting ontological determinism. As 
explained, if natural causality was to be only the effect of local motion, the ontological 
existence of void, however minimal, would introduce a gap between body and body that 
left undecided the question of whether and how the conatus of an individual body could be 
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70 Bernhardt, for instance, points to Hobbes’s physics of light: ‘At first Hobbes thought that the “vacuists” were 
right, because his theory of illumination required the possibility of a vacuum. But when he abandoned this 
heart-like schema and chose the motus cribrationis instead, there was no more need of any vacuum. Then, 
Hobbes adopted a “plenum” theory, as a consequence of his theory according to which light is propagated in a 
medium, that is, a real substance supporting light as a mode, for instance in the experience of the “empty” 
tube, carried out by Charles Cavendish (1648) and probably decisive in Hobbes’ mind after 1649, mainly for 
experimental reasons’ (Bernhardt 1993: 225). 
71 Against all disputes on spirits and subtle matter, only a strictly ontological conception of the causal-effect 
relationship could definitely dispel the dangerous contrasts so terrifically reflected by the political troubles of 
England (Shapin and Shaffer 1985: 107-109). I have discussed in detail Shapin and Shaffer’s sociological 
interpretation of Hobbes’s ‘from of life’ in my Introduction. 
72 The research of Shapin and Shaffer does not cover this period and, precisely because of its exclusive focus 
on Leviathan’s ‘political epistemology’, it can hardly grasp the internal tension between Hobbes’s dualist 
epistemology and his monist political ontology. 
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preserved through an empty space and transmitted to another body. In this sense 
Hobbes’s eventual solution of the problem of void can be seen as the mark of the 
accomplishment of an ideological process of reduction of motion to its mechanistic 
representation. 
And from this perspective it is not surprising that Hobbes’s need for a definitive solution to 
the problem of void emerged precisely after the 1645 dispute with Bramhall had raised the 
exigency of discussing necessity as a theological issue concerning human liberty. In this 
sense Hobbes’s discussion with Bramhall is the key to understanding the ideological 
reasons for Hobbes’s endorsement of ontological determinism because of its relevance 
for political theory, as far as it directly concerned the genuinely political theme of human 
nature. This need for a definitive solution of the anthropological problem – later revived in 
the failed synthesis of De homine – was initially triggered by the way in which the 
epistemological stance assumed in De cive – along with the vicissitudes of the on-going 
civil war – strongly affected Hobbes’s faith in the power of reason during the 1640s.73 The 
epistemological shift of De cive contributed to transform the issue of determinism from a 
formerly unreflected ontological assumption coupled with a methodological claim, to a key 
philosophical issue that Hobbes soon endorsed in all its theological and political 
relevance. 
From epistemological to ontological determinism through the idea of God 
The dispute with Bramhall was not the first debate among the deaf Hobbes went through. 
The clash between the two theories can be said once again to be pre-determinate 
precisely by the metaphysical opposition between Bramhall’s dualism and Hobbes’s 
materialistic monism. Bramhall’s dualism was indeed quite far from the precise world of 
mechanicism. According to Bramhall, if human beings enjoy some ‘liberty from necessity’ 
(LN I.4: 1), it is because the universe is the mixed, approximate world where ‘God leaves 
many things indifferent […] so still there is liberty’ (LN I.23: 12). In Bramhall’s scheme 
‘necessity’ is clearly attributed to physical ‘outward’ objects which nevertheless cannot 
destroy human (or divine) ‘true liberty’ (LN I.22: 11). The latter is in fact independent of 
‘the complexion and temperature of the body’ (LN I.21: 19), because it ultimately relies on 
the existence of a soul in all the ‘free agents’ in whom intellect and will are not 
predetermined (LN I.23: 13). In his reply Hobbes immediately individuates the issue of 
free agency as crucial and symptomatic. Although he initially claims the question is ill 
posed (‘The question therefore is not whether a man be a free agent’ LN II.3: 16), when 
he finally displays his ‘opinion about liberty and necessity’, he concludes: ‘lastly, I hold 
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73 As explained in the introduction, my interpretation endorses, although in a different perspective, Skinner’s 
idea that during the 1640s Hobbes’s political theory changed along with his decreasing faith in the political 
efficacy of reason. 
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that ordinary definition of a free agent, namely that a free agent is that which, when all 
things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce 
it, implies contradiction and is nonsense’ (LN II.32: 38-39). Consequently, the point for 
Hobbes is not what the free-agency imagined by Bramhall in humans is, but rather what 
definition of liberty could be consistent with his materialism. And this question could not be 
answered without providing the metaphysical background of his deterministic conception 
of nature. 
In Hobbes’s universe there is definitely no space for an ontological difference between 
human beings and nature, nor there is difference between man on the one hand, and 
animals, children, ‘fools[,] and madmen’, who ‘manifestly deliberate no less than the 
wisest men’ (LN II.8: 19). ‘Election’ or ‘choice’ follows from the process of deliberation as 
an effect, and of course there can be no ontological difference between the actions (that is 
motions) of the different kinds of bodies. In this sense the issue of human liberty is 
necessarily inscribed in the more general one of natural necessity: 
Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the 
will, and consequently the action; but for moral efficacy, I understand not what he 
means by it. (LN II.11: 20) 
The case, however, is not as simple as it might seem. Hobbes’s universe is indeed a 
complex set of an ‘innumerable number of [causal] chains’ which concur with the ‘whole 
cause of an event’. The event ‘does not always depend on one single chain, but on many 
together’; and therefore the whole set of causes is hardly accessible to human knowledge, 
if even ‘the foreknowledge of God’ ‘cannot be truly said’ a cause (LN II.11: 20). In fact, in 
the Treatise Hobbes explicitly adheres to an epistemology founded on the validity of 
internal experience: hence truth, when experience and matter of fact is concerned, cannot 
be more than verified ‘by every man’s own sense and memory’ (LN II.33: 39). Such a 
stance might appear to make of a global determinism a kind of ‘epistemological’ working 
hypothesis as far as the Treatise is concerned. 
But this is not the case. At the time of the Treatise the die was cast, and the concepts of 
fortune and contingency were rejected as the marks of mere boundaries of knowledge on 
the ground of a solid ontological belief: ‘by contingent, men do not mean that which has 
no cause, but that which has not for cause anything that we perceive’ (LN II.16: 28).74 At 
the end of the day, although Hobbes openly states that ‘we ought not to dispute of God’s 
nature; he is no fit subject of our philosophy’ (LN II. 38: 42), all the different events 
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74 Bramhall’s stance can be thus connected by Hobbes to a kind of natural illusion: ‘when we see and know 
the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not, or mark not, the force that 
moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes but liberty that produces the action’ (LN II.20: 
32; cf. also LN II.24: 35 and LN II.34: 40). 
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produced by the different kinds of agents and actions Bramhall had imagined contributing 
to the overall beauty of the cosmos were drawn back to an equally ‘divine’ necessity: 
‘though there be three sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet these may be 
all necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe’ (LN II.16: 28). 
Also in Hobbes’s professed materialism the whole set of the causal chains, ‘joined 
together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty’, hung together from God as the 
first cause: ‘this concourse of causes […] may well be called (in respect they were all set 
and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God’ (LN II.11: 
20). 
Indeed, it had been Hobbes’s stable conviction that ‘predestination’ in itself should not be 
a matter of philosophical enquiry, because it exclusively concerned the nature of God (by 
definition out of human knowledge), while, on the contrary, the issue of free-will was: 
This whole controversy concerning the predestination of God, and the freewill of 
man, is not peculiar to Christian men. For we have huge volumes of this subject, 
under the name of fate and contingency, disputed between the Epicureans and the 
Stoics, and consequently it is not matter of faith, but of philosophy; and so are also 
all the questions concerning any other point, but the foundation before named [on 
God’s predestination]. (EL XXV.9, italics added) 
In principle, no theological foundation (either positive or negative) to the philosophical 
issue of natural necessity was allowed. On this basis Hobbes refused also in De cive both 
the Stoic solution of God as a pervasive reason,75 and the Epicurean one of God as 
indifferent to the world (DC XV.14; OL II, 340). And nevertheless, these repeated claims 
do not seem to exhaust all the assumptions implicit in Hobbes’s systematic enterprise, 
which made of his materialism a metaphysical doctrine hardly safe from theological 
presuppositions. It is true that the reference to the existence of God is often used in De 
cive with rhetorical purposes rather than to provide a proper demonstration (DC II.21; OL 
II, 179) (DC XIV.19; OL II, 326); and this is also true for the conception of God as ‘first 
cause’.76 Even though it was something that ‘may rightly be inferred’, he never assumed it 
was possible to transform this ‘philosophical belief’ into a proper demonstration: ‘I cannot 
therefore commend those that boast they have demonstrated, by reasons drawn from 
natural things, that the world had a beginning’ (DeCo XXVI.1; EW I, 412-13). Furthermore, 
one might even extend to the very idea of God as first cause Hobbes’s own condemnation 
of any attempt ‘to confine him [God] within the limits of our imagination [phantasiae]’: ‘nor 
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75 On a possible Stoic influence on Hobbes concerning the understanding of the physical world as an organic 
unity pervaded by right reason because imposed by God’s absolute will, see Oakley 2005: 30-31. 
76 For instance when he states that right and exercise of sovereign power are (and have to be) separated he 
makes the example of the way, as the king, ‘God the first mover of all things, produces natural effects through 
the order of secondary causes’ (DC XIII.1; OL II, 298). 
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does it reflect honour on God to say that the idea of him is in our minds, for an idea is a 
concept of ours’ (DC XV.14; OL II, 341-42).77 And nevertheless, in Hobbes’s system the 
idea of God clearly functions to mark the horizon of physical knowledge and, as a matter 
of fact, it grounds the underlying belief in nature as a mechanistically conceived whole. 
Rejecting the claim that Hobbes felt no need to ground his physics on metaphysics, Lupoli 
(2006) tries to explain how Hobbes’s physics of local motion entailed a metaphysical 
foundation even from a materialistic point of view. His argument is quite clear: for Hobbes 
matter in motion is the only existing reality, and local motion is the only possible object of 
a science of causes. Therefore, given that we have no actual knowledge of any ‘causes’ 
of the existence of matter, there can be no scientific knowledge of the paradoxically 
‘ingenerated matter’ named God. 78  Whether sharing this view or not, from Lupoli’s 
argument one can understand how Hobbes’s system did not escape all the annexed 
metaphysical implications of Descartes’s epistemology. On the contrary, it incurred the 
same metaphysical consequences both of conceiving matter within the horizon of a 
deterministic ontology and of grounding physics on God as a first cause and the very 
mythical origin of matter in motion.79 
As a matter of fact, by the time Hobbes completed De corpore, ontological determinism 
was definitively incorporated into his doctrine. It was there synthetically demonstrated and 
widely motivated through the full and systematic assumption of the unity of the ‘whole 
cause’ he had sketched as an hypothesis in De motu, and the reduction of ‘contingency’ 
to the limits of knowledge he had fully anticipated in the Treatise80 (DeCo IX-X; EW I, 120-
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77 ‘Eum limitibus nostrae phantasiae circumscribere’; ‘Neque dici de Deo honorifice, quod idea ejus animo 
nostro insit; idea enim conceptum noster est’. 
78 Lupoli is explicitly following here Brandt’s interpretation of Hobbes’s mechanicism as a ‘pure kinetics’, which 
makes of motion the proper object of a science of causes and brings to a ‘deontologised’ conception of matter, 
metaphysically founded on a quite peculiar ‘materialistic dualism’ (Lupoli 2006: 556; Lupoli takes this 
expression from Boyle’s attack on Hobbes’s ‘corporeal God’ in his Animadversions 1674). According to him, 
the problem of an ingenerated (that is non-caused) matter would throw Hobbes’s philosophy back to the 
metaphysical, extra-scientific problem of the ‘First Mover’ and therefore compel him to conclude for the 
necessity of an original ‘creation’ of the solid body particles called ‘atoms’ (Lupoli 2006: 541-54). Hence the 
equivocal meaning (both physical and theological) of the term ‘creation’ in Hobbes’s works, to be explained by 
the peculiar identification of the God of religion and the philosophical God in a single metaphysical principle. 
This principle would constitute the – a priori unknowable – basis of Hobbes’s entire philosophy (Lupoli 2006: 
571): ‘Creation […] far from being collocated outside physics, is in fact a necessary postulate of Hobbesian 
physics. It presupposes a scientifically unexplained transition from a sort of pre-world made of absolutely fluid 
matter, to a mechanical world which can be actually known’ (Lupoli 2006: 565-66). See also Pacchi 1988, 
which Lupoli takes his start from. Lupoli explicitly contrasts Giancotti, according to whom ‘matter in motion 
does not need the God creator’ (Giancotti 1990: 25). But also implicitly Garber, according to whom Hobbes 
and Gassendi – differently from Descartes – ‘felt no need to ground their physics in metaphysics [and] Hobbes 
seems to leave God out altogether’ (Garber 1992a: 62). 
79 Zarka even leads Hobbes back to the medieval ‘theory of theological voluntarism’, claiming that although in 
his system ‘an explicitly recognized theology is excluded […] yet, when one turns from statements of Hobbes's 
own doctrines to polemical writings (involving Descartes, White, and Bramhall), where Hobbes is obliged to 
take account of other philosophical views, a theological presupposition reasserts itself. The presupposition 
consists of a theology of omnipotence’ (Zarka 1996: 77-79). 
80 ‘By contingent, men do not mean that which has no cause, but that which has not for cause anything that 
we perceive’ (LN II.16: 28).  
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32). Although these concepts did not appear in Hobbes’s ‘first philosophy’, the themes of 
ontological determinism and theological necessity had been demonstrated as being 
inextricably connected and conjointly relevant in all the domains of philosophy and, more 
relevantly, both at the epistemological and at the political level. In effect, it was in the 
controversy concerning human liberty carried on with Bramhall that the impossibility of 
knowing the nature of God was apparently overcome, in contradiction to the sceptical 
stance Hobbes in fact never abandoned on this topic. This was not a change of mind, but 
rather the mark of the political nature of Hobbes’s concern with determinism: 
Hobbes’s reinterpretation of the divine attributes of prescience and omnipotence in 
the terms of his own determinism does not provide a theological foundation for 
natural philosophy, but rather supports a different theological purpose, that is, in 
Hobbes’s case, a political purpose. (Leijenhorst 2005b: 97) 
On Hobbes’s changing conception of human liberty 
From this perspective, the 1645 dispute with Bramhall on liberty and necessity appears 
both grounded on Hobbes’s ontological and epistemological research and – as far as it 
explicitly connects human nature to the physical and metaphysical framework – influential 
to his ongoing elaboration of civil science. Nevertheless, most commentators have tended 
to focus exclusively on Hobbes’s anthropology and on his political agenda, concentrating 
on its influence on his conception of human liberty, and rarely connecting this issue to the 
wider theoretical background in which the dispute was also inscribed. Although the 
dispute was primarily endowed with theological-political implications and related to the 
dramatic context in which it took place, my aim is to explain how Hobbes’s ongoing 
attempt to provide an epistemology of civil science consistent with both his materialistic 
premises and the epistemological shift enacted by De cive strongly contributed to his 
adopting the ontological determinism that shaped his conception of human liberty. 
In commenting on the dispute, Jackson (2007) notes no substantial change at the 
conceptual level in Hobbes’s reduction of liberty to natural necessity.81 Yet he highlights 
that the Preface and notes to the 1647 edition of De cive might well be read as replies ‘to 
some of the theological and political criticisms’ Hobbes received from Bramhall since the 
beginning of their dispute in 1645 (Jackson 2007: 123). Hood holds a similar thesis 
concerning a substantial continuity in Hobbes’s understanding of liberty, grounded on his 
invariant conception of power: ‘From first to last Hobbes had substantially the same 
conception of liberty as liberty to do or to forbear in accordance with one’s own last 
appetite’ (Hood 1967: 159) because there was no relevant change in his conception of the 
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81 In his deeply documented book, Jackson (2007) unveils all the connections of this metaphysical topic to the 
different undertones inhabiting the royalist and anti-royalist causes, in particular during the 1640s, in 
connection with the Hobbes-Bramhall debate. 
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underlying physical power, ‘the power whose exercise was subject to impediment’ (Hood 
1967: 156). And, although he cannot avoid noting the anomaly represented by the 
‘change in his definition of liberty’ in De cive,82 Hood concludes that this was only due to a 
kind of momentary ‘mistake’: ‘He was untrue to this conception when he relied in De Cive 
on a concept of arbitrary impediment; but he corrected this mistake before he wrote 
Leviathan’ (Hood 1957: 159). 
Taking on Hood’s remark, Skinner builds a much more articulated account of the 
development of Hobbes’s definition of liberty. He shows that the concept of liberty 
changes its function within the general argument displayed in the three political treatises, 
and, accordingly, he explains it is initially ‘described’ and ‘circumscribed’ in The Elements 
of Law, then ‘defined’ in De cive, and finally ‘redefined’ in Leviathan. These labels I 
interpret as consistent with my hypothesis of an epistemological shift taking place in De 
cive. In De cive liberty is still negatively connotated as it was in The Elements of Law: as 
the frontispiece of De cive clearly demonstrates by representing the alternative between 
libertas and imperium, ‘liberty’ stands on the side of natural war and disorder, and clearly 
opposed to the side of artificial peace and order. And nevertheless it is as well treated as 
one of the founding concepts of the whole theory, and as such neutrally ‘defined’. 
Skinner’s explanation for this shift points to Hobbes’s political agenda, that is his rhetorical 
strategy for the defence of absolutism: ‘His new analysis enables him to present his 
defence of absolute sovereignty in a far more conciliatory and less inflammatory style’ and 
therefore ‘to insist that, even after we perform our act of submission, we continue to enjoy 
a substantial amount of what he now feels able to describe as libertas civilis or civil liberty’ 
(Skinner 2008: 116-17). As a consequence, in Hobbes’s political theory natural liberty is 
no longer described as completely ‘lost’ by the subjects within the body politic as it was in 
The Elements of Law83: in De cive liberty is not the ‘bad’ alternative to subjection, but 
appears rather a power ‘absorbed’ in the ‘libertas civilis’ of the citizen almost entirely 
entrusted to sovereign power, although a part of it remains active as a threatening 
background (Skinner 2008: 122-23). 
In my view, along with a new epistemological approach, in De cive Hobbes sought to 
redefine the conceptual tools of political theory. As explained, these new tools had to be 
formulated both according to the specific principles of the new civil science, and to the 
general principles of the science of motion. Consequently, liberty stopped being a concept 
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82 ‘It was, however, mainly on a concept of arbitrary impediment that Hobbes relied in his attempt to establish 
prudential obligation in De cive. The change in his definition of liberty in 1646 consisted simply in the 
restriction of impediments to external impediments’ (Hood 1967: 155). For an analytical account on the role 
played by the internal/external impediments in Hobbes’s changing conception of liberty, see Skinner 2008: 
132 ff. 
83 In The Elements of Law subjection to the sovereign is absolute except for what is not covered by the civil 
law (Skinner 2008: 54-55). 
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only apt to describe human nature in its natural condition, in order to become a more 
comprehensive one, suitable to describe motion in general, and in particular referring – 
within political theory – to a peculiar kind of natural ‘motion’, conatus, which defines, 
although not exclusively, human nature. Thus if we can find no ‘definition’ of liberty in The 
Elements of Law it is because Hobbes did not even feel the need to theoretically 
circumscribe what was not yet a problem at all for civil science. Only with De cive does 
liberty become a problem: and it becomes a problem because therein the concept of 
liberty is supposed to keep together the ‘good’ scientific principles (the ‘laws of human 
nature’) and the ‘bad’ actual human natural motion that disrupts the artificial body politic. A 
unified definition of liberty is needed in De cive to keep together the two aspects: human 
free action within the body politic as prescribed by the laws of nature, and the natural 
necessity and powers characterising human nature in itself. As a consequence, human 
nature has to be ordered according to its own rational principles against its natural 
tendency. 
From De cive onwards Hobbes had to explicitly pose the problem of this relation between 
a ‘natural’ and an ‘artificial’ liberty that haunted his political theory since the beginning. He 
had to, because in De cive the epistemological level and the ontological one were disjoint 
and therefore liberty was at the same time a principle, a theoretical model, and a cause, 
an actual physical power which appeared in the light of that model as a constraint.84 As 
this internal contradiction of the concept arose, liberty was to be defined in ‘internal’ 
differentiation to the deterministic laws of nature, and as a part of them. Hence it is clear 
that the problem of liberty compelled Hobbes to link human natural motion to the artificial 
motion of the body politic, where will, choice, decision, had become collective issues, and 
– once again – an epistemological problem had assumed political centrality. 
Natural and human conatus: individual agency as cause 
The concept of ‘conatus’ or ‘endeavour’ had always played the strategic function of 
connecting the physical and ethical-political domains in Hobbes’s works.85 As explained 
above, Hobbes’s philosophy allows for no direct identification of the motion of natural 
bodies to the individual human motions that compose the peculiar ‘artificial’ motion of the 
body politic; and, least of all, for a direct collection of all these issues under the label ‘laws 
of nature’. Yet the individual specificity of the different kinds of bodies, not only inanimate 
and animal bodies, but the body politic too, could not be conceived in ontological terms: it 
was rather to be defined in terms of the specificity of the different kinds of motion. Thus it 
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84 As I will explain in Chapter 3.2, Leviathan was intended to solve the problem: the superposition of a 
(transcendental) epistemology and an (empirical) ontology of human nature marks there the place of the 
typically modern ideological solution to the problem of scientific knowledge. 
85 As Barnouw notes, the use itself of the term conatus obliges to face the problem of the relation between the 
different parts of Hobbes’s philosophy (Barnouw 1992: 103). 
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is precisely going deep into the physical concept of conatus, which displays the non-linear 
connection between the fields of the natural and political sciences in Hobbes’s philosophy, 
that we encounter Hobbes’s difficult anthropology in relation to both domains. The 
concept of liberty, and consequently the relation between political will, decision, and 
action, can be therefore translated in terms of Hobbes’s more general understanding of 
the relation between conatus and the motions it describes. And here we can notice a 
remarkable shift in Hobbes’s treatment of the issue at the beginning of the 1640s and at 
the end of his epistemological development in De corpore. 
In De motu, although defined as ‘the principle of motion [motus principium]’, conatus is 
also itself ‘an actual motion [motus actualis]’ that results from another motion: ‘So conatus 
lies in the fact that a body that tends [conans] is being moved’ (DM XIII.2, 119).86 This 
uninterrupted chain of local motions makes hardly distinguishable the individual bodies, 
and poses a problem concerning individual and collective identity and agency. The 
ontological homogeneity from the flow of the river to the individual human body and the 
body politic is assumed to be more or less self-evident. Motion is what all bodies have in 
common, and its uninterrupted flow is what defines the individual bodies: 
Since the motion and the flow are one and the same, the river will also be one and 
the same. Likewise if one asks: ‘Is a man, when old and young, the same being, 
ens, or matter, in number?’ it is clear that, because of the continual casting of 
[existing] body-tissue and the acquisition of new, it is not the same material [that 
endures], and hence not the same body; yet because of the unbroken nature of the 
flux by which matter decays and is replaced, he is always the same man. The same 
must be said of the commonwealth. When any citizen dies, the material of the state 
is not the same, i.e. the state is not the same ens. Yet the uninterrupted degree 
[ordo] and motion of government that signalise a state ensure, while they remain as 
one, that the state is the same in number. (DM XII.4, 111v)87 
It is evident that it is precisely motion that specifies matter: matter is homogeneous and 
the different kinds of motions are what identifies the individual bodies. But it is far less 
evident in De motu how motion works in general, and what precisely allows the 
identification of individuals. It is true that, because the problem of void was not yet solved, 
the idea of an empty space separating the different bodies could have made sense of the 
individuality of bodies. Nevertheless, Hobbes never assumed this point. On the contrary, 
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86 ‘Conatus ergo in eo consistit quod conans moveatur’. 
87 ‘Cum motus sive fluxus sit unus & idem, erit quoque unum & idem flumen. Similiter si quaeratur an homo sit 
idem numero Ens, sive corpus, senex & infans, manifestum est propter continuam materiae iacturam, & novae 
acquisitionem, quod non est eadem materia, neque ergo idem corpus, tamen propter unitatem fluxus qua 
materia expirat & redintegratur, eundem semper esse hominem. Idem dicendum est de civitate, mortuo enim 
quocunque cive, civitatis materia non est eadem, id est civitas non est idem Ens. Continuus tamen ordo & 
motus regiminis, propter quem vocatur civitas, dum unus existit, facit ut eadem numero sit civitas’. 
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as we have said, he always resolutely rejected the idea of a macroscopical void. Indeed it 
was the definitive cancellation of void and the assumption of ontological determinism that 
carried on also a more strict definition of the individual based on the concept of conatus. 
The point is made by the passage of the later De corpore concerning the same problem of 
the ‘principle of individuation’, where the stress is on conatus conceived as the ‘beginning’ 
of motion, or the ‘institution’ in the case of the commonwealth: 
[I]f the name be given for such form as is the beginning of motion, then, as long as 
that motion remains, it will be the same individual thing; as that man will be always 
the same, whose actions and thoughts proceed all from the same beginning of 
motion, namely, that which was in his generation; and that will be the same river 
which flows from one and the same fountain, whether the same water, or other 
water, or something else than water, flow from thence; and that the same city, 
whose acts proceed continually from the same institution, whether the men be the 
same or no. (DeCo XI.7; EW I, 137-38) 
The concept of conatus as the ‘beginning of motion’ – already partially theorised by 
Hobbes in his optical works and an earlier motive of quarrel with Descartes88 – had 
eventually become sufficient to explain the individuality of a body, precisely when bodily 
motion was entirely reduced to a deterministic consequence of its beginning as a cause. 
When all consequences depend on the very beginning of motion, the individual itself is 
defined by it, whether it is a natural or an artificial individual. In this sense the ontological 
chain was restored, and each ring could be separately considered in the different fields of 
philosophy. The continuity between natural and human motion, and therefore between the 
objects of physics, psychology and politics that the epistemological turn of De cive had put 
in crisis, was eventually restored thanks to Hobbes’s final return to the straight ontological 
determinism he had abandoned in front of Descartes’s epistemology. In fact, few scholars 
deny that Hobbes had always been a metaphysical determinist. And nevertheless they 
have to cope with the fact that through his whole work Hobbes slips into the hesitations 
and contradictions that the difficult path of materialism requires. The problem is that most 
scholars take as an invariant determination of Hobbes’s philosophy what was 
systematically achieved through a development that took place during the 1640s following 
his flight from England and his philosophical clash with Descartes’s metaphysics. In fact, 
determinism was patently inconsistent with Hobbes’s materialistic metaphysics: 
Like most mechanical philosophers, Hobbes is convinced that nature follows a 
deterministic course. And nevertheless, as I am going to explain, differently from 
Descartes, Hobbes cannot legitimate this necessity in a theological and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 See above, Chapter 1.2. 
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transcendent way. (Leijenhorst 2005b: 91)89 
To this crystalline evidence I have added that determinism acquired a more and more 
philosophical centrality in Hobbes’s system as the development of his ‘political’ 
epistemology took form. After the crucial epistemological shift represented by De cive had 
transformed civil science into a non-effective form of knowledge, which could not grant the 
safe control of the functioning of the body politic it had promised, natural determinism 
helped restore Hobbes’s hopes of settling the condition that would reproduce in the 
(artificial) political field the inner rationality of nature. It is on this basis that the withdrawal 
from a definition of individuality as itself in motion to individuality defined by the 
beginnings of motion could fully display the ethical, juridical, and political implications that 
Hobbes had to challenge in political theory: above all it opened up the possibility of 
planning and producing an artificial individuality even more consistent and durable than 
the natural ones. In this sense the adoption of a deterministic metaphysics of nature 
appears perfectly complementary to Hobbes’s adoption of the theological-juridical concept 
of ‘persona’, which allowed him to pose to civil science the problem of producing a 
collective agency capable of connecting the ‘neutral’ perfection of right reason to the 
actual efficacy of political power. 
 
2.4 Empowering Reason: The Artificial Persona as a Cause 
The request for a definitive and guaranteed foundation of reason outside the safe 
boundaries of the Cartesian metaphysical framework brought about an exponential drive 
towards security in Hobbes’s political theory. As the more and more intractable problem of 
founding science firmly within a materialistic framework resurfaced in Hobbes’s natural 
philosophy, his civil philosophy encountered decisive contradictions. The problem was 
two-sided, both epistemological and political. Firstly, because reason was always in 
motion and the principles of the sciences were structurally dependent on the changing 
wills and covenants of men, how could civil philosophy and its principles (the laws of 
nature) find an absolute and stable foundation? Secondly, because the effectiveness of 
reason could hardly exceed the perimeters of geometry, how could civil philosophy be 
capable not only of planning, but also of materially contributing to the production of the 
body politic? To the difficulties encountered in trying to solve this epistemological and 
political puzzle, Hobbes responded with a double move. On the one hand he modified the 
classical (and scholastic) concept of ‘right reason’ by assuming the absolute absence of 
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89 ‘In this sense, the argument of medieval determinists, who proposed a purely logical identification of the 
sufficient cause and of the necessary cause, must have appeared quite seducing to Hobbes.’ Following this 
argument Leijenhorst concludes that ‘the result was some awkward combination of a “material” mechanistic 
model of causality with a “formal” definition, ultimately Scholastic, of necessity’ (Leijenhorst 2005b: 91). 
 127 
divine justice from the body politic. This entailed a definitive commitment to its incarnation 
in the representative function of the state through a deliberate (and indeed effective) 
fiction, the sovereign as a persona, who would impose social order as a substitute for 
divine justice. On the other hand ‘determinism’ became for Hobbes both an ontological 
postulate (the guarantee of the effective power of the laws of nature) and a theoretical 
means of justification of the neutrality and objectivity of civil science, committed to plan 
and provide the rationale of the ‘whole cause’ that – once effected by sovereign power – 
would grant the long term existence of the artificial body politic. This double attempt of 
founding scientia civilis on the laws of nature as the clear and distinct dictates of ‘right 
reason’ and of founding their efficacy on the natural powers and mechanisms 
characterising human nature grounded Hobbes’s progressive elaboration of the concept 
of persona along with his explicit endorsement of ontological determinism. 
The person in Leviathan 
The scholarship on Hobbes’s political theory has usually focused on the way he 
elaborated the concept of person in Leviathan. Although it has been noted that the 
associated expressions of ‘natural person’ and ‘civil person’ (or persona civilis) already 
appear in The Elements of Law and De cive, yet Chapter XVI of Leviathan, entitled On 
Persons, Authors and Things Personated, has been considered, and with no mistake, the 
first place where Hobbes explicitly defines and widely theorises the function of the 
concept. In Leviathan Hobbes would provide the first clear account of it, which he would 
develop and refine in De homine and in the Latin Leviathan. 90  It has been widely 
demonstrated that the concept refers to the original etymological meaning of persona as a 
mask for theatrical representation (according to Hobbes’s own presentation of the 
argument), to ancient Roman law for legal representation, and, last but not least, to 
theology.91 And this reference to representation eventually allows Hobbes to point to the 
concept of authorisation, as both the attribution and legitimation of an act. This finally 
makes him able to square the key issue of his political theory: the production and 
justification of the artificial person of the body politic made up of the natural bodies of the 
individuals. The whole argument can be resumed in a few steps. We have the person: 
A PERSON is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as 
representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom 
they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. 
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90 Skinner’s Hobbes and the purely artificial person of the state (in Skinner 2002: 177-208) is an exemplar 
summary of the debate on the concept of person focused on its development. For what we are concerned 
here, the Latin Leviathan will not be called into question, since on these issues ‘in the Latin version of 1668 
[Hobbes] was content to offer a simplified version of essentially the same argument’ (Skinner 2007: 157). 
91 On Hobbes’s theological sources for the concept, see Martinich 1992: 165-66. My argument will necessarily 
hint at the relation between the political-juridical and the political-theological function of the concept. 
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The person performs representation: 
To personate, is to act, or represent himself, or an other; and he that acteth another, 
is said to bear his person, or act in his name. 
Therefore the person is the actor, automatically endowed with authority: 
Then the person is the actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the 
AUTHOR: In which case the actor acteth by authority. 
The authority to act is immediately the power and, of course, the right to act: 
And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, 
is called AUTHORITY. So that by authority is always understood a right of doing any 
act. 
This scheme has been read as the paradigmatic construction of the rhetoric of 
authorisation underlying the modern conception of sovereign power, which makes the 
power of the sovereign appear as founded on the free divestiture of the citizens’ individual 
rights and liberty to a superior authority capable of granting those citizens the safe 
boundaries within which they can enjoy the only possible liberty, that is a limited and 
protected one. In short, Hobbes’s conception of the state as a person would correspond to 
the modern political novelty per antonomasia of the king as no more the representative of 
God on earth, but the representative of the many to whose artificial body he confers the 
unity of a people. 
This sequence is so emblematic that commenting on it might appear unnecessary. And 
yet, commentators have usually overlooked the underlying meaning of this argument, 
which cannot be correctly understood without connecting the concept of person to the 
physical concept of ‘cause’. In fact, Hobbes never abandoned the basic postulate of his 
materialistic mechanicism, that all is ‘but’ matter in motion. Although Hobbes’s political 
discourse cannot evidently be reduced to a physical account of the body politic, it is also 
clear that this was also the implicit postulate of his civil philosophy, and therefore all the 
concepts Hobbes adopted in civil science also had to comply with this basic principle and 
with the basic principle of its explanation: the unity of the motive cause. Hence I shall now 
try to explain how it is possible – within Hobbes’s mechanistic framework – to conceive 
the artificial motion (power) of the body politic as an outcome of the natural motion 
(power) of bodies. This will allow me to show in Chapter 2.5 how the ‘small power’ of civil 
science should be, according to Hobbes, implemented by the artificial body of the ‘state’, 
and, incidentally, to explain why assuming the concept of ‘natural person’ in an exclusively 
‘political’ or juridical sense does not make full sense of Hobbes’s discourse. I shall 
therefore start focusing on the concept of person as the signifier of a defined and effective 
causality. 
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From the person as a physical cause to the power of representation 
In the first part of The Elements of Law the term person is indifferently referred to ‘natural’ 
persons (EL X.4, 11; XII.7; XIV.13), to imagined or perceived persons (in dreams, EL III.3, 
III.9; pictured, EL V.6; desired, EL IX.13) or to their characteristics (‘beauty of person’ EL 
VIII.5; ‘worth of the person’, EL IX.11), and it usually hints at the right to defend and 
preserve one’s physical or juridical body (EL VII.9; XII.3; XV.2; XVI.8, 10). It is only in 
Chapter XIX, On the Necessity and Definition of a Body Politic, that the specific use we 
are concerned with appears, along with Hobbes’s very first definition of the ‘body politic’: 
This union so made, is that which men call now-a-days a BODY POLITIC or civil 
society; and the Greeks call it polis, that is to say, a city, which may be defined to be 
a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common 
peace, defence, and benefit. (EL XIX.8) 
And immediately after, he adds: ‘This union into a city or body politic, is instituted with 
common power over all the particular persons’ (EL XIX.9, italics added). It is clear that the 
theory of a collective civil person that gives unity to the bodies of the individual natural 
persons is not a late achievement of Hobbes’s political theory. On the contrary, it is 
situated at its very beginning. It is in fact the final purpose of the second part of The 
Elements of Law, devoted to De corpore politico, to explain ‘lastly how a multitude of 
persons natural are united by covenants into one person civil or body politic’ (EL XX.1). 
And already in The Elements of Law ‘a person civil’ can be indifferently ‘either one man’, 
in which case the sovereign would be at the same time also a ‘natural’ person, ‘or one 
council’, the will of which includes and involves ‘the will of every one in particular’ (EL 
XXI.11). The person is crucial to defining the unity of the will, because the latter cannot be 
the outcome of a concurrence (‘the concord’) of different wills, but must be one will, that is 
the will of the ‘union of many men’ in one person.92 It is the outcome of the unity of the 
person – whether natural or civil – that makes of the will a unitary power, a motion which 
can be an effective cause. Each person bears its power, which is nothing but ‘motive’ 
power, the power of moving. This power is exercised by the natural and civil persons 
through their wills, that is the result of deliberation and the beginning of action (and 
speech), and can also be transferred from one to another: ‘For no person, natural or civil, 
can transfer unto another more power than himself hath’ (EL XX.18). So in Hobbes’s first 
treatise most of the issues connected to the concept of person have already emerged, 
although Hobbes does not seem to notice any problem in his argument, since, as already 
explained, The Elements of Law consistently works as an ontological description of the 
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92 ‘The error concerning mixed government hath proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by 
this word body politic, and how it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men’ (EL XXVII.8) 
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dynamics of individual and collective powers, that is of the transmission of local motion 
from one body to another. 
Apart from a more diffused and crucial use of the concept of person, which is fully justified 
by the very structure of a book more strictly focused on the body politic, in De cive no 
substantial change can be noticed regarding its use. The purpose of Chapter V, On the 
Causes and Generation of a Commonwealth [civitas], is still to display ‘how and by what 
stages, in the passion for self-preservation, a number of natural persons from fear of each 
other have coalesced into one civil person to which we have given the name of 
commonwealth’ (DC V.12; OL II, 215).93 The point is, more precisely, how to explain the 
mechanism of unification of the motions of the human persons as natural powers into the 
artificial power of a collective person ‘whose will, by the agreement of several men, is to 
be taken as the will of them all, to make use of their strength and resources for the 
common peace and defence’ (DC V.9; OL II, 214).94 And in the end, despite Hobbes’s 
self-confident claims, a physical explanation of how it comes that ‘multiple wills are 
contained [continetur] in the will of one’ (DC X.5; OL II, 268)95 is definitively lacking. 
As demonstrated above, it was the concept of conatus that allowed Hobbes to extend the 
mechanistic explanation onto the whole of the existing bodies, human will included, and 
therefore allows us to grasp the problematic connection between the objects of the natural 
and the political sciences. In both cases the unity and coherence of bodily motion 
depends on the system of causes that produces it. Yet it has different origins in the natural 
and artificial bodies. While in the case of natural bodies the system of causes depends on 
what we would call a natural ‘pattern’, in the case of artificial bodies, motion is a 
compound of natural ‘patterns’ and of human conatus. In this sense, the peculiar kind of 
conatus characterising human bodies is also one of the concurring causes characterising 
the conatus of the artificial bodies: an artificial motion is constituted by assembled natural 
motions, among which are human ones. So, while natural bodies are machines set in 
motion by natural movements of bodies independent of men’s individual conatus, artificial 
bodies are machines whose motion is caused by the concurrence of human mental and 
physical powers or ‘faculties’, which eventually converge in the last deliberation, will, 
whose effects are action and speech, that is actual physical causes of motion.96 Now, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 ‘Quo modo et quibus gradibus multae personae naturales in unam personam civilem, quam civitatem 
appellavimus, studio sese conservandi mutuo metu coaluere’. 
94 ‘CIVITAS ergo, ut eam definiamus, est persona una, cujus voluntas, ex pactis plurium hominum, pro 
voluntate habenda est ipsorum omnium, ut singulorum viribus et facultatibus uti possit ad pacem et 
defentionem communem’. 
95 ‘Persona autem una est […] quando plurium voluntates unius voluntate continetur’. 
96 It is clear that what counts in the juridical structure of De cive is the beginning of action and not the interplay 
of appetites, which nevertheless Hobbes cannot expel from his ‘geometrical’ consideration. The abstract 
definition of will as not ‘voluntary in itself’, but the principle (or beginning [principium]) of voluntary actions (‘for 
we do not will to will, but to act’, DC V.8; OL II, 214), explains that the internal process of deliberation is what 
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order to come into and to persist in existence, each body needs to combine its internal 
motions with the external motions it is concerned with. The persistence of the unity of a 
body is thus related to the persistence of a coherent motion, and therefore, in the case of 
the (artificial) body politic, to the persistence and coherence of many (natural) human 
wills. And these are individual wills which respond each to a different ‘internal’ conatus. 
The specificity of the artificial body politic thus posed the problem of its lack of an internal, 
natural conatus, and consequently the need for an adequate artificial substitute. The 
solution was provided by Hobbes in Leviathan thanks to the concept of representation: 
A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one 
person, represented […]. It is the unity of the representer, not of the unity of the 
represented, that maketh the person one. (Lev XVI; EW III, 151) 
The concept of representation (along with the connected one of ‘authorisation’97) is in 
effect the real novelty of Hobbes’s third political treatise, notably the way this polysemous 
term (at once optical, theatrical, epistemological, and juridical) had to be injected into the 
old concept of persona. And the connection of a new understanding of representation in 
this old concept is what allowed scholars to detect a radical novelty in the concept of 
person as it is presented by Hobbes in Leviathan. So it is possible to claim, as most 
scholars do, that, compared to The Elements and De cive, Leviathan develops the 
concept of representation, while it is hardly sustainable that Hobbes conceives the 
concept of person differently in Leviathan than in the other treatises.98 When in Leviathan 
Hobbes refers to natural human beings as ‘natural’ persons as distinct from ‘artificial’ or 
‘feigned’ persons, this fact cannot be accounted for within the exclusive boundaries of 
Hobbes’s political theory, strictly conceived as a theory of sovereignty, as is usually done 
by those scholars who impute to Hobbes an equivocal use of the term person.99 Instead it 
is my argument that the difference between natural and artificial, when the person is 
concerned, does not affect the way representation takes place, and does not affect the 
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produces the will as the outcome of the internal motions bringing to deliberation and therefore to the beginning 
of the external action. 
97 Skinner sees in ‘authorisation’ the crucial concept of ‘one of the most important theoretical advances he 
made between the publication of De cive in 1642 and Leviathan nearly a decade later, and arguably embodies 
his most original contribution to the theory of the state’ (Skinner 2002: 183). In fact in my view the concept of 
authorisation would rather depend on the one of representation: authorisation is nothing more than the 
translation in formal, human, and juridical terms of the physical concept of the unification of the different 
natural powers of men into one cause, that is one coherent motion. 
98 ‘The most important way in which that book [Leviathan] went beyond the theories of its predecessors, The 
Elements of Law and De cive, was in its development of two related concepts: representation and the person’ 
(Malcolm 2002: 223). 
99 Tricaud 1982; Skinner 2002: 190 ff. In fact, as Skinner notes, Hobbes himself differentiates the common use 
of the term (‘we use the world in English vulgarly’) from the ‘exact meaning of the word persona’ (Hobbes, An 
Answer to a Book Published by Dr Bramhall, late bishop of Derry, called the Catching of Leviathan; EW IV, 
311). Yet it is not necessary to suppose this lexical continuity hides a radical conceptual opposition: the 
‘technical’ use of the term is more likely to be intended as a specification of its use in the domain of civil 
science that does not cancel the conceptual correlation with the larger picture of Hobbes’s philosophy. 
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fact that the person is the actual cause of the action. 
To represent means to provide artificial unity to a collection of natural individual bodies by 
‘bearing’ their persons, acting in their names. While the natural body is one person, the 
artificial body politic needs to be unified by a person in order to acquire a unitary will. So 
the commonwealth needs some sovereign power in order to be able to act (that is to 
exist): ‘a commonwealth, without sovereign power, is but a word without substance, and 
cannot stand’ (Lev XXXI; EW III, 343).100 Yet for Hobbes it is not the sovereign that acts. It 
is the ‘persona civitatis, the person of the commonwealth’, the one who acts, making the 
law, that is the command, ‘civil’ (Lev XXVI; EW III, 251). In this sense the Commonwealth 
(as any other ‘thing personated’101) can be truly said to be ‘one person’ whenever it acts 
through a person endowed with sovereign power, whether the ‘natural’ person of a king or 
the ‘artificial’ person of an assembly. From this scheme plenty of questions arise: how 
should we conceive this unifying power of the Civil Person? How does it produce effects? 
What is the ontological status of the peculiar person that acts as a ‘representer’? What 
does it mean to act ‘by fiction’ as a ‘feigned or artificial person’ (Lev XVI; EW III, 147)? 
And crucially, what is the ontological status of this act of representation? 
There is no doubt that the representative function is not affected by the ‘nature’ of the 
person. As far ‘as the civil use of the term is concerned’ the person can indifferently be 
either a ‘natural’ or ‘a fictitious [fictitia] one’ (DH XV.1; OL II, 130).102 And this can only be 
explained by referring to what Hobbes means by imagination. Imagination is for Hobbes 
‘sense decaying’, whose products – phantasms – ‘are not [all] images’ (DeCo XXV.7; EW 
I, 396), and are the continuation of the motion of senses. So imagination is endowed with 
no less motive power than sense itself, and in effect ‘the perpetual arising of phantasms’ 
is an internal motion of bodies ‘common to men with other living creatures’ that ‘we 
commonly call discourse of the mind’ (DeCo XXV.8; EW I, 399). In short imagination is for 
Hobbes part of the physical causes originating will and therefore bodily motion; or, better, 
as Hobbes puts it in Leviathan, ‘imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary 
motion (Lev VI; EW III, 39, italics added).103 In fact, in Hobbes’s theory imagination is the 
motive power of most human actions, and it is precisely in this sense that in Hobbes 
‘representation is always concrete, even in the case of a covenant which creates 
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100 The phrase ‘cannot stand’ recurs in Leviathan connected to the issue of division (EW III, 168, 276, 316, 
702) 
101 It is worth recalling that in the title of Lev XVI either ‘Persons’, ‘Authors’, and ‘Things Personated’ appear. 
As Hobbes will explain in De homine, ‘even an inanimate thing [i.e. a non-living body] can be a person [i.e. 
personated], that is, can have possessions and other goods and be able to act at law [i.e. be an author 
through an actor]’ (DH XV.4; OL II, 132). This works for ‘temples’, ‘bridges’, and for the commonwealth too. 
102 ‘Quod autem ad usum personae civilem attinet, definiri potest hoc modo; persona est, cui verba et actiones 
hominum attribuuntur vel suae vel alienaei: si suae, persona naturalis est; si alienae, fictitia est’. 
103 ‘And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of 
whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary 
motion’ (Lev VI; EW III, 39). 
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sovereignty: it is a material transfer of power’ (Balibar 1996: 224). The point is that an 
‘artificial person’ is fictitious, that is ‘imaginary’, yet not as we conceive the term in a sense 
opposed to ‘real’. The person is ‘fictitia’ in the same sense in which the political bodies are 
‘artificial, and fictitious bodies’ (Lev XXII; EW III, 213), endowed with a peculiar kind of 
causality, but still – of course – a physical one.104 And in Hobbes’s intentions, the material 
power of imagination explains both the physical power the persona fictitia derives from the 
individual powers of those who ‘personate’ it, and the physical power of the persona fictitia 
– as a representation – on the internal motions and hence on the actions of the citizens. 
As a result the unity of the civil person is not at all a merely linguistic one, as it happens, 
on the contrary, with the ‘soul’.105 Either natural or fictitious, the ‘representer’ performs the 
convergence of actual powers into one powerful will: ‘to confer all their power and strength 
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality 
of voices, unto one will’ (Lev XVII; EW III, 157). It is thus a consistent set of natural or/and 
artificial causes (powers) that – concurring with the other ‘external’ causes – produces 
deliberation and hence the will and consequently the action of the body politic. The act of 
representing is so effective that when the different wills are ‘represented’ as convergent 
their action is de facto made ‘one’, because it depends on a unitary cause. The civil 
person – either natural or artificial – is a physical unity of natural individual wills which acts 
as a unitary cause of motion.106 Furthermore, as Hobbes’s civil science is intended to 
demonstrate on the basis of the laws of nature, although the individual wills might diverge 
‘in principle’, they are in fact part of a represented unitary motion (collective and artificial) 
to which their natural conatus not only has no power to escape, but ultimately finds it 
rational to be submitted. The convergence of the civil law and the rational laws of nature is 
thus physically effected by representation, which actually makes of the civil law ‘the will 
and appetite of the state’ (Lev XLVI; EW III, 681). 
Despite this sound achievement, Hobbes was well aware that no law – either natural or 
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104 In this sense I can see no conceptual difference, as Skinner does, between the ‘feigned or artificial person’ 
of the English Leviathan, the ‘fictitious one’ of De homine, and the ‘representative’ person of the Latin 
Leviathan (Skinner 2002: 189). Not to mention that the Latin adjective ‘fictitius’ bears the double meaning of 
‘fictitious’ and ‘artificial’. In this perspective the point is not even whether the state be an organic community or 
a ‘persona ficta’ since it is none of them. 
105 In the Treatise Hobbes clearly opposes the actual existence of the group (a commonwealth or a family) in 
opposition to the purely imaginary status of the human soul, when he refers to ‘that metaphorical speech of 
attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family 
among themselves and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the 
question’ (LN II.20: 32, italics mine). 
106 And therefore the citizen, as such, is also juridically imputable for the act: ‘Hobbes’s political theory, which 
is explained in physical (or quasi-physical) terms, in reality relies upon fundamental categories which belong 
to juridical anthropology and depend on the metaphysical decisions it imposes. As a consequence, the 
dualisms which had been eliminated will now reappear, but on the practical level: they do not refer to 
ontological distinctions, but to the issues confronting the legal subject. Man, in Hobbes, appears to be a split 
being, for example, he is torn between the “external forum” and the “internal forum”, but, above all, he divides 
himself between the symmetric functions of actor and author, which allow him to act as a “person”’ (Balibar 
1996: 223-24) 
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civil – could be ‘the whole cause’. Because individual will can always be against the law, 
we deduce that laws by themselves cannot be considered a ‘sufficient and therefore 
necessitated cause’ (LN I.16: 29). The aim of civil science was therefore to establish a 
mechanism that would complement the ‘small power’ of the natural law and the still non-
sufficient power of civil law as causes, with further effective powers. In short, it had to 
provide as far as possible ‘the whole cause’, thus making the different natural trajectories 
of the individual bodies converge into one regulated artificial motion, in agreement with 
the predictive power of reason. For this purpose a civil science was needed, which had 
not only to provide a perfect scientific knowledge of the body politic, but also to be itself 
part of the means of its actual production and preservation. The frontispiece of Leviathan 
is a considerable piece of this conjoint epistemological and ideological effort. 
Frontispieces: the materiality of ideology 
A large amount of ink has been devoted to the suggestive figure represented in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan’s frontispiece and, more seriously, to the study of its theoretical meaning, 
historical sources, and significance within Hobbes’s political theory. More recently the 
discussion has been extended to the whole of Hobbes’s frontispieces, particularly 
attracting new interest as rhetorical tools through which Hobbes intended to implement his 
political theory. It has been noticed that there is hardly a compatibility between the 
‘traditional’ trope of the body politic to which Hobbes often refers metaphorically, and the 
allegorical image represented in the frontispiece of Leviathan.107 The traditional body 
politic entails different functions for the different parts of the body politic, while the image 
(in particular the one in the original MS drawing) represents indistinct individuals forming 
one person. Yet it has rarely been noticed and explicitly thematised that the programmatic 
reference to an automaton Hobbes provides in the introduction – where he describes an 
artificial man made of spring, wheels, and strings – is clearly inconsistent with the 
theological and biological metaphors Hobbes scattered throughout the whole book and 
pictured in the famous frontispiece. It is evident that Hobbes was looking for an alternative 
model to the ancient (and openly Aristotelian) organic one, and it is quite clear that 
Hobbes’s Leviathan aims at the mechanical model of a powerful automaton he derived 
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107 Bredekamp’s studies on the sources of Hobbes’s ‘visual strategies’ (far beyond the famous frontispiece of 
Leviathan, Bredekamp 2003) point to display the strategic efficacy of the accurate iconographical work 
Hobbes carried on. His enquiry on Hobbes’s sources collects the influences of the hermetic corpus on the 
imagination of an automaton endowed with reason, of the royal effigy representing the continuity of 
sovereignty during the time of the interregnum, and the optical machine producing the actual unity of the 
image starting from a multiplicity of bodies (Bredekamp 2007: 33-44). According to Malcolm the image on 
Leviathan’s frontispiece allowed Hobbes to represent ‘the relationship between sovereign, state and people’ 
when iconography lacked. This relationship would be analogical to the one displayed by Hobbes in the English 
Optical Treatise when explaining perspective: the perceptive shift between the actual shapes on the canvas 
perceived depending on actual vision and the represented things depicted perceived depending on memory 
(Malcolm 2002: 224-26). These are both fancies, but one corresponds to an actual body, the second to former 
fancies and it is in the end illusory. 
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from the imagery of his epoch, endowed with a consistent and uniform motion capable of 
defeating the ungovernable multiplicity of the natural bodies of the multitude. In this sense 
the development of Hobbes’s civil science also seems to point to the progressive 
integration of the traditional organic model for the body politic into the new mechanical 
model. And from this perspective the contradiction between the programmatic assumption 
of a mechanical model, and the constant use of biological metaphors can hardly be 
explained in terms of the rhetorical aims of Leviathan; rather, it offers a privileged insight 
into the paradoxical nature itself of Hobbes’s enterprise. 
Hobbes’s exercise of a rational civil science does not imply a dismissal of metaphors; on 
the contrary, it needs a constant, adverted, ‘double sight’108 on them, a genuinely Platonic 
concern of using them as metaphors without concealing they actually are metaphors. 
Hobbes’s civil science in fact operates at two different levels. It provides an actual 
demystification of political power, by explaining that sovereign power is a consequence of 
the rational acts of will of the ‘educated’ people, and it demonstrates the necessity of a 
mystification of political power: because the passions of men are more powerful than their 
reason, representation functions only on the condition of power being ‘conferred’ on the 
sovereign through ‘belief’. Although it is true that ‘honour consisteth only in the opinion of 
power’, it is also true that this opinion of power becomes actual power: ‘Reputation of 
power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection’ 
(Lev X; EW III 80, 74).109 Malcolm clearly sees how the two sides of the coin are 
assembled in Hobbes’s theory: to ‘instruct the people that the sovereign is merely an 
artificial person’ and to ‘require them to believe in the “person” as something outside them 
and greater than any of them’; but he concludes this duality is a ‘curious structure of the 
argument’ (Malcolm 2002: 227-28). He does not seem to be aware that he is touching the 
theoretical core of the modern concept of sovereignty itself. 
The very absence of God and of right reason, and therefore the structural imperfection of 
the earthly city, entails, as a consequence, a permanent crisis of politics. This crisis 
defines the political domain, where civil power represents the only possible substitute for 
absolute divine truth and justice, which transcends by definition (being ab-solutus) the 
political domain, and yet is relevant precisely because of its absence. In fact the absence 
of God from history and politics is what authorises the rational acceptance of the 
sovereign as the paradoxical embodiment of a non-present right reason. In this sense 
modern sovereignty can be considered dependent on an inherently eschatological 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 I take this expression from Shapin and Shaffer 1985. 
109 ‘Now since men believe that a man is powerful when they see him honoured, i.e. regarded as powerful by 
others, it comes about that honour is enlarged by worship; and real power accrues from a reputation for 
power. So in ordering or allowing himself to be worshipped, his purpose is to make as many people as 
possible obedient to him either from love or from fear’ (DC XV.13; OL II, 340). 
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discourse. All problems concerning justice are moved into the mythical future of the Last 
Judgement, out of the positive boundaries of anthropology and political theory, thus 
allowing civil science to assume the entirely immanent task of ordering, homogenising, 
and in fact neutralising the present, by granting the predictability of human actions, once 
hope and fear for/of the future are neutralised. Yet the formal justification of this power 
does not imply its actual legitimation: born out of the emergence of a demystifying science 
of nature, the new civil science would therefore discover that the very existence of its 
conditions of possibility – that is social order – prescribes a re-mythisation of the roots of 
sovereignty. 
The theological-political structure of modern sovereignty was first theorised by Schmitt 
precisely through his interpretation of Leviathan.110 According to Schmitt this structure 
would be theorised in Hobbes’s civil science with the purity of a ‘crystal’, the basis of 
which is a naturalistic account of human nature, and the structural openness of which to 
transcendence would be saturated by the collective values established by the decision of 
the sovereign.111 This is the ground of the criticism he advances to Hobbes’s political 
theory in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a 
Political Symbol (1938).112 According to Schmitt, Hobbes’s ‘political myth’ was a failure 
because it accepted the discrepancy between the inner and the outer faith of the citizens, 
a separation that entails a kind of ‘neutrality’ of the state power in the face of individual 
values that would seed potential subversion. In short, Hobbes’s rational political 
philosophy would not be able to successfully found the state on the historical and cultural 
roots of a people, a failure well represented in his eyes by the failure of the liberal-
democratic states. According to Schmitt the bureaucratic and technocratic state would not 
be able to stand if it is not coupled with the myth of the nation-state. 
In contrasting Schmitt’s interpretation, I assume that Hobbes indeed theorised a project 
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110 Schmitt’s interpretation of a political-theological foundation of political power in Hobbes is not to be 
confused with those interpretations of Hobbes that highlight the foundational role for his whole system of 
religion or, on the contrary, of the critique to religion. Martinich well represents the first line of research, 
according to which Hobbes’s metaphysical attempt in De corpore to reconcile Calvinist Protestantism with the 
new science, is to be understood in the light of Hobbes’s belief in God’s existence (Martinich 1992). The other 
line of research is the one of Leo Strauss, who first underlined the strategic function played in Hobbes’s 
political theory by the critique to religion as the only possible ground for political science. Facing religious 
wars, the neutralisation of religion would be the necessary prerequisite of Hobbes’s political science, the 
liberation of a neutral space for the exercise of reason. This preliminary operation would allow for the rational 
justification, instead of a theological foundation, of political power. Leo Strauss’ opposition to Hobbes rather 
concerns the kind of abstract rationality Hobbes is dealing with, which is far from the way classical reason 
was, according to him, connaturated with the very exercise of political praxis (Strauss 1936). For a synthetic 
view on the different interpretations of the theological-political problem in Hobbes, see Cammellone 2013: 18-
41. 
111 See the famous note sketching Hobbes’s conceptual ‘crystal’ in Schmitt 1929-32: 52-53. According to 
Smith in Hobbes’s theory the ‘crystal’ was closed by the truth that ‘Jesus is the Christ’, yet, in order to function, 
the myth needs to be grounded onto the basic friend/enemy contraposition. The myth of the nation-state 
fulfilled this purpose ever since. 
112 In fact his critique was already sketched in The State as a Mechanism in Hobbes and Descartes (1937). 
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for incorporating the citizens’ ‘inner faith’ into the functioning of the body politic. In this 
sense, Hobbes’s representation of the artificial unity of the body politic must be taken as a 
programmatic one. We have there the intuition of the materiality of ideology, and of the 
possibility of planning and producing the effects of a politically planned pedagogy, among 
the means of which religious imagery is the most effective weapon. As explained, if it is 
true that the unity of the person is an ‘illusory’ fancy, yet both fancies and their effects are 
real. In this sense it can be assumed that all the different scientific and rhetorical issues 
related to the representation of the body politic, added to the biblical sources of Hobbes’s 
imagination, converged in ‘inventing’ Leviathan as a materially effective sign: 
The picture of Leviathan completed the step from mark to sign: in no way only as a 
device of individual fantasy, it forms the sign of the state, which directions the action 
from within at any given time. Inasmuch as it has become a sign, the frontispiece 
possesses a character relevant to the action. (Bredekamp 2007: 50) 
The effective signs of power are those that make the parts of the body politic function 
according to the whole as if there was one person and one aim. In this way, the necessity 
of the existence of the artificial body politic is precisely what cannot be called into 
question, the very presupposition of politics that immediately becomes at the same time 
the political goal. In this sense, in Leviathan the imagined persona is at the same time the 
overall ideological effect of a well-established commonwealth, and the actual cause of its 
correct functioning. The imagination of the civil person thus embodies right reason in the 
perfect circularity established through a continuous double motion: from power to 
collective imagination and from collective imagination to power. 
 
2.5 Leviathan as an Ideological Synthesis 
The concept of a representative person works in Leviathan as a bridge between the 
ancient and the modern: it allows Hobbes both to refer to the tradition of ‘recta ratio’ and, 
once its inexistence in rerum natura is assumed, it provides the rational justification of the 
commitment of individual powers and rights to a sovereign power. Once evoked, right 
reason needs at the same time to be structurally dislocated, emptied, and unfulfilled in 
order to allow a passionate belief. And in fact it is still reason that explains that the 
structural lack of recta ratio must be accepted and overcome by means of a faith in the 
intrinsic rationality of the existing state of things. Hence the concept of person really works 
in Hobbes’s political theory as the immanent substitute of the same function developed by 
the mystical body of the king in the medieval tradition, translated into the terms of 
mechanical materialism. By embodying the recta ratio, the person of the sovereign – the 
political actor – shifts it from the pertinence to political theology and divine monarchy to 
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the artificially existent and effective body politic. The continuity of political power, originally 
granted by the immortality of the king’s mystical body,113 is thus transferred to the rational 
and automatic continuity of the mechanical motion of the body politic.114 This automatic 
motion was to be safeguarded by the perfect ‘impersonality’ of the power of the civil 
person which in fact perfectly mirrors the defensive ‘neutrality’ of the new civil science: 
I speak not of men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple 
and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those 
within it, not because they were they, but there). (Leviathan, Dedicatory Letter; EW 
III, not paginated) 
This defence of ‘just’ power was what reason was initially accounted for in civil science. 
But the new perspective opened by De cive, although it had solved the problem of 
providing civil science with an epistemological foundation on right reason, compelled 
Hobbes to abandon the hypothesis of a possible actual efficacy of reason, therein 
conceived as a ‘model’ rather than as a physical power. In De cive the truth of scientific 
‘models’ was intended to be released from the materiality of civil power. And on this basis 
all sciences – civil science included – were definitively assumed to be, in Leviathan, ‘of 
small power’ (Lev X; EW III, 75). 
In effect, what ‘new’ kind of reality characterised the epistemologically powerful ‘right 
reason’ of De cive? ‘Right reason’ was the epistemological model which stood for the 
subject of perfect knowledge, and could be ‘personated’ through the adoption of a method 
made of principles, definitions, and deductions. In physics, the figures of geometry – made 
of perfectly straight lines and curves drawn by an ideal hand following the ideal eye of an 
ideal subject geometer – were the model which stood for the ‘real’ natural bodies, and 
likewise in civil philosophy the ‘laws of nature’ were the model which stood for the ‘real’ 
political bodies. But right reason, the subject of science, needed an objective counterpart 
which would allow it to become effective. Reality in itself was unachievable to a human 
knowledge epistemologically limited to pure contemplation, and it resisted as such any 
human rational deliberation, planning, and action. Taking the rational models of the new 
geometrical mechanics for reality was the ideological trick which allowed Hobbes to 
connect science to the reality it addressed, and consequently civil science to the body 
politic. And this is what Hobbes attempted by making of ‘ontological determinism’ the 
corresponding ‘model’ for the object of science. 
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113 On the distinction between the physical and the mystical body of the king, which granted the continuity of 
power, see the classic Kantorowicz 1957. 
114 ‘In the end, the constitution of the “body politic” and its physical/legal unity is hardly to be distinguished 
from a secular transposition of the corpus mysticum of the church, in the best theological tradition […]. With its 
universal, mediating function and its unconditional authority, the legal fabric of the State exactly reproduces 
the theological properties of the divine/human incarnate Word, a material realization of spiritual power’ 
(Balibar 1996: 225). 
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The systematic adoption of ‘ontological determinism’ was a key step towards this 
ideological synthesis. Taking determinism as an objective correlative to the perfection of 
right reason, allowed Hobbes to assume that it was possible, on the one hand, to 
calculate the objective consequences of political intervention, thus grounding the efficacy 
of right reason when embodied in the agency of the artificial body; and it was possible, on 
the other hand, to explain and justify political power as the necessary outcome of a whole 
series of natural causes. In short, ontological determinism grounds both the power and 
authority of the sovereign. The sovereign can produce order because his command, once 
adequately settled, causes necessary effects. The sovereign is authorised to govern 
because, although there is no God that directly invests him, the fact he is a sovereign is a 
necessary effect of the whole set of causes we call nature; i.e. if ‘right’ is ‘power’ the 
sovereign deserves his power. The point is not only that any government is better than no 
government at all, as maintained by those who claim that Hobbes’s is a ‘de facto’ political 
theory. Although it is true that for Hobbes there can hardly be a more radical evil than the 
absence of government, the point is rather that the existing power can draw its 
authorisation from its very existence, precisely because existence itself is necessary. In 
this sense theological necessity and ontological determinism play a conjoint ideological 
role. Theological necessity is the investiture of the existing state of things through the 
divine necessity of nature, and at the same time ontological determinism is the investiture 
of scientific knowledge by an ordered nature perfectly corresponding to the geometrical-
mechanistic model. In this sense the ideological assumption of the deterministic laws of a 
nature conceived as a mechanical whole would play the role of God’s agency in the 
background of Hobbes’s civil science, by both empowering and justifying the existing state 
of things, civil power included, and political science itself. 
For these reasons the postulate of ontological determinism might have been considered 
by Hobbes a part of his political pedagogy: an effective rhetorical tool that would spread 
the belief in the identification of natural-divine necessity and civil power. But Hobbes never 
claimed his doctrine of necessity was to be used as such. On the contrary, he explicitly 
expressed his concern of making it public: ‘This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop 
[Bramhall] says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been if 
both your Lordship [Newcastle] and he had not pressed me to answer’ (LN II.11: 21). This 
claim has always been read as a sign of Hobbes’s fear of being persecuted for his 
doctrine. Although this is probably the case, I would not underestimate the importance of a 
subsequent claim, which appears in surprising agreement with Bramhall’s arguments 
against the moral danger represented by the doctrine of necessity (cf. in particular LN I. 
14-17: 4-6). In the passage where he recalls Bramhall’s remark, Hobbes implicitly adds a 
pedagogical-political issue: ‘what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now 
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the question is not what is fit to be preached but what is true’ (LN II.14: 24). This 
differentiation between the actual ‘truth’ of a doctrine and its possible ‘preaching’, clearly 
points to one of the main problems Hobbes encountered through developing his political 
theory, the pedagogical concern on the efficacy of reason towards the multitude. And 
about the possible misuse of the ‘truth’ displayed in his Treatise, Hobbes finally concedes: 
I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind not as they should be but 
as they are […] the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety. (LN 
II.15: 27) 
Hobbes’s civil science was intended to explain that a purely rational will would correspond 
to the automatic functioning of the body politic. But, as he had always denounced in his 
political treatises, even a perfect knowledge of this mechanism would not suffice to 
capture the actions inspired by a profusely diffused non-rational will. The reason why in 
Leviathan a ‘denunciation’ of irrationality (of fools, children, and atheists) did not suffice 
anymore is that at that point of his epistemological development no sufficient power was 
attributable to science as a cause.115 Yet civil power was not to be considered sufficient 
either. As Hobbes had claimed in Liberty and Necessity, ‘to make the law is therefore to 
make a cause of justice and to necessitate justice’ (LN I.14: 25). But, because ‘the law 
regards the will and no other precedent causes of action’ (LN I.14: 24), it can only be a 
cause, and not the whole cause. In fact the natural law provides a rational ‘command’ 
which can always be disobeyed, while civil law perfectly works only as far as the external 
actions are concerned.116 
While Hobbes was well aware that in Descartes’s framework the metaphysical liberty of 
res cogitans would remain out of reach for political power, his materialistic version of 
mechanicism apparently offered the means for a more radical solution to this political 
problem. In effect, Hobbes’s materialistic determinism granted that once an appropriate 
geometrical systematisation of the body politic was settled according to the universal (and 
natural) laws of human nature and of the body politic, a consistent artificial motion would 
follow, with no ‘spiritual’ impediments. In other words, the ontological connection of 
causes established by Hobbes’s deterministic ontology would grant the efficacy of right 
reason once its connection to civil power was achieved, thanks to the integration of civil 
science into the functioning of the body politic. Civil science was thus directly concerned 
with its material conditions of possibility, and was ready to endorse them as its central 
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115 Weber sketches the evolution from The Elements of Law to Leviathan as the shift from a denunciation of 
‘de-raison’ to a pedagogy of ‘guerison’, corresponding to a shift from a physics to a medicine of the political 
body (Weber 2000: 43-45, 54). 
116 ‘The external actions done in obedience to them [laws], without the inward approbation, are the actions of 
the sovereign, and not of the subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his own 
at all’ (Lev XLII). This passage is differently analysed, although on the basis of not so different purposes, by 
Feltham 2013: 154-55. 
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purpose. The concrete assumption of this goal found its concretisation in Hobbes’s 
rewriting of The Elements of Law as Leviathan. 
Conclusion 
It is crucial to stress that Hobbes was determined to import into political theory concepts 
elaborated by seventeenth-century mechanical science. The complexity of this conceptual 
transposition made of his scientia civilis or ‘civil philosophy’ a real work in progress. This is 
an aspect which is often obscured by considering Leviathan the monolithic outcome of his 
political theory. For this reason, I have followed the main orientation of Hobbesian 
scholarship towards a developmental rather than systematic account of Hobbes’s 
philosophy.117 But to fulfil this purpose it was necessary to cross Hobbes’s work in 
progress in the natural sciences during the 1640s with the development of his civil 
philosophy, in order to find out how much this was epistemologically consistent with its 
own premises of producing a materialistic science of the body politic. In fact, through this 
reconstruction of the development of Hobbes’s political thought, I aimed to unveil the 
basic structure of an ideological move, which shows no exhaustive epistemological 
justification within his materialism. 
As his epistemology evolved, Hobbes progressively shifted the relationship between 
science and political power: he started supposing science could be the solid base for civil 
power, but more and more he conceived a circular relation in which politics had the 
primacy. He finally assumed that, on the one hand, civil power provides the material 
conditions of possibility for science (enduring covenants, which establish peace and 
therefore grant stability both to men’s wills and to the principles, definitions, and names on 
which science is based). On the other hand, he assumed that civil science should 
contribute (with the support of rhetoric) to provide the psychological conditions of 
possibility of civil power, that is the belief in the actual power of right reason embodied in 
the person of the commonwealth. The result was perfectly consistent with Hobbes’s 
foundational aim, but this aim was not consistent with his epistemology. 
In fact a parallel ideological progression was taking place in his philosophy, which I have 
treated as two issues: the conjoint adoption of a ‘theological-political’ perspective on ‘right 
reason’ and the endorsement of ontological determinism, that is the key points onto which 
he could firmly weld a mechanical epistemology with a politics of security. In effect, both 
assumptions progressively reduced Hobbesian science (and not only civil science) to an 
ideological apology of the sovereign power they relied on, and ultimately committed civil 
science to providing the means to implement this ideological synthesis with political 
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117 A trend which started within the ‘Cambridge School’, mainly interested in the influence of the political 
agenda on the development of Hobbes’s civil philosophy. See my Introduction. 
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practice. This stance entailed the conjoint epistemological neutralisation of civil science 
and its absolute commitment to a political-pedagogical project which assumed human 
nature as the object both of scientific knowledge and of technological action. The 
achievement of this ideological synthesis pushed Hobbes towards a further reformulation 
of civil science that took shape as Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a 
Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ‘the Matter thereof, and the Artificer, both which 
is Man’ (Lev Introduction; EW III, X). 
The book was an operation of re-foundation of civil science on a conception of human 
nature that would carry all the paradoxical burden of Hobbes’s materialistic mechanicism. 
The naturalisation of civil science entailed the a priori justification of the technologies it 
had to adopt in order to organise and improve the functioning of the body politic as a 
collective person. Far from cancelling individual agency, the coupling of the concepts of 
determinism and of the representative persona enforced the connection between the 
subject of science and the sovereign’s agency, making it strongest, and, in effect, 
‘automatic’. Political power could thus provide a foundation for the actual power of reason, 
which in turn brought to an epistemological foundation of that power. And the 
achievement of the perfect knowledge of this circular truth provided by the new civil 
science was likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. All this said, Hobbes’s 
epistemology offered the possibility to follow completely different lines of development. 
The ideological development of Hobbes’s political theory was in fact, as I am going to 
explain in the next chapter, perfectly consistent with the ‘political agenda’ settled by 
Descartes for mechanical philosophy. Not at all with Hobbes’s materialistic premises. 
Chapter 3 
Mechanicism as Ideology 
 
 
Hobbes tried to solve the problems posed by ancient political philosophy within the secure 
boundaries of mechanicism. The attempt to provide an anti-Aristotelian, ‘geometrical’ civil 
science brought him closer and closer to Plato, whose question concerning the relation 
between wisdom and government he apparently solved by identifying wisdom with the 
new mechanical science. This epistemological choice immediately raised the political 
problem of granting efficacy to the theoretical principles of human nature that grounded 
civil science: the laws of nature. Through a redefinition of human nature according to the 
principles of his materialistic mechanicism, Hobbes intended to institutionalise civil 
science, thus making of politics a neutral, ‘administrative’ task removed from the domain 
of political struggle. This process of neutralisation of the conflicting nature of politics 
entailed the identification of justice and law as the ideal theoretical solution for the 
indefinite preservation of the artificial motion of the body politic, and the unification of both 
under sovereign power as the most effective tool for their implementation. 
This tension between the professed neutrality and the actual political purposes of science 
is reflected in Hobbes’s theory of human nature. Hobbes was never able to consistently 
deduce civil science from the principles of his physics without incurring in the problems 
entailed by Descartes’s dualist epistemological agenda. As a matter of fact, although 
materialism remained the unvaried horizon of Hobbes’s political theory, it did not 
determine its actual shape, which was, on the contrary, a process of redefinition of the 
ontological and epistemological status of human nature in order to solve the ancient 
political problem of securing the government of passions by reason. As a result human 
nature was to be defined by the paradoxical coincidence of a physical and a political body. 
For the purposes of civil science Hobbes eventually tried to collapse these two opposite 
features of human nature into a unified image that finally proved its contradictory status by 
undermining the structure of De homine and, in fact, Hobbes’s entire system of sciences. 
For the same reason Leviathan, the final achievement of his scientia civilis, was born as 
an epistemological monstrosity in which human nature played a contradictory role, being 
at the same time the subject of scientific knowledge (as a sovereign reason) and the 
object of political intervention (as a part of the body politic). 
Despite the appearance of a neutral description, Hobbes’s political theory entailed a 
theoretical and practical process of definition, control, and even production of human 
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nature through pedagogical technologies. Thus Hobbes’s pedagogical political project 
displayed a whole set of tools that would allow for its realisation: rhetoric, religion, and 
even history. It is my aim to demonstrate that this outcome cannot be entirely explained 
either as a consistent development of Hobbes’s theoretical premises or on the basis of 
historical and/or biographical vicissitudes. Hobbes’s ideological development in political 
theory was, rather, consistent with the metaphysical premises of Cartesian mechanicism 
and, more generally, with the historical process from which it emerged as a systematic 
understanding of reality. 
On the ground of Hobbes’s pedagogical political project my analysis will therefore move to 
the study of the ideological significance of mechanicism itself. I will discuss the relation 
between science and ideology starting from the analysis of some Marxist interpretations of 
the relation between the emergence of modern science, of the bourgeoisie, and of the 
modern state. I shall particularly focus on the role played by technics in contrast with the 
ideological theorisation of automatism developed by Descartes and Hobbes in natural and 
political philosophy according to an abstract conception of the machine. Technics 
represents the experimental side of the twofold method of science whose implicit relation 
to matter resists the effort of mathematical and metaphorical symbolisation carried on 
within mechanicism as both science and ideology. While the neutralising approach of 
early-modern ‘geometrical’ mechanicism entails a project of normalisation of political 
administration according to the principles established by political theory, the normativity of 
technics confronts political practice with the material emergence of new finalities, thus 
opening, in accord with a genuinely materialistic agenda, the field of political 
experimentation. 
The chapter demonstrates that Hobbes’s civil science did not develop a genuinely 
materialistic political agenda (whether representing individual or class interests), it rather 
carried on the epistemological agenda of early-modern mechanical philosophy along with 
its ideological implications. And, in this sense, Hobbes might be said to have acted as a 
kind of ‘infiltrator’ within the materialist tradition, and in particular in mechanical 
philosophy, in which he imported a dualistic political agenda. Hence the achievement of 
the thesis is to trace back the origin of the mechanistic ideology in seventeenth-century 
mechanical philosophy, in order to ground my conclusion that the epistemology of 
twentieth-century natural sciences allows for both a demystification of the early-modern 
conception of the world as a deterministic machine, an automaton, and a new materialistic 
understanding of the relations between science and political power. 
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3.1 Hobbes with Plato: The Purposes of Civil Science 
Classical Greek, Latin, and Christian political philosophy was strictly connected to ethical, 
moral, and theological issues. A prescriptive science shaped the ideal model of the body 
politic and the relative duties, functions, and expected behaviour of its members.1 Political 
philosophers had always described men ‘not as they are, but as they would like them to 
be’, and therefore – in Spinoza’s words – they had ‘written satire rather than ethics’. The 
scientific revolution in political philosophy was a shift from political theory as a prescriptive 
science to political theory as a descriptive science, which entailed therefore also a shift 
from a close connection to a sharp differentiation between morality and politics. Yet 
‘political theory’ as a descriptive science does not at all appear to be a neutral issue if, still 
following Spinoza, we assume that understanding men as they are was intended to ‘be 
turned to use’ (Spinoza 1670, I.1).2 These considerations do not entail that political 
realism was born in the seventeenth century as a mechanical physics of the body politic. 
On the contrary, political science itself was probably born more than a century before with 
Machiavelli, whose political theory was grounded on history as a science. But it was 
during the seventeenth century that – through Galileo and Descartes and finally Newton – 
the revolutionary and ground-breaking mechanical science triumphed and completely 
changed the world picture. And it was along this process that the exigency of a new 
political science beyond morality, but also completely neutral and objective, emerged: and 
its model was geometry, not history. 
In this framework Hobbes intended to build a new civil science. Yet along with the 
emerging mechanical world picture, plenty of further questions arose: what kind of 
machines (if any) were human beings? What was a mechanically conceived social 
system? In which kind of universe were they inscribed? All these questions might have 
had a quite simple response for the few who wanted to abandon the Aristotelian-Christian 
framework of a well-ordered cosmos, along with the well-ordered organic image of the 
body politic it entailed. The straight answer might have been: they are all machines – the 
universe, the human body, the body politic. But this answer was far from being provided 
and accepted as a proved, definitive one, and, particularly in political theory, mechanical 
imagination slowly became a source for metaphors, models, and hopes, rather than a 
solid epistemological ground for scientific research. 
Although Hobbes was probably the first to systematically assume the goal of integrating a 
project of epistemological foundation of civil science into the mechanical world picture, the 
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1 I deliberately say ‘members’ and ‘body’, because the classical metaphor of the human body, although 
supplemented in Christian thought by the reference to the divine persons, dominated political theory 
throughout the entire medieval period and beyond (see below my Conclusion). 
2 ‘Homines namque non ut sunt, sed ut eosdem esse vellent, concipiunt; unde factum est, ut plerumque pro 
ethica satyram scripserint, et ut nunquam politicam conceperint, quae possit ad usum revocari’. 
 146 
mechanistic imaginary was hardly compatible with the old questions political philosophy 
had been asking for centuries. All the questions Hobbes’s ‘geometrical’ civil science 
intended to answer were in fact drawn from ancient political philosophy: What is the 
relation between the individual and the common good, and between law and justice? 
What is the political function of science? And what is the political role played by wisdom? 
Furthermore, mechanicism also posed new problems for political theory. First, the body 
politic was an artificial machine which did not exist in nature; and therefore there was no 
naturally prescribed functioning for the body politic: individual human machines did not 
naturally tend to unite in an artificial collective body. Second, the clear and distinct 
knowledge of the Wisest was deprived of power, and therefore political practice could 
hardly be conceived as a domain in which science could prove its predictive and 
technological efficacy, as was promisingly happening within the domain of nature. 
It is the figure of Socrates that, in De cive’s preface to the readers – precisely when 
Hobbes is warning that civil science is the most dangerous and problematic part of 
philosophy – turns out to be emblematic of the original connection between civil science 
and wisdom (DC Praef.; OL II, 142). This connection is indeed formulated in Socratic 
terms in Leviathan too. Reason is equally distributed in all men, yet this entails some 
considerable irony: 
Such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to 
be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there 
be many so wise as themselves […]. This proveth rather that men are in that point 
equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal 
distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share. (Lev XIII; 
EW III: 111) 
This passage recalls Descartes’s opening of the Discourse on the Method, where he 
ironically claims that ‘Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally 
distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even 
who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger 
measure of this quality than they already possess’ (AT VI 1-2).3 In fact Descartes is 
maintaining here the universal distribution of ‘good sense or reason’, which is ‘by nature 
equal in all men’ although rarely ‘applied’. Also for Hobbes human nature has all the 
potentialities to produce peace, but the lack of diffusion (and the diffused presumption of 
possession) of what Descartes had called ‘good sense or reason’ prevents these 
potentialities from being expressed. In this sense Hobbes openly defends men from the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 ‘Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chacun pense en être si bien pourvu, que ceux 
même qui sont les plus difficiles à contenter en toute autre chose, n’ont point coutume d’en désirer plus qu’ils 
en ont’. 
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accusation of being ‘evil by nature’. In fact ‘that men are evil by nature, follows not from 
this principle’; on the contrary ‘an evil man is rather like a sturdy boy, or a man of childish 
mind, and evil is simply want of reason at an age when it normally accrues to men by 
nature governed by discipline and experience of harm’ (DC Praef.; OL II, 147-48).4 
Yet it is precisely because of the presence of ignorant ‘evil men’ who, although being few, 
are always in a sufficient number to create a perturbation in the system, that a generalized 
war might arise (DC Praef.; OL II, 147). As a consequence, the general distrust and 
mutual fear of all men must be taken as a first principle ‘by experience known to all men 
and denied by none’, and security is the logical final choice for those who, ‘otherwise glad 
to be at ease within modest bounds’ have to defend themselves by pursuing the 
‘augmentation of dominion over men [being] necessary to a man’s conservation’ (Lev XIII; 
EW III, 112). The natural striving for self-preservation is rationally justified and even 
augmented by the wise awareness of risk. In this framework the state of nature pictures 
precisely the ever re-emerging impotence to which natural reason and wisdom are 
irremediably condemned when left to themselves. Despite being the noblest part of a 
more and more pessimistically conceived human nature, reason is irremediably 
dominated by passions. The striving for power makes the original equality and community 
of goods (‘what nature had placed in common’, DC Ep.; OL II, 139)5 unsustainable, and 
the fable rationality of human beings prevents any natural instauration of justice. In short, 
the ancient wisdom reserved to a few privileged men was at the mercy of the blind self-
preservation tendency characterising the multitude. On these grounds wisdom did not only 
authorise violence, but it prescribed it, precisely for the defence of wisdom itself. 
On the grounds of Socrates’ political interrogation of wisdom, Plato had provided in The 
Republic a science of human nature and of the body politic in order to solve the problem 
of social organisation and reproduction. His solution prescribed a political pedagogy 
(paideia) based on the selection and education of those men endowed with the best 
natures, some naturally born aristoi, whose ethical status and individual wisdom would 
ensure the good government of the polis. The same political-pedagogical task concerned 
Hobbes’s civil science, but mechanicism completely changed the shape of the problem. In 
Hobbes’s civil science men were all machines equally made of matter in motion (not some 
of gold, others of silver or bronze): this ontological feature, along with the epistemological 
assumption that, as said, civil science was a purely descriptive practice with no ethical 
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4 ‘Homines natura malos esse, ex hoc principio non sequitur […] Ita ut vir malus idem ferre sit, quod puer 
robustus, vel vir animo puerili, et malitia idem quod defectus rationis ea aetate, qua per naturam, disciplina 
atque damnorum experientia gubernatam, accidere hominibus solet’. 
5 ‘Quae natura in medium protulit’. 
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content, and, finally, the factual evidence that there were no naturally powerful aristoi, 
deprived civil science of any political efficacy. 
In the concluding paragraph of the first half of Leviathan concerning the principles of 
political theory (parts I and II) 6 , just before introducing the third and fourth parts 
concerning the religious foundations of the commonwealth, Hobbes significantly 
addresses Plato’s doctrine to lament the powerlessness of reason and specifically of 
political theory when not incarnated in the philosopher-king: 
And thus far concerning the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and 
concerning the duty of subjects, derived from the principles of natural reason. And 
now, considering how different this doctrine is, from the practice of the greatest part 
of the world, especially of these western parts, that have received their moral 
learning from Rome and Athens; and how much depth of moral philosophy is 
required, in them that have the administration of the sovereign power; I am at the 
point of believing this my labour, as useless, as the commonwealth of Plato. For he 
also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of 
governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers. 
(Lev XXXI; EW III, 357) 
But the twofold access to civil science first theorised in De cive,7 although situating it in a 
peculiar domain within the system of sciences, is converted here into its peculiar force. It 
is precisely because a shortcut from the ideal path of a systematic geometrical deduction 
is possible in civil science that it does not reserve exclusive access to the philosopher. On 
the contrary, the object of civil science – as ‘the science of natural justice’ – becomes 
directly accessible by the sovereign through his own human nature: 
But when I consider again, that the science of natural justice, is the only science 
necessary for sovereigns and their principal ministers; and that they need not be 
charged with the sciences mathematical, as by Plato they are, farther than by good 
laws to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other 
philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently or probably proved all the 
theorems of moral doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and 
how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine may 
fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will consider it himself, (for it is short, and I 
think clear,) without the help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Leviathan’s Chapter XXXI, Of the Kingdom of God by Nature, matches De cive’s Chapter XV, Of God’s 
government by nature. Yet the same chapter has a completely different structural function: while in Leviathan 
it concludes the second part, Of Commonwealth, in De cive it was the introductory chapter of the third part on 
Religion. No reference to Plato appeared there. 
7 See above, Chapter 1.4 on the peculiar epistemological status of civil science as both analytical and 
synthetical, and below, Chapter 3.2 for a further discussion of the topic. 
 149 
exercise of entire sovereignty, in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this 
truth of speculation, into the utility of practice. (Lev XXXI; EW III, 357-58) 
Plato’s too-demanding model of rationality and his conception of the eternal truth of ideas 
is finally replaced by a more ‘modest’ rationality, which is nevertheless, at least potentially, 
much more effective. A procedural form of rationality can be implemented before the ideal 
achievement of the mechanistic system by some supreme geometer-kings ‘charged with 
the sciences mathematical’. Hobbes’s commonwealth can thus be well established 
independently of the achievement of perfect knowledge, and not at all by a rear-guard 
battle, as it appeared to be the case with Descartes’s ‘provisional moral’. Hobbes’s 
solution was intended to be as definitive as Plato’s and yet independent of the too rare 
eventuality of the intellectual intuition of truth by right reason. 
This solution had to be so morally neutral to any determinate content that it could entail no 
constitutional prescription, in order to be able to be adopted and ‘technically’ implemented 
by any form of government. A new kind of ‘morally neutral’ truth had to impose itself for 
this purpose, and mechanicism was perfectly suitable for this, as Hobbes’s final reduction 
of reason to calculus proved. In De cive Hobbes had already clarified that ‘truth is the 
same with a true Proposition’. Not by chance, he was evoking there Plato’s anamnesis 
concerning the classical link between aletheia and mnemosyne, and, consequently, the 
knowledge of truth and memory, but warning against the risks carried on by the mutability 
of significations and the frailty of collective memory, so varying that it could deceive any 
accurate reasoning: 
And to know truth is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves 
by the actual use of the terms. Plato was not far off when he said long ago that 
knowledge is memory. And it sometimes happens that though words have fixed 
meanings defined by decision, they are so distorted in popular usage from their 
proper meanings by a particular passion for ornament or even deception, that it is 
very difficult to recall to memory the concepts for the sake of which they were 
attached to things, and it needs to a keen judgement and intense labour to 
overcome the difficulty. (DC XVIII.4; OL II, 419)8 
Yet it was only in Leviathan that Plato’s political-pedagogical model finally appears to be 
the very alternative to the long-fought Aristotelian one.9 And when he is approaching the 
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8 ‘Veritatem scire, idem quod, esse eam a nobisme ipsis ipsa nominum usurpatione factam, meminisse. 
Neque temere olim a Platone dictum est, scientiam esse memoriam. Accidit autem interdum, ut voces, etsi 
certam et ex constituto definitam habeant significationem, usu tamen vulgari ad ornandum vel etiam fallendum 
particulari studio a propriis significationibus ita divellantur, ut conceptus, propter quos rebusimpositae fuerunt, 
revocare in memoraim difficultatem magnam habeat, neque nisi acri judicio et diligentia maxima superandam’. 
9 In The Elements of Law Plato is only once individually referenced by Hobbes, in a passage criticising 
‘platonic love’ (EL IX.17); in De cive he merely appears generically associated to Aristotle, Cicero, and 
Seneca, and once again in the quoted passage on memory. Only in Leviathan Plato appears in clear shape as 
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conclusion of Leviathan, Hobbes recalls Plato once again for the last time as the 
philosopher who first posed geometry as a precondition for philosophy and founded a 
school for teaching ‘to the youth of the city’ (Lev XLVI; EW III, 666).10 Again, it is by 
assuming the model of geometry that Hobbes makes his final point on the distinction 
between philosophy as science (that is wisdom), and prudence as a mere ‘memory of 
successions’, by pointing – not to the concept of ‘right reason’ as a perfect knowledge – 
but to ‘right reasoning’, hereby conceived as a purely ‘procedural’ rationality: 
By PHILOSOPHY is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning, from the 
manner of the generation of any thing, to the properties: or from the properties, to 
some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as 
far as matter, and human force permit, such effects, as human life requireth. So the 
geometrician, from the construction of figures, findeth out many properties thereof; 
and from the properties, new ways of their construction, by reasoning; to the end to 
be able to measure land, and water; and for infinite other uses […]. By which 
definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that original 
knowledge called experience, in which consisteth prudence: because it is not 
attained by reasoning, but found as well in brute beasts, as in man; and is but a 
memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little 
circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent: 
whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general, eternal, and 
immutable truth. (LEV XLVI; EL III, 664) 
The natural limitation of ‘prudence’ depends on its scarce capacity of prevision, to which it 
is not to be remedied in detail by ‘reasoning aright’, which only concerns ‘general’ truth. 
Reason provides the framework and the method, not the solution to political problems, 
and thus it opens the space for the efficacy of civil power. The power of reason consists in 
limiting the hybris of prudence, in preventing ‘right reasoning’ from assuming the 
imaginary and destructive shape of a supposedly transcendent truth incarnated in right 
reason, which would make the actual foundation of civil order impossible, or even threaten 
it. Quite pragmatically, by building the conditions for the exercise of ‘right reasoning’ – 
rather than for the mystical access to ‘right reason’ – Hobbes prescribed purposes for civil 
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‘the best philosopher of the Greeks’, and a straight epistemological reference; a reference which appears 
(sometimes implicitly) throughout Hobbes’s repeated attacks on Aristotle. Also when in the Epistola 
dedicatoria of De corpore Hobbes evokes ancient Greek Sophistry, the ‘phantasm’ of philosophy, and 
Aristotle, the ‘internal enemy’ of Christian faith, he also refers to the less pernicious doctrines of Plato (DC Ep.; 
OL I, not paginated). 
10 ‘Every master took some place for that purpose. Plato in certain public walks called Academia’; ‘Plato, that 
was the best philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his school to all that were not already in some 
measure geometricians’ (Lev XLVI; EW III, 666-68). This references introduce Hobbes’s discussion on the 
political significance of the universities that he will later develop in Behemoth. See below, Chapter 3.3. 
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science whose fulfilment required a whole set of new ‘preventive’ technologies and, as a 
matter of fact, contradicted its alleged neutrality.11 
The purposes of a ‘neutral’ civil science: between the Epistola dedicatoria (1641) 
and the Praefatio ad lectores (1647) 
Hobbes claims in the 1641 Epistola dedicatoria12 that in his De cive – when laying the 
foundations of civil science – he has ‘paid careful attention through the whole length of 
[his] discourse not to say anything of the civil laws of any nation’ (DC Ep.; OL II, 139).13 
What makes this assumption problematic is not only the obvious consideration that 
Hobbes’s political theory was in fact a political weapon. 14  The assumption is quite 
problematic also when taken seriously as a scientific claim for the complete ‘geometrical’ 
neutrality of civil science. In effect, it carries on an apparent contradiction: the neutral 
structure of civil science is explicitly conceived by Hobbes as actually serving political 
purposes. As Skinner notes, ‘the artificial bodies investigated by civil scientists are such 
that it remains inescapable to consider in addition the purposes for which they are brought 
into existence’ (Skinner 1996: 5).15 This problem in fact concerns all artificial bodies, with 
the difference that political bodies are made of natural bodies endowed with their own 
purposes and wills, which can be actually influenced by civil science. 
In the Praefatio ad lectores of 1647 Hobbes himself stresses this peculiarity of civil 
science in relation to all the other sciences, that either brought to men great benefits or did 
no harm. On the contrary, since the moment of its birth, civil science has been both the 
most dangerous and the most useful of sciences, precisely because it could not avoid 
influencing human behaviour once in place. This process is not reversible, and no return 
is possible to the golden age in which ‘before questions of that kind began to be debated, 
Princes did not lay claim to sovereign power, they simply exercised it’. Although regretting 
that ‘the simplicity of those times evidently could not understand such sophisticated 
stupidity’, Hobbes is forced to recognise that, once sovereign power has been first 
questioned by civil science, the latter has become both the most dangerous, when 
rhetorically imitated, and the most useful ‘when rightly taught’ (DC Praef.; OL II, 141-44). 
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11 On Hobbes’s conception of ‘right reasoning’ as distinguished from ‘right reason’, see above, Chapter 2.2. 
On the problematic connection of Hobbes’s right reason with ‘Plato’s project’, see Johnston 1990: 48-49. 
12 See above, Chapter 1 note 58. 
13 ‘Opera etiam diligentem per totum cursum orationis meae dedi, ne quid de legibus cujuscumque nationis 
civilibus dicerem’. 
14 To this consideration it might be also opposed that this weapon could be used by different parties for 
opposed purposes from the engagement controversy onwards. 
15 Skinner interestingly suggests that, in fact, also natural sciences can be. After stating that in De cive’s 
preface Hobbes ‘also endorses the classical view that such a science must be purposive in character’ 
(Skinner 2002: 42), he adds in a note: ‘I am tempted to go even further than Malcolm [1990: 146-47] and add 
that Hobbes’s Baconian conception of scientia propter potentiam gives a purposive orientation to his view of 
the natural sciences as well’ (Skinner 2002: 73, n. 42). It is my intention in Chapters 3.4 and 3.5 to extend this 
hypothesis to the whole of early-modern science and to the ideological assumptions it contributed to injecting 
into political theory until today. 
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In this sense from Hobbes’s point of view civil science cannot be neutral precisely 
because if it retired from the political debate, it would leave it to open the spreading of 
false imitations, politically favouring the dominion of opinion. In Hobbes’s world of matter 
in motion there is no place for immobile neutrality. 
From an epistemological point of view, this necessity of being political would not suffice to 
discharge Hobbes’s civil science from the accusation of not being a properly geometrical 
science, capable of describing men as they are and not as they ought to be. According to 
Vaughan, De cive’s 1647 Praefatio would mark the turning point in the development of 
Hobbes’s political philosophy, because it makes the relationship between political theory 
and practice explicit by connecting moral-political and military matters, and providing the 
political context of his science, that is the English Civil War (Vaughan 2002: 13-14). This is 
true, but not in the sense that Hobbes is abandoning there the project of building civil 
science as an abstract descriptive science. On the contrary, Hobbes appears to be fully 
endorsing that project precisely while becoming aware of the power of neutrality itself. 
McNeilly indicates in De cive’s Praefatio the threshold from The Elements of Law to 
Leviathan, in which the particularity of human motives cannot touch the general structure 
of the argument. Civil science deals with human nature in general, providing it with an 
unvarying formalisation of the relationship between man and man, independently of the 
variations of human motives: ‘What is important is not the nature of human motives, 
whether fair or foul conditioned, but the bearing of the unknown on rational deliberation. It 
is this passage […] which marks the transition from the earlier version of Hobbes’s 
political science in The Elements to the later formalised version of Leviathan’ (McNeilly 
1968: 167, referring to OL II, 147). Hobbes’s purely abstract science thus clearly 
anticipates the power of neutrality that will be implemented by the juridical apparatus of 
the modern state. According to Bobbio, it is precisely the formal structure of the law that 
most interests Hobbes in De cive, where he displays a ‘purely formal conception of justice’ 
(Bobbio 1988: 116, n. 1). This connection of rationalisation with formalisation allows for 
the identification of law and justice. The neutral identification of justice and law represents 
for Hobbes the ideal theoretical solution for the indefinite preservation of the artificial 
motion of the body politic, and it is a solid argument for those who interpret Hobbes as a 
‘de facto theorist’, by stressing that the process of neutralisation of politics he is carrying 
on runs along the lines of the emergence of the juridical system as the mark of the 
impersonal power typical of the modern state.16 
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16 The importance of the ‘de facto theorists’ contemporary to Hobbes in anticipating his view that the ability to 
provide protection rather than legitimacy justifies sovereign power has been stressed since Skinner 1966. 
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What these scholars usually fail to notice is that between De cive and Leviathan a further 
step had to be accomplished in order to provide adequate foundation for the neutral 
structure of knowledge elaborated in De cive. As I have explained in Chapter 1.4, 
Hobbes’s philosophy did not claim for reason any privileged, ‘external’, and steady gaze 
over (the rest of) matter and therefore over human behaviour. In particular, Hobbes’s 
materialistic approach, in itself, could hardly allow any theorisation of the neutrality of 
scientific knowledge. Consequently this should be considered an entirely ideological 
outcome of his research, inconsistent with its materialistic premises. In effect, the ideology 
of neutrality is grounded on the characterisation of science as the objective description of 
natural causes that, for their nature, are so complex that their complete account goes 
beyond the power of human nature. But it also adds that the whole set of causes has to 
be complete so that a sufficiently detailed knowledge of them would allow not only a 
complete account of the current state of things, but also a perfect forecasting of the future 
state of things depending on the present causes. This assumption, that I have named 
‘ontological determinism’, is usually taken as the indisputable ontological ground of 
scientific research itself, which in fact is based on the methodological assumption of 
determinism as a tool for detecting causal chains and making previsions (the 
‘epistemological determinism’ described in Chapter 2.3). Through the ontological 
assumption of determinism, science silently shifts from classically being the ‘knowledge of 
causes’ that allows an objective, neutral (although incomplete) description of reality as it 
is, to being the ‘knowledge of effects’ that allows planning and technological 
implementation of reality as it is believed it ought to be.17 
This shift is particularly noteworthy from a political point of view, if analysed through the 
lens of the development of Hobbes’s political thought. In fact, Hobbes’s materialistic 
epistemology did not allow a complete reduction of physics to geometry, and therefore it 
did not allow a complete identification of the actual motion of the body politic to the 
geometrical theorisation of the laws of nature. But Hobbes’s attempt to neutralise science, 
civil science included, could eventually find in ontological determinism its ground, since 
ontological determinism allowed the faith in the efficacy of political planning according to 
the established practical exigencies dictated by the knowledge of the laws of human 
nature. Hobbes’s ontological choice went far beyond what Descartes’ philosophy 
suggested without being allowed to endorse, precisely because of the existence of a 
spiritual substance independent of the mechanical motion of matter. It was this choice of a 
radically deterministic version of mechanicism that allowed Hobbes to theorise the efficacy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 A vision also shared by many of Hobbes’s interpreters, such as Tuck, who thus comments on the latter’s 
deterministic views in his dispute against Bramhall: ‘Hobbes’s philosophy is closer to the assumptions on 
which modern science rests than any of the competing philosophies on offer in the seventeenth century’ (Tuck 
1989: 50) 
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of civil science which, as a result, could be granted only by the epistemological-political 
faith in ontological determinism.18 Yet just a small step was required to discover that this 
efficacy could be further implemented by the endorsement of an ideology of neutrality. In 
effect, the assumption of ontological determinism fills the empty space left open by the 
disappearance of God’s providence and government of the world apparently challenged 
by mechanicism. In short, ontological determinism has religious relevance as far as it 
perfectly substitutes for God’s government of nature. But what is even more important 
from the political point of view is that the new faith in ontological determinism grounds the 
assumption of the neutral objectivity and predictive power of science: the rhetoric of 
reason as an instance super partes and as the subject of secure appeal for the solution of 
political issues. 
Far from denoting lack of political commitment, a rhetoric of the neutrality of reason entails 
a powerful political commitment as a means of delegitimation of any political partisanship, 
in the name of the overarching neutrality of the sovereign subject of science.19 And in fact, 
from Hobbes’s point of view, there appears to be no contradiction between the 
geometrical neutrality of civil science and its political purposes. Not only is civil science 
neutral as far as it is geometrical, but also its political purposes, as far as they deal with 
human nature in general, are presented as neutral. And in its neutrality resides the 
specific power of mechanical science. The new civil science is a formal science of general 
relations among men, and supposedly without content, that can last – in principle – longer 
than any body politic, precisely because it can be equally assumed and sustained by any 
form of political power capable of endorsing the neutrality of science as the ground of its 
technologies over human nature: 
Finally throughout my discourse it has been my aim, first, not to give decisions on 
the justice of particular actions, but to leave them to be settled by the laws. 
Secondly, not to say anything about the laws of any particular commonwealth, i.e. to 
say what law is rather than what the laws are. Thirdly, not to give the impression 
that citizens owe less obedience to an Aristocratic commonwealth or to a 
Democratic commonwealth than they owe to a Monarchical commonwealth. (DC 
Praefatio; OL II, 152)20 
Thus Hobbes seemed to have finally overcome the Greek contraposition of law and 
justice. In fact he erased it. The anti-platonic nature of this outcome was noted by Leibniz: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See above, Chapters 2.3-2.5. 
19 A very interesting clue on Hobbes’s ‘rhetoric’ of objectivity I have found in Jackson 2007: 73, n. 26. 
20 ‘Postremo, per totam oratione meam modum talem conservandum mihi proposui, primo ne de justitia 
singularium actionum quicquam determinarem, sed legibus determinandum relinquerem. Deinde, ne 
quicquam dissererem de cijuscumque civitatis legibus speciatim, id est, ne quae sint, sed quid sint leges, 
dicerem. Tertio, ne civitati aristocraticae vel democtraticae minorem a civibus obedientiam deberim quam 
monarchicae existimare viderer’. 
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A celebrated English philosopher named Hobbes, who is noted for his paradoxes, 
has wished to uphold the same thing as Thrasymachus: for he wants God to have 
the right to do everything, because he is all powerful. This is a failure to distinguish 
between right and fact. (Leibniz 1702-03: 47) 
Hobbes’s mechanistic ideology of neutrality was based on the adoption of a geometrical 
model for the understanding of reality. As I will explain in Chapter 3.3, assumed within 
Hobbes’s materialistic framework, this model entailed a political project of reduction of 
reality, and an even more radical reduction of human nature – the basic element of civil 
science and power – to its mechanical representation. In fact, Hobbes’s new pedagogical 
project was still quite classically based on the study of human nature. But the dualistic 
picture of human nature provided by early-modern mechanicism was hardly compatible 
with Hobbes’s materialistic ontology. In order to fit its mechanical picture Hobbes’s vision 
of human nature and of its epistemological status dramatically changed, more and more 
incorporating the dualistic nature of early-modern mechanicism. This process went so far 
as to renew also the exigency of a pedagogy up to date with mechanicism which would 
move far beyond its alleged neutrality. In this sense Hobbes’s mechanicism can be said to 
have marked the end of the platonic dream of the philosopher becoming a king (or at least 
his major advisor), and the birth of political science as an objective, neutral science with 
full theoretical value and possible technological applications. But Hobbes’s move was not 
at all a cancellation of the teleological grounds of Greek philosophy. Wisdom, turned into 
science, prescribed that all the power should be monopolised by politics, on the one hand, 
and exerted through a whole set of pedagogical ‘technologies’ addressing human nature 
on the other. In this sense, along with the definitive failure of the ancient Platonic project, 
Hobbes’s theory also marked the conjoint emergence of a new project to connect science 
to civil power, which acquired its fully recognisable shape in De cive and could not avoid 
challenging Plato’s original dream, as explained by Johnston (1990).21 For this purpose a 
new mechanical epistemology of human nature was needed. 
 
3.2 For a Mechanistic Epistemology of Human Nature 
Mechanical models were progressively extended to the whole of the existing bodies, that 
is to the whole of nature. Yet human nature still represented a noteworthy exception in 
seventeenth-century mechanicism. Descartes’s early De l’homme was a systematic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 As it should be evident from Chapter 2, I agree with Johnston that ‘rather than abandoning Plato’s project, 
Hobbes proposed to transform it’ by committing to the sovereign the function of embodying right reason 
(Johnston 1990: 48-49). Yet my interpretation is inscribed in a completely different framework: rather than 
rejecting a mechanical (moral and political) ‘science of calculation’ as inhuman (52-53), I am more interested 
in distrusting it as too human (see below, my Conclusion). 
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attempt to provide a mechanical explanation of the functioning of the human body taken 
as ‘to be just a statue or a machine made of earth’ (AT XI, 120).22 The unpublished 
treatise was presented by Descartes as a supposedly fictive account, along the same line 
of Le monde:23 
These men will be composed, as we are, of a soul and a body. And I must describe 
for you first the body on its own; and then the soul, again on its own; and finally I 
must show you how these two natures would have to be joined and united so as to 
constitute men resembling us. (AT XI, 119-120)24 
Yet the fable in this case provided no conclusion, because it was significantly arrested at 
the threshold of the functions attributed to the soul. It was only a few years later that the 
mature Descartes went back to the delicate theme of the mechanisation of human body 
with Les passions de l’âme [The Passions of the Soul] (1649). Quite consistently with the 
supreme medical aim of science formerly stated in the conclusion to his Discourse (AT VI, 
78), he was giving his key contribution to the process of mechanisation of the image of the 
human body that would come to considerable success (and some striking mistakes) in 
anatomical research and more in generally in medicine.25 Yet the tension between the 
whole mechanical project and its underlying metaphysical claims cannot escape a close 
analysis: in the case of the human body a safe place had to be reserved for the soul. The 
human body appears thus an exception to the functioning of mechanical bodies precisely 
because the soul is supposed to play a role in it, an in it only, as it is evidenced by the fact 
that, although passions are entirely mechanical bodily motions, they are in fact passions 
of the soul. This stance was clearly connected to Descartes’s conception of body or 
extension as entirely passive (see above, Chapter 1.2), but it was not at all limited to the 
boundaries of Cartesian philosophy. On the contrary, the necessity to postulate a soul 
inhabiting the machine was inscribed in the core of the same Galilean science of nature 
through which the mechanisation of human body reached it apex. 
With Borelli’s De motu animalium (1680-81) the geometrisation and, subsequently, the 
mechanisation of the (human) body carried on by Harvey and Malpighi was, at least in 
principle, achieved. And the metaphor through which Borelli presented it just before dying 
to the Queen Christina of Sweden – the ‘open book constituted by the heavens, the earth 
and all the visible creatures and, in the first place, in the anatomy of animals and man’ – 
was a clear reference to its Galilean roots:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 ‘Une statue ou machine de Terre’. 
23 On Descartes’s Le monde as a ‘fable’, see above, Chapter 1.1. 
24 ‘Ces hommes seront composés comme nous, d’une Ame et d’un Corps ; et il faut que je vous décrive 
premièrement le corps à part, puis après l’âme aussi à part: et enfin, que je vous montre comment ces deux 
Natures doivent être jointes et unies, pour composer des hommes qui nous ressemblent’. 
25 ‘Between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries a gradual and complex shift took place in European 
medicine: man the microcosm gradually transformed into man the machine’ (Hanafi 2000: 121). 
 157 
Animals are bodies and their vital operations are either movements or actions which 
require movements. But bodies and movements are the subject of Mathematics. 
Such a scientific approach is exactly Geometry. Similarly, the operations of animals 
are carried out using instruments and mechanical means such as scales, levers, 
pulleys, winding-drums, nails, spirals, etc. The scientific knowledge of these means 
is the province of geometry. Thus it is true that, in building the organs of animals, 
God exerts geometry. To understand them we need geometry, which is the unique 
and appropriate science to enable one to read and understand the divine book 
written on animals. (Borelli 1680-81: 2) 
And yet this radical mechanisation of the body did not automatically entail the adoption of 
a materialistic metaphysics. On the contrary, ‘iatromechanics’, the application of (Galilean) 
physics to physiology, neither arrived to cancel the existence of a ‘soul’, nor excluded it 
from the functioning of all natural bodies. Corpuscolarism and experimentalism did not 
imply a radical materialism in physiology and, consequently, did not completely overcome 
the ‘ontological’ difference between living and artificial bodies. Although Borelli rejected 
the Cartesian (and Aristotelian) preeminence of the heart, pointing to the central role 
played by the brain, he never reduced natural bodies to automata. Automata are useful 
instruments for the knowledge of regular discrete and recursive natural motions (Borelli 
1680-81, LXXIX: 282-84); it is true that the animal is in fact ‘an automaton of Nature’ 
endowed with ‘a regulating machine’ similar to ‘the regulating pendulum of a clock’ which 
‘regulates by its oscillatory force the movement of blood and spirits to prevent these from 
flowing frantically and foolishly’ (Borelli 1680-81, CXVI: 319-20).26 But natural bodies are 
furthermore dependent on ‘the principle and the effective cause of movement of animals’: 
the soul (Borelli 1680-81, I: 7). Thus they are subject to ‘fear and belief, which are the 
cognitive faculties of the soul’ commanding voluntary motions through the motive faculty 
residing in the animal spirits. The ‘animal cognitive faculty’ modifies the automatically 
regulated motions by transmitting ‘spirits to certain parts of the brain to shake the roots of 
well-determined nerves which go to a certain muscle rather than to another’ (Borelli 1680-
81, LXXX: 285-86). 27  Borelli was resolutely anti-Cartesian because radically 
experimentalist and diffident towards the deductive approach. Yet in the light of this 
original distinction between natural-automatic motions on the one hand, and will-
determined ones on the other, one might argue that, even though iatromechanicism 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In this sense air respiration is the origin and constant support of the regular motion of blood, namely of life 
itself (and it is important to notice how close – also epistemologically – respiration was to being a function of 
the psyche). 
27 See Hanafi 2000: 129-34; but the author does not clarify whether animal motion is guided by the soul or not, 
and smoothly passes from the animal/automaton analogy to a human/automaton difference which is not so 
evident in Borelli’s text (Hanafi 2000: 132). 
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extended Galileo’s geometrisation to the functioning of the human body, it could not get 
rid of Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics. 
According to my hypothesis, explanations that only point to a precautionary use of the 
concept of soul by these authors do not suffice to clarify the topic. I am rather focusing on 
the simplified vision of the machine offered by early-modern mechanics in order to 
achieve the project of mechanisation of nature. For this purpose machines themselves 
had to be reduced to geometrical representation. The irregular, unpredictable functioning 
of actual machines had to be transformed into the well ordered, perfectly structured and 
articulated motion of the ‘theoretical machines’ used by ‘geometers’ in their researches. 
Only through the imagination of these perfect machines endowed with a perfectly 
organised (artificial) motion could matter in (natural) motion itself be conceived as a 
machine, and could the laws of motion be both grasped in their geometrical essence and 
extended to the whole of nature. Thus the purely imaginary functioning of geometrical 
machines was made perfectly suitable for an abstract representation of nature.28 
The assumption of such geometrical models had relevant consequences also at the 
ideological level. The complex phenomena characterising life, and in particular the 
emergent phenomena characterising human life, could not be easily explained in such 
simplistic mechanical terms. This required an alternative explanation, which could be 
easily intended as a metaphysical alternative to the material reference to bodily motions. 
This ontological necessity joined the epistemological necessity of founding the new 
science of motion on reason, with the consequent attribution to it of a status of exception 
compared to all moving bodies. As explained in Chapter 1, reason as the subject of the 
method of the new mechanical science needed to be grounded on an immaterial instance 
accessing some eternal and divine principles of motion, themselves immune from motion. 
It is quite easy to see how these ontological and epistemological exigencies – on the one 
hand to explain the peculiar motion of living bodies (and of the human body in particular) 
and, on the other hand, to provide a stable ground to human reason – could converge, 
making of the soul the keystone of the entire edifice of mechanics. In this sense 
materialism was a dangerous exception in the process of systematisation of the 
mechanical world view. And for this reason human nature was also the topic on which 
Hobbes’s materialistic mechanicism found its major impasse. This is particularly 
noticeable in his treatises concerning civil science, on which the knowledge of human 
nature was to be based. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 On the way the ‘intellectual manipulation of objects and geometric diagrams’, as much as actual practice of 
mechanics with technical objects, influenced early-modern mechanics, before algebra took possess of it by 
the end of the seventeenth century, see Bartoloni Meli 2006. 
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Hobbes’s evolving conception of human nature 
The simplified image of human nature provided by mechanicism did not allow Hobbes to 
solve the classical problem of the relation between passions and reason, which was 
nevertheless crucial for his political theory. As I am going to explain, the metaphysical 
postulate on human nature that grounded Cartesian mechanics – and was in principle 
excluded from Hobbes’s materialistic philosophy – can be said to have re-emerged within 
the development of Hobbes’s civil science as a methodological dualism. On these 
grounds, I am going to take as a serious epistemological assumption Hobbes’s claim in 
Leviathan that the first thing to be considered in order to describe the Commonwealth is 
‘the Matter thereof, and the Artificer, both which is Man’ (Lev Introduction; EW III, X). In 
effect, the metaphor appears here to carry a quite ponderous methodological significance 
if referred to the crucial role played by human nature in Hobbes’s research. In Hobbes’s 
three political treatises the same quite ‘classical’ picture of human nature as divided 
between reason on the one hand, and passion, desire, or will on the other, is differently 
presented. But the different configurations of this opposition, which of course cannot be 
taken as an ontological one, have a clear methodological meaning. A sequential 
consideration of the dedicatory epistles, prefaces, and/or introductions to the three 
political treatises and to De homine helps to stress some discontinuities in a progression 
that may be quite revealing of Hobbes’s conjoint treatment of human nature as both an 
epistemological and a political issue. This development displays the progressive 
transcription of a classical problem of political theory – the government of passions by 
reason – in terms compatible with the implicit dualism of early-modern mechanicism. 
In the Dedicatory epistle of The Elements of Law Hobbes is concerned with the study of 
the complexity of human nature as it actually is, and this actual complexity is synthesised 
by the duality of reason and passion. The opposition between reason and passion is not 
at all ontological, because, as we know, human nature as a whole is rather characterised 
by the complexity of the motions that inhabit the human ‘body and mind’. But it entails a 
double kind of ‘learning’, ‘mathematical’ and ‘dogmatical’: the first is based on ‘figure and 
motion’, while the second depends on ‘right and profit’. While through ‘mathematical’ 
learning reason always leads to agreement, through ‘dogmatical’ learning passion 
invariably leads to ‘dispute and contradiction’. The aim of the book is therefore to build a 
mathematical science of ‘justice and policy’ that, relying on the knowledge of all the 
elements composing human nature, would grant peace (EL Ded. Letter XV-XVI). 
In the Epistola dedicatoria of De cive the opposition inhabiting human nature is strongly 
accentuated at the ontological level, while at the epistemological level a fundamental unity 
is preserved. At the ontological level human nature is clearly split into two opposite and 
 160 
hardly compatible tendencies, one of which is clearly natural, while the other appears to 
be rather artificial. The commonly stressed wolf-like tendency (‘homo homini lupus’) is in 
fact applied by Hobbes to the relations between commonwealths, where the ‘natural’ 
bestial state cannot be definitely overcome. The Godlike tendency (‘homo homini deus’) is 
assumed as typical of the relations among citizens within the commonwealth, that is in the 
artificial body politic, where ‘Man is a God to man’ (DC Ep.; OL II, 135-36). On the 
contrary, at the epistemological level the two opposite tendencies are assumed as the 
‘two certain postulates of human nature’ – on the one hand natural desire [cupiditatis 
naturalis], and on the other natural reason [rationis naturalis] – which should serve to 
ground and extend geometrical knowledge to the whole of moral philosophy, thus 
providing the basis for the only possible a priori science of natural justice [justitia naturalis] 
the book is intended to be founding (DC Ep.; OL II, 138). 
In short, while in The Elements of Law human nature is considered the unitary object of 
two possible kinds of knowledge, one of which is science, in De cive human nature is itself 
split into two opposite tendencies, that a unitary geometrical science of natural justice is 
supposed to deal with. This sequence well represents the shift from an original project of 
deduction of the body politic from the ontological ‘elements’ featuring human nature 
(human faculties and powers), to the assumption of human nature as the epistemological 
starting point of a science of principles. The first part of The Elements of Law concerning 
human natural motions (Chapters I-XIII) could thus disappear from De cive, in order to be 
placed in De homine, the second part of Hobbes’s system of sciences, where the 
ontological nature of man was supposed to be investigated outside the boundaries of civil 
science. 
But this was not Hobbes’s conclusive word. In the later Praefatio ad lectores for the 1647 
edition of De cive he openly stated the possibility of a twofold method. In the Praefatio, it 
is through the image of the body politic as a watch that human nature is definitely 
considered an internal mechanism of it, and the objective ‘matter’ of civil science. Yet 
once man has been isolated as a peculiar object of science at the threshold between 
nature and artifice, its dualism immediately reappears in the twofold methodology 
admitted for civil science. As explained in Chapter 1.4, Hobbes explicitly theorises there a 
double path for civil science, by opposing a quite elitist ‘synthetical’ geometrical science 
based on deductive demonstration, and a more popular ‘analytical’ one based on the 
internal experience of directly evident first principles. In effect Hobbes claims that the early 
publication of the third part of his system had been undertaken under the assumption that 
‘it did not need the preceding parts, since it rests upon its own principles known by reason’ 
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(DC Praef.; OL II, 151). 29 A twofold method for civil science thus embodies at the 
epistemological level a dualism that Hobbes had banished from the ontological horizon. 
Apparently, Hobbes’s conclusive solution was that a twofold method for civil science was 
possible: 
They also that have not learned the first part of philosophy, namely geometry and 
physics, may, notwithstanding, attain the principles of civil philosophy, by the 
analytical method. (DeCo VI.7; EW I, 74) 
But Hobbes’s conclusive word in political theory had been completely different, as was 
evident from the first pages of Leviathan. The methodology of a direct access to the 
science of human nature through internal experience first provided in De cive as an 
alternative path for science, was eventually demonstrated in Leviathan to be the definitive 
and, in fact, the only possible method for civil science. More precisely, the method 
concerning man as a ‘part’ of the political body appeared there to be an autonomous 
section of the science of the human being: still a geometrical science, but characterised 
by a peculiar method that, as I am going to explain, irremediably undermined the same 
‘scientific’ picture it was supposed to provide. In effect, when he finally accomplished his 
philosophical system, Hobbes was forced to openly admit that the only evidence for the 
‘geometrical’ account of the body politic provided by civil science was given by internal 
introspection. Thus in the introduction to Leviathan he explicitly addressed the sovereign 
to ‘read in himself’ the universal features of human nature: 
He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular 
man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language 
or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and 
perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the 
same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration. (Lev 
Introduction; EW III, XII) 
In effect human nature was precisely what allowed Hobbes to collapse in Leviathan the 
subject and the object of civil science, reason and the natural body, in the same way in 
which ontological determinism had allowed him to make geometry and natural motion 
coincide. In this sense Leviathan can be said to have transferred into civil science the 
collapse of the geometrical epistemology of mechanicism and the ontology of motion that 
characterised Descartes’s natural philosophy, as explained in Chapter 1.4. 
Leviathan, Chapter IX: ‘Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge’ 
In Chapter IX of Leviathan Hobbes felt the necessity to provide a scheme of the sciences 
which he possibly built by renovating the tree structure he had adopted for establishing 
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29 ‘Cum eam principiis propriis experientia cognitis innixam, praecedentibus indigere non viderem’. 
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the table of contents of The Elements of Law, which in the manuscript copies he had 
entitled ‘The Order’ (Malcolm 2012: 142). This time, after the full immersion in the 
Elementa project during the 1640s, the scheme had to cover the whole spectrum of 
philosophy, including all possible sciences. Thus the table presents the different kinds of 
scientific ‘knowledge of consequences’ (‘which is also called philosophy’) sorted 
‘according to the diversity of Matter’ (Lev IX; EW III, 71-73). The main division between 
‘natural philosophy’ and ‘civil philosophy’ is related to the kind of bodies they refer to, 
either ‘natural’ or ‘politics’. Yet as far as the former include ‘Mechanics’ and the latter 
‘ETHICS’, ‘POETRY’, ‘RHETORIC’, ‘LOGIC’, it is clear that this classification of the bodies 
does not match the distinction between natural and artificial bodies that would be more 
consistent with the reference to human nature as a producer or not of the bodily motion 
concerned. And what is more striking, ‘The Science of JUST and UNJUST’ is classified as 
a part of natural philosophy, as if it was not an integral part of, or even the same as, civil 
philosophy. This patent contradiction clearly makes of Leviathan Chapter IX an open 
question, rather than an answer, concerning the epistemological status of civil science. 
In an article devoted to Hobbes’s Scheme of the Sciences, Sorell deepens his previous 
analysis of Chapter VI of De corpore (Sorell 1988a), highlighting its strong continuity with 
the Preface to the 1947 edition of De cive. He notes that, as in De corpore Hobbes 
problematically collocated ‘civil philosophy’ out of the methodological domain of 
‘philosophia prima’, similarly, De cive’s analytic method ‘bypasses the sciences’, thus 
making of civil philosophy a specific form of knowledge, in striking contrast with the 
general scheme of sciences provided in Leviathan IX (Sorell 1996: 50, 55-56). In short, 
what Sorell aims at is to demonstrate that Hobbes was not actually willing to (or able to) 
treat civil philosophy as a science of matter in motion, and its ‘philosophically informed 
rhetoric’ was safely far from a ‘Realist philosophy of science’ pretending that ‘social 
studies significantly resemble physics’ (Sorell 1988a: 80). I certainly agree with Sorell 
when he says that ‘there is more continuity between Chapter VI of De corpore and the 
Epistle to the Reader [sic] of De cive published nearly a decade earlier’ than with the 
(English version of) Leviathan (Sorell 1996: 50), and I also agree with the fact that the 
method of De cive – the most properly ‘scientific’ political work of Hobbes’s – is not 
directly related to a physics of motion.30 But I refuse his hypothesis that the different 
accounts for the epistemological status of civil philosophy (and first philosophy) Hobbes 
gives in De cive, De corpore and in the English Leviathan are due to the fact that they are 
‘apparent exceptions’ (Sorell 1996: 49) to Hobbes’s materialism. In particular, in order to 
make his point and to ‘save’ Hobbes’s civil science from the accusation of mechanistic 
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30 Sorell concludes by attacking the general idea of a ‘politics of motion’ (Sorell 1996: 56-57) as it was 
presented by Spragens 1973. 
 163 
reductionism, Sorell proposes a differentiation between ‘science’ and ‘knowledge’ that 
results in denying to civil philosophy the status of ‘genuine science’, rather limiting it within 
the boundaries of historical (or prudential) knowledge. Not only this is something Hobbes 
struggled all his lifetime to reject, it is not even based on textual evidence, and in fact it 
clearly contrasts what Hobbes himself claims in the corresponding Chapter IX of the Latin 
version of Leviathan, which Sorell omits mentioning. 
In the Latin version of Leviathan31 Hobbes replaces the scheme of the English version 
with a couple of pages where he gives a brief textual account of his scheme of the 
sciences: he explains there the difference between ‘two kinds of knowledge’ and their 
consequent register [conscriptio], represented by history and philosophy. It must be 
stressed that both fields are concerned at the same time with ‘natural’ and ‘civil’ subjects, 
but, while history registers a knowledge of facts relying on ‘witnesses’, philosophy 
registers a proper science ‘of consequences’ both of natural and civil bodies (cf. Lev Lat 
IX; OL III 66).32 This epistemological divide between two methods of knowledge allows 
Hobbes here to maintain the distinctiveness of science independently of any ontological 
characterisation of the kind of bodies it is concerned with, and hence to clearly reassert 
that his civil philosophy pertains to the system of sciences.33 
What I am trying to suggest is that civil science entails no exception in Hobbes’s 
materialism, and that in the table of sciences presented in the English Leviathan there 
was a contradiction due to the quasi-ontological opposition between natural and artificial 
bodies that Hobbes tried to resolve with the new Chapter IX of the Latin version. In 
general, from the epistemological perspective assumed in Leviathan the classification of 
civil philosophy among the other sciences depends on the different relationship between 
the political body and ‘human nature’ as a subject (and in this case also an object) of 
science, rather than on the characterising features of the object studied. And in effect in 
the Latin version the classification of sciences is still based on the distinction between 
different kinds of bodies,34 yet the opposition between natural and artificial bodies is 
replaced there by the distinction between bodies the ‘internal motions’ of which are either 
invisible or visible, which is a distinction more openly relative to the way human nature, as 
a subject of science, has access to such bodies. 
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31 According to Tricaud 1971 the first version was the Latin one. Skinners (1996: 3, n. 15) definitely rejected 
the hypothesis. 
32 ‘Cognitionis duae sunt species. Altera facti; et est cognitio propria testium, cujus conscriptio est historia. 
Dividitur autem in naturalem et civilem, quarum neutra pertinet ad institutum nostrum. Altera est 
consequentiarum, vocaturque scientia; conscriptio autem ejus appellari solet philosophia’. 
33 As had always been clear throughout the whole of the Elementa project (and therefore both in De corpore 
and in De cive), where first philosophy had its proper place as a methodological precondition of all kind of 
sciences. 
34 ‘Quoniam autem subjecta scientiarum sunt corpora, [philosophia, i.e. scientia] distribuenda est in species, 
eodem modo quo distribuuntur in suas species corpora ipsa, id est, ita ut universaliora minus universalibus 
antecedant’ (LEV IX; OL III, 66). 
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Now, this shift from the natural/artificial to the invisible/visible opposition might shed some 
light on the epistemological meaning of Leviathan itself. As explained, in Leviathan it is 
not anymore the quasi-ontological distinction between natural/artificial objects of science 
(bodies) but rather the epistemological relation to human nature as a subject to mark the 
threshold between different kinds of bodies and, therefore, between different methods of 
knowledge. This is the long-term result of the epistemological stance earlier assumed in 
De cive, following which civil philosophy becomes, from an epistemological point of view 
(and not from an alleged ‘ontological’ point of view), much nearer to sciences such as 
mechanics, ethics, and geometry, in which internal motions are ‘directly’ knowable by 
man, being dependent on the subject’s will rather than on physics.35 On the other hand, 
and at the same time, the ontological reference to ‘human nature’ as an object still serves 
the purpose of assigning to civil philosophy a place in the system of sciences among the 
other sciences concerned with human bodily motions: ‘Finally, from the observation of 
man and its faculties, sciences as ethics, logic, rhetoric arise, and also politics or civil 
philosophy’ (Lev Lat IX; OL III, 66).36 In this sense the unity of the method was achieved 
only in principle, as de facto the different sciences had to follow different paths depending 
on the respective relation between their objects, but the overall unity of their object was 
never called into question. The object of all Hobbesian sciences is the body in motion, for 
the quite simple and straight reason that other objects do not exist. 
It is true that natural bodies, whose internal motions are invisible, can only imperfectly be 
known from the ‘outside’, starting from the ‘signs’ we collect, while the artificial bodies of 
civil philosophy offer to our knowledge an alternative shortcut due to the fact that we are 
part of their internal motions. And nevertheless I don’t think the conclusion that Hobbes’s 
civil science ‘does not depend on knowledge of physics and geometry’ (Sorell 1996: 56)37 
can be indistinctively applied to the whole of Hobbes’s political production. If this view can 
be applied to many and probably most of Hobbes’s actual political writings, it is clearly not 
true if referred to the Elementa project as a whole, which is on the contrary grounded on a 
postulate of methodological unity based on the primacy of first philosophy, and the 
dependence of civil science. Yet Sorell’s lesson has to be considered: we must in fact 
acknowledge that Hobbes’s science did not achieve the actual deductive aim it had 
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35 As explained, geometry is the ‘only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind’ (Lev IV: 
105), because it is the only kind of science which man produces the principles of, and therefore it is built on an 
a priori knowledge of the right definitions of names (cf. also DH X.4). Outside the field of geometry, individual 
reason has no power to ‘produce’ names, since its operations concern only addition and subtraction. On the 
analogy between civil science, mechanics and ethics, see above, Chapter 1.4. 
36 ‘Ex contemplatione denique hominis et facultatum ejus oriuntur scientiae ethica, logica, rhetorica, et tandem 
politica sive philosophia civilis’. 
37 ‘While the truths of civil philosophy may depend on truths that are explained by physics and geometry, 
knowledge of the truths of civil philosophy does not depend on knowledge of physics and geometry, and can 
indeed be acquired on the basis of a certain self-knowledge, or acquaintance, with human passions in oneself’ 
(Sorell 1996: 56). 
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carried on in the ontology of The Elements of Law and promised when first sketching the 
epistemology of the Elementa project in De cive. But my thesis is that this failure of 
Hobbes’s project was not due to a kind of ontological peculiarity of human nature, as 
Sorell seems to assume (which makes no sense in Hobbes’s materialistic perspective),38 
but to the structural limitation of early-modern mechanicism, as I will explain in my 
conclusion. 
From this perspective, in Leviathan we witness the failure of the Elementa project, and the 
collapse of the epistemological gap between model and reality opened by De cive. The 
patent contradiction between the methodology explicitly adopted in Leviathan and the one 
Hobbes was at the same time theorising in De corpore could not leave his systematic 
project untouched. In the Epistola dedicatoria to De homine Hobbes eventually 
acknowledged that the twofold methodology of his treatise depended on the twofold 
characterisation of its object. He stressed that De homine had been a quite difficult 
achievement precisely because it had to connect the final part of physics (De corpore) 
with the principles of politics (De cive), that is ‘the most difficult with the easiest one’. And, 
since ‘man is not only a natural body, but also part of a state [civitatis], i.e. (so to say) a 
political body’, the very intermediate section of Hobbes’s system had necessarily to be 
split into two ‘very different’ parts, developed according to two different methods, relying 
respectively ‘on demontrations’ and ‘on experience’, and accessible to two quite different 
audiences (DH Ep.; OL II, not paginated).39 While in De cive the analytical method was 
supposed to be an equivalent alternative to the rigorous synthetical one, in De homine the 
two methods were to be combined, because neither of them could provide by itself a 
complete account of human nature: ‘This was necessary as it was required by the method 
of the whole work’ (DH Ep.; OL II, not paginated).40 
Where the ontological unity of human nature as the object of science was postulated, the 
peculiarity of human nature as both the object and the subject of mechanical science 
made Hobbes’s civil science the turning point of the failure of his system. As explained in 
Chapter 2, the epistemological gap first opened by De cive had far-reaching 
consequences for the development of Hobbes’s political theory, as far as it strongly 
questioned the political efficacy of reason. More generally, the twofold nature of the 
method of science itself became more and more evident to Hobbes and contaminated the 
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38 Sorell’s ‘solution’ appears to be a typically ‘Straussian’ assumption of the epistemological incompatibility 
between Hobbes’s natural and political philosophies. Malcolm poses the hermeneutic problem represented by 
Hobbes’s scheme of sciences by considering the variations between the two versions, yet his explanation 
appears to be driven by the assumption that the hope for an epistemological composition of ‘the puzzle’ is far 
from being at hand (Malcolm 2012: 145). 
39 ‘Contigit autem sectioni huic, ut duae partes ex quibus constat sint inter se dissimillimae. Est enim altera 
difficillima, altera facillima; altera demonstrationibus, altera experientia constans; altera a paucis, altera ab 
omnibus intelligi potest’. 
40 ‘Necessarium erat, ita scilicet postulante totius operis methodo’. 
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whole of his systematic project. As Pacchi noted, the ‘ideal of the unity of science’ – in the 
form of a ‘methodological unity’ alternative to the Aristotelian one – remained untouched 
throughout the whole of Hobbes’s production, but its ‘internal’ duality progressively 
brought his enterprise to a failure of which De homine marked the final step.41 
But this epistemological failure was in fact turned into a striking success by the ideological 
move through which, in Leviathan, Hobbes made of the twofold nature of men – natural 
and artificial – both the starting point and the result of the perfect automatic functioning of 
the body politic. In fact, as I explained in chapter 2.5, the ideological solution to the 
epistemological impasse of civil science Hobbes provided in Leviathan was ultimately 
inconsistent and non-scientific. He postulated on the one hand a deterministic ontology of 
human nature and on the other hand the possibility of a privileged and neutral scientific 
insight on its mechanical functioning. This impossible coincidence was what finally defined 
the paradoxical nature of Hobbes’s epistemology of civil science. In this sense we can say 
that the epistemological gap opened by De cive was ‘saturated’ in Leviathan by human 
nature and supported by both the deterministic ontology Hobbes had in the meantime 
developed and consolidated in his natural philosophy, and the epistemological function he 
attributed to the sovereign. And in effect, Hobbes’s treatment of ‘human nature’ in 
Leviathan displays this postulated identification of the epistemological and ontological 
functions of ‘human nature’, that is the very collapse of ‘man’ as a subject and as an 
object of science, within a body politic ‘the Matter thereof, and the Artificer, both which is 
Man’ (Lev Introduction; EW III, X). 
The epistemological function of human nature 
Hobbes’s conception of human nature completely changed once it had entered the 
transcendental shift of early-modern epistemology and metaphysics enacted by 
Descartes, in which human nature was split in order to become both the natural object 
(body) and the metaphysical subject (reason) of mechanical science. Although no doubt 
about Hobbes’s genuine materialism can be admitted, evidently his concern with framing 
human nature as a ‘natural’ but stable starting point for civil science disclosed the 
necessity of finding a way to cut the edge between man’s reason and nature also within 
materialism. In Hobbes’s materialistic framework this split had to be reformulated in 
different terms, which affected at the same time his conception of human nature and the 
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41 According to Pacchi Hobbes pursued his project of a ‘deduction’ of civil science from geometry only during 
the period 1645-1649 (Pacchi 1965: 169-170), which would mean that such project concerned the Preface to 
De cive but not yet the text of De cive itself. However, in De homine, while physics still remained hypothetical, 
civil and moral philosophy had been definitely assumed to be ‘a priori deducible as geometry, but starting from 
principles internal to themselves; in complete autonomy, and not from general principles anymore’. According 
to Pacchi this methodological unification of all the fields of science, was carried on by Hobbes on the basis of 
the unity of their object: the phenomenon (Pacchi 1965: 216-17; see also Pacchi 1971: 112 ff.). In this sense 
he claims that Hobbes’s system was as a complex attempt to conciliate ‘epistemological phenomenalism’ and 
‘materialistic realism’. 
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epistemology of civil science. And this is what he tried to do in Leviathan. In order not to 
abandon the postulate of the unity of science, Hobbes eventually made human nature the 
key methodological issue and the impossible point of convergence of his entire research, 
characterised by a kind of ‘double bind’. Because of its paradoxical ‘internal’ universality, 
civil science should have been able to stand on the stable ground of human nature both 
as its object and subject. But the human nature that grounded civil science was 
irreversibly marked by its ‘natural’ absence of reason. As an object (stable) of science it 
might even be entirely known according to the most rigorous principles of mechanics, but 
as a subject (in motion), it undermined any possible stabilisation of such a knowledge. 
This irreversibly made of the science of human nature itself a crucially political issue, 
despite Hobbes’s pretended neutral description of human nature as it was and not as it 
ought to be.42 
In fact, human nature marks in Leviathan the collapse of the object and the subject of civil 
science within a conceptual framework that does not allow it. It injects a de facto idealistic 
anthropological difference into the heart of Hobbes’s materialism, where ‘man’ plays the 
role of the ‘privileged’ part of nature in which the latter produces a rational knowledge of 
its own functioning. Apparently, the procedural reason displayed in Leviathan is not 
inscribed in human natural motion as such. It is clearly not ‘as sense and memory, born 
with us; nor gotten by experience only’, but it ‘is attained by industry’ through the activity 
of ‘imposing’ names and getting a method (Lev V; EW III, 35): an attained capacity of 
doing abstract operations on names (Lev V; EW III, 30).43 Reason is, in this sense, a 
normative concept, a feature characterising ‘adult’ human nature. That is why ‘speech’ 
constitutes for every individual man both a heritage and a mark of the attained capacity of 
using ‘Reason’: 
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use 
of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of 
having the use of Reason in time to come. (Lev V; EW III, 35-36) 
And nevertheless, when other typical human passions such as ‘curiosity’ and ‘admiration’ 
are concerned (Lev VI; EW III, 44, 45), reason reveals to be profoundly rooted in the 
properly human conatus, a desire that, in order to secure its continuation, has to gain 
exponential increase: 
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42 Johnston frames the problem in terms of the opposition between the abstract theory of human nature 
characterising Hobbes’s former political treatises and the ‘historical dimension’ he would add to human nature 
in Leviathan, while basically maintaining the same abstract theory of the commonwealth. Hence the new 
political purposes of civil science: ‘Hobbes’s theory would not achieve practical realization until men became 
the rational actors they had always had the potential to be’ (Johnston 1986: 128-29). 
43 The procedural neutrality of reason is allowed to cover any possible object of science: ‘In what matter 
soever there is place for addition and subtraction, there also is place for reason; and where these have no 
place, there reason has nothing at all to do’ (Lev V; EW III, 30). 
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So that in the first place I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and 
restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of 
this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has 
already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but 
because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, 
without the acquisition of more. (Lev XI; EW III, 85-86) 
Although concealed under the more physical cloth of ‘speech’ or some peculiar ‘desire of 
knowledge’, reason, like any other typically human feature, is profoundly rooted in a 
potentially infinite desire characterising human motion that simultaneously both nourishes 
and threatens the body politic. As a result, the procedural neutrality of reason has not only 
to account for, but also to take in charge, the continuation of the bodily motion it is 
assumed to arise from and depend on. Reason is bound to protect and regulate human 
desire because reason itself is desire, and its endless continuation becomes the founding 
value to be protected at all costs. It is in order to regulate and maintain human motion that 
the body politic – as a ‘second Nature’ – assumes the monstrous shape of a deterministic 
machine that would repeat at the human scale the ‘divine’ mechanical order of nature, and 
it is for this purpose that human nature has to be accurately shaped to fit the particular 
kind of motion which corresponds to the geometrical model of its perfect functioning: men 
‘as they are’ must be reduced to men ‘as they ought to be’. This exigency of defining, 
controlling and even producing the ‘nature’ of man is what finally made – precisely 
through Hobbes’s materialistic determinism – the idealistic nature of the political agenda 
of mechanicism explicit. 
 
3.3 Educating the Educators: Behemoth’s Political Pedagogy 
Laws of nature, right reason, power, right, sovereignty, will, liberty, and – in particular with 
Leviathan – also representation, these and all the other concepts that provide the 
scaffolding of Hobbes’s political theory were evidently born outside of the domain of 
mechanicism and their genealogy is often completely indifferent to the field of natural 
philosophy. Yet Hobbes had to implicitly or explicitly translate them, in order to allow them 
make sense also in the terms of a physics of motion. In effect, in all the domains of his 
research Hobbes never abandoned the key assumption of his materialistic version of 
mechanical philosophy, the basic postulate that all is ‘but’ matter in motion. This is the 
postulate of his whole epistemology of sciences and the implicit postulate of his political 
doctrine, which entails that all the concepts Hobbes adopts to elaborate his civil science 
also have to comply with this basic principle. More precisely, the ‘train of thought’ 
representing science and the whole set of its principles are always implicitly assumed to 
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be physical motions themselves. Therefore it is evident that, since the principles of 
science must be understood also from the point of view of the physical motion that 
generates them, they should be also considered motions of mind which, as such, can 
always be changed by further motions, as entailed by Hobbes himself when he argues 
against the Cartesian ‘ideas’ of God, of the infinite, of eternity etc. (AT VII, 179-80).44 And, 
although my former analysis prevents any straight identification of Hobbes’s ‘law of nature’ 
with the objective laws of natural motion as they were first established by Descartes and 
later accepted after Newton’s enterprise, it has nevertheless also stressed that a deeper 
connection between the laws of nature and the laws of physical motion can be seen 
running through all of Hobbes’s writings and constantly influencing his civil science as a 
necessary background. 
Of course, this does not mean that Hobbes simply ‘analogically’ transposed the Galilean 
concept of motion onto the psychological and political domains. Rather he postulated that 
the explanation of causes in any possible domain was to be in principle compatible with a 
physical account of motion, whether this explanation was directly accessible by human 
enquiry or not. In fact Hobbes did not provide a systematic redefinition in the jargon of 
mechanicism of any of the psychological and political concepts he used.45 Nevertheless 
he assumed this was, at least in principle, possible: in his works – political or not – he also 
repeatedly returned to these issues, trying to perfect the definitions and explanations of 
the terms, principles, and concepts he was using, as long as his philosophical system 
evolved. 
There is no doubt that, from the beginning of his scientific career, Hobbes was trying to 
found his theory of knowledge on the Galilean principle of local motion, on the basic 
assumption that nothing else than matter in motion existed, as his own account of the 
journey with Cavendish clearly shows (OL I, LXXXIX, vv. 105-130).46 As usual, the 
systematic evaluation of the ontological and/or epistemological relevance of Galileo’s 
hypothesis was committed to mechanical philosophers. Like all the authors gravitating 
around Mersenne’s circle, Hobbes soon became concerned with the epistemological need 
to ground the new mechanical science of matter. As a matter of fact, both Hobbes’s and 
Descartes’s enterprises were looking for a philosophical solution to the problem posed by 
Galilean relativity. But Hobbes’s radical opposition to Descartes’s dualist conception of 
substance and physical conception of matter resulted in a completely different strategy to 
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44 It is worth recalling that Hobbes had just argued that ‘the mind will be nothing more than motion occurring in 
various parts of an organic body. (AT VII, 178). See above, Chapter 1.2 on Hobbes’s Objections to 
Descartes’s meditations. 
45 Macpherson interestingly pointed out that the epistemological ‘gap’ between Hobbes’s physiology of the 
individual body and his sociology of the collective body had an ideological source (Macpherson 1962: 40 ff). 
46 Hobbes, Vita Carmine Expressa. According to Paganini, along his research Hobbes was not even so far 
from developing a kind of ‘anti-Platonic’ tendency also present in Galileo (Paganini 2010: 66-67). 
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solve the epistemological problem of the foundation of mechanical science. In Descartes, 
as explained in Chapter 1, this was achieved through a) the postulate of a metaphysical 
substance, immune from motion, capable of intuitive knowledge; b) the mechanisation of 
nature through reduction of matter to an extended body submitted to the laws of nature. In 
Hobbes the same purpose was pursued through two converging strategies: the 
‘physicalisation’ of geometry and the ‘geometrisation’ of physics. But Hobbes’s path was 
the one which required the utmost ideological effort, because it was carried on within the 
framework of a materialistic metaphysics, traditionally empiricist and relativist, and, quite 
often, non-deterministic. 
The basic inconsistency between the integral assumption of the mechanistic project and 
the framework of materialism required Hobbes to fight his war on different front lines: 
against the Aristotelian tradition and against the new mechanical philosophy both in its 
Cartesian deductive form and in the experimental form which was soon thereafter 
triumphing through the Royal Society. This aporetical stance compelled him to oscillate for 
a long time between some themes of the materialist tradition: the hypothesis of void, 
which dangerously opened the space for an aleatory form of materialism, and the 
question of ontological determinism, which soon proved to be a decisive battle for the 
holding of the whole system. Along this path he finally committed to the (purely 
ideological) solution of the epistemological-political problem of connecting the foundation 
of the names, definitions, and principles of science to the effective artificial order of the 
political body, with the purpose of granting the continual motion (and infinite reproduction) 
of the latter. This was Hobbes’s way of abandoning the Galilean principle of the relativity 
of physical motion and making of ‘matter in motion’ a safely circumscribed object for 
science. As I am now going to explain, this political outcome is at the very core of the 
mechanistic project. It corresponded to the political agenda of mechanical philosophy, 
which Descartes had settled on apparently opposed metaphysical grounds. In fact early-
modern mechanicism – the philosophical foundation of Galilean mechanics – was born 
essentially dualist, deductivist, and determinist. And, despite – or rather precisely because 
of – its apparent neutrality, it was implicitly committed to developing a pedagogical 
agenda. Along this path, Hobbes’s pedagogical project drives straight back to its 
mechanical sources. 
Defining, controlling, and producing human nature 
When in Leviathan civil science identified human nature as an object of scientific 
knowledge and pedagogical technology, this was the result of Hobbes’s epistemological-
political enterprise. But the agenda of this project was set as early as in De cive, and it 
was the transposition into civil science of the Cartesian agenda which prescribed the 
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identification of geometry and the physics of motion. As stones ‘of rough and irregular 
shape’ have to be shaped to fit the structure, while others, too hard ‘to be compressed or 
cut’, must be ‘thrown away as unsuitable’, 47  the same is for men who, when 
‘inconsiderate’ to others, are not to be esteemed human anymore: ‘Cicero regards 
inhuman as the opposite of considerate, as if he had this law in mind’ (DC III.9; OL II, 
187).48 This exigency of order, along with the exigency of ‘squaring’ human actions 
through laws, was not at all a novelty in Hobbes’s political views: 
The true end of all Laws is to ordain, and settle an order, and government amongst 
us, the Jurisdiction whereof we are rather bound to obey, than dispute; Laws being 
[…] the very rules, by which all the actions of our life be squared and disposed. (HS 
105, italics added)49 
Yet the actual endorsement of the ‘collapse’ of geometry and civil science by means of 
mechanics was not clearly stated by Hobbes before the Preface to the Readers, where 
there appears for the first time in his writings the model of the clock. Emblematic of 
Hobbes’s definitive adoption of ontological determinism, the model of the clock allowed 
him to postulate, despite the epistemological limitations of knowledge, the ontological 
presupposition of a perfect mechanical functioning of the body politic: 
As in an automatic Clock or other fairly complex device, one cannot get to know the 
function of each part and wheel unless one takes it apart, and examines separately 
the material, shape, and motion of the parts, so in investigating the right of the 
commonwealth and the duties of the citizens, there is a need, not indeed to take the 
commonwealth apart, but to view it as taken apart, i.e. to understand correctly what 
human nature is like, and in what features it is suitable and in what unsuitable to 
construct a commonwealth, and how men who want to grow together must be 
connected. (DC Praef.; OL II, 145-46) 
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47 ‘Lapis, qui prae figura apsera et angulosa plus loci caeteris aufert quam ipse implet, neque prae materiae 
duritie comprimi vel secari facile potest, nec compaginari aedificium sinit, tanquam incommodus abjicitur’. 
48 ‘Cicero tamen commodo opponit inhumanum, tanquam ad hanc ipsam legem adspectans’. 
49  A Discourse of Laws is part of a twelve-essay volume entitled Horae Subsecivae [Leisure Hours]: 
Observations and Discourses, published anonymously in London in 1620 (cf. Reynolds and Saxonhouse 
1995, pp. 3-19). Strauss relied on Horae Subsecivae as Hobbes’s early work. A recent study based on a 
computerised ‘Wordprint Analysis Procedure’ has apparently ‘proved’ Hobbes’s authorship for three of the 
twelve essays. Skinner casts doubts on such analyses, although he provisionally accepts the hypothesis on 
the young humanist Hobbes, which is highly compatible with his portrait of the development of the latter’s 
philosophy: ‘Nevertheless, it seems very probable that Hobbes at least had a considerable hand in these texts 
[…]. There are, in short, some independent reasons for thinking it likely that the computer analysis is correct. 
Given these reasons, it seems appropriate to assume, at least provisionally, that the three Discourses singled 
out by the computer are indeed by Hobbes. The implications with respect to the place of the studia 
humanitatis in his intellectual development are of great interest’ (Skinner 2002: 46). More recently Skinner 
2008: 1, n. 3, seems to have rejected the hypothesis. However, these problems of attribution do not affect my 
argument, because quotations from Horae Subsecivae are here rather used as rhetorical device than as 
arguments. 
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This assumption definitively integrated Hobbes’s civil science into a systemic perspective 
where the main purpose of philosophy was the preservation of the body politic at all costs. 
For this purpose an epistemological and political decision was needed to both define and 
dominate the political monstrosity of human nature, by re-inscribing it within the 
established geometrical order: 
Suppose a woman gives birth to a deformed figure, and the law forbids killing a 
human being, the question arises whether the new-born is a human being. The 
question then is, what is a human being? No one doubts that the commonwealth will 
decide – and without taking account of the Aristotelian definition that Man is a 
rational Animal. […] In all disputes on these topics [i.e. ‘ius, politia, et scientiae 
naturales’] individual citizens should obey the laws and decisions of their 
commonwealth. (DC XVII.12; OL II, 389) 
The political efficacy and the risk of all politics of human rights substantiated by a science 
of human nature is evident here.50 Through different pedagogical technologies human 
nature can be reduced to fit any ‘artificial’ order grounded on (if not established by) 
political power.51 And, in effect, the definition, control, and production of human nature 
was in Hobbes a strategic epistemological and political task. 
Although Leviathan was not at all about mechanics, mechanics was postulated as the 
ultimate justification of the argument presented therein: human natural individual bodies 
are not fit for collective life, their growth is disorderly, and therefore the collective body has 
to be an artificial one, whose mechanical motion would function, on the contrary, 
according to the ideal laws of (human) nature. Hobbes’s horror of organic growth is quite 
evident when he invests Leviathan, the biblical monster he draws from the book of Job, 
with the epic task of fighting the multiple-headed monster representing the hybris of ‘the 
children of pride’:52 
To what disease in the natural body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity 
of a commonwealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man 
growing out of his side, with a head, arms, breast, and stomach, of his own: if he 
had had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have 
been exact. [...] It is a contention with ambition, like that of Hercules with the 
monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there 
grew up three. (Lev XXIX; EW III, 318-19, 338) 
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50 See for instance Badiou 2001. See also Agamben 1998. 
51 It is worth noting that Hobbes always conceived the sovereign as an ‘arbiter’, not the ‘creator’, of truth. It is 
through this conceptual distinction that Popkin maintains that – although Hobbes was not a sceptic – by 
‘making the sovereign the political arbiter of truth’ he laid ‘the groundwork for a much more dangerous 
scepticism’, the one characterising ‘the new Orwellian state’, based on technologies capable of shifting state 
power from the possibility of ‘deciding’ on truth to the capacity of ‘creating’ it (Popkin 1982: 145). 
52 Leviathan ‘is king over all the children of pride’ in the book of Job 41:34. 
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New heads of the hydra continuously sprout and grow within the body politic because of 
the natural passions of men, from the dangerous imitation of the exempla of some great 
men, who should be opposed by the sovereign at the outset (when they still are of little 
danger).53 This ‘organic’ re-emergence of the natural irrational tendencies characterising 
human nature was in fact pictured by Hobbes in the earlier Elements of Law, where he 
denounced all internally growing bodies as inherently cancerous, capable of becoming 
‘one body of rebellion’ (EL XXVII.11).54 In De cive’s dedicatory letter he stressed that a 
‘geometrically organised’ commonwealth could perfectly secure peace, exception made 
for the eventuality of conflicts ‘over space, due to the growth of the multitude [crescente 
hominum multitudine]’ (DC Ep.; OL II, 137-38). In short, any growth preventing the artificial 
functioning-as-one of the body politic becomes a kind of ‘internal enemy’, a risk for the 
overarching aim of the collective automaton: its continuation at all costs, in order to grant 
‘peace and leisure’ (and, last but not least, a stable ground for scientific research).55 
Hobbes’s problem was to control the genesis of the artificial body politic from the natural 
bodies of men, that is from human nature. To this problem – a problem of motion again – 
Hobbes’s subsequent solutions changed along with his epistemology. In the case of a 
‘natural’ body politic the narration of The Elements of Law poses the problem of the 
passage from the natural commonwealth (by acquisition) to the artificial commonwealth 
(by institution), to which corresponds a certain genealogical analysis of the passage from 
democracy to aristocracy and monarchy in Chapter XXI devoted to the forms of 
government, and finally the distinction between the pact unionis and the pact 
subjectionis. 56  From De cive onwards everything changes. The pact is unified and 
neutralised, and we have in fact a quite a-temporal description of the model of the pact, 
while the description of the three forms of government is largely topological and its 
genealogical progression still appears as a background narration. In short, Hobbes moves 
from an ontological genealogy of the pact producing the commonwealth in The Elements 
of Law to the uniformation and neutralisation of the model of the pact in De cive (union 
and submission), and the consequent disappearance of the problem of the relation 
between what is natural and artificial in the political sphere. 
The next step is the ideological achievement of the representation of the logical form of 
the pact in Leviathan, where the birth of a rhetoric of neutralisation is finally accomplished. 
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53 On the crucial role played by the ambivalence of ‘ambition’ in Hobbes’s ‘political philosophy of glory’, see 
Slomp 2000: 58-73. According to the author the assumption of this structural ambivalence would progressively 
open Hobbes’s political theory to a political pedagogy of civil obedience. 
54 In De cive and Leviathan Hobbes does not even mention a ‘body of rebellion’. More radically, he explicitly 
states that sedition cannot generate new ‘civitates’ (DC XII.8; OL II, 291-92) or ‘commonwealths’ (Lev XXIX, 
308-9, 313, 318-19), it just menaces to dissolve existing ones. 
55 ‘Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth, the mother of peace and leisure. Where first were 
great and flourishing cities, there was first the study of philosophy’ (Lev XLVI; EW III, 666). 
56 This sequence is synthesised by Piccinini 2007: 73, 76-77. 
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While in both De cive and Leviathan the pact unionis and the pact subiectionis are in fact 
a single step, the great novelty of the latter is the reappearance of the problem of the 
relation between human nature and the artificial body politic. The problem of the transition 
is solved by the ritualisation of the sovereign’s investiture: the actor/author scheme puts 
on the stage the imaginary result of the pact as if it were a pact of each one with 
everyone. The material democratic genealogy of sovereignty described in the ontology of 
The Elements of Law is here revived as a democratic ritual and therefore neutralised 
(Piccinini 2007: 82).57 Therefore in Leviathan we do not have only the investiture of the 
sovereign with the power of controlling human nature but, more significantly, with the 
power to produce a representation of it that would guide the mechanisms of its selection 
and preservation, according to an ordered, secure, artificial pattern. 
In fact, even in The Elements of Law we are never concerned with an actually ‘natural’ 
body politic. Human ‘wills’ continuously provide their ‘natural’ part of causality contributing 
to the building of artificial bodies, but without ever granting their unity and persistence. 
Thus, even if a body politic might ‘naturally’ result from the convergence of men’s natural 
wills, it should also have to be ‘artificially’ kept in motion, otherwise it would soon cease to 
be (since, as Hobbes clearly explains in Leviathan, ‘life is but a motion of limbs’, Lev Intro, 
EW III, IX). That is why Hobbes can at the same time state that consent is a natural (that 
is mechanical) convergence of wills producing one single action (EL XII.7), and still claim 
the necessity of a further ‘artificial’ common power in order to compel men to ‘direct their 
actions to one and same end’ (EL XIX.4).58 But Hobbes’s achievement in Leviathan is 
marked by the complete awareness of the necessity of regulating – that is dominating and 
preserving – human natural motion. Individuals are properly defined ‘human’ only by some 
particular kind of motions which constitute the model of their ‘functioning’, in particular, as 
explained in Chapter 3.2, curiosity and admiration (Lev VI; EW III, 44, 45), and last but not 
least speech, the mark of the attained capacity of acquiring the use of ‘Reason’ (Lev V; 
EW III, 116). Humans are a peculiar part of matter that must be organised in order to be 
kept in motion on the basis of its internal causes, the laws of human nature. Any artificial 
tools (also and mainly ideological) have to be employed to help human natural bodies 
develop their inner human motions by coping with external causes, utilising or resisting 
them according to the case: 
The use of laws is not to bind the people from voluntary actions, but to direct and 
keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous 
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57 The author convincingly pictures Leviathan as a ‘huge disciplinary dispositif’ strongly contributing to the 
generation of the very concept of ‘public opinion’ as the basis of a public space of disciplination and 
compatibilisaton of individual opinions (Piccinini 2007: 84-85; see also Piccinini 1999: 136). 
58 Cf. also EL XIX.6 to see how ‘natural’ consent needs an artificial reinforcement. 
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desires […] not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. (Lev XXX; EW III, 
335, italics added) 
It was still alluding to the book of Job that Hobbes tried to picture this distinction between 
the natural and artificial motion of human matter. The Leviathan/Behemoth antithesis 
mythically represents in the political domain this struggle between the ordered motion of 
the machine and the disorderly growing matter of the multitude.59 In effect in Behemoth 
Hobbes conceives the multitude as characterised by a kind of motion which tends – so to 
say – to oppose the artificial motion of the body politic. Independently of its composition, 
the multitude tends to forget all that has been learned: 
The common people have been, and always will be, ignorant of their duty to the 
public […]. If you think the late miseries have made them wiser, that will quickly be 
forgot, and then we shall be no wiser than we were. (Beh; EW VI, 212, italics 
added)60 
This feature characterises the ‘natural’ motion of the multitude towards the ignorance, 
notably, of the ‘rules of just and unjust’ despite their simplicity (Beh; EW VI, 212). And this 
natural tendency of the multitude is precisely what exposes it to all kinds of propaganda 
from which intermediate bodies (that is ‘the unjust’) can emerge and grow.61 Hobbes’s 
remedy for this cancerous disease was a true pharmakon, a Leviathan contrasting 
Behemoth: an artificial counter-monster endowed with mechanically regulated motion, 
capable of preventing the risk of a disordered organic growth due to the intrinsic lack of 
memory and ignorance of the multitude. 
Also Behemoth’s science is ultimately based on one single fundamental law of nature – 
that prescribes the preservation of life – which is double sided: on the one hand it 
prescribes for the people the obedience to the sovereign; on the other it prescribes for the 
king the preservation of the salus populi (Beh; EW VI, 248-49). And it is Hobbes’s 
conviction that, on the basis of this single clear and evident law of nature, all disputes 
could be settled thanks to a commitment to the ‘wisdom of the state’ (Beh; EW VI, 244). 
But in Behemoth it is more clear than ever that, for this purpose, an active endorsement 
by civil power of the pedagogical power of both science and ideology is required. Although 
the practice of natural philosophy must not mingle with religion and remain the privilege of 
an elite (Beh; EW VI, 236-37), its discoveries have to be at the service of the state that 
conversely grants the ‘leisure’ for the development of research. Thus a fundamental 
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59 This antithesis was explicitly stated by Hobbes when he ironically suggested to Bramhall, for those who 
would prepare a refutation of his Leviathan, ‘a fit Title for their Book, Behemoth against Leviathan’ (EW V, 27). 
60 Hobbes’s use of the ‘we’ here might suggest that the multitude represents a feature inscribed in the nature 
of every human being, the learned included. 
61 It is quite easy to imagine ‘what kind of men such a multitude of ignorant people were like to elect for their 
burgesses and knights of shires’ (Beh; EW VI, 212). 
 176 
feature of the state becomes the development of philosophy, because it is the actual basis 
of the system of knowledge that, on the law of (human) nature, can project the 
foundations of public education through what we might call a deliberately ideological use 
of science. This development has the aim of overcoming the divide between science and 
ideology in order to make of rhetoric, Hobbes’s greater enemy (Beh; EW VI, 249), a tool of 
state power. In fact, Hobbes is well aware of the limitations of state power and the risk 
entailed by coercion, as far as opinions are concerned: 
A state can constrain obedience, but convince no error, nor alter the mind of them 
that believe they have the better reason. Suppression of doctrines does but unite 
and exasperate, that is, increase both the malice and power of them that have 
already believed them. (Beh; EW VI, 249) 
As a consequence, through science civil power has not only to control public opinion, but 
must also produce it. And around this issue the problem of universities comes to be 
crucial. First, because ‘the Universities have been to this nation, as the wooden horse was 
to the Trojans’ (Beh; EW VI, 213).62 And second because they can be transformed into the 
most powerful tool for state power. For these reasons, universities ‘are not to be cast 
away, but to be disciplined’ (Beh; EW VI, 236). In short, only an institutional reform of the 
university, sustained by the powers of science and religion through rhetoric, can fully 
serve this purpose, and make ‘solid reason’ prevail (Beh; EW VI, 233). On this ground 
Hobbes sketched his project of reformation of the universities by the formation of an 
intellectual army educated to the new science against ‘all those preachers that taught the 
contrary’ (Beh; EW VI, 213): an army of ‘well-principled preachers’ (Beh; EW VI, 237) who 
would bring men to love obedience and true liberty, namely the absence of ‘the constraint 
and insolence of their neighbours’ (Beh; EW VI, 237).63 In effect, at that point Hobbes’s 
main political problem was no longer the Platonic one of ‘controlling the controllers’ – it 
was not a problem of ‘sovereignty’ – but rather of ‘educating the educators’. It was a 
problem of discipline. And in this project also the discipline of history had a crucial role to 
play. 
From this perspective Behemoth can be read as a book in which, against any 
epistemological claim ever provided by Hobbes, history is treated from the perspective of 
a ‘science’ of human nature, and therefore subject to similar limitations: ‘I cannot enter 
into other men’s thoughts, farther than I am led by the consideration of human nature in 
general’ (Beh; EW VI, 200). But in this case the simplicity of science must confront the 
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62  Here Hobbes is particular challenging the Presbyterians and the Catholic Church. In effect, the 
(counter)model of Hobbes’s project was the Catholic Church, who occupied the universities, forming scholars 
who spread Christian-Aristotelianism. 
63 On Hobbes’s definition of liberty as ‘absence of external impediments’, see above, Chapter 2.3. 
 177 
complexity of ideology, because Hobbes’s history of the Civil War is intended to shed 
some light on the effects of the opposition between the clarity of science and those who 
made use of ‘the obscurity’ of their doctrine (Beh; EW VI, 215). As a result Behemoth 
appears to be a study of human actions through the scientific lens of human nature, but 
also what one might name a militant science of ideology, namely of the disputable 
contents that cause and drive human actions, independently of scientific truth. In 
Behemoth history appears to be first of all the description of the human actions that led to 
the Civil War. But it is, at the same time, the science of the ‘causes, pretensions, justice, 
order, artifice, and event’ of human actions (Beh; EW VI, 165). It is therefore based on the 
science of human nature as a cause, but it is also, and more precisely, a science of 
ideology as a cause of sedition and war: 
The history, not so much of those actions that passed in the time of the late 
troubles, as of their causes, and of the councils and artifice by which they were 
brought to pass. (Beh; EW VI, 220)64 
In this sense it is evident that Hobbes’s practice of history in Behemoth is part of the 
disciplinary technologies required by a politics of science in order to provide an artificial 
functioning for the natural motion of human matter. Such technologies are not included in 
Hobbes’s system of sciences – in fact they were never considered sciences by him – and 
yet they function as political means at the service of the main scientific aim: consolidating 
the social order allows peace and therefore scientific research to take place.65 For this 
purposes the educators in the universities should have been educated not only in the new 
science, but also in the good use of the pedagogical technique par excellence, that is 
Religion, which in turn will allow them to educate the multitude: 
The rules of just and unjust sufficiently demonstrated, and from principles evident to 
the meanest capacity, have not been wanting; and notwithstanding the obscurity of 
their author, have shined, not only in this, but also in foreign countries, to men of 
good education. But they are few, in respect of the rest of the men, whereof many 
cannot read: many, though they can, have no leisure; and of them that have leisure, 
the greatest part have their minds wholly employed and taken up by their private 
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64 Hobbes himself does not fail to clarify that Behemoth is not at all a piece of (military) history: ‘I intended only 
the story of their injustice, impudence, and hypocrisy; therefore, for the proceeding of the war, I refer you to 
the history thereof written at large in English’ (Beh; EW VI, 313). 
65 As explained by Skinner, in The Elements of Law, De cive, and Behemoth Hobbes consistently considered 
history as only a source of prudence (in which also beasts participate), and therefore not a science (Skinner 
1996: 260 ff). But according to Skinner Hobbes’s argument was simply Aristotelian: history has no universality 
nor necessity since it narrates individual events (Skinner 1996: 262). I am suggesting that in fact Hobbes, 
precisely in Behemoth, was prospecting the possibility of changing the Aristotelian view on history. 
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businesses or pleasures. So that it is impossible that the multitude should ever learn 
their duty, but from the pulpit and upon holidays. (Beh; EW VI, 213)66 
Hobbes’s ontological assumption concerning the nature of the multitude grounded and 
justified a conjoint epistemological and political action on human nature through which the 
latter could be reduced to the laws of nature prescribed by the established ‘artificial’ order. 
And here comes Hobbes’s main argument concerning the special kind of rhetoric of 
neutrality that science can effectively endorse. Precisely because science is not a 
question of contents but of procedures of reasoning based on the correct establishing of 
meanings, it can be used in disputes against those (here ‘this Parliament’) who, on the 
contrary, ‘in the use of their words, when they accused any man, never regarded the 
signification of them, but the weight they had to aggravate their accusation to the ignorant 
multitude’ (Beh; EW VI, 249). More precisely, the rhetoric of science can be properly used 
not in disputes, but rather against them, by preventing the useless quarrels in the 
universities from becoming dangerous struggles within the state that would threaten the 
unity of the body politic (Beh; EW VI, 242). For this purpose any means would fit, apart 
from the ones that excluded what had to be necessarily presupposed and produced: the 
disposition to understand and/or to believe in the theoretical power of reason, capable of 
providing a neutral account of facts and effective advice for political action. 
 
3.4 Science and Ideology? The Political Agenda of Mechanicism 
My research has shown so far that Hobbes’s civil science was not only the outcome of a 
political agenda, it also carried on an epistemological agenda that was hardly compatible 
with its materialistic premises. Hence I am going to move a step further in order to claim 
that this contradiction casts doubt on the consistency of the mechanistic enterprise as a 
whole as the attempt to define the secure boundaries of science from the moving 
perimeters of opinion, which modern science simply labels as ignorance or ideology. As 
explained in the introduction, I have crossed three different approaches in order to 
analyse the role played by ideology in Hobbes’s mechanicism: constructivism, intellectual 
history, and Marxism.67 Each of these approaches entails, more or less explicitly, a theory 
of the emergence of modern science and of its political stakes, on the one hand, and a 
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66 According to Vaughan, a rhetorical use of history was carried on by Hobbes in Behemoth, where he 
displayed a process of pedagogical education – between A and B – through historical examples (Vaughan 
2002: 98-100). Although clearly seeing the centrality of political pedagogy in Hobbes’s project, Vaughan 
seems to overlook the pedagogical function of religion, which is also crucial in Behemoth. Religion was not at 
all ‘a private concern’ for Hobbes (Vaughan 2002: 80): on the contrary, it had to be monopolised by the public 
sphere, in order to avoid any ‘private’ use of it. In fact, it is in this direction that he spent more and more ink 
and time dealing with this topic in his political treatises, and not only. 
67 In my Introduction I have mainly dealt with intellectual history and constructivism by taking as emblematic of 
these approaches Jesseph 1999, Shapin and Shaffer 1988, respectively. In this section I will extensively deal 
with Marxist interpretations. 
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theory of the relation between scientific truth and ideology, on the other. For intellectual 
history, the term ‘ideology’ usually explains inconsistent deviations of the individual’s 
thought from reason and a meaningless opposition to facts: in short, ideology equals 
objective description minus natural facts as they appear to a neutral observer in his 
historical context. For the constructivist approach ideology is a relational concept born 
within Western science in order to identify antagonist truths by stressing their distance 
from the dominant scientific one. For Marxism ideologies are the superstructural 
expression of modes of productions and class conflicts, and they must therefore be 
interpreted in terms of their strategic opposition to a scientific truth which is rarely 
questioned.68 According to Sohn-Rethel most Marxist accounts on science inherited this 
biased view from an original lack in Marx’s own work: 
In fact Marx did not focus his attention on a historical-materialist understanding of 
natural science […] natural science was not given a place as either belonging to the 
ideological superstructure or the social base. The references to science in Capital 
appear to take its intrinsic methodological possibility for granted. (Sohn-Rethel 1978: 
2) 
As a matter of fact, also when presented within Marxism, such an approach is idealistic 
insofar it takes as its undisputed object a natural ‘reality’ which is in fact the result of 
collective processes of imagination, transformation, and manipulation of matter, in a word 
of praxis. It is evident that any account of philosophical thought which undisputedly 
assumes science (of facts) as the ultimate horizon of knowledge can only find its own 
epistemological foundation in the present achievements of science, and refuse any 
philosophical questioning of the emergence of science itself. These achievements are 
nevertheless the results of a ‘tradition’ the emergence of which is usually explained 
through a plain reference to some primordial evidence, implicitly based – willing or not – 
on the undue hypostatisation of ‘human being’, ‘human nature’, or ‘human rationality’, 
whether in the form of a biologically determined feature or of a metaphysical soul. In my 
view this hypostatisation is precisely the persisting counterpart of an implicit idealistic 
reduction of nature to mechanical functioning as it was imagined in the seventeenth 
century by those who invented mechanical philosophy. By imagining nature as an abstract 
machine, modern mechanicism provided a powerful image of it which was perfectly 
reflected in the perfection in principle attributed to human reason. From such a 
perspective, in Descartes’s res extensa and in his mechanistic image of nature we find an 
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68 Of course, as I have explained in my Introduction, in Marxist thought the relation between science and 
ideology has always been quite far from being a plain assumption. And, as a matter of fact, modern science 
was in Marxism the subject of deep and prolonged debates that, by questioning science, arrived at 
questioning the epistemological status of Marxism as a science itself. 
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ideology both so near and so far from us, which implicitly avoids questioning the historicity 
of science and the ‘a-theoretical facts’ through which it allegedly represents reality as it is. 
But Descartes’s systematic foundation of what will be later called mechanical philosophy 
was not a direct and necessary outcome of the method of the new science. In fact, it was 
rather the result of a metaphysical choice the roots of which fall far beyond the boundaries 
of the realm of philosophical writings and scientific research. And the world picture it 
contributed to generating has for a long time been a winning and pervasive one. Yet it is 
not clear how much this outcome depended on the method of the new mechanical 
science or/and on its metaphysical systematisation by mechanical philosophers. In short, 
it is still to be enquired how far the method of modern science itself, although defined and 
supported by the apparently ahistorical evidence of its technological applications, was 
rooted in early-modern society. This detour will allow me to get back to my interpretation 
of the significance of Hobbes’s materialism as a case study perfectly embodying the 
ideological stakes of early-modern mechanical philosophy.  
Science as ideology and the technical basis: A Marxist debate 
Edgar Zisel was one of the first to analyse the social roots of early-modern science by 
focusing on the twofold characterisation of the scientific method itself: 
The two components of scientific method were separated by a social barrier: logical 
training was reserved for upper-class scholars; experimentation, causal interest, and 
quantitative method were left to more or less plebeian artisans. Science was born 
when, with the progress of technology, the experimental method eventually 
overcame the social prejudice against manual labor and was adopted by rationally 
trained scholars. This was accomplished about 1600 (Gilbert, Galileo, Bacon) […]. 
Eventually the social barrier between the two components of the scientific method 
broke down, and the methods of the superior craftsmen were adopted by 
academically trained scholars: real science was born. (Zilsel 1942a: 935, 942) 
Quite emblematic of the problem concerning the social roots and ideological status of 
modern science within the Marxist tradition was the debate between Borkenau and 
Grossmann, a brief summary of which will allow me to pose the problem of the relation 
between the two sides of the method of modern science outside of any simplistic 
opposition between classes. This will display all the difficulty of treating modern science 
under the label of bourgeois ideology. In fact, in my work, I have assumed that the 
problem of the objective value of modern science must be addressed within its ideological 
function, through the peculiar role played by technics in shaping the method of modern 
science. 
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At the beginning of the 1930s, Franz Borkenau crossed the boundaries of the Frankfurt 
School’s conceptual framework in order to provide one of the most interesting Marxist 
narrations about the emergence of modernity.69 According to Borkenau the bourgeois 
mechanistic world-picture ultimately derived from the development of manufacture. 
Mechanised manufacturing processes of production constituted the model for a new way 
of understanding natural phenomena (Borkenau 1932: 109). The emergence of ‘abstract 
work’ gave an impulse to quantitative methods exclusively concerned with the abstract 
properties of matter deprived of all non-controlled unproductive qualities, thus developing 
the theoretical basis for modern Galilean mechanics: ‘For the first time it [manufacture] 
created abstract work and abstract matter’ (Borkenau 1934: 22).70 Galilean mechanics, 
the prerequisite of the mechanistic world-picture, was hence differently framed according 
to the exigencies of the different social forces. Cartesian philosophy was the ideological 
construction of an ‘optimistic’ and idealistic Weltanschauung by the French noblesse de 
robe, while Hobbesian civil science was the ideological construction of a ‘pessimistic’ and 
materialistic Weltanschauung by the English landed gentry (Borkenau 1932: 120-125). 
The mechanistic Weltanschauung eventually imposed itself, not mainly in regard to ‘the 
requirements of the technical production process’, but where the social classes which 
were carrying it on prevailed (Borkenau 1932: 110): not in Italy then, but in France, 
Holland, and England (Borkenau 1932: 117). 
Borkenau’s train of thought is: 1) men’s social self-intuition is the basis for the 
understanding of nature; 2) in the seventeenth century a new mode of production 
(manufacture) produced a new framework for collective self-intuition,71  and therefore 
determined the emergence of a new image of nature (mechanicism), which assumed 
different forms depending on the different social forces carrying it on; 3) when the social 
transformation of productive-social relations had widely transformed men’s self-intuition, 
the new bourgeois world-picture was culturally ‘established’ and mechanicism became the 
dominant ideology. As a consequence, when nature was eventually conceived as an 
ordered mechanism governed by abstract mathematical laws, and society revealed inner 
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69 Although basically Marxist, his analysis is indebted both to Weber and Dilthey. For the Dilthey-Weber 
heritage in Borkenau, see Szakolczai 2011, who notes that Weber himself claimed that beside his work on the 
Protestant Ethic, a parallel one could be devoted to the ‘mechanisation of technology’, ‘the creation and 
diffusion of the rationalist and antitraditionalist spirit’ (Weber 1978: 1128-29; quoted in Szakolczai 2011: 110, 
n. 12). 
70 The mechanistic ‘revolution’ had taken place in a quite short period, but the same model encountered, in 
fact, different ethical-political perspectives depending on the different positions endorsed by different actors 
within the framework of class struggle: ‘The rejection of qualitative philosophy, the creation of the mechanistic 
world-picture is a radical change that started around 1615 and had its culmination in Descartes’s Discours 
(1637), Galileo’s Discorsi (1638), and Hobbes’s Elements (1640)’ (Borkenau 1934: 22-23). 
71 In short, modern anthropology was the result of a circular epistemological process conceiving man as a part 
of nature, by completely removing the fact that the latter actually was a social construct (Borkenau 1934: 299 
ff.). In partial consonance with Borkenau’s view, one of my aims shall be to explain, through the analysis of the 
concept of machine, why, despite the appearances, mechanicism still was anthropomorphic. 
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contradictions and irreducibility to the rational laws of nature, a reversal was accomplished 
of the medieval hierarchy in which, on the contrary, the cosmos of human society was 
opposed to a qualitatively impenetrable and ‘diabolic’ nature. 
But then on what was the entire process of mechanization of the bourgeois world-picture 
based, in the last instance? To a certain extent, Borkenau seems to look for the 
foundation of men’s social self-intuition in the categories of thought and praxis dependent 
on the historical determination of the technical experience of the ‘working process’. 
According to Borkenau the source of mechanicism as bourgeois ideology was not 
manufacture as a technique of production, but rather the mathematical reduction of reality 
in which the productive ‘model’ of manufacture found its adequate and powerful 
representation. The mechanistic epistemological ‘turn’ was, in short, the ideological 
systematisation of a new – socially produced – Weltanschauung: 
The theory of knowledge, apparently a presupposition, proves to be an outcome of 
the socially conditioned view of the world order. (Borkenau 1932: 114) 
These topics, both epistemological and political, touched a deeper problem in Marxist 
thought, concerning the link between modern science and capitalism and therefore the 
ideological status of modern science as integrant part of bourgeois ideology. Indeed, the 
reaction was not long in coming. One year after Borkenau had published his book, 
Grossmann (1935a) harshly criticised him for providing an ‘over-simplified’ narration of the 
emergence of modern mechanical science, by presenting the origins of capitalism, that is 
primitive accumulation, as an ‘idyll’ (Grossmann 1935a: 120).72 This heresy, partially 
inherited from Weber, would entail a double mistake – theoretical and historiographical – 
concerning both the super-structural determinacy and the dating of the emergence of 
capitalism.73 Borkenau would in fact be projecting Smith’s eighteenth-century account of 
manufacture onto seventeenth century, thus failing to provide a correct account of the 
earlier emergence of mechanised processes of production under the shield of monetary 
capitalism (Grossmann 1935a: 120), and consequently disregarding the initial historical 
development of capitalism in the pre-manufacturing period pointed out by Marx himself in 
Capital XII.74 The category of ‘monetary capitalism’ would this way cease to be a valid 
Marxist tool for explaining the Renaissance and the dissolution of the feudal world. On the 
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72 Against this ill-tolerated heresy Horkheimer commissioned an attack on Henryk Grossmann, after Benjamin 
had failed to provide the requested article for the Süddeutsche Zeitung (Freudenthal – McLaughlin 2009: 247). 
The result was an important quarrel concerning Marxist interpretations of modernity, touching some points of 
the relationship among ideology, science, and technics, which are vital for my research. On Borkenau’s 
heretical position within the Frankfurt School and Horkheimer’s reaction, see Schiera 1978. 
73 One year before, Borkenau was similarly criticized by Grossmann for his Weberian stances, in that case 
related to the way he dealt with the role played by Calvinism in the emergence of capitalism: ‘In short, he 
follows directly in the footsteps of the petit bourgeois ideology of Max Weber, in which the history of emergent 
capitalism is an idyll’ (Grossmann 1934: 205). See Kuhn 2006. 
74 Chapter XIV of the English version. 
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contrary, for Grossmann ‘the bearers of the emerging capitalism did not originate from 
artisans’, since money governed this process far before the appearance of manufacture 
(Grossmann 1935a: 114). In conclusion – states Grossmann – the model for the ‘abstract 
work’ conception which links capitalism to mechanics was not originated in manufactural 
production, but rather developed in the sphere of trade (Grossmann 1935a: 129). 
Besides this whole set of important historiographical questions, what is more interesting 
for my purpose is the central role played by technics in Grossman’s argument. This is, as 
Grossmann clearly states, the ‘essential point’ of divergence with Borkenau, well 
evidenced by the centrality given to Leonardo’s texts in Grossmann’s essay (Grossmann 
1935a: 110 ff.). According to his argument, well covered in the original English summary 
of The Social Foundations of the Mechanistic Philosophy of Manufacture, the straight 
impact of the study of machines on the new world-view was not necessarily linked to a 
fully developed capitalistic framework: 
The development of machinery, not the calculation with abstract hours of labour, is 
the immediate source of modern scientific mechanics. This goes back to the 
Renaissance and has relatively little to do with the original factory system that was 
finally superseded by the Industrial Revolution. (Grossmann 1935a: 156) 
Grossmann contrasts here a widely shared view on technology as the goal of 
seventeenth-century science, which would result from a struggle between relations and 
forces of production. To this narration, which ‘expresses the position usually attributed to 
Marxist historiography of science – and emphatically rejected by Koyré, Hall and other 
traditional internalists in the history of science’ (Freudenthal – McLaughlin 2009: 4-5), 
Grossmann opposes that modern science is rather the genuine expression of a collective 
power of invention through ‘technical’ models. As far as it is linked to technics, science is 
not in itself ideological: it just becomes ideological within the development of capitalism. 
Hence Grossmann interrogates the bourgeois project of colonisation of collective imagery 
which originated during the Renaissance.75 For Grossmann, early-modern science had a 
revolutionary potential which it directly inherited from (Leonardo’s) mechanics, and 
Borkenau’s basic historiographical mistake was precisely to underestimate the importance 
of earlier mechanics for the shaping of the new world-picture. In short, according to 
Grossmann, Borkenau’s analysis not only tended to reduce mathematics to the 
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75 The way he conceives this as a revolutionary potential still present in seventeenth-century science is 
particularly evident in his essay on Descartes and the Social Origins of the Mechanistic Concept of World 
(1946), where he examines the sociological aspects of Descartes’s ‘Science Universelle’: ‘Not Descartes and 
Hobbes but Leonardo da Vinci was the initiator of modern thought. Leonardo’s theories, evolved from a study 
of machines, were the source of the mechanistic categories that culminated in modern thought […]. In 
Descartes, science thus reveals a truly new character, popular in the profoundest sense of the term, and 
universally human; a character alien to antiquity, as well as to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance’ 
(Grossmann 1946: 225, italics added; see also 161-62). 
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expression of a historical conjuncture, it also deliberately left out the theme of the 
ontological status of technics.76 
On the contrary, for Grossmann technics and science as collective tasks share the same 
‘ontological’ link with the collective power of invention: ‘There is no fundamental difference 
between inventing a technical and an intellectual construction. In the last analysis, every 
technical construction is also an intellectual one’ (Grossmann 1946: 221). Although he 
does not explicitly assign to technics a specific role in the social processes of constitution 
of the world picture, Grossmann repeatedly stresses the role of the observation of 
machines in shaping men’s (and philosophers’) thought. And, quite significantly, to 
Leonardo’s reflection on mechanics he sometimes seems to attribute a sort of progressive 
infrastructural autonomy due to the fact that ‘mechanics was only slowly created by the 
struggle of human reason with the empirical material’ (Grossmann 1935a: 141). Hence 
Grossmann provides plenty of examples of his faith in the historically progressive force of 
technics, which seems to find its epiphany in a letter of 1935, where he openly contrasts 
Marx’s answer ‘to the question, why no scientific mechanics could rise in antiquity’. It was 
not because antique society was based on slavery – he claims – but because of the 
encounter of a new social need for ‘saving human labor’ with some determinate inventions 
that both accomplished this practical task and provided the theoretical models for 
mechanics (Grossmann 1935b: 231-233).77 
The Borkenau-Grossmann debate not only directly challenges the understanding of early-
modern mechanicism as a science and an ideology, it also indirectly touches the 
assumptions of constructivism and intellectual history. What is more crucial, this debate 
allows us to draw some provisional conclusions, because it suggests that the social and 
ontological status of technics poses the problem of the link between science as a symbolic 
construction and matter as an instance that brings into modern science, and hence into 
culture, its own independent normativity. Grossmann’s concern is to show how the 
emergence of modern science is related to specific technological problems and solutions, 
rather than to attribute to technics in itself a particular inventive function, which could be 
more than the expression of the socioeconomic infrastructure. Therefore he does not 
actually provide a dedicated reflection to the ideological status of science, ultimately 
relying on productive forces and relations to set the framework for the structural 
explanation of ‘the totality of the social situation’ (Grossmann 1935a: 155). Although he 
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76 This reduced his enquiry to a purely ‘idealistic’ history of the concept of ‘natural law’ as the supposed 
pinpoint for modern science (Grossmann 1935a: 107), and excluded the possibility of any epistemological or 
factual evidence capable of imposing by its own force. 
77 Here Grossmann adds catapults, levers, and pumps to firearms and, in particular, clock mechanisms, which 
he had already mentioned and analysed in his essay on The Social Foundations. There he also underlined 
that ‘in our context Th. Hobbes is of special importance, since he first applied the mechanical conceptions to 
the social sphere, whereas previously they referred to natural phenomena only’ (Grossmann 1935a: 141 ff.). 
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reproaches Borkenau’s method as confused (literally ‘protean’, Grossmann 1935a: 147), 
Grossmann does not seem here to grasp the central active role he sometimes seems to 
assign to technics, and therefore he misses the way the ontological force of technical 
invention can be transposed in theoretical science too, thus partially preserving it from its 
ideological usage. In conclusion, despite the strength of Grossmann’s own method, that is 
the implementation of his genuinely Marxist historical analysis in the study of technics, his 
approach does not clearly prevent mechanical science from being reduced to the 
ideological expression of determinate forces and relations of production. 
For this reason I will rather follow Sohn-Rethel when – despite confirming the ‘primacy of 
society on technics’ – he clearly assumes that the basis is as much economical as 
technological, and its twofold nature explains both scientific and ideological development: 
Two parallel causal series contribute to the formation of consciousness, which I 
marked as economical and technological lines of development. Their effects are 
actualized in different ways and consequently have different ideological or scientific 
value. In European intellectual history, the ideological-philosophical series is clearly 
represented by Descartes, Hobbes, Gassendi, etc., the series of scientific thought 
by Galileo, Huygens, Newton, etc. Although the two series are surprisingly often 
conceptually intertwined, nevertheless I understand them as two separate trunks 
born from the same roots. (Sohn-Rethel 1970: 109)78 
It is worth considering, of course, all the risks connected to this conception of technics 
(and, as far as it is concerned with experiments, of science) as an independent line of 
development. But if we assume this approach, we can appreciate how, much more 
sharply than Grossmann’s, it allows us to differentiate modern sciences and ideology. If 
science were just intended to follow actual techniques it could be read as their ideological 
implementation within class interests, while if science is intended to borrow from 
techniques its theoretical instruments, it can be considered itself an alternative field of 
invention: ‘exact sciences are the preliminary conditions, while ideology is only an effect of 
the capitalistic class domain’ (Sohn-Rethel 1970: 116). According to this approach, 
sciences can be considered in themselves non-ideological only insofar as they depend on 
the technological ‘line of development’,79 and therefore, as Sohn-Rethel points out, the 
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78 The manuscript of Intellectual and Manual Labour, Critique of Idealistic Epistemology was ready in 1951 
(Sohn-Rethel 1970: 22), but it was first published in German (1970) and then translated into Italian. Only in 
1978 it appeared also in English, but with so many variations (mainly cuts in the text and additions in 
quotations) that it is not always possible to refer to the English edition of Intellectual and Manual Labour: A 
Critique of Epistemology (1978). 
79 ‘Unlike the economical line of development, technological development does not allow consideration of its 
ideological effect abstracted from the nature of things’ (Sohn-Rethel 1970: 114). However, technological 
development is still understood by Sohn-Rethel through the dialectical scheme (Sohn-Rethel 1970: 114, n. 
13). My approach is rather indebted to the way Leroi-Gourhan 1964, 1965, and Simondon 2012 highlight the 
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ideological significance of mechanicism does not discredit it tout court, but only its 
capitalistic ‘postulate of automatism’: 
Needless to say, however, the self-acting property of the labour process presents 
itself from the point of view of the capitalist; from that of the workers it looks different 
indeed! It is thus not science but ideology in the sense of one-sided class 
consciousness when, in the seventeenth century, philosophers like Descartes and 
Hobbes looked upon the outer world as a whole and in all its parts, organic no less 
than inorganic, as self-operating mechanisms. (Sohn-Rethel 1978: 123) 
And in effect the myth of a universal automatism became the basis of the mechanistic 
model of the modern state presented by Hobbes in Leviathan as a political project rather 
than as an object of scientific description. As explained in Chapter 3.3, the struggle 
against the ‘organic’ body politic was programmatic in Leviathan, where Hobbes explicitly 
aimed at the mechanical model of a powerful automaton that would build a consistent 
artificial body out of the natural bodies of the multitude. But when he displayed the political 
power of the anthropomorphic image of the geometrical machine, contrasting the 
irreducibility of human matter, he was still facing Descartes’s epistemological project of 
reducing the real emerging from technical experimentation to its mechanical-geometrical 
account. What seemed there to be a reduction of man to matter was in fact a reduction of 
matter to man: to the perfect, pure automatism imagined as both the accomplishment of 
the capitalist mode of production and the final solution to the political problem. 
Mechanicism as (bourgeois) ideology? 
From this perspective Hobbes’s theory of political power can be interpreted as part of the 
same ideological struggle Descartes was taking part in: a struggle in the field of 
epistemology between the exigencies of aristocracy and of the emerging bourgeoisie. But 
this was not a struggle in which the two philosophers can be taken as the representatives 
of one or the other field: rather, the struggle took place within each of their two 
philosophical enterprises. Probably for this reason Hobbes has been 
differently defined as the ideologue of absolutism, of despotism, of a declining 
feudal aristocracy, of an emerging or winning bourgeoisie, of the totalitarian State, of 
a society that had reached the generalisation of market economy, Hobbes escapes 
any of these definitions. (Biral 1999: 134) 
Engels addressed Hobbes’s political theory as an ‘aristocratic, esoteric doctrine’ (Engels 
MEW 19: 536), as such committed to absolutism and opposed to the political expression 
of merchants and landed gentry, that is the provisional political forms through which the 
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role played by technics as a trigger of symbolic and social invention. See also Mumford 1934, and Stiegler 
1994. 
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capitalist mode of production would later lead to the emergence of the bourgeoisie. Yet 
Marxist historiography has traditionally shared a bourgeois characterisation of Hobbes’s 
political thought (e.g. Macpherson 1945 and 1962) with both liberal and conservative 
scholars – such as Tönnies (1925), Leo Strauss (1936), Arendt (1958).80 Of course one 
can assume that the twofold nature of Hobbes’s social position was, in such an age of 
revolutionary transition, ‘equivocal, open onto two sides’ (Hill 1971: 355-57).81 Indeed the 
ambiguous socio-political collocation of Hobbes’s texts, early detected by his 
contemporary opponents, pushes to consider the seventeenth century itself as double-
sided. In Marxist terms, it might be said that the century prepared the shift to a capitalist 
economy while displaying the feudal reaction to the capitalistic issues that were already 
appearing on the political field.82 
Most of the thinkers this thesis has been dealing with were part of this historical process. 
And in particular, although playing a different role, Hobbes acted and thought in the same 
historical conjuncture as Descartes’s, thus representing another ‘individual facet’ of a 
collective drama taking place during the seventeenth century (Negri 2007: 113), following 
the libertine/sceptical denunciation of the end of the revolutionary project of the 
Renaissance. 83  The twofold method of science, dangerously open to technics as 
experimentation, was thus neutralised by Descartes’s metaphysics, which postulated the 
modern ideology of the objective neutrality of science and technology. Through 
Descartes’s ideological ‘choice’ for a mechanistic ontology of res extensa and for res 
cogitans as its metaphysical counterpart, mechanicism became provisionally consistent 
both with the bourgeois long-term project of domination of the world-machine and with the 
aristocratic need to equip the existing state of things with the power of scientific 
knowledge and technical invention. This framework steadily opened to the free 
development of an economy of techno-scientific progress within the secure boundaries of 
state power. 
From this perspective Hobbes’s integration of Descartes’s perspective can be said to 
reflect the fact that the modern sphere of ‘the political’ arose, and Europe entered the 
conjuncture in which ‘the field of politics was enlarged to sectors which it could previously 
overlook’ (De Giovanni 1981: 33-35). More precisely, Hobbes contributed to the 
replication of the secure boundaries established by Cartesian metaphysics out of the 
spiritual domain: on a political domain where human beings would be able to actually build 
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80 Thomas (1965) is a useful source of information on the variegated range of interpretations concerning the 
social origins of Hobbes’s political thought. 
81 Yet Hill finally maintains that Hobbes’s overall attitude towards politics, his mentality, his presuppositions 
‘are bourgeois’ (Hill 1971: 355-57). 
82 This perspective is explicitly assumed for instance by Haydn 1950 and Tronti 1977. 
83 On Hobbes’s conceptually problematic relation to the ‘constructive or mitigated scepticism’ characterising 
Mersenne’s circle, see Popkin 1982. 
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– through the state – a secured space for what would later be called civil society. In this 
sense ‘we are witnessing the historical phase in which “the political” is becoming “state”’ 
(De Giovanni 1981: 46). In this transition the main scope of political science became the 
conservation, administration, and even production of the form of life peculiar to these new 
artificial bodies. Through Hobbes’s implementation of mechanicism in the political domain, 
Descartes’s project for a reconstruction of the world-picture could definitely accept 
absolute authority as the only alternative granting – through a renunciation of direct 
political participation – ‘a limited but safe social space’ for freedom and research (Negri 
2007: 121). 
In this sense Negri has been able to recognise the spectre of Leviathan flowing from the 
same source as Cartesian ideology: ‘Absolutism was born on the lack of pursuable 
alternatives for men who had set their sights on revolution’ (Negri 2007: 128).84 In an only 
apparently similar way Koselleck claims that ‘[Hobbes’s] absolutist theory of the State 
already contains the nucleus of the bourgeois notion of a government of laws’ (Koselleck 
1988: 22). In fact, Koselleck detects in Hobbes the origins of the ‘pathogenesis of modern 
society’, that leads to the ‘neutralisation of conscience by politics’ (Koselleck 1988: 38-39): 
situated precisely at the seventeenth-century ‘juncture’ of Absolutism and Rationalist 
philosophy, Hobbes’s political theory would still presuppose the necessity of a sovereign 
defence of reason, thus preventing seventeenth-century philosophy from understanding 
that ‘the spirit of Enlightenment enables reason to emancipate itself’ (Koselleck 1988: 34). 
In this sense Negri’s Marxist thesis that Absolutism was the strategic ‘choice’ of a 
bourgeoisie which had abandoned its Renaissance utopian dream of conquest, rather 
reverses Koselleck’s – quite dialectical, indeed – thesis that ‘the bourgeoisie utopia was 
the “natural child” of Absolutist sovereignty’ (Koselleck 1988: 183). 
Both agree on the crucial role played in this process by early-modern rationalist 
philosophy through Descartes and Hobbes. And nevertheless, despite the metaphysical 
‘perfection’ of the rationalist solution, in mechanicism there was also something exceeding 
the historical circumstances of the absolutist and/or bourgeois project: something 
concerning the collective praxis of science, in which technical activity and experimentation 
showed the resistance of matter to geometrical models. In fact, in mechanistic philosophy 
a particular kind of praxis can be found, which experiments with the actual limits of its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Negri explains Descartes’s ‘reasonable ideology’ of separation as the separation of the long-term project of 
the bourgeoisie from the time of its accomplishment after the provisional defeat of its Renaissance 
emancipatory dream (Negri 2007, Chapter 3). Cacciari thus sketches ‘the political theory’ to be drawn from the 
Cartesian subject of science: ‘foundation of modern science as global rationalisation of the world and as 
general political domain […] bourgeois property of science […] rationalisation of “nature” in order to use it, and 
rationalisation of the “world” in order to make of it a private property. The Cogito which “functionalises” being, 
reduces it to technics, namely to a system of relations – the subject separates itself from being in order to 
have it technically, as a rationalised world’ (Cacciari 1970: 388-89). In short ‘separation and political 
domination (through scientific ratio) of the world are no longer in contradiction’ (Cacciari 1970: 377). 
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theoretical models, by challenging a reality which – as technics repeatedly testify – is 
outside of the predictability typical of geometrical mechanisms and required by the long-
term project of the bourgeoisie. But from a materialistic point of view, mechanical 
philosophy must be considered – as exemplarily testified by Hobbes’s case-study – an 
ideological attempt to reduce technics to a human measure, detaching it from the realm of 
nature, thus entirely submitting it, and through it nature itself, to the control of political 
power (and possibly by a determinate class). It was the bourgeoisie that eventually won 
the game, successfully reducing material techniques to the idea of technology, that is to 
its own image of the abstract machine of market, where the resistance of matter – and of 
human matter too – was relegated to a disturbance of the automatic and supposed 
‘natural’ functioning of the machine itself. I this sense, Hobbes’s rationalisation of the 
method of political science through reduction of politics to the laws of human nature was 
probably counterrevolutionary in its aims, and certainly Hobbes’s political epistemology 
was not originated within the bourgeoisie. But it finally became consistent with its long-
term development, driven by the necessity of producing a stable point of view consistent 
with (if not sustaining) the neutral horizon of ‘laws’ and ‘facts’, on which the technological 
administration of the existing state of things could be secured. To the epistemological 
struggle between the ‘bourgeois’ Descartes and the philo-aristocratic Hobbes, Leviathan 
provided an apparently neutral solution, which alternatively appeared to be fit – not by 
chance – for both the monarchy and the parliament, or for neither of them. 
The complexity of Hobbes’s biographical and intellectual relation with the different 
theological, metaphysical and political aspects of mechanical philosophy prevents any 
individual work from picturing it without previously drawing the boundaries of such an 
effort. What I have tried to do in this thesis has been to particularly focus on one aspect – 
materialism – from which a wider picture of the problematic development of Hobbes’s 
philosophy could be drawn, in order to question the basic assumption of the mechanistic 
project itself: the political neutrality of science. The analysis of the contradictions entailed 
by this assumption leads to the understanding of mechanicism as ‘a materialistic inversion 
of theological schemes’ (Balibar 1996: 221).85 Hence it is through the prism of Hobbes’s 
materialism that I have tried to analyse the hesitations, impasses, and shortcomings 
characterising the development of his political thought. Materialism was for Hobbes the 
fundamental philosophical postulate around which his epistemology, along with the 
methodology of his civil science, evolved. But in this process his materialist mechanicism 
itself evolved, and as far as it assumed its peculiar shape, it incorporated some essential 
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85 Balibar is referring here to Hobbes’s doctrine, whose equivocal interpretation would possibly arise ‘from the 
fact that Hobbes uses physical concepts to build an anthropological doctrine which is officially free from any 
theological allegiance but ultimately grants the “body politic” a mystical kind of unity, which might very well 
prove to be a materialistic inversion of theological schemes’ (Balibar 1996: 221). 
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features inherited from the dualistic metaphysics of his declared enemy, the dualistic 
metaphysics of Cartesian mechanicism. 
Hobbes’s materialism as a case study of the political agenda of mechanicism 
As a background of my research I have assumed that the new Galilean physics was not 
only the epicentre of the scientific revolution, but was also an ideological battlefield for 
establishing the metaphysics which would found the new world picture. Hence 
Descartes’s and Hobbes’s philosophical choices have been taken as both epistemological 
and ideological outcomes consistent with the agenda of early-modern mechanics. This 
means that their metaphysical assumptions have been taken as both theoretically 
required by the aim of founding a mechanistic epistemology and historically confirmed in 
their ideological function of justifying an emerging world picture. The concept of an 
automatic functioning of nature and the body politic, had political, economic, and social 
stakes because it allowed for the extension of the allegedly neutral power of technology 
over all these spheres. And to this historical process mechanical philosophy provided its 
ideological support. 
Hobbes’s epistemological development in civil science was, in fact, an ideological one, in 
which he might be said to have actually endorsed Descartes’s completely inadvertent 
suggestion of a possible extension of the mechanistic approach to the political domain. 
This suggestion we can recollect by returning to the above quoted letter to Mersenne, 
where, just after stating that ‘it is God who has laid down these laws [mathematical truths] 
in nature just as a King lays down laws in his Kingdom’, Descartes appears to convey the 
implicit desire of the whole mechanistic enterprise: 
These laws [‘mathematical truths’] are all inborn in our minds [mentibus nostris 
ingenitae] just as a king would imprint his laws on the hearts of all his subjects if he 
had enough power to do so. (AT I, 145) 
In this light, along with other disciplinary technologies, civil law itself appears to be for 
Hobbes’s sovereign a tool apt at making uneducated citizens behave according to the 
laws of nature, despite the general want of wisdom that commonly prevents human nature 
from perfectly complying with the dictates of right reason. This ‘disciplinary’86 production of 
subjects was not only Hobbes’s political project, it was in fact the very dualistic 
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86 Hobbes is pictured by Foucault mainly as the theorist of territorial sovereignty. I concede that Hobbes’s 
concern with movement opens to a more dynamic interpretation of his conception of the relationship between 
society and the state, yet I assume that his mechanistic opposition to growth prevents going so far as to detect 
a properly ‘biopolitical’ issue in the ‘(re)productive movement’ he deals with in political theory, as interestingly 
argued by De Vries and Spieker 2009: 470-74. Rather – by assuming the tripartite framework provided in 
Foucault 2004: 10-11, 22 – Hobbes might be said to have developed a theory of disciplinary power. On this 
topic see also Chignola 2006. 
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epistemology of mechanicism that entailed, as such, an entire political pedagogy, 
ultimately relying on a conception of nature as the potential enemy: 
Whether men will or not, God is king of the whole earth; and he is not shaken from 
his throne if a few men deny his Existence or his Providence. God so rules all men 
through power that no man can do anything which He does not want done; yet this 
is not Reigning in the precise and proper sense. A ruler is said to reign if he rules 
through speech rather than action, i.e. if he rules by precepts and threats. In the 
kingdom of God therefore we do not count inanimate bodies or things without 
reason as subjects (though they are subject to divine power), because they do not 
understand God’s precepts and threats. (DC XV.2; OL II, 332)87 
Along with ‘atheists’ and ‘those who believe in God’s existence but not in his governance 
here below’, ‘inanimate bodies’ and things ‘without reason’ are also included in Hobbes’s 
list of what cannot be counted as a ‘subject’ in God’s kingdom (DC XV.2; OL II, 332-33). 
All natural bodies are in fact, from this perspective, a danger in themselves as far as they 
resist scientific and politically-established rationality. This epistemological attack on nature 
was in fact an ideological one, in which Hobbes was endorsing the political agenda of 
mechanicism. The political agenda of mechanicism prescribed the ontological neutrality of 
Reason as an apolitical subject, and therefore a political project of neutralisation of 
knowledge and of its objects. It is in this sense that the objectivist approach of mechanical 
philosophy, when transferred into the political domain, entailed a project of normalisation 
of political practice according to the principles established by political theory. 
In my view, the challenge represented by Descartes’s metaphysics led Hobbes to tackle 
the topic of civil science three times in about a decade, from The Elements of Law Natural 
and Politic (1640), through two editions of De Cive (1642 and 1647), to the English 
Leviathan (1651). On this basis I have tracked in Chapter 2 the progressive politicization 
of epistemology and of scientific discourse in Hobbes’s philosophy, focusing particularly 
on the connections between his epistemology and the civil science he built during the 
1640s in close contact with Descartes’s natural philosophy. Along the lines of this 
epistemological struggle, Hobbes’s research eventually generated a subject of science 
that was entirely dependent on the power that could preserve its existence from the 
ungovernable contingency of matter in motion and of human matter in particular. This path 
led to a ‘conclusion’ which appears strikingly far from Hobbes’s possible point of departure 
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87  ‘Scilicet velint nolint homies, Deus est rex universae terrae; neque si sint qui existentiam ejus vel 
providentiam negaverint, ideo solio suo excutitur. Quamquam autem Deus homines universos ita per 
potentiam regat, ut nemo possit quidquam facere quod ille factum nolit, non est tamen hoc, proprie et 
accurate loquendo, regnare. Regnare enim dicitur, non qui agendo, sed qui loquendo, id est, praeceptis et 
minis regit. In regno igitur Dei, pro subditis habemus, non corpora inanimata, neque irrationalia, licet potentiae 
divinae subjiciantur; quia precepta et minas Dei non intelligunt.’ Hobbes is here commenting on the Psalms 
96:1, 98:1 (Vulgate numbering, in the Molesworth edition; 97:1 and 99:1 in King James Version numbering). 
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in Horae Subsecivae (1620) when – writing A Discourse upon the Beginning of Tacitus – 
he seemed to maintain a certain primacy of liberty: ‘the Fable is also applied of the Horse, 
who suffering a rider and the bit, for his assurance against the Hart that fed with him in the 
same pasture, could never after recover his former liberty’ (HS 238).88 In fact, in order to 
maintain peace at all costs, in Leviathan Hobbes often expected the sovereign to use any 
means, going so far as to implicitly desire something similar to what Tacitus himself had 
once described as a fake peace grounded on false names: 
To plunder, to slaughter, to steal, they falsely name government; and where they 
make a desert, they call it peace. (Tacitus, Agricola, XXX)89 
My choice of Hobbes as a case study has been precisely aimed at displaying how 
materialism is inconsistent with the epistemological-political project entailed by the 
deterministic – and inherently dualistic – version of mechanicism founded by Descartes’s 
metaphysics, and how this inconsistency required an ideological commitment of science 
to political power. In this light the development of an ontological determinism, incompatible 
with Hobbes’s epistemology, was rather the consequent result of an ideological enterprise 
he shared with Descartes: the effort to exclude with a single move both the experimental 
unpredictability and the epistemological relativity the Galilean approach had introduced in 
the new mechanical science. In fact, in Hobbes’s quarrel with Descartes the metaphysical 
or theological fight between idealism and materialism proved to be less important than 
Hobbes’s primary concern with the relations between science and politics. Descartes had 
provided a theological metaphysics ratifying the eternity of scientific knowledge and 
freeing soul and reason from the constraint of the mechanical world. From his materialistic 
point of view Hobbes could clearly see the inconsistency of Descartes’s metaphysical 
solution, in which man’s res cogitans still remained out of the control of political power. In 
this sense Hobbes’s stance appears to have been even more radical than Descartes’s. 
Not only did he maintain his materialism despite all the epistemological difficulties it 
entailed, but he maintained it against all the experimental evidence provided by the most 
advanced physiological research of his time, according to which the existence of a soul 
could hardly be excluded.90 Thus he helped make materialism more and more radically 
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88 Hobbes quotes here Aesop ‘against’ Augustus, under which ‘Rome utterly lost her liberty’ (HS 237). As 
Martinich emphasizes, this passage highlights the difference between Hobbes’s Leviathan and his Tacitus, 
where Hobbes ‘praises liberty’ (Martinich 1999: 49). In fact, I would be quite careful in extending the 
differences between Tacitus and Leviathan to the whole of the Horae Subsecivae. Although it is clear that 
‘some of the essays contain opinions diametrically opposed to those later expressed by Hobbes on the same 
subjects’ (Skinner 1996: 237, italics added), yet this does not appear to be the case with many of them, such 
as the very Hobbesian incipit of A Discourse of Laws quoted above, Chapter 3.3. 
89 ‘Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant’. 
Tacitus is reporting a speech he attributes to Calgacus, a Briton leader. 
90 See above, Chapter 3.2. 
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mechanistic and deterministic, according to one of the two sides of the twofold 
methodology of mechanical science, the one hypostatised by Descartes as res extensa. 
In conclusion, despite following completely different metaphysical paths, Cartesian and 
Hobbesian metaphysics came to the same end: the foundation of a techno-scientific 
theory of securisation of bodily motion – individual and collective – deterministically 
conceived. During the 1640s Hobbes progressively incorporated the epistemology of his 
declared enemy, finally reducing – if not in principle, at least de facto – matter in motion to 
a mechanical expression of the pure geometrical, ‘divine’ laws of nature. But following his 
monistic premises Hobbes had to commit the inscription of the laws of (human) nature to 
the only power capable of actually making them effective: political power. Thus the 
integration of the mechanistic project in materialism entailed an entire political pedagogy 
that Hobbes injected into civil science. As he clearly explains in De corpore, if the 
‘universal principles’ of motion are principles and not postulates, although by definition 
they cannot be demonstrated, yet they can be taught, since ‘teaching is nothing but 
leading the mind of him we teach, to the knowledge of our inventions, in that track by 
which we attained the same with our mind’ (DeCo VI.12; EW I, 80; OL I, 71). This was 
Hobbes’s final version of the maieutic method. 
What Hobbes had to erase from his materialism was the very epistemological question 
that dualistic mechanicism had raised and progressively cancelled: Is the geometrical 
image of nature fit to describe natural motion? In principle, the identification of natural and 
artificial motions could have resulted in conceiving the experienced complexity and partial 
indeterminacy of physical motion as a model for the understanding of mechanical motion 
(and of geometry itself). On the contrary, the identification went the other way round, and 
the geometrical account of artificial motion was extended to natural motion itself. This 
correspondence between geometrical motions and natural motions was granted by God’s 
geometrical legislation, and all that did not fit that picture was to be considered either the 
effect of imperfect knowledge or the effect of non-mechanical causes. To this purpose, 
Cartesian dualism fixed the problematisation of this imagined regularity by suturing within 
res cogitans any possible doubt concerning the completeness of the geometrical accounts 
of nature. That nature would not ultimately be grounded in some eternally fixed 
regularities was consistently denied by the whole Aristotelian tradition, by Christian faith, 
and by the new dualistic mechanical philosophy. Although the image of the cosmos could 
change, in fact the postulate of a basic subordination of nature to some superior 
legislation was far from being abandoned. But early-modern deterministic materialism 
went even further in this ideological enterprise: through Hobbes’s effort it colonised the 
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very field of resistance to this idealistic representation of reality, namely materialist 
philosophy. 
This operation required a strong reduction of complexity. A reduction of knowledge to 
geometry, of matter in motion to its primary qualities, of actual techniques to an abstract 
conception of technology, of scientific research to Science, and a coherent reduction of 
the social machine to the abstract machine of the state through which Hobbes 
ideologically joined political theology with technocracy. The consequence was both a new 
sacralisation of collectivity as the state and a depoliticization of society the automatic 
functioning of which was the ideal to be implemented through technology. In this 
perspective, addressing Hobbes’s peculiar materialism has meant challenging the very 
philosophical system in which mechanicism explicitly and radically confronted the 
epistemological limitations and the ideological opportunities of expanding the automatic 
machine theorised by early-modern mechanicism in the field of political theory. Thus my 
research has aimed at demonstrating that the development of Hobbes’s civil science not 
only was the outcome of a political agenda (whether representing individual or class 
interests), but also carried on the epistemological agenda of early-modern mechanical 
philosophy along with its ideological implications. My hypothesis is that this agenda 
cannot be abandoned without the elaboration of a new epistemological agenda that takes 
into account the development of the twentieth century’s natural sciences. It is my 
conviction that this very framework allows for both the demystification of the early-modern 
conception of the automatic and deterministic machine, and a new materialistic 
understanding of the relations between science and political power. And it is with some of 





Human species seizes that much reality in order to 
become master of it, to take it into service. The 
mechanistic concept of motion is itself a translation of the 




Although the machina mundi had remained until the seventeenth century rather a 
metaphor than a scientific model (Roux 2009: 166, 171), by the end of the following 
century the mechanistic picture of nature had acquired an ontological primacy which, in 
natural philosophy, completely overcame the limits of the metaphor. On the contrary, 
political thought resisted the integral mechanisation of man and of his political milieu. 
Since the late Renaissance, mechanical metaphors had begun to appear alongside the 
ancient organic metaphor of the body politic, the origin of which was both biological and 
mystical.1 Clocks, levers, and balances had became the accepted tools for both rhetorical 
and scientific representations of the body politic (Mayr 1986: 102).2 And yet, with few 
exceptions – such as Hobbes and some of the ‘court philosophers’ of Frederick the Great 
– the question of the ‘political machine’ displayed in political thought a metaphorical and 
mythical rather than a scientific function, while the organic model maintained an 
undisputed scientific primacy. 
Indeed, when Romanticism adopted organicism as a sort of anti-mechanistic antidote, the 
simplistic image of the automatic clock had long since been dismissed in political thought, 
and in the end it was the idea of the organism as a ‘developing totality’ that became 
widespread throughout the nineteenth century as a kind of a priori in the field of the social 
sciences, both as a scientific model and as a metaphor (Schlanger 1995: 48, 173). As a 
scientific model, it proved to be much more suitable to the description of the ‘physiological’ 
processes of economic distribution of the money-blood and thus the development of a 
theory of the social-medical intervention of the state, precisely at the time when economy 
was pushing towards a ‘mechanisation’ of social life (Harvey 2007: 60 ff.). As a metaphor, 
it served perfectly the celebration of the totalising form of life of the organic nation-state. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 On the organism as a metaphor also in political theory, see Schlanger 1995. On the theological nature of the 
political body of the king, see the classical Kantorowicz 1957; on the theological-political nature of the body 
politic and its functioning, see Agamben 2011. 
2 Schlanger stresses the importance of the ‘theology of the clock’ (Schlanger 1995: 52). In effect clocks hide – 
and glorify – the mechanism under the uniform time pictured by the resulting movement of clock hands, while 
balances show the interplay of weights and counterweights. And nevertheless clock and balances share the 
same deterministic perspective on the functioning of the machine. 
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Nevertheless, the automatic machine theorised by early-modern natural philosophy 
indirectly colonised all the fields of the philosophical imagery, if not as an accepted model 
then as a threatening one. Spreading from the nature-machine to the animal-machine and 
to the state-machine, the metaphor of the machine was intended to be a warning against 
any ethical and political reduction of the human being to the supposed automatic, 
‘inhuman’ functioning of nature. At the same time, it was also leading political thought to a 
new understanding of the body politic in view of its technological administration. For these 
reasons the metaphor of the machine is far from being a mere rhetorical device. It has to 
be taken seriously as a model that played a major role in shaping modern political theory.  
We witness today the long term effects of the early-modern adoption of mechanical 
metaphors and models in the natural sciences and in political theory. Despite the attacks 
by the natural sciences, the mechanistic imagery forged in early-modern philosophy still 
inhabits the conceptual framework we adopt in order to understand reality, along with the 
ideological alternatives it entails. The very ontological opposition between the natural and 
the artificial always played a peculiar role in political theory, providing it with a false 
alternative entailing some form of metaphysical commitment, and compelling people to 
take some kind of stand for or against the mechanisation of human beings and society. 
The choice between either a closed community characterised by a strong natural identity, 
or a depersonalised artificial individualistic society, has for a long time dictated the agenda 
of political theory. In going back to the early-modern origin of this apparent opposition we 
can detect the implications and the political power of mechanicism as ideology and the 
way it has also affected the materialist tradition. 
My research was precisely concerned with the possible discovery, beyond Hobbes’s 
professed materialism, of a theoretical structure which would prove an implicit adhesion to 
a dualistic metaphysics, namely an anthropocentric stance that de facto preserves for 
human beings a privileged place out of or, in the case of Hobbes, in nature. This was a 
completely ideological move within the materialistic tradition. To this move Hobbes 
contributed by politically encompassing the intrinsic epistemological limitations of a 
materialistic philosophy. In fact, as I have explained in Chapter 1.4 dealing with Hobbes’s 
‘political epistemology’, in a consistently materialistic perspective it is always impossible to 
found the ontological gap between reason and the rest of the universe that grounded 
early-modern mechanicism. Although defining the domain of human nature is not 
incompatible with materialism, yet it is incompatible to take it as the ultimate foundation of 
science and, furthermore, of political practice. Nevertheless, Hobbes’s ideological solution 
in civil science was to build a totalising deductive methodology postulating a privileged 
scientific insight in human nature. This attempt of neutralising science, civil science 
 197 
included, only could find in ontological determinism its ground, since it was precisely 
ontological determinism that allowed the faith in the efficacy of political planning according 
to the established science of human nature. And on this path, although it contributed to 
the destruction of the ancient faith in a natural teleology, mechanicism made a new kind of 
teleology emerge in both the fields of natural and political philosophy. 
The implicit teleology characterising a deterministic mechanicism can be detected only 
through an analysis of its theoretical structure. As I have argued, determinism is grounded 
on the characterisation of science as the objective description of natural causes that, 
given their nature, are so complex that a complete account of them goes beyond the 
power of human reason. But it also adds that the whole set of causes has to be complete 
so that a sufficiently detailed knowledge of them would in principle allow not only a 
complete account of the current state of things, but also a perfect forecasting of the future 
state of things depending on the present ‘causes’. This assumption, that I have named 
‘ontological determinism’, is usually taken as the indisputable ontological ground of 
scientific research itself, which in fact is based on the methodological assumption of 
determinism as a tool for detecting causal chains and making previsions, which I have 
named ‘epistemological determinism’ (see above, Chapter 2.3). Through the ontological 
assumption of determinism, science silently shifts from classically being the ‘knowledge of 
causes’ that allows an objective and incomplete description of reality as it is, to being the 
‘knowledge of effects’ that allows planning and the technological implementation of reality 
as it will be and therefore ought to be.3 
In short, although finality appeared to disappear from the horizon of the new science of 
motion, where a causal explanation concerned only efficient causes, it was surreptitiously 
reintroduced both in the natural and in the political domain through ontological 
determinism and in the form of natural necessity. The geometrical laws of nature set at the 
moment of creation were intended to prescribe the automatic functioning of God’s 
clockwork with no exception, just as in the political domain the laws of human nature 
provided the founding normativity that justified any technological intervention over the 
abnormal functioning of human matter in order to contribute to the ‘normal’ development 
of the whole process. The respect of the first principles of human mechanical motion was 
thus turned into its final cause. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Kelsen framed the problem as follows: ‘The norm determines what is to happen in the future. Natural law, on 
the contrary, explains reality by seeking in the past the cause of the present event’. Yet in science ‘the law of 
causality’, that is a probabilistic statement about reality, has been taken as a ‘a norm’, that is a theological and 
juridical claim to inviolability. Hence modern technology is to be intended as a secularised form of prophecy: 
‘The application of the laws of causality to future events, an application which originated from practical 
necessity, is a secondary function resulting from the fact that cognition, though independent of volition and 
action, is placed at their service. Prophecy is no longer pure cognition but knowledge applied to technique’ 
(Kelsen 1941: 554-55). 
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On the background of the theoretical structure of deterministic mechanicism, in this thesis 
I have interpreted dualistic metaphysics, born out of the reflection on the principles of 
modern science by some of those who invented and practised it, as the attempt to 
stabilise the shift between knowledge and reality characterising the productive method of 
science by making of the mathematisable reality of primary qualities a reality in itself. Thus 
the models, principles, and laws adopted by early-modern mechanicism do not describe 
reality as it is: they describe it as an automatic machine whose motion can in principle be 
perfectly understood and, if well planned at the outset, be maintained through minor 
interventions of regulation and with no substantial changes. In fact the emergence of 
nature as a deterministically conceived object within the modern dualistic framework went 
far beyond the exigency of scientific research, and rather appears to have been pictured 
as the counterpart of the hypostatisation of a sovereign ‘subject of science’: the automatic 
machine. To this imagination of nature, in the emblematic enterprise of Descartes a 
deterministic res extensa provided adequate ontological repair while, on the other hand, to 
its scientific knowledge res cogitans offered – in all its metamorphoses – a metaphysical 
hook which preserved the subject of science from the collective vicissitudes of human and 
natural history, in which it is nevertheless embodied. 
In this sense ontological determinism displays a problem which is both epistemological 
and political. On the one hand, the mechanistic model of the automaton misses the actual 
motion of human nature, of organisms, and in fact of matter, which is understood as the 
passive subject of a superior legislation. 4  On the other hand, automatism is also 
ideological: it presents itself as a neutral, descriptive form of knowledge, and in fact it is 
prescriptive, because it presents the normal functioning of the automaton as the most 
performing and simple, and in the last instance as ‘natural’. Thus both at the 
epistemological and political level, automatism downplays experimentation and privileges 
deduction and discipline on the basis of the ideological justification it draws from picturing 
the objective, non-teleological, in a word neutral, ‘power of science’: in Greek, 
‘technocracy’. Thus not only did mechanicism mark the birth of the ideology of science as 
a neutral form of knowledge: as the case of Hobbes exemplarily demonstrates (see 
above, Chapter 3.3), the mechanistic ideology of neutrality entails the identification of 
model and reality and its implementation in politics through pedagogical technologies. In 
this sense Hobbes’s extension of mechanical determinism to the field of political theory 
can be said to have also marked the birth of the ideology of technocracy as a neutral form 
of government. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For a critique of the mechanistic imagination of organisms from Positivism to cybernetics, and its extension 
to social systems, see Canguilhem (1955, 1966). 
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From this perspective I have analysed the theoretical structure of Hobbes’s inaugural 
move as the transposition of mechanicism as ideology into the field of political thought. 
Hobbes’s move was the common source of two apparently opposed ideologies 
concerning the body politic: the theological faith in its ontological unity, and the technical 
organisation of its planned automatism. In this light, Leviathan appears to have been the 
ideological synthesis of two scientific models, the state-machine and the state-organism. 
The Leviathan-automaton – this artificial body endowed with the same automatic unity of 
functioning supposedly existing in natural bodies – has been regarded in this thesis as the 
result of a tormented epistemological development, at the end of which Hobbes finally 
made the two metaphors (the classical biological and the mechanical one) ideologically 
coincide. In this sense I have pointed out in Chapter 2.5 that the contradiction between 
Hobbes’s programmatic assumption of a mechanical model, and his constant use of 
biological metaphors in Leviathan, reflects the paradoxical nature of his solution. As I 
have tried to demonstrate, the compatibility of the two models was purely ideological 
precisely because it was aporetical at the theoretical level and effective at the practical 
level: the two opposite ideologies of ‘organic teleology’ and ‘mechanical determinism’ 
converged into an original synthesis of technocratic liberalism and voluntaristic 
conservatism. 
This synthesis still appears to be guiding most political practices by converging, on the 
one hand, the often unconfessed belief in a natural finality of the political body to be 
respected, and, on the other, the commitment to a technical finality imposed by the 
indeferrable exigencies of political administration. Although the technocratic model of the 
state-machine has been, and still can be, considered a successful alternative to the re-
emergent imagination of the state as an organic body, the two apparently opposed 
models – the mechanical and the organic – have also proved to be compatible with the 
myth of the nation-state and complementary to the development of capitalism. Indeed, the 
two apparent alternatives concur to effect the same neutralisation of political invention. In 
the era of the end of ideologies, tempered by artificially planned procedures, the 
mechanisms of democracy would maintain the body politic open, preventing the social 
system from naturally collapsing in a closing tendency inscribed in the very nature of 
human social groups.5 Indeed, what has always been a false alternative at the theoretical 
level, has eventually proved to be a quite performative oscillation at the political level, 
where technocratic practices function and can be tolerated precisely thanks to the 
teleological horizon they implicitly assume, by combining a rhetoric of ‘natural’ collective 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See for instance how Fukuyama grounds his ‘natural history’ of social order on the assumption of the 
adaptive function of institutions coupled with their overall rigidity and inner tendency to ‘political decay’ 
(Fukuyama 2011: 26-48, 437-57; Fukuyama 2014: 524-48). 
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identity with the technological organisation of social relationship. In fact the interplay 
between the two models excludes the actual emergence of finality from within the social 
system. In short, it cancels the field of political invention, namely the process of 
experimentation in which finality would actually emerge within the body politic as the result 
of political struggles. These struggles are precisely what Hobbes’s work sought to remove 
from the political sphere, situating them in an a-political outside of the ideological 
alternative framed by modern political theory: 
The actions of men, which singly are inconsiderable, after many conjunctures, grow 
at last either into one great protecting power, or into two destroying factions. (PrG 
50, 200-203) 
According to my hypothesis the theoretical grounds for this ideological-political synthesis 
were provided by seventeenth-century epistemology. The organism/machine corresponds 
perfectly to Descartes’s metaphysical opposition between an ontological liberty that 
entirely frees res cogitans from its ties to reality and an ontological determinism that 
allows us to plan the effects of any intervention on the res extensa. On the one hand 
organicism institutes the unconditioned domain of a natural political will and of its goals. 
On the other hand mechanicism, pictured as automatism, allows for a technocracy that 
entirely reduces political intervention to the initially established exigencies of its 
functioning. This synthesis is granted by an ideology that, although apparently depriving 
teleology of any possible significance, in fact restrains any political project to the 
calculable conditions of possibility that underlie it and therefore to the a-problematic 
assumption of predetermined goals. In short, this kind of normativity is inherently 
conservative and, furthermore, concerned as it is with keeping at distance the spectre of 
revolution, results in an exponential growth of the exigency for security entirely determined 
by the organisation of the system initially adopted. Through the inscription of civil science 
into the Cartesian deductive epistemology of mechanics, Thomas Hobbes not only 
conferred on political theory its objective, neutral, scientific method, but also provided its 
basic ideological configuration. It is in order to suggest a move beyond this synthesis 
provided by modern political thought that I have undertaken my research on the 
epistemological foundations of Hobbes’s materialistic political theory. 
The model of the automatic machine offered by early-modern mechanicism and the 
reference to an absolute subject implicit in its dualistic epistemology still inhabits our 
understanding of nature and entails considerable ethical and political effects. First of all it 
pushes an ethical choice: either we integrally embrace mechanicism and conceive the 
universe as deprived of any sense, or we refuse it and consider the human being a 
different kind of being, capable of knowledge of truth and freedom of choice. The 
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undisputed ground of this alternative is the ontological opposition between liberty and 
necessity, the key institution of a supposed ‘ontological difference’ between the human 
being and nature (or better – to use a Spinozian rather than an Heideggerian expression – 
the presupposition of an ‘imperium in imperio’). In this sense the criticism of ontological 
determinism and its implicit automatism allows for a ‘genealogical’ explanation of the 
meaning attributed to the apparent ‘distance’ between human being and nature, and of 
the early-modern epistemological divide between knowledge and reality. All this history is 
in fact dominated by a postulate of dichotomy between the (in principle) perfect order of 
knowledge and the chaos of opinions also in the political field. The unaccountability of 
something makes of it a monstrous menace to the power of knowledge. ‘Matter’ was for a 
long time the name of this unaccountability, which mechanicism contributed to exorcise, 
by forcing the perfect regularity of the laws of nature both in the natural bodies of physics 
and in the artificial bodies of politics. 
Yet at the beginning of the last century in the eyes of many scientists and philosophers 
quantum physics seemed to present unprecedented evidence: matter was hardly 
reducible to imagination, not even to a possible mathematical kind, and certainly not the 
one which classical mechanics had dreamt up. It is in the light of that thaumaston that it 
might be possible to overcome the very horizon that grounded both the determinism and 
the substantialism of modern philosophical mechanicism: metaphysical dualism. 6  My 
research is intended to contribute to the dismantling of both the modern image of nature 
as a deterministic machine and its complementary onto-theological postulate: the 
transcendence of reason. It is from this very perspective that determinism shows its 
original connection with substantialism. The two concepts originally derived from the same 
ideological matrix, which postulated an ontological gap between the order of reality and 
the order of knowledge, and therefore a kind of isolation: man’s thought as an exception 
within the realm of nature. This operation had been condemned by Spinoza, who intended 
to use determinism as a conceptual lever in order to dismantle Aristotelian and Scholastic 
teleology. Nevertheless, as it emerged from Cartesian mechanicism, determinism 
assumed the paradigmatic function of isolating the human species from its milieu, by 
reclaiming the straight metaphysical substantialisation of free will. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 According to Prigogine and Stengers it was not quantum mechanics, but rather thermodynamics, that 
marked the beginning of a possible ‘new alliance’ between human beings and nature, long after the early-
modern breakthrough. The study of dissipative structures and of processes far from equilibrium might possibly 
end the faith in the modern myth of a science ‘capable of discovering global truths about nature’ that 
culminated in a metaphysical dualism that overlooked precisely the technical characterisation of the physical-
mathematical notions it was relying on (Prigogine-Stengers 1984: 44, 51, 75-77). Rightly or wrongly inspired 
by the paradigmatic power of quantum physics, Simondon considered instead the conception of singularity he 
derived from quantum mechanics incompatible with the Cartesian conception of res extensa: ‘A particle which 
can be represented as the singularity of a field cannot be conceived within Cartesian geometry, because one 
cannot introduce singularities in the space of Res extensa, extended substance, without modifying Cartesian 
geometry and mechanics’ (Simondon 2005: 144). 
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But in Hobbes’s world, exclusively made of matter in motion, not even free will could 
differentiate humans and animals in the cosmos of mechanics, where ‘beasts also 
deliberate […] And beasts that have deliberation must necessarily also have will’ (Lev VI; 
EW III, 48). Yet Hobbes was so well aware of the epistemological inconsistency and 
political risk entailed by the very presence of a metaphysical will that he made of the 
techno-political exigency of forecasting one of the main features characterising human 
nature. Given the universality of determinism, in Leviathan the human/animal divide is 
marked by a specific human passion, a ‘curiosity’ that derives from the human imaginative 
and rational capacity of projecting and programming the future: 
The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect imagined we 
seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to man and beast. 
The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, 
that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when 
we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is 
a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other 
passion but sensual. (Lev III; EW III, 13-14) 
In this framework determinism fulfils first of all a ‘techno-biological’ task, which one could 
define as strategic due to its perceptive efficacy in foreseeing and thus orienting action. 
Organisms, in general, through the deterministic perceptual filter, reduce complexity and 
shape their own milieu in view of possible actions. Piaget individuated the evolution of this 
pattern in the changing relation between the child and its milieu, which entails the 
progressive elimination of chance from ‘nature’ (Piaget 1927: 310).7 As the quantum 
physicist De Broglie stated, by referring to Bergson, at the ‘macroscopic’ level of 
perception ‘reigns the apparent determinism that makes […] action on things possible’ (De 
Broglie 1947: 210-11).8 The possibility of questioning determinism can emerge only when 
scientific knowledge is conceived, as happens in quantum physics, as the result of the 
experimental interaction between subject and object. This conception of science as 
‘techno-science’, that is as a technical intervention that produces the object of description 
itself, demonstrates any ‘neutral’ description of the existing state of things impossible, thus 
allowing doubt to be cast also on accounts of any alleged deterministic ‘laws’.9 On the 
contrary, early-modern mechanics was inescapably bound up with what I have called 
‘ontological’ determinism; that is, with an integrally deterministic understanding of natural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For Piaget, ‘the evolution of the notion of cause presents for children a characterisation very close to the one 
we examined in the notion of real’ (Piaget 1927: 291). See also Piaget 1926. 
8 The note to which De Broglie refers can be found in Bergson 1934: 61. 
9 On the basis of this conception of techno-science Bachelard could schedule an entire epistemological 
agenda: ‘It is necessary to dissolve the huge block of metaphysical determinism that burdens scientific 
thought’ (Bachelard 1934: 112). 
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mechanisms which did not understand that the immediate identification of nature with the 
‘imagined’ machines of Euclidean geometry was not a scientific result but an ideological 
outcome. 
But these biological and psychological explanations do not dismiss the problem, because 
they all presuppose the invariance of ‘perception’, as if it were not strongly influenced by 
culture, and, in the case of Western culture, even shaped by the historical emergence of 
deterministic mechanicism itself. Precisely for that reason, this cannot be considered a 
merely psychological issue. Beyond the basic explanations of determinism depending on 
an organic, or more specifically anthropomorphic, process of reduction of complexity, an 
ideological explanation is needed which again returns to the particular structure and 
history of early-modern science, where deterministic causality progressively became the 
very postulate for a kind of knowledge which has gained undisputed worldwide supremacy 
and shapes the ‘spontaneous philosophy’ of scientism. This topic raises a wide range of 
issues which cannot be challenged without referring to the epistemological structure and 
to the historical conditions of the emergence of early-modern science. From this 
perspective, the emergence of determinism calls not only for biological but also for 
epistemological and historico-sociological explanation, which, as I have explained in 
Chapter 3.4, should also refer to the acceleration of the process of mechanisation and 
mathematisation of the world picture which took place along with the emergence of 
capitalism. 
As a matter of fact, the epistemological models built by science in order to explain, control, 
and foresee physical processes are both rooted in our biological constitution and strongly 
affected by the way modern science has been absorbed in culture thanks to technological 
achievements, and therefore the myth of automatism is as hard to question as the one of 
progress. Yet in the natural sciences the encounters with matter actually contributed to 
shape the first principles of natural sciences. The Cartesian deductive model initially gave 
way to the Royal Society’s experimentalist strategy, and then to Newton’s scientist 
prefiguration of the moral imperative: ‘hypotheses non fingo’. But the two trends later 
resolved into a productive conflict between experimentalism and the deductive approach 
that proved its force in pushing the development of the sciences of matter. On the 
contrary, modern political theory encountered at its very beginning an important impasse 
when dealing with modern science, because its twofold method could not adequately fulfil 
the striving for security it was intended to satisfy. Therefore its experimental side tended to 
be ignored in political theory, where the deductive path made of the experimental 
questioning of the first principles a purely discursive and fictional matter. As a result, the 
same dualism that in natural sciences has proved productive, in the field of political 
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thought has become an irreconcilable dualism between philosophical theory and political 
practice: the first reduced to ineffectual speculation, the second following collective 
imagery (that is ideology) rather than actual science. And if a practice out of the horizon of 
science is usually a conservative one, which reproduces prejudices rather than producing 
experimentation, a practice inside the horizon of a fictive science (purely deductive and 
technocratic) is necessarily a false practice, and just a means for maintaining the existing 
state of things. 
Indeed, it was and is hard to maintain determinism in its technical, inventive, and 
epistemological dimension, irrespective of the metaphysical assumption of ontological 
determinism and the implicit anthropomorphic teleology it entails. Through Hobbes’s 
philosophical case study, my analysis pointed to another possible mechanicism, neither 
anthropomorphic nor deterministic. Hence I aimed to show that a genuine materialistic 
conception of being and knowledge – and therefore of politics – requires an epistemology 
compatible with a mechanical conception of physics, but not essentially deterministic. A 
deterministic conception of motion must be understood as ideological and 
anthropomorphic, since it is not at all consistent with the epistemological premises of 
materialistic mechanicism, and it projects on nature the too-human construction of 
Euclidean geometry. It is only with the understanding of the complex nature and partial 
indeterminacy of any motion that determinism (and mathematics itself) is confined in the 
realm of the conceptual tools, where it serves the purposes of scientific knowledge and 
political practice. Thus science – and therefore political theory – can be built on the 
methodological assumption of determinism without pretending it to be the ontological 
postulate that grounds a secure, ordered image of reality governed by divine laws, 
consequentially rising the complementary spectres of the perfect artificial political 
automaton and of the pure natural body politic, and their ideological, technocratic 
synthesis. 
If we assume that political theory still follows the agenda set by early-modern 
mechanicism, privileging the deductive conception of science and social reproduction 
against social experimentation, we cannot overlook the historical process through which 
sovereignty, science, and technocracy converged in framing a theory that postulates the 
automatisation of the artificial body politic as the only possible solution to the political 
problem. On the contrary, questioning the simplistic image of nature provided by early-
modern mechanicism means assuming the political relevance of the actual inscription of 
human nature in it. On this ground, sciences such as genetics, cognitive sciences, 
sociology, and natural history itself have direct political relevance as far as they challenge 
precisely the concept through which modern political theory aimed at defining and 
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governing social processes: ‘human nature’. After Darwin we know that human nature is 
not fixed, and, from natural history, that the human/animal divide is just the provisional 
result of a serious competition between species. In this ecological perspective political 
problems cannot concern only humanity, because the order of magnitude of politics is 
crossed by many different processes that take place between the long-term history of our 
ecosystem and the hic et nunc of political decisions. At this order of magnitude politics 
appears to be a quite short-term process in which human nature is no more entitled to 
occupy an exclusive and privileged place. An ideological battlefield is opened in which a 
materialist political philosophy can challenge the early-modern model of nature which still 
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